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PREFACE
It is a great pleasure to introduce the second volume of the RECiFER Eurofutures Publication
Series. Like the first volume the second volume is dedicated to the European Parliament as a
challenging inquiry into the Future of Europe.
The rich and differented content of the volume — “Europe — the strategic choices” — was
created by innovative and competent effort of forty Authors representing eminent international
organizations and academic institutions.
Let me express deep words of gratitude for this effort and for the valuable contributions to
the volume.
Krzysztof Paw³owski
Rector WSB-NLU
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INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITORS
The Twin Volumes — primo — “Europe — the global challenges” and secundo — “Europe
— the strategic choices” should be seen as an holistic inquiry into the Future of Europe.
The Second Volume is supplementing the classical set of well organized papers by a new
dimension of short interventions which try to change the volume into a discussion forum
incorporating not only intellectual but also emotional involvement into the inquiry of the Future
of Europe.
This is one of the ways to promote the pluralistic philosophy of REUPUS.
Antoni Kukliñski Krzysztof Paw³owski
Nowy S¹cz, March 10, 2005
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Part One
Science—Technology—Economy
—TheStrategicChoices
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HENRI DELANGHE
UGUR MULDUR
FROM A VICIOUS TO A VIRTUOUS CYCLE—
EUROPE, GROWTH AND THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECONOMY*
A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of obsoleteness in the next long wave in the
development of the world economy because of Europe’s inability to break out of a vicious cycle.
While historically European economic growth rates have compared rather well to those of other
economies and the world average, recently Europe has begun to perform worse than other
economies in an almost structural manner. In the past three decades, other major economies
certainly have had their lows—Japan for most of the 1990s, the US after the bursting of the new
economy bubble, but also their highs, and more so. Europe’s performance, on the other hand, has
been flat. After 1973, European economic growth has never equalled nor exceeded 3 percent for
three years in a row. 1
An important reason is the low growth rate of productivity, resulting from serious weaknesses
in the European innovation system. As research and development constitute the main engines of
economic growth, these need to be addressed urgently. Otherwise this threatens to set in motion
a vicious cycle as slow growth leads to less investment in research and development, leading to
slower growth, etc.
The negative consequences of slow European economic growth are manifold. They can be
analysed in terms of the short, medium and longer term. The most immediate negative impact is
on the standard of living. Average European standards of living are no longer catching up with
and even decreasing compared to American ones (Figure 1). In contrast to the rapid European
catch-up of the 1950s and 1960s, no progress has been made since 1970. In that year, euro-zone
GDP per capita amounted to 70.1 percent of US GDP per capita, while by 2000 this figure had
dropped to 68.5 percent. 2 Methodological quarrels focusing on the calculation of GDP, or the
relation between GDP per capita and ‘real’ living standards, can only soften such conclusions to
a small extent. 3 Also within Europe the dramatic effects of sustained periods of growth or lack
of growth on standards of living have been witnessed clearly. In the early 1980s, Great Britain
* The views expressed are purely those of the writers and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating
an official position of the European Commission.
1 Maddison, 2001, p. 332.
2 International Monetary Fund, 2004 (1), p. 14.
3 For some recent material see: Opinion. Economics focus. Computing the gains. The economic benefits of the IT
revolution are now visible in Europe and Japan, In: The Economist, Oct 23rd 2003; Opinion. American productivity. The
new “new economy”. How real and how durable are America’s extraordinary gains in productivity, In: The Economist,
Sep 11th 2003; Finance & Economics. Measuring America’s economy. Grossly Distorted Product. Are official statistics
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was among the poorest countries in the then EEC while now it is the richest big country. On the
other hand, German living standards have dropped below the European average in a dramatic
reversal of fortunes. 4
In the medium term, slow growth means that it will be more difficult for Europe to deal in
a sustainable manner with at least three challenges it is currently confronting at the same time:
ageing, enlargement, and environmental sustainability. European fertility levels are low and life
expectancies high. Given current employment patterns and social security systems, this results
in high dependency ratios and social security (pension, health) outlays. In addition to changes in
employment patterns, social security reform, or a mix of these, absorbing those costs will require
achieving higher economic growth through higher productivity. A second challenge relates to
European cohesion more generally and European enlargement more specifically. As has been seen
in the case of German reunification, bringing Eastern European countries up to level in terms of
infrastructure and capabilities will require huge resource transfers. High economic growth will be
necessary to generate the resources needed to continue making those transfers. A third important
challenge is that of achieving environmental sustainability. Even though it has become clear that
economic growth and environmental sustainability do not contradict each other per definition, it is
nevertheless the case that sometimes painful trade-offs have to be made. These can be softened
when higher productivity and economic growth are achieved.
Perhaps the most dramatic consequence is situated in the longer term. If Europe does not
make the necessary investments that generate higher productivity and economic growth then it
will quite simply be relegated to a secondary place in what appears to be a new stage in the
development of the world economy. More and more evidence is emerging that the world economy
is about to enter into a new long cycle, a new so-called Kondratieff wave, the 5th since the
beginning of the industrial revolution, based upon new technologies, new ways of organising work,
and new international divisions of labour. Europe has to ask itself whether it wants to be part of
it.
This paper starts out by putting the European growth problem in historical perspective
and identifying the main reasons behind the recent slowdown in European growth. In a next
section it explains Europe’s faltering productivity growth through weaknesses in Europe’s science,
technology and innovation system. The final section of this paper focuses on solutions. It will be
exaggerating America’s growth?, In: The Economist, Apr 7th 2004; Gordon, 2002 (A review of this paper can be found
in Opinion. Economics focus. Chasing the leader. Are Europeans really so much worse off than Americans, In: The
Economist, Feb 6th 2003).
4 World. Europe. EU Rebate. Too rich for a rebate. The European Commission thinks Britain should pay more,
In: The Economist, Jul 8th 2004.
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argued that, at least in the short to medium term, no new policy agendas need to be developed.
The Lisbon agenda remains valid. Its implementation just needs to be taken more seriously
and accelerated. While the Commission is doing its bit, the Member States need to take their
responsibility. In the longer term, however, more fundamental questions regarding European
science, technology and innovation policy need to be addressed. If not, Europe will find itself
declining, perhaps not rapidly but no doubt persistently.
1. The European growth problem
Historically, European economic growth rates have compared rather well to those of other
economies and the world average. 5 For most of the period since the year 1000, the European
economy grew significantly faster than, or at least as fast as, the world economy (Figure 2). In
the period 1000–1500, Europe’s GDP grew at a rate twice the rate for world GDP. And in the
period 1500–1820, the average economic growth rate increased for both the European and the
world economies, but the former still grew faster. In the period 1820–70, the average European
economic growth rate made a further jump. But while European growth still exceeded world
growth by a large margin, the US grew 2.5 times faster than Europe. The average European
economic growth rate reached a higher level still in the period 1870–1913. But European growth
barely equalled world growth, and was exceeded to a significant extent by both US and Japanese
growth. This pattern fundamentally changed after the First World War. The interwar period was
not a very good period for Europe, growing as it did much slower than the US, Japan or the
world. The first half of the post-war period, however, made Europe forget about the interwar
period. It constituted a period of significant catch-up. European growth exceeded US growth and
almost equalled world growth, but was exceeded by Japanese growth.
In the second half of the post-war period, European growth slowed significantly—returning
to the average growth rate of the period 1870–1913—and was exceeded to a significant extent by
growth in the US, Japanese and world economies, where growth also slowed, however (Figure
2). Over the past 10 years, average economic growth rates have been lower for Europe than for
the US (Figure 3). Ever since its recent recovery, Japan too has started to outperform Europe
once more. And things do not look good for the future either. Even though the EU stated in the
Lisbon European Council conclusions that an average economic growth rate of around 3% should
5 Unless mentioned differently this section is based on Maddison, 2001.
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be a realistic prospect for the coming years, the IMF has recently revised downward by about .5
percentage point the euro-zone’s potential growth to about 2 percent. 6 Optimists point out that it
is mainly the bad German performance that drags down the European average or that because of
recent structural reform Europe is well positioned for the future. 7 But the situation is worrying
nevertheless.
A number of factors have been referred to, to explain Europe’s recent weak growth
performance. In addition to perceived inappropriately high interest rates, the perceived unsuitably
rigid stability and growth pact, and a low labour utilisation rate, reference is usually made to
faltering productivity growth. 8 It is often argued that Europe has been catching up with, and in
some cases is already outperforming, the US in terms of this measure. 9 But especially in the
most recent period labour productivity growth has slowed in Europe as compared to the US.
The catch-up in terms of GDP per hour worked has stopped since 1995 and the divergence is
increasing again (Figure 4).
6 International Monetary Fund, 2004 (1), p. 10.
7 Opinion. Germany’s economy. Odd European out. Germany is now a relatively poor member of the European
club, In: The Economist, Feb 19th 2004; Blanchard, 2004.
8 International Monetary Fund, 2004 (1), p. 14 and 17; International Labour Organisation, 2004; Gordon, 2002;
Blanchard, 2004.
9 Gordon, 2002; Blanchard, 2004.
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Recent explanations have linked Europe’s hesitating productivity growth to weaknesses in the
ICT producing manufacturing and ICT using services industries (as opposed to the ‘traditional’
industries, where Europe is stronger but vulnerable because competing with newly emerging
economies), drops in European non-ICT capital deepening, and insufficient growth in ICT capital
deepening and TFP.10
2. Weaknesses in the European science, technology and innovation
system
The slowdown in European productivity and TFP growth stems from important flaws in
European science, technology and innovation. Even though there are pockets of excellence, the
overall picture is one of insufficient, fragmented and sometimes misdirected investment, insufficient
human resources, a rather low return on investment, and an innovation system that is becoming
more integrated but at the same time has not sufficiently opened itself up to the outside world.
Europe does not invest enough in research. The EU-15 and EU-25 spend far less on R&D
as a percentage of GDP than either Japan or the US. 11 Since the second half of the 1990s,
Europe has been recording levels of approximately 2 percent, compared with around 3 percent
for the US and over 3 percent for Japan. That is particularly embarrassing as even China aims
to increase its R&D intensity to 2 percent by 2010 and Taiwan to 3 percent by 2006. At the
individual Member State level there are some star performers with high R&D intensities, but
even those are outperformed at the international level. For example, if one compared individual
EU Member States to the top 10 US states in terms of R&D intensity, then its best performer,
Sweden, would come only 6th, while its second best, Finland, would not even reach the top 10. 12
In absolute terms, the EU-15 and EU-25 spend somewhat more on R&D than Japan, but
far less than the US. 13 And the US-European R&D expenditure gap is increasing. Between 1991
and 2001, it nearly doubled in real terms to E141 billion. And it is set to grow further as total
US federal R&D investment, for instance, will increase to a record $132 billion by 2005, from $91
billion in 2001—equivalent to an overall increase of 44 percent or annual increases of 10 percent. 14
The isolation and fragmentation of national research efforts and systems compound the already
negative effects of Europe’s relatively low investment in research. The costs of research and
development have risen heavily in recent years. In pharmaceuticals, for instance, it is estimated
that it costs around US$800 million in R&D for each new approved drug that makes it to the
market. But the European research system is still highly compartmentalised, sources of funding
fragmented, and efforts duplicated. The average R&D spending of an EU-25 country is just E7.5
billion. 15 One of the smallest countries, Cyprus, spends just E27.5 million on R&D.16 The total
research expenditure of Europe’s biggest R&D performer, Germany, is still less than half that
of Japan. 17 And the Ford motor Company spends more on R&D than at least 15 out of 25 EU
Member States do individually. 18 Nevertheless, most Member states, whatever their size, have
their own separate research actions in, for instance, biotechnology, nanotechnology and ICT.
10 Van Ark, 2004; International Monetary Fund, 2004 (2), pp. 5–6.
11 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 22.
12 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 22; National Science Foundation, 2002.
13 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 19.
14 The White House—President George W. Bush, 2004.
15 Eurostat Newcronos Database.
16 Eurostat Newcronos Database.
17 Eurostat Newcronos Database.
18 Eurostat Newcronos Database; Department of Trade and Industry, 2003.
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The case of basic research clearly exhibits the aforementioned problems of low levels of
investment and fragmentation. High-quality basic research constitutes an absolutely critical input
into the innovation process. It is, as some like to call it, ‘the fuel for future technology
development’. 19 High-quality basic research, mediated by efficient and effective university-industry
linkages, ensures that companies have at their fingertips the input they need to be able to remain
at the frontier of new product and process development. The previous, ‘linear’ conceptual model
of innovation, with a one-way and straightforward relation from basic research to technology to
innovation, can no longer be accepted. Much more attention is paid these days to the interaction
effects between basic research and technology. Basic research remains, however, of fundamental
importance, especially as far as radical (as opposed to, for instance, engineering-based incremental)
innovation is concerned, and increasingly so. As someone recently noted, “it is hard to imagine
apoptosis, antisense, monoclonal antibodies, or other generic biotechnologies being developed
through experimentation rather than derived from previous advances in microbiology”. 20
As yet, Europe has failed to grasp the importance of basic research and the increased
scientification of technology. It is true that Europe leads the world in terms of the number of
scientific publications. In 2001, the EU-15 accounted for 37.2 percent of the world’s scientific
publications, as compared to 31.0 percent for the US and 10.1 percent for Japan.21 And if one
looks at the number of publications per inhabitant, Europe comes second. In 2002, the number of
scientific publications per million population amounted to 673 in the EU-15, as compared to 774
in the US and 550 in Japan. 22 The quality of European research is also good. This is reflected
in the fact that as far as highly cited papers as a percentage of the total number of scientific
publications are concerned, a substantial number of EU Member States score above the world
average. 23 And a large number of co-publications points to the fact that the European Research
Area is progressively becoming more of a reality. 24
But several problems negatively affect and hamper European basic research. These problems
need to be solved if Europe is to maintain its leadership in terms of the number of publications
and maintain good quality. A first problem is that European levels of investment in actual research,
equipment and positions for young researchers are low, specifically compared to the US. Federal
funding for basic research there is set to increase from $21.3 billion in 2001 to $26.8 billion
in FY2005, an increase with 26 percent overall or 6 percent per year. 25 The amount spent in
the US on academic R&D amounted to $32,723 million in 2001, with the leading 20 institutions
accounting for $10,176 million, and the most important institution (Johns Hopkins University) for
$999 million. 26 Federal funding for the National Science Foundation, an organisation which would
serve as a model for the proposed European Research Council, increased by 30 percent to $5.7
billion over the same period. 27 US federally funded nanotechnology and information technology
R&D, both of which have the potential to bring about ‘radical’ innovation, increased to $1 billion
and $2 billion respectively. 28 As mentioned earlier, European funding for basic research is also
dispersed, and Europe’s research systems fragmented. A majority of individual EU-15 Member
19 The White House—President George W. Bush, 2004.
20 Tassey, 2004, p. 173.
21 European Commission, 2003 (1), p. 279.
22 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 61.
23 European Commission, 2002, p. 48.
24 European Commission, 2003 (1), p. 302.
25 The White House—President George W. Bush, 2004.
26 National Science Foundation, 2003.
27 The White House—President George W. Bush, 2004.
28 The White House—President George W. Bush, 2004.
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States, as well as all new Member States combined, spend less on basic research than Johns
Hopkins University alone. 29
The European business sector is not sufficiently engaged in research. There is discussion on
the optimal role of the public and private sectors in the innovation system but it is generally
assumed that it is better that the private sector, closer in touch with consumers and demand,
take on a larger role. In Europe, the private sector accounts for a much smaller percentage of
R&D financing than in either Japan or the US, while the reverse is true for government R&D
financing. 30 The private sector also accounts for a much smaller percentage of R&D expenditure. 31
While small and medium-sized European companies may be spending less on R&D in relative
terms than their peers in Japan or the US, this does not appear to be the case for Europe’s
largest companies. 32 The latter do, however, appear to spend their R&D money disproportionately
outside the EU, resulting in net R&D outflows. In 2000, EU companies spent 30 percent more
on R&D in the US than US companies spent in Europe. And between the EU and Japan the
imbalance was even more dramatic. EU firms spent almost four times more on R&D in Japan
than Japanese companies spent in the EU.33
To a certain extent, European research is also misdirected. Overall, Europe carries out less
research in relative terms in high-tech than in low- or medium-tech industries. 34 Compared to the
US, Europe appears to make less effort in sectors such as pharma, biotech, IT hardware, and
software and computer services, while performing better in the electronic and electronical sectors,
and the automobiles and parts, chemicals, and telecommunication services sectors. 35
Weaknesses in the field of human resources compound the problems of low, fragmented and
misdirected investment. It is an often repeated fallacy that Europe spends more than the US
on education. In fact, both in terms of educational expenditure as a percentage of GDP and
educational expenditure in E per inhabitant, Europe performs worse than the US. 36 Especially in
the case of the very important tertiary education, the expenditure gaps are remarkable. 37 Even
so Europe succeeds in producing far more university graduates in absolute terms than either
Japan or the US, whether looked at from the perspective of all fields of study or only S&E
fields of study. 38 In relative terms, Europe also produces more new PhDs. 39 But even though
intra-European mobility has increased, Europe does not succeed in attracting the best foreign
students. 40
Few of the graduates Europe produces end up in the right place, however. Because of low
R&D investment, Europe has fewer researchers overall than the US, in absolute as well as
relative numbers, and proportionately far more in government and higher education than in
business enterprise. 41 Researchers also have few resources to work with. There is far less R&D
expenditure per researcher in Europe than in either the US or Japan. 42 This lack of positions
for researchers and the little funding they have available have a number of effects. Europeans
29 Eurostat Newcronos Database; National Science Foundation, 2003.
30 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 23.
31 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 28.
32 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 30–1.
33 European Commission, 2003 (2), pp. 31–2.
34 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 35.
35 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 34.
36 European Commission, 2003 (1), p. 212.
37 European Commission, 2003 (1), p. 217.
38 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 49.
39 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 50.
40 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 52.
41 European Commission, 2003 (2), pp. 43–4.
42 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 47.
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stay in the US after completion of their PhD or proactively leave Europe. 43 And Europe does not
succeed in attracting the best foreign employees, even as intra-European mobility has increased. 44
The aforementioned factors combine with weak framework conditions—such as the limited
and misdirected availability of venture capital in Europe as compared to the US, or the high cost
of patenting45—to create obstacles for the conversion of knowledge into innovation. Europe has
the largest share of EPO patents, but is situated in the middle as far as the intensity (per million
population) for this measure is concerned. 46 Europe also has the smallest share of and lowest
intensity for USPTO patents. 47 And it has the lowest intensity for triadic patents (per million
population). 48 Compared to the overall EPO and USPTO situation, Europe’s performance is worse
in ICT and biotech. 49
Some of the aforementioned weaknesses are condensed in the recent experiences of so-called
key technologies, technologies that have the potential to confer large social and economic benefits.
The ICT revolution has been completed, and Europe has largely missed it. The biotechnology
industry is undergoing large changes, and Europe is already lagging behind. The transition from
the academic to the commercial stage has already been made. Europe, however, while strong in
terms of scientific performance, is weak in terms of patenting, or the conversion of scientific
knowledge into products with industrial and economic benefits. 50 As yet, the nanotechnology
industry has not progressed as far as the biotechnology one. The transition from the academic to
the commercial stage has not yet been made. Europe is currently leading the way in terms of
scientific performance and performing well in terms of patenting. 51
Europe’s S&T weaknesses are also reflected in the final stage of the ‘linear process’: high-tech
trade. Among the largest economies, Europe has the lowest high-tech export intensity, defined as
high-tech exports over total exports. 52 It is situated in the middle as far as high-tech exports
world share is concerned. 53 And it runs a high-tech trade deficit, mainly due to its weaknesses in
the fields of computers, electronics and telecommunications. Europe is performing well in fields
such as pharmaceuticals, but lower trade volumes in this sector have a smaller net effect on the
high-tech trade balance. 54
3. An action plan for Europe
In the above sections, a number of problems affecting Europe’s capacity to generate economic
growth have been identified. They centre on a low labour utilisation rate and decreasing labour
productivity. It has also been agreed that the recently decreasing labour productivity exposes
a number of weaknesses of the European innovation system. The main question which arises then
is what should be done to address these problems. For sure no new policy agendas need to be
formulated. Useful policy agendas to remedy the above problems have already been defined.
43 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 46.
44 European Commission, 2003 (1), pp. 236–42.
45 European Commission, 2003 (2), pp. 40–1; European Commission, 2003 (1), 354.
46 European Commission, 2003 (2), pp. 67–8.
47 European Commission, 2003 (2), pp. 67 and 69.
48 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 70.
49 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 71.
50 European Commission, 2003 (1), pp. 380–85.
51 European Commission, 2003 (1), pp. 392–97.
52 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 73.
53 European Commission, 2003 (2), p. 74.
54 European Commission, 2003 (1), p. 355–70.
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The concern about growth dominated the Lisbon European Council. At Lisbon, the European
Union set itself the goal of becoming by the year 2010 the world’s most dynamic and competitive
knowledge-based economy. In addition to the low labour utilisation rate and the low degree of ICT
capital deepening the main concern focused on science, technology and innovation. Given the low
labour utilisation rate in Europe, the presidency conclusions called for raising the employment rate
to an average of 70% by 2010, and increasing the average female labour force participation rate to
more than 60% by the same year. This would be achieved through measures focusing on education,
training, tax reform, social security reform and business creation. Given the insufficient degree of
ICT capital deepening, the presidency conclusions called for the promotion of electronic commerce,
telecoms regulatory reform, greater competition in local access networks, school access to internet
and multimedia resources, electronic access to main basic public services, and high-speed state of
the art networks.
But the Lisbon European Council’s most important and innovative recommendations given
Europe’s urgently needed transition into the knowledge-based economy were reserved for the field
of research, where it called for the creation or establishment of a European Area of Research
and Innovation. Planned measures focused on better coordinating national and joint research
programmes; supporting policy-making through a better provision of comparable information by
mapping European R&D excellence in a variety of fields and benchmarking national R&D policies
through the skilful use of indicators; improving the environment for private research investment,
R&D partnerships and high technology start-ups, by using tax policies, venture capital and
EIB support; facilitating the creation of a very high-speed transeuropean network for electronic
scientific communications, with EIB support, linking research institutions and universities, as well
as scientific libraries, scientific centres and, progressively, schools; taking steps to remove obstacles
to the mobility of researchers in Europe and to attract and retain high-quality research talent
in Europe; and ensuring the availability of a Community patent so that Community-wide patent
protection in the Union would be as simple and inexpensive to obtain and as comprehensive in its
scope as the protection granted by key competitors.
Growth has remained a serious concern for European and national policy-makers after the
Lisbon European Council. At least partially this was planned for as at the Lisbon European
Council it was agreed that the Spring European Councils would be the occasion for the annual
review of achievements and strategy adjustments towards that goal; that the European Council
would meet each year in Spring on the economic, social and, since the 15–16 June 2001 Göteborg
Council, also environmental situation in Europe. 55 In 2002, at the occasion of the first such review,
for instance, the Barcelona European Council, it was agreed that overall spending on R&D and
innovation in the union should be increased with the aim of approaching 3% of GDP by 2001.
Two-thirds of this new investment should come from the private sector. 56 But in 2003 the so-called
Growth Initiative was launched, an initiative in cooperation with the European Investment Bank
to support growth and integration by increasing overall investment and private sector involvement
in TENs and major R&D projects. 57 And in February 2004, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and
Gerhard Shröder wrote a letter to the presidents of the European Council and the European
Commission calling among other things for the appointment of a vice-president of the commission
to focus exclusively on economic reform.
The limited progress made thus far towards the realisation of the Lisbon objectives has to
be seen as the main reason behind this recent flurry of new actions. The 2003 Spring European
55 The 15–16 June 2001 Göteborg European Council agreed on a strategy for sustainable development and added
an environmental dimension to the Lisbon process for employment, economic reform and social cohesion (Presidency
Conclusions. Göteborg European Council 15 and 16 June 2001—SN 2001/01/REV 1).
56 Presidency Conclusions. Barcelona European Council 15 and 16 March 2002—SN 100/1/02 REV 1.
57 Presidency Conclusions. Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003.
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Council noted progress made as well as the amount of work still left to be done, called for
the Union and the Member States to fulfil their commitments regarding economic reforms by
translating words into action, and set 4 priorities: raising employment and social cohesion, giving
priority to innovation and entrepreneurship; strengthening the internal market; and environmental
protection. 58 The tone of the 2004 Spring European Council was more impatient, focusing directly
on how to implement commitments already made. 59
The Commission has made substantial progress so far. The Commission has kept its end of the
bargain and is making substantial progress towards the realisation of the various objectives. The
European excellence in various fields of science has been mapped. The benchmarking of S&T inputs
and outputs has progressed through the skilful use of indicators. Important progress has been
made towards the implementation of a community patent. The Commission is also implementing
FP6. More can of course be done, and in a better way. That is why the Commission is preparing
for FP7, recognising that there is a need for more funds, less bureaucracy, and attention for
impact, and trying to integrate its policies better.
The member states need to do more, however. Far too often still they define the problem
wrongly, seeing it as preventing de-industrialisation as opposed to making the transition into the
knowledge-based economy. Even if they correctly define the problem then reform is slow, limited,
and often progress is reversed. Investment in research is not increasing.
Beyond the implementation of the Lisbon and Barcelona objectives, however, a broader debate
on a number of fundamental questions with greater importance for the long-term future of Europe
is looming. Beyond optimum levels of investment in research, questions will have to be asked,
and answered, about the optimal system of governance for European science, technology and
innovation. In other words, even if the 3 percent Barcelona objective is reached, will it be possible
to remain within a paradigm that, at the end of the day, is still very much driven by national
systems of innovation? Probably the European Research Area needs to become more of a reality.
But where will economies of scale and scope be aimed for, and where does competition have to
reign?
And what should be the respective roles of the European Commission and the Member States
in this European Research Area? What will be the new division of responsibilities in the field of
science, technology and innovation? Will more funding be distributed at the EU level to make
the most of the European added value of pooling and leveraging resources, fostering excellence
in research and development through enhancing capability, quality and competition, and better
integrating European R&D? Or will the current situation be maintained, or even a recentralisation
of research take place? What will then be done by each actor, where will collaboration take place?
And what does all of this mean then for the kinds of policies that need to be implemented? Do
European programmes really need to continue to be comprehensive, both horizontally, by focusing
on all scientific priorities, and vertically, by focusing on the whole range of basic, applied and
collaborative research, as well as human resources and infrastructure? Or is there real scope for
more selective policies? These are the kinds of questions that will need to be answered soon if
Europe is not to become obsolete in the next long-wave in world economic development.
58 Presidency Conclusions. Brussels European Council 20 and 21 March 2003.
59 Presidency Conclusions. Brussels European Council 25 and 26 March 2004.
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SIMONE ARNALDI
CONVERGING TECHNOLOGIES
AND EUROPEAN SOCIETIES
IN THE XXI CENTURIES:
VALUES AT THE CORE OF OUR FUTURES
1. Introduction
This short paper presents a social and cultural perspective on the so-called Converging
Technologies (CTTs). CTTs mean the integration and synergy of four technologies (nano-, bio-,
info-, cogno- or NBIC) made possible by engineering at nanoscale. I will try to discuss briefly the
importance of this issue as a “strategic choice” for Europe in the first decades of the XXI century
and outline some critical remarks to the current public discourse on Converging Technology.
After presenting two different perspectives on CTTs developed in the US and EU, I will
discuss some of what seem the main features of the public discourse on technology, which appear
characterised by an uncritical technological optimism. Then, an analysis of the concept of risk is
proposed to question the ideological view of deterministic technological optimism and the opposite
option of technological pessimism. Eventually, from the results of these two different sections of
the paper, a proposal for designing a role to futures research in outlining CTTs policy options is
examined.
2. What converging technologies are
The first explicit reference to the perspective of converging technologies appeared in the
US National Science Foundation Report on “Converging technologies for improving human
performance” published in June 20021. The report is the result of a series of workshops and
experts contributions on several themes (overall potential of converging technologies, expanding
human cognition and communication, improving human health and physical capabilities, enhancing
group and societal outcomes, national security, unifying science and education). Converging
technologies as described by the NSF Report have tremendous implications both for scientific
knowledge or culture in general, as well as for the structure of society. The best description of
this basic philosophy of Converging Technologies may be the opening paragraph of the Report:
1 The report is downloadable at http://wtec.org/ConvergingTechnologies/
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“We stand at the threshold of a new renaissance in science and technology,
based on a comprehensive understanding of the structure and behaviour of matter
from the nanoscale up to the most complex system yet discovered, the human
brain. Unification of science based on unity in nature and its holistic investigation
will lead to technological convergence and a more efficient societal structure for
reaching human goals. In the early decades of the 21st century, concentrated effort
can bring together nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and new
technologies based on cognitive science. With proper attention to ethical issues and
societal needs, the result can be a tremendous improvement in human abilities,
new industries and products, societal outcomes, and quality of life. Rapid advances
in convergent technologies have the potential to enhance both human performance
and the nation’s productivity” (Roco and Bainbridge 2002:1).
In 2003, the European Commission established an independent High Level Expert Group on
“Foresighting the new technology wave” to question, to specify and to deepen concerns raised
by the NSF Report in particular with regard to the potential threats of ideological, military and
manipulative applications of Converging Technologies. The discussion process within the Group
of Experts lasted about one year and on September 14th 2004, the Final Report on Converging
technologies—Shaping the future of European societies was presented2.
The Report outlined a European specific strategy for Converging technologies which is
called “Converging technologies in European knowledge society—CTEKS”, which relates CTTs to
European environment and policy goals, in particular to the Lisbon strategy.
Though an extensive presentation of the report is far beyond the aim of this article, it seems
interesting to focus briefly on the four main characteristics the HLEG Final Report associates to
Converging Technologies.
According to the Report 3:
(1) CTTs are embedded: they “form an invisible technical infrastructure for human action[...].
Once all of us are living continuously in the pervasively artificial environment of ambient
computing, smart materials and ubiquitous sensing, society will be confronted with far more
frequent and deep transformations of people’s and groups’ self-understanding”;
(2) CTTs have an unlimited reach: “nanotechnology’s dream to control everything molecular
follows upon information technology’s increasing ability to transform everything into information.
As the convergence draws in other technologies and technology-enabling sciences, it would appear
that nothing can escape the reach of CTTs and that the mind, social interactions, communication,
and emotional states can all be engineered”;
(3) CTTs can engineer the mind and the body: they can realise the engineering of the mind
and of the body, by electronic implants and physical modifications to enhance current human
capacities. The HLEG expert group proposes that CT research should focus on engineering for
the mind and for the body to change to human cognitive environment;
(4) CTTs are specific: generally, “the convergence of enabling technologies and technology-
enabling sciences can be geared to address very specific tasks”. E.g. “research on the interface
between nano- and biotechnology allows for the targeted delivery of designer pharmaceuticals that
are tailored to an individual’s genome in order to affect a cure without side effects”.
2 The Final Report and all the other relevant documentation about the work of the High Level Expert Group is
downloadable at http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/conferences/2004/ntw/index en.html.
3 Here, quotations are from the Executive Summary of the HLEG Final Report. More detailed accounts of these
characteristics are obviously developed along the entire report, in particular pages 24–26 (general characteristics of
Converging Technologies and outline of an original CTEKS approach) and page 36 (risks of CTTs).
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These features promise that NBIC diffused integration in our social and economic systems
can have an enormous transformational potential on our cultural view of subjectivity, agency and
the world in general. The following sections try to outline how such a potential is independent to
a certain extent from the actual application of converging technologies.
3. Converging technologies and the technological discourse
The HLEG Final Report deals with different aspects of the impact of CTTs on culture. This
issue is discussed in terms of acceptance/rejection by the general public of NBIC applications
(HLEG Final Report 2004:18), of cultural homogenisation as a consequence of a massive
introduction of CTTs in social life (HLEG Final Report 2004:42, Special Interest Group II 2004),
and of reversal of current ethical and cultural standards (HLEG Final Report 2004:34) because of
the use (and abuse) of CTTs.
Nevertheless, it seems that the convergence of NBIC can exercise a significant influence on
the cultural system independently from the actual realisation and application of technologies. In
fact, the most far-reaching assumption of CTTs is that “to the extent that CTTs engineering
is done from the bottom-up in the nano-, micro- or bio- domains, it is presupposed that the
problems can be resolved at their physical basis” (HLEG Final Report 2004:18). In other words,
the possibility to manipulate matter at nano-scale paves the way to a materialistic ideology. This
ambivalence of the discourse on convergence is well defined by the Special Interest Group II:
“The first view refers to a normal feature of disciplinary science. Every now
and then, disciplines coalesce for heuristic reasons. In the first view heuristics
refer solely to growth of knowledge and new technological perspectives. The second
view on convergence is one that does not consider the heuristics solely as an
intrinsic and neutral feature of nanosciences. In this view convergence refers to
a technological concept of human and nature.” (Special interest group report 2 on
the ethical, legal and societal aspects of the converging technologies, p. 2).
In a future-oriented perspective, CTTs seem to pretend to offer an articulated and compre-
hensive vision of the future. The transformational potential of images and visions of the future
and their influence on social development has been widely discussed at the societal (Polak 1978),
organisational (e.g. Malaska and Holstius 1999) and individual (e.g. Page 1998) level. Looking at
some extreme visionary projects about the application of CTTs to society (e.g. Yonas and Glicken
Turnley, Albus, Cauller and Penz in Roco and Bainbridge 2002:158–160, 256–259, 281–293), this
transformational potential seems extremely high and it surely challenges many of the present
social, cultural and ethical standards of our society. The point of view is shared by the HLEG and
the idea itself of a European-specific approach to CTTs means these challenges create concerns
among experts, decision-makers and the public.
4. Culture, technological discourse and utopia
Peter Henrici defines culture as the artificial environment of human life. According to Henrici,
human identity is built through the cultural differentiation of man and nature and human
interaction with nature is always mediated by culture and, in modern and late modern ages, this
interaction is based on technology which becomes the key feature of human culture (Henrici 1985).
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Thus, on the one hand, technology is recognised as the key driver of culture, at least
of European culture. From the other, an obvious implication of Henrici’s statement is that
technologies can be studied as cultural objects (Griswold 1997) and they are bearer of meanings.
Therefore, if the “ideal type” of the research process may be considered neutral with respect
to values4, this is not the case for technology which has been defined by the Italian sociologist
Luciano Gallino as “the systematic application of scientific knowledge for a transformative goal”
(1993:691) and the existence of a “defined goal” precedes the two phases of invention and
construction in the technological process (Henrici 1985). The elaboration of a goal (a set of goal)
implies the use of inventories of meanings with both a symbolising (symbols) and validating
(values) functions5, whose social organisation can be defined properly as culture (Hannerz 1999).
It is possible to establish a morphological identity between culture and images or visions
of the future (Arnaldi 2000) and, more generally, the latter can be considered as a part of the
wider cultural system. This position is supported by sociological theory (Elias 1998, 1986), by
historical analysis (Polak 1978) and by futures studies (Barbieri Masini 1999). Therefore, what are
the cultural meanings (values and symbols) that can be identified in the visions and images of the
future proposed by the cultural discourse of converging technologies?
Without aiming at a comprehensive discussion, it seems useful to introduce the comments by
Nordmann (2002) on the new paradigm behind nano-research and, by extension, behind converging
technologies. Moving from Nordmann’s argument, it can be noted how this research seems not
theory-driven (either falsifying hypothesis or building paradigms), nor application-focused (like
e.g. AI research) or goal-oriented (like e.g. GMOs). According to this Author, nano-people’s work
blurs the very distinction between science (investigation) and technology (transformation) as far
as “[t]echnoscience does not ask whether some statement about nature is true or false, it is not
defined by methodological standards of falsificationism, hypothesis testing and the like. Nor does
technoscience validate itself by making devices that work. Instead, it is said to involve a wholesale
transformation of self and nature. In a sense, these technosciences—they include robotics, artificial
intelligence research, genetic engineering, etc.—refashion nature” (Nordmann 2002:5).
Technoscience seems to reverse the general condition of functioning of technology as indicated
by Niklas Luhmann. According to this Author, technology implies the delimitation of a finite set
of causes within an operative field, the definition of a finite number of steady relations among
such factors and the creation of a stable environment (the “normal conditions of functioning”) by
isolating the operative field from outer environmental factors (Luhmann 1996:101). To a certain
extent, technoscience cancels this distinction and the environment is assumed as “this implies
that there is no given world that already exists atom by atom but that we think of the world
as something plastic, a technological artifact in its own right, a world related to our sensory,
conceptual, practical modalities”6 (Nordmann 2002:5).
This potential “unlimited reach” is translated in cultural discourse. I propose here few
considerations about its contents based on the work of Lucien Sfez (2002) on biotechnology7.
According to Sfez, the cultural discourse on biotechnology has the features of utopian discourse
4 According to Niklas Luhmann, the social process of scientific research has the only goal of distinguishing
between true and not true (1996).
5 Cognitive and normative perspectives on culture are the two mainstream approaches in contemporary anthropology
(e.g. Geertz for a cognitive perspective, while Kluckhohn and Kroeber propose a normative one). The former considers
that culture has a mainly symbolising function, the latter a validating one. The Japanese sociologist Raymond Bachika
suggests a combination of both approaches (1996).
6 A comprehensive perspective of this attempt to reduce the world to a set of proceduralised and fully predictable
behaviours is well sketched by the “socio-tech” proposed by Glicken and Turnley (2002) as the predictive science of
societal behaviour, whose core is based on genomics and cellular biology.
7 The extension to Converging Technologies of considerations on biotech seems justified for several reasons as
bio-technologies are a constituent part of CTTs and they fully belong to technosciences as in Nordmann’s article.
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and it is based on the idea of „perfect health”. What is then the “perfect health paradigm”?
It is the utopia of the perfection and of the harmonic unity of the bio-sphere (between man
and nature) achieved through the use of bio- and information technologies; it is the desire for
individual and species immortality. Sfez examines the communication strategies of four projects:
The Genome Project (mapping and sequencing of human genome), cloning, the Biosphere II
Project, and the Artificial Life Project 8. From his analysis, this „perfect health ideology” results
as a new bio-ecological „figure”, which suggests the idea of a general purification of planet and
man. According to the Author, biotechnology rationale has become the basis for the reconstruction
of individual and group identity, as a reaction to relativism and to fragmentation in late modern
age. It is a strong rationality, materialistic and simplifying, based on what is considered the
ultimate and basic principle of life: the gene.
“This new foundation of meaning stands on a material and materialistic basis as extreme as
possible: our apparatus delegated to perceive the world and our action on the world, our body,
which cannot be separated by the body of the planet. The perfect health is for both bodies, one
for the other, one within the other. Perfect health is considered as a means and as an end. Health
for life. But, at the same time, life for health. Living to make biotechnologies and eco-technologies
live, both of them the “perfect health” could not be possible without” (Sfez 2002:13).
In his extensive account of values in utopian thought and its relations with futures studies,
Wendell Bell (1996a) lists four features of utopian discourse, which is “a vision of some other place
or time that is: (1) judged as more desirable than existing society; (2) critical of existing society;
(3) not currently actually existent; and (4) usually, implicitly or explicitly, a call for some human
action to bring a society better than the present one to existence”
(Bell 1996a:8)
Values and consequent action are hence the real and essential features of utopia. The “perfect
health” utopia shows the same markers: (1) it expresses a value judgement: the claim for an
“improvement” of human individual and societal performance and either implicit or explicit,
a criticism of present society; (2) it does not actually exist at its stage of “perfection” and hence
it is isolated and separated from the world of the narrator and the one of the listener/reader; (3)
it claims for a more harmonic relation between man and nature (a sort of return to origin), but
through a deliberate simplification of the world through engineering and with a complete mastery
of man on both corruption and death.
However, the most important feature of the utopian discourse is perhaps monologism. The
narrator’s perspective is the only one in the discourse and manages without the other, and
therefore to some degree materialises all reality. Monologue pretends to be the ultimate word and
audience is only passive. In a sense, utopian narration communicates only certainty.
8 The Genome and Cloning projects are well known at the media communication level. Artificial life is a project
of the Santa Fé Institute for the Future aimed to the creation of artificial beings through computer simulation. These
artificial beings are gendered, they can reproduce and they can have a social life. Furthermore, they need nutrition
and they can suffer diseases, they age and they die (Sfez 2002: 68–76). The Biosphere II project tried to recreate
a model of the planet biosphere in a hangar in Arizona, with four human volunteers who participated in the project
from 1991 to 1993 (Sfez 2002: 55–67).
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5. Technical decision-making, trading zones
and the “problem of extension”
The critical discussion of the utopian values proposed by the technological discourse on CTTs
requires a more general analysis of the interplay of actors (experts, decision-makers and the
public) in the field of CTTs and the influence of technological discourse on decision-making.
The first relevant level of observation is that of the community of experts. It seems that this
level focused very much of the general attention. This attention is caused by interdisciplinarity in
NBIC, which is both a factual observation and a declared goal 9.
The second relevant level is the communication about Converging Technologies to the public.
Stephens (2004) presents some preliminary findings of a research about media communication
about nano-technology and nano-science in the United States. The Author notes that since 1998
the articles with the words “nano-technology” and “nano-science” published in science journals
increased from 1 in 1987 to 497 in 2003. A similar pattern of increase is for articles published in
94 mostly US newspapers and popular periodicals. The range is from 1 in 1998 to 305 in 2003.
Therefore, the first point to stress is that the volume of communication has surely increased.
Stephens’s article does not present any detailed content analysis about articles about “nano-“. To
develop this second level of analysis, we rely on Berube’s work again on nanotechnology.
The Author presents some general considerations about communication of technology, he
applies them partially to nano-science and he adds some specific remarks on communication of
nano-technology. Barube notes that studies in communication of technology focused mainly on the
two issues of crisis and risk communication (Berube 2003). In both cases, the Author notes that
institutional communication is aimed to augment public’s confidence and feeling of safety through
both oversimplification of language and even purposeful semantic “obfuscation” of communication
potentially threatening contents. This seek of simplification seems to be based on the patterns of
risk perception in the public. In fact, according to a NSF survey cited by Barube, perceived risk
increases with the augmented perceived complexity of issues. Generally speaking, communication
of technology seems not to be able to clearly explain nano-science and technology to the general
public and hence a wide degree of informed public discussion does not appear to be achieved.
Berube’s conclusions are based on a series of case studies (corporations, scientists, think
tanks). However, his text does not attempt to develop a comprehensive model describing the
patterns of communication between the scientists and the general public. Collins and Evans (2002)
succeeded in presenting a model based on the differential level of expertise.
In their model of the interactional dynamics of the community of experts in a certain scientific
domain or in a certain scientific controversy (called the core-set of scientists) and other groups
of outsiders, these Authors note that the latter learn of the core of the science only indirectly
through digested sources, which are basically condensed and simplified10. The differential in
expertise defines the degree outsiders are unable (or unwilling) to contribute to the knowledge of
the field11.
The Authors call “the problem of extension” the decision about how far participation should
extend in technical decision making. Different degrees of participation imply a higher or lower
9 For a formal analysis of multi- and inter-disciplinarity in nanoscience, see Schummer (2003).
10 Though this description is well fitted with broadcast media as one can find also in the cited works of Berube
and Stephens, Collins and Evans note how also training of scientists by the educational system reflects this kind of
simplification.
11 Three levels of expertise can be distinguished: (1) no expertise; (2) interactional expertise: enough to interact
interestingly with the core-set of scientists; (3) contributory expertise: enough to contribute to the science of the field
being analysed.
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level of expertise to be legitimated to contribute to technical decision-making, which is defined as
“decision-making at those points where sciences and technology intersect with the political domain
because the issues are of visible relevance to the public” (Collins and Evans 2002:236). As in the
cited article, the HLEG Final Reports deals with the problem of extension basically in terms of
interdisciplinarity, i.e. it privileges a level that is internal to the scientific community.
Michael Gorman, maintains this emphasis in his comment to Collins and Evans’s article.
He suggests a relationship between the differential of expertise and the different forms of
institutionalisation of the scientific community and different trading zones (Gorman 2002a), which
describe interaction and sharing of expertise among different cultures at disciplinary boundaries
(Gorman 2002b).
According to this Author, when outsiders are considered not to have any relevant expertise,
there really is no trade: those “not in the élite either obey, or they are ignored”. Communication
is one-way and it is near to monologism we discussed in section on the utopian discourse.
When outsiders are considered to have interactive expertise, then disciplinary experts “create
creoles around boundary objects representing technological possibilities”. When disciplinary experts
share a “common understanding of a goal and collaborate closely” to build a continually evolving
representation of the techno-social system they are involved in, they share a contributory expertise.
In the same article, Gorman discusses the different possible levels of sharing in Converging
Technology and in the other essay considered, he calls for the incorporation of practical ethics in
CTTS research and education and he suggests the creation of new engineering research centre
with a strong interdisciplinary characterisation (Gorman 2002b).
Beyond disciplinarity, which is not the focus of this article, this perspective may be worth of
using in interpreting the relation between the scientific community of the CTTs and the general
public. If we limit the ground of discussion only to expertise, the public is likely not to be
able even to interact and misconception about research and technology application are to spread
among the non-scientific observers. The consequences may be a structural misperception of risk,
according to the simplicity/complexity opposition noted by Berube. Then, what about a different
level of interaction?
With regard to this, two points are worth of developing. First of all, social actors’ knowledge
of science and technology is built not only on expertise, but also (often I would say mostly) on
their social knowledge. In Collins and Evans’s cited article, this social knowledge refers either
to the knowledge of the position of the author of a scientific view within social networks, or
his previous experience. In sum, it refers to scientist’s credibility. In my opinion, it is worth of
extending this concept of social knowledge. In fact, validity of a scientific claim can be challenged
by different assumptions based on the different cultural inventories that are distributed in the
social structure. These assumptions are cultural assumptions. If this social knowledge is cultural,
then it includes also values.
The relevance of this perspective is significant as far as we consider the discussion on the
utopian features of a substantial part of technological discourse presented above. The discussion
shows how the communication from the core-sets of scientists to outsiders is not value free.
Technoscience paradigm itself is not value free, as far as its aim is not the perpetuation of the
falsification process that Luhmann assumes as the goal of science (1996). Therefore, it seems
useful to extend the model of trading zones from expertise to values which orient decision-making,
select the goals of technology and contribute to enrich and change cultural inventories.
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6. Epistemic implication model, negotiation of values
and images of the future
Is it possible to imagine trading zones not only for expertise but also for values? Is it
possible to extend the zones beyond the research community towards the general audience? This
tentative proposal relies heavily on the work of the American sociologist and futurist Wendell Bell,
whom I gratefully acknowledge. Bell’s argument is developed in his attempt to shift from cultural
relativism to critical evaluation of the normative discourse in futures studies. In my opinion, the
efforts by Wendel Bell to build such a critical theory of values on a future-oriented basis, appears
to be a relevant contribution to the change of focus in future research I suggested in the previous
sections.
The first model of evaluating specific moral propositions or value judgement Bell considers, it
is the “commitment-deducibility model”:
“This model imitates the logical hierarchical structure of science as conceived by
the positivists, except that the propositions involved are value judgements, not
statements of fact. Logical relationships exist among the propositions. [...] Thus
there is deducibility through logical consistency. But [...] ultimately the highest-
order assertion, and thus the entire system of justification itself, rests on an act of
faith or will” (Bell 1996b: 82–83).
With regard to action,
“the commitment-deducibility model emphasises whether a given act, event, process,
etc. is an instance of or consistent with the value to which a commitment has been
made” (Bell 1996b:83).
The second model is called “means-ends” model. This model emphasises causal knowledge and
empirical facts.
“The goal or end itself in the means-ends model remains unjustifiable within
the model, the goal being a matter of preferences, desires, or values of some
individual or collective agents. [Therefore,] the coherence of the selection of means
to an end necessarily contains an explanation, at least an implicit cause-and-effect
proposition” (Bell 1996b:84–85).
The two models are different but they have a common essential feature: they fail to create an
explicit framework of discussion of value judgements whose justification remains out of the model.
What is relevant to our discussion is the third model proposed by Wendell Bell that is an
extension of the epistemic implication model by Keekok Lee. As described by Bell, the latter
implies that descriptive elements of value assertions can be subjected to a series of criteria and,
by implication, a tentative judgement about their validity can be reached. Lee’s criteria as listed
by Bell are the following:
(1) serious evidence: any assertion must have some external features of the situation referred to
in the assertion. Thus, the “serious evidence criterion” includes “only assertions that can be
denied or confirmed by independent observers, by some kind of objective or intersubjective
process”
(Bell 1996b:87);
(2) referentially relevant evidence: the assertion and the reasons for it must share the subject
term;
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(3) causally relevant evidence: the evidence cited to test a moral assertion must bear on the
assertion in some causal way;
(4) causal independence of evidence and conclusion: the evidence is not acceptable if it is produced
by the conclusion itself;
(5) empirical test: “finally there is the requirement to put the evidence to an empirical test, to
assess whether it is true or false. If the evidence meets the above four criteria, then the
evidence, if true, would serve to support the assertion, while if false, would serve to refute
it” (Lee in Bell 1996b:91).
The epistemic implication model cannot be applied to assertions about the future without
being modified. In fact, propositions about the future cannot be empirically tested and falsified12.
Therefore, assertions about the future cannot satisfy the fifth criterion of Keekok Lee’s model.
Wendell Bell’s extension of such a model considers this limitation and it includes predictions as
a basis for applying it to future knowledge:
“Assertions about the future, when they are warranted by specific grounds,
constitutes evidence to support or negate value premises, the same as do facts about
the past and present” (Bell 1996b:101).
Like evidences, these “predictive grounds” can be true or false, but only on a presumptive
basis, because “we must rely on present indicators that may only indirectly bear on the future”
(Bell 1996b:101).
With respect of our discussion on technological discourse, the “extended epistemic implication
model” suggested by Wendell Bell offers several advantages:
(1) it emphasises the communicative and deliberative aspect of value judgements, thus encouraging
a collective and intersubjective perspective on evaluation;
(2) it shifts the source of possible disagreement from value conflict to disagreement about
predictions;
(3) it encourages interdisciplinarity because of the wide range of predictive grounds that can be
taken into account to support or refuse a value judgement;
(4) it provides a common ground of discussion about both normative and cognitive statements;
(5) it creates a common framework of negotiation about contents of the technological discourse
(both means and ends, expertise and values) for experts, decision-makers and the public.
(6) it provides a critical tool for decoding technical imagery and visionary pictures concerning
CTTS and technologies in general.
7. Conclusion
This short comment tried to point out that the relational dimensions of CTTs and culture may
not be framed either only from an engineering perspective or from and individual point of view.
With regard to these two issues, sociology and futures studies may give a contribution not
only in terms of social and technology foresight or technological assessment. I suggest rather that
foresight and sociology may serve as interpretive and critical tools for decoding and demystifying
the discourse of technical decision-making about NBIC and the visions of the future it relies on.
From this point of view, the “extended epistemic implication model” proposed by Wendell Bell
is of outmost importance for providing such a critical framework. In line with this perspective,
12 About the epistemic conditions of the knowledge about the future, see Kuusi (2000) and Bell himself (1996a). For
a discussion about the epistemic conditions of sociological analysis of the future, see Barbieri Masini (2001, 1999) and
Arnaldi (forthcoming).
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institutional choice to integrate such a futures thinking perspective in the social processes of
decision-making should be taken to extend the range of stakeholders that can contribute to
a critical cultural discourse of converging technologies.
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ADAPTIVE VERSUS MANAGERIAL APPROACH
TO S&T POLICY
This contribution presents some comments on the “Third European Report on Science
& Technology Indicators”1, mostly reactions to its core ideology. According to Kukliñski’s
proposition2, it might be classified as an attempt in the domain of deeply critical evaluations
transgressing the limits of political correctness and conventional wisdom. Naturally, it is not
comprehensive enough to aspire to such a status. At best, it rises some question that might
deserve discussion. My position is based on my understanding of the precepts of evolutionary
development3.
It has to be stressed that the Report is a very complex composition. In some cases, I might
be arguing with ideas, which are also argued with in some other places of the Report. In such
short contribution I was not able to capture the whole picture, so I can only apologize if this lead
to misunderstandings.
Some common sense qualms
The Report presents a wealth of statistical analysis and makes a very interesting reading. Data
are abundant. Concepts are clearly explained. Technical problems are well identified. A number of
simplistic convictions is challenged. An effort to grasp the complexity of R&D outputs is obvious.
Some results of the earlier implemented policies are critically analyzed. But there is also an excess
of the politically correct clichés, a number of not really obvious juxtapositions and an unshakeable
conviction that an effective S&T policy might be implemented by the stiff regulatory measures.
For example:
• The blissful vision of the knowledge economy seems to be masking the real tradeoffs: most
employment in skilled well-paid jobs in knowledge based sectors 4 (is that really true about
the most of jobs in this sector?), majority of production is high-tech (for how long some tech
stays high-tech?), growth is sustainable and based on clean technologies (innovations are often
disruptive and clean technologies might be uncompetitive), protecting inventions is cheaper
and easier than anywhere else (will this improve or hamper the spread of innovations?).
1 European Commission, Third European Report on Sciences and Technology Indicators—2003, Towards
a knowledge-based economy, Brussels 2003
2 A. Kukliñski, Europe—the strategic choices of the XXI century, Seven methodological reflections.
3 R. Galar, Knowledge Economy and Evolutionary Traps, (in:) Kukliñski A., W. M. Or³owski (eds), The knowledge
based economy, The global challenges of the 21st century, Rewasz, Warsaw, 2000
4 Phrases in italics are taken from the text of the Report.
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• If it is so obvious that research is so very profitable for economy, how to explain that
governments are reducing their investments? Between 2000 and 2010 the government
financing of R&D in relation to GDP is expected to drop about 40%. The same concerns the
private sector in Europe, which has to be called to rise private R&D to 2/3 of the total R&D
spending by 2010. Why this need to call, if enterprises appreciate the growing importance
of research and new technologies for their competitiveness? Why should private sector stray
from the profitable investments? Why actions profitable in US are unprofitable in EU? What
are the real casual loops? Explaining this would be more useful then all the pleas for action.
• Research policy is to be a central pillar of Europe’s strategy toward the knowledge based
economy.—It is arguable that the US advantage in this domain is an effect of some
governmental strategy. It is only by the modernisation and integration of its structural
policies that the EU can be the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
in the world.—The present leader has got to his eminence by the more market oriented
approach.
• Why highly qualified scientist should be given more opportunities especially in the business
sector—is there any evidence that this group is particularly good in producing, exploiting or
commercializing innovations?
• Europe remains a world class scientific power. (...) However, its most important challenge
remains the exploitation and commercialisation of science in order to boost growth and
employment and improve social conditions.—The linkage between exploitation and com-
mercialisation of science and growth, employment and social conditions is not as obvious
as suggested. With the research priorities assumed the results might be opposite; e.g. the
expected progress in biotechnology will extend human lives and aggravate the dependency
problems.
• There are component indicators concerning highly skilled human capital (total number
of researchers per capita and number of new S&T PhDs per capita), investment and
participation in education (educational spending per capita and share of adult population
participating in life-long learning).—It should be noted that S&T personnel from China and
India and also ECE countries, is quite competitive in US and EU environment, while the cost
of its formation was fractional.
• Citizens are becoming more and more aware of the impact of science and technology on
their daily lives.—It doesn’t necessarily mean neither great recent progress nor positive
assessment...
The overall managerial paradigm
The Report emanates conviction that science and technology should be dealt with as any
other profitable domain of programmed growth. In terms of the 7th of Kukliñski’s dichotomies5 it
obviously opts for “dirigistic” instead of “leseferic” Europe. It calls confidently for clearly defined
priorities, extensive co-ordination and precise benchmarking. Yet, the reasons for such confidence
are neither theoretically explained nor practically corroborated, what opens space for serious
reservations:
• The wish to target financing on these key areas that will be vital for our future, such as
nanotechnology and biotechnology is understandable, but is it justifiable? It seems striking,
how fast expectations based on ICT become downgraded. Only few years ago ICT was the
5 Kukliñski, A., Europe—the strategic choices of the XXI century, op. cit.
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official standard bearer of progress for the next decades. Now some consider ICT as merely
an utility. 6 The more or less similar position is expressed in the Report—an information
society for all. The analysis of the reasons of this sudden reevaluation should be very helpful
in avoiding future blunders.
• The science creation is treated as any other productive activity. The problem is reduced to
matching well equipped research system with supply of highly educated research scientists.
This attitude is not new, so it might be asked where has it worked up to expectations?
Some point out that miniaturization of electronic equipment belong to this category. Yet, the
invention of transistor itself was clearly an individual obsession propelled trial and error
process7. Other attempts to set aims and means and expect results fared less well. What about
clean energy, artificial intelligence, cancer and AIDS cure, new generation of pharmaceuticals
and so on? The efforts are still continued, but it has already taken much longer and cost
much more then anticipated, irrespective of significantly downgraded expectations.
• The Report proclaims introduction of a new open method of co-ordination, namely: guidelines,
timetables, indicators and benchmarking against the best in the world as means of comparing
best practices. It might be interesting to consider how such policy implemented 25 years ago
would foster the progress of ICT? In 1970s the idea of PC was considered ludicrous by the
computer establishment and the best practices pointed in the very different direction8. Why
assumption that all surprises of this kind are already over?
• The concepts inspired by the business ideas, such as error free production, just in time
delivery, benchmarking etc., should not be transferred uncritically to S&T policy. These
concepts work fine in the world of the repetitive. Significant innovations emerge in the world
of unique. Practical experiences should be taken into account even if they negate the seemingly
rational expectations. When the cost and length of the project phase of the International
Space Station greatly exceeds the estimated cost and length of realization of the station itself,
it seems a good reason to give up this kind of estimates.
• Will nanotechnology and biotechnology actually rise to expectations? They are around for
about quarter of century generating great promises and recently showing some results. It
might be true that there is nothing better around to bet on, still it might be risky to put
all the eggs in just two baskets. The problem is deeper than the lack of common definitions
concerning ‘what is biotechnology’ and ‘what are biotechnology firms’. History of technological
progress has systematically demonstrated that the future belongs to the unexpected. The
policy of accumulating financing on selected targets works to the exclusion of such unexpected
developments. It might be that the evident deficit of breakthrough innovations in the last
decades9 is the result of such policies.
It helps little that this inventive crisis of our times is conveniently reinterpreted in terms
of the new era of development: many authors now consider innovation capability less in terms
of the ability to discover new technological principles, than the ability to exploit systematically
the effects produced by new combinations within the existing stock of knowledge. The number of
combinations is limited, so this is tantamount to the opinion that the age of progress is ending.
6 N.G. Carr, It doesn’t matter, Harvard Business Review, May 2003
7 William B. Shockley explained: A basic truth that the history of the creation of the transistor reveals is that the
foundations of transistor electronics were created by making errors and following hunches that failed to give what
was expected. W. Saxon, Obituary: William B. Shockley, 79, Creator of Transistor and Theory on Race, The New
York Times, August 14, 1989
8 “There is no reason anyone would want a computer in their home”. Ken Olson, president, chairman and founder
of Digital Equipment Corp., 1977, http://www.cs.virginia.edu/ robins/quotes.html
9 R. J. Gordon , Does the “New Economy” Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past? Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 4, no 14, 2000
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To me, it seems the “fox and sour grapes” approach10. Real intelligence, biotechnology
and nanotechnology, they all operate in living bodies so it should be possible to replicate them
technologically. The first problem is that we might still need to discover some new “technological
principles” to make it happen. The second problem is that these discoveries might not be
approachable from the current paradigms11. This was the case with the alchemic research
program. To succeed in their transmutation-quest alchemists needed new principles but, as we
know for some time, these were not to be found in the domain of their quasi-chemical experiments.
The way to the solution led, between others, through investigation of obscure electric phenomena,
whose practical significance Faraday was unable to explain to appropriate commissions. Most
fortunately for the emergence of postindustrial society, his “grant” was not revoked.
The telling absence of social capital
The term “human capital” appears in the Report 46 times while “social capital” comes out only
once and this is in the title of the book referred to. This concentration on human capital to the
exclusion of social capital is not accidental—it seems to be a direct consequence of the managerial
paradigm. The first capital is an individual’s asset which might be transferred wherever the
individual moves. The second is a context dependent emanation of constructive human interactions
and it cannot be easily transferred out of this context. As it is usually emphasized social capital
is based on mutual trust between concrete people belonging to an actually interacting group.
The concept of social capital is not very tangible, still there is nothing better to explain why
in some places things go well, while in the others, under the very similar external conditions,
nothing really happens. It would be tempting to use this concept to explain the “European
Paradox”—strength of European educational and science base and its inability to convert this
advantage into strong technological and economic performance. Unfortunately, this way seems
closed as it collides with the basic ideological precepts of the European S&T policy. Introduction
of social capital into considerations would challenge aims such as mobility, excellence and lifelong
learning:
• The initiative of European Research Area and its core message: to overcome the traditional
fragmentation and compartmentalisation of research efforts in EU through better coordination
and cooperation is based on conviction that research teams might be easily regrouped and
mustered to perform whatever is the task of the day. Does experience always point this way?
Was there anything wrong with innovativeness of fragmented ancient Greece and medieval
Italy? What about overcoming the traditional fragmentation and compartmentalisation of
research efforts in Silicon Valley? What about regional innovation systems? It is very
important that people can meet and exchange ideas but it is decisive that these ideas must
be formed first. This hatching of ideas demands a degree of seclusion and more intimate
cooperation. 12
• The idea of the European Network of Centres of Excellence emphasizes the common conviction
that science and research should be excellent and the more so, the better. This is very similar
to the erroneous notion that evolution produces and improves perfection. Excellence is an
10 “Everything that can be invented has been invented.” Charles H. Duell, Commissioner, U.S. Office of Patents,
1899, http://www.cs.virginia.edu/ robins/quotes.html
11 “The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created
them.” Albert Einstein (1879–1955), http://www.cs.virginia.edu/ robins/quotes.html
12 R. Galar (1998), Europe as a Continent of Regional Systems of Innovations Regarded from the Evolutionary
Viewpoint. W: A. Kukliñski, K. Paw³owska (eds) Innowacja—Edukacja—Rozwój Regionalny, Nowy S¹cz, 1998
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emergent property of the process but can be harmful for the process itself. The strive for
excessive excellence embodied in multilevel critical evaluations tends to hamper emergence of
creative ideas. The well organized trial and error process are still at the base of significant
innovations—as they say in Silicon Valley: The successful people have a lot more failures than
the failures do. 13
• The idea of lifelong education might be the best idea of our times, if taken as cultural propo-
sition aimed at internal human development. Taken as a practical postulate of reprogramming
people at will, as the need arises, is not very practical. First, people are biological beings
and their learning abilities tend to diminish with age. Second, even if the human capital gets
enriched, the social capital is lost when the person with new qualifications moves to another
occupation. This might be of little consequence when repetitive work is involved, but it is all
important when creative abilities are at stake.
Perfection over freedom
The philosophy of catching up with the US, expressed both by strategic goals of European
S&T policy and the choice of its benchmarking indices, might be self-defeating. The goals and the
way are clear for the followers only. The pioneers have to put their trail in unknown, they go as
the terrain permits. What counts is their competence, persistence and adaptive abilities.
The word “adaptation” is never used in the Report. The word “adapt” occurs 16 times and
only once refers to the adaptive research policy. It appears in the box concerning Changes in
basic research in large firms brought about by the new ‘Industrial Ecology’ approach in the
sentence stating that: The strategy making process itself has had to adapt to new circumstances,
introducing far greater speed and flexibility with a view to coping with radical compression of
time-scales. This might be a very promising opening, but the main thrust of European S&T policy
goes the other way:
• European Research Area has “the ambition of re-inventing the research landscape, in
redefining the roles of each of the players and reconfiguring the process and policies that
underpin the processes and politics that underpin the research effort in Europe”. Is it not
a bit risky to engage in tinkering with the base of European civilization without some lesser
scale experiments and unifying theory of why should it work?
• The need is stressed for integration and co-ordination on all research levels, what is tantamount
to the rejection of the evolutionary paradigm of development based on independent, parallel
and largely random trials. In the US the best research is surprisingly little coordinated...
• One can negate the adaptive, evolutionary, largely random selection-modification mechanism
and imagine that some extremely complex chain-link model is working that organizes
interactions and diffusions of knowledge flows (continuous interaction and feedback, linkages
between upstream and downstream research, external feedback between science, technology
and processes of development). It would be reasonable however to build an appropriate model
first and to test it in the limited and controlled setting before some irreparable damage is
done to our cultural environment.
The main competitive asset of Europe used to be freedom, not perfection. At present
perfection receives more and more attention, while freedom is being pushed to the preserves
of procedural democracy and unconventional lifestyles. The progressing degradation of the once
13 Knowledge Management in the Learning Society. Educations and Skills, Centre for Educational Research and
Innovation, OECD 2000.
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paramount innovative prominence of Europe might be a direct consequence of this shift. Perfection
is tempting as it allows to squeeze most from the existing opportunities. Freedom is necessary
as to explore opportunities not yet identified, what is the essence of adaptation. It is needed to
open the doors into the world of trial and error, spontaneity and soft selection, where subsequent
waves of priorities and high-techs emerge rather than are decreed. The specific predicament of
the present European might be that its S&T sector and economy are both: not free enough to
compete with the US in opening new innovative horizons, and not perfect enough to compete with
the East Asian cultures in exploitation of new technologies 14.
Organic vs. organizational
A strong performance in science and technology is not an end in itself, but rather represents
an important and necessary precondition for generating improvements in economic growth and
social welfare. This observation seems obvious, yet it should not imply that relationships are as
simple as to justify the present policies. The confusion might follow from the choice of metaphors.
Let us note that the precondition for efficient production of artifacts is capital, workforce, materials
and technologies. To make things happen all these factors must be connected by appropriate
procedures—well planed and well controlled. The precondition for organic growth is sun, water,
fertilizers and seeds. It is neither possible nor necessary to program organic process, it is enough
to create favorable conditions and seeds will take care about themselves. It is not even necessary
to control these processes too extensively—digging out carrot everyday to inspect how it grows
is not a good idea. It can be argued that development of innovations, except the trivial ones, in
its most critical phase is of organic nature.
• Organizations tend to eliminate the unexpected and order innovations on the base of the
estimated market demand or urgent needs. Yet, also today, the real bright innovative ideas
are mostly conceived as results of happy circumstances15—serendipity being the key world.
The anecdotic evidence of breakthrough innovations usually emphasize their chaotic input. The
history of the planned breakthroughs, if written, would be mostly the history of failures.
• Organization culture demands that expected benefits of projects are assessed a priori, assuming
that the most promising one is developed, while the others are aborted. It is not a good idea
in case of innovative projects. It is practically impossible to grasp the potential of the freshly
born idea16 (except of evident pathologies). The system of preemptive assessments acts as
a filter which passes only the more obvious i.e. more trivial projects. It would be interesting
to make a backward test of present S&T policies and to find which of the great inventions,
innovations and subsequent high-techs would have emerged, if their realization was dependent
on the modern grant systems utilizing the best competence of the period. 17
• Organizations try hard to implement uniform standards and procedures that would streamline
the development of innovative ideas into marketable products. People are rearing their
14 A. Kukliñski, in: Kukliñski A., Skuza B. (eds): Europe in the perspective of global change, Polish Association for
the Club of Rome, Rewasz, Warszawa 2003
15 The recent survey suggests that the worst “idea factors” for innovating are trend following and mental inventions,
which produced 3 times more failures than successes. The clear winner was “taking advantage of random events” (),
which generated 13 times more successes than failures. The Economist, Expect the unexpected, Sep. 6–17, 2003
16 The famous Faraday adage: when asked about relevance of his investigation into the nature of electricity,
Faraday have said: what use is a newborn baby? Another version: Mr Faraday replied that he did not know, but he
was sure governments would one day tax it.
17 “We don’t like their sound, and guitar music is on the way out.” Decca Recording Co. rejecting the Beatles,
1962, http://www.cs.virginia.edu/ robins/quotes.html
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(brain)children individually, trying to improve abilities and compensate disadvantages. The
parental, distributed system is never perfect, but, due to its diversity, it is a self-learning
and adaptive which allows for diffusion of good practices and correction of errors. When an
uniform systems goes wrong, it might go wholly wrong and provide no feedback on what
should be done to correct the situation.
Corruptible indices
Indicators are paramount to inform policy makers whether they are on track and to what
extent they are (not). This seems a rational assertion but the vision of the competent order it
creates might be misleading. There are data concerning measurable financial, material and human
inputs and there are data reporting the measurable outputs: publications, patents, etc. Yet there is
no verified model connecting these inputs and outputs and, more important still, there is no proven
model that would connect the measurable outputs with effects that really matter, i.e. innovative
outputs with capacity to improve economy. Therefore being on track does not necessarily mean
that the right things are done. For policy makers and indeed for most citizens it is the bottom
line; they are not interested in the generation and diffusion of knowledge per se, but rather its
impact on the economy and society.
The logic behind the choice of European S&T indices is quite simple:
• As far as inputs are concerned, there is a determination to mimic the chosen aspects of
innovation systems that fare better than the European system (e.g. the relative business
financing inputs in US).
• What concerns outputs, the idea is to exploit past correlations between form and content as
casual links (eg: profitable innovations were patented, so more patenting should mean more
profitable innovations).
It has to be applauded that the Report is often critical with regard to the effects of simplistic
policies, intending, for example, to increase the numbers of publications and patents:
• It is one thing to publish one or two additional publications per year. However, the demand
for constant increases is likely to become counterproductive in terms of quality of the
research and of the publications.
• Since 1980 patenting by US public universities dramatically—with some unintended results:
their quality measured by scientific citations in the patents has decreased. Second, the
increase of university patents might have an impact on the decreasing publication numbers.
It should be added that also new pathological kinds of patents emerged, the ones that not so
much document the achievements made as impede the of research in some promising domains.
These observations fit to the more general pattern emerging with attempts to manage the
essentially cultural activities by tying incentives with objective indices of performance. What really
matters in such activities is practically immeasurable. These are the intrinsic values, such as
depth of thought, quality of education, innovative potential, good governance, etc. In effect only
appearances, i.e. formal aspects, might be indexed. Initially such attempts work as intended; i.e.
everything goes as usual, only better. Latter on the scheme backfires, as the new feedbacks modify
all activities, in order to maximize the indexed outputs at the expense of everything else, also
ethical standards. Even if indices are perfectly chosen at first, they soon become corrupt—people
are too intelligent to be manipulated that simply. This is why social capital is indispensable.
Objective estimates become possible only after generation or two.
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The Report presents the idea of benchmarking of R&D policies of member states e.g. through
innovation scoreboards. It would be useful to extend this proposition to benchmark explicitly the
effects of effects of the EU S&T policies.
The chaotic component of adaptations
There exist two huge, elaborate and well defined systems: research system and economy. The
Report confirm the general impression that the problem is in interface between them, which is
elusive and not responding to the control inputs as expected. It was commonly assumed that this
interface should efficiently convert scientific results into marketable products. It does not work
and it is not quite evident why. Despite the wealth of academic work focusing on technology
transfers from research organizations or universities to the incumbent industry little is known
about creating new ventures as a way of commercializing research and technology. Two relatively
short chapters of the Report are very illuminating in this respect.
DOSSIER II on Research Based Spin-offs as a Vehicle to Commercialise Technology starts
with opinion that: The creation of spin-offs in Europe has long been a marginal phenomenon
emerging despite the indifference or active opposition of European Universities. This is followed
by few definitions, a diagram segregating spin-offs into four categories (high/low degree of
technological/commercial uncertainty), three block diagrams visualizing concept of spin-off (funnel,
financing, nurturing in 3 phases called invention, transition and innovation). There are some
phenomenological observations and absolutely no data. The Dossiers concludes rightly that: an
effective policy will have to bring very different networks into contact with each other: the
network of government officials (...) to the one of the financial investors (...). One problem is
that both networks seldom overlap, they do not know each other. The network of university
professors and researchers has to be related to the network of the business managers. Again, both
are complementary, but seldom overlap. Finally, the different networks grouping the financial
resources has to be brought into contact with the network knowledge resources. There are only
a few examples in the world where this mixture of networks is accomplished of which Silicon
Valley is probably the most well-known. The spontaneity of Silicon Valley culture is not mentioned.
DOSSIER VI on Science and Technology Linkage approaches the problem of science-
technology interaction analyzing references to scientific publications in the “prior art” description
of a patented invention. The presented data support opinion that S&T interaction seems to be far
more reciprocal than the linear model suggests. In this light, citations in patents tend to indicate
the degree of closeness between S&T rather than a direct and causal scientific contribution to
technological development. This seems rather obvious to the believers in knowledge management18.
Yet, even them might find information that the average number of citations to scientific articles in
European and US patents (all countries and technology fields) has grown recently to about one
and half. The same seems true about the practical absence of references to mathematics in the
high-tech patents.
Yet, it is in the domain of mathematical models were the explanation of the European Paradox
should be sought for. The essence of innovation is creativity and the essence of creativity is in
finding of new, better kinds of solutions. This might be represented as transitions toward not yet
explored adaptive equilibria (paradigm shifts). These transition are stepwise, but they can not be
executed as series of improvement, because they have a nature of saddle crossings. In saddle
crossing it is necessary to go down from the top (representing the present paradigm) before going
18 Knowledge Management in the Learning Society. Educations and Skills, op.cit.
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up toward the next top. (It is also necessary to find the direction!) There is a growing evidence
(chaos theory, complexity theory, evolutionary algorithms) that to perform such transitions systems
must be chaotic enough. This puts limits on expectations that it is possible to organize procedural
systems able to produce innovations (unless this system is greatly imperfect). This explains why
social capital, which is based on a degree of mutual tolerance, which produces the background of
diversity, is indispensable.
Even if comparable data and indicators as a basis for an evaluation of a number of concrete
measures that might be contemplated could be provided, a caution should be advised. Such policy
could be momentarily efficient, but it would destroy diversity, which is the precondition of the
innovative culture.
As far as innovative development is concerned, important thing happens in the largely chaotic
margins of education, science and research systems. These margins are sometimes called the
cutting edges. Policies aimed at the increase of average levels (e.g. more publications, patents)
are dysfunctional in a sense that in effort to promote the best practices they tend to “suck” the
margins in. This also stops further development of the best practices.
Policies aimed at the concentration of efforts on the cutting edges (eg. setting priorities) are
dysfunctional because of time factor. The time windows in which high-techs provide economical
advantages tend to be short. Latecomers should not expect more than average returns from
investment; less, if there was an overinvestment (production of processors). Worse still, they suck
resources from other margins, decreasing chances that some new “cutting edge” will emerge.
Some meaningful questions
S&T policy would be easy, if future developments could be divined. Unfortunately this is
rarely the case. As the second best option, S&T policy tends to bet on extrapolating of recognized
successes, sending support their way. This seems unnecessary, as recognized successes can get
all the support they need from the market. This is also unreasonable, as experience shows that
future almost always belonged to the not yet existing. Yet, it is an old and persistent human error
to assume that past experiences are meaningless as “our” situation is completely new...
What if research and innovation policy can not be treated as any other policy? What if
innovating is a trial and error learning process, and innovations must be breed rather than
produced? What if elusive social capital plays the decisive role? Then indicators used by S&T
policy should become more sophisticated. It will be necessary to face problems of defining and
measuring, among others:
• indispensable level of trust,
• appropriate structure and density of team interactions,
• necessary degree of impulsiveness
• proper deliberation-communication ratio,
• optimal failure tolerance index,
• suitable tuning of selective pressures,
• proper extent of research parallelization,
• correct compartmentalization of research,
• early symptoms of innovative sprouts,
• minimal levels of risk expected from research projects,
• abilities of education to form social capital,
• allowable procedural workload of researchers,
• prohibitive thresholds of procedural expenses,
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Naturally, an adequate systematization of innovative efforts will be necessary to define the
proper indexing and the right S&T policy for each class. If this will turn to be impossibly difficult,
the attention should turn toward recreating appropriate cultural conditions for more spontaneous
development of innovations. This might be also extremely difficult, but is there any other choice?
Was it not recognized in economy that, with all the necessary regulatory framework, the free
market interplay of demand and supply is the best engine of growth?
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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN FINLAND—
TRANSFORMATION INTO
A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
1. Finland—an Advanced Northern European Country
1.1. From domestic player to top-ranked international competitor
Finland is an advanced Northern European Country that has successfully transformed its
economy from a structure dominated by domestic industries and service sectors and forest
industry based exports towards much more open and competitive international structures with
significant contributions by high technology and knowledge industries.
Finland is a relatively large country by size, about the area of United Kingdom or Italy,
extending between latitudes 60’s and 70’s North extending beyond the Arctic Circle. Finland is
a small country by population of five million people and the Finnish language spoken only by
Finns is an asset for a strong national culture but provides no automatic access to international
communications.
Finland is a European country with cultural and political links to Western Europe. For
centuries it was part of greater Sweden, then for more than hundred years associated as an
autonomous grand duchy with the tsarist Russia. It gained its independence in 1917 and became
a constitutional democracy with a Parliament of 200 members elected every four years and the
President of the Republic elected every six years. The government is typically a coalition of
several parties with quite stable structures in recent years. Since 1995 Finland has been a member
of the European Union.
Finland has enjoyed long periods of sustained economic growth after the Second World War
and has reached a position amongst the most prosperous nations in the world. This success is
closely linked to the developments of technology, research and development and functioning of the
whole innovation system including education and financing sectors. Finland has greatly improved its
standing and has been ranked amongst the world’s most competitive economies in the latest reviews
by the World Economic Forum and the International Institute of Management Development. In
particular, in the areas related to development of knowledge economies Finland has been very
highly ranked.
Finland has always had a competitive spirit. Great achievements in the Olympic long distance
running and field and track events characterized this spirit for many decades. Today the best
performing sportsmen are often formula one and rally car drivers or ski jumpers, maybe also
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characterizing the willingness and ability for controlled risk taking, that is also necessary in the
global economic competition, especially in the new knowledge industries.
1.2. Finnish innovation policies
The Finnish innovation system attracts today a lot of international interest since it is widely
considered as one of the most successful anywhere. The commitments towards the knowledge
economy are vividly illustrated by the rapidly increased R&D investments.
The R&D investments have risen at a record rate from 1.5% level of gross domestic product
(GDP) in 1985, and from less than 1% level earlier, to the current investments amounting to 3.6%
of the GDP. In comparison, the OECD average is slightly over 2% and the EU average below 2%
while Eastern European countries invest between 0.5 and 1.5% and the developing countries even
less.
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What is the impact of such R&D investments and how to measure them? Classical methods
include publication and citation records, advanced degrees and international rewards, patenting
activities and creation of new industries. But one would like to see the impact on the national
level measured in terms indicating the structural change of the whole economy.
Such a change is clearly illustrated by the rapidly increasing share of high technology part
of the exports. The share expressed on percentage scale up to 30% would typically be larger for
a large country when comparing countries of similar technological developments. For instance the
United States has a more closed economy where foreign trade represents a smaller share than in
a small country that needs to trade also basic materials, such as food, textiles and construction
materials. The US exports are to a larger extent high technology products, such as computers
and software, pharmaceuticals and aircraft leading to a high percentage.
The high technology exports accounted for about 5% in Finland fifteen years ago. The exports
were largely dominated by forest industries, which still play a major role in the economy, and
today at the global level. However, dependence on the cyclical forest industry was vulnerable and
required frequent devaluations of the currency. Today this is not possible due to common Euro
currency regime, nor desirable because of foreign debt accumulated.
The increase of high technology share of exports to the levels of over 20% has diversified
the exports as a whole and reduced the dependence on a single industrial sector. It has also
brought a significant positive balance to the high technology trade where exports are about double
compared to imports. This achievement of major structural change is of world record magnitude,
largely based on telecommunications industries, new high tech companies and knowledge industries,
and has been very beneficial to Finland.
How has such a growth been achieved and maintained when at the same time many older
industrialized countries have decreased their R&D investments? How to convince policy makers
of such investments that typically bring fruit at a much later time, if even then? And how to
measure the results and effectiveness of such investments to guide them in the optimal direction?
These are questions closely related to the development of knowledge economies.
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The economic and social development in the world today are driven increasingly by
globalization, digital revolution, innovation systems and knowledge based economies. Economic
policy needs a vision and a strategy for future and a sufficient degree of political consensus for
its implementation. In Finland careful planning, necessity of action, and some degree of good
luck have reached them.
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Necessity of action relates to the economic difficulties of the early 1990’s. As a results of
an overheated economy, further fueled by deregulated financial market, going into a recession,
collapse of about 15% of trade with the rumbling Soviet Union, unemployment levels exceeding
15%, significant foreign borrowing and accumulating public debt rising in a few years to 60% level
of GNP, the corrective actions were mandatory. A courageous decision was made both by public
and private sectors to invest more into research and technological development and introduce
tax laws and other incentives to encourage both domestic and international investments in new
industrial sectors.
An important consensus instruments enhancing the political commitments has been also
a series of economic policy and national strategy programs organized by Sitra, the Finnish
National Fund for R&D. The participants have included most new members of the Parliament
and hence also ministers and political leaders, industrial, labor market, university and media
leaders having an active role in the economic policy formulation. The programs have covered
fiscal policy related to budget planning and monetary policy, and structural topics related to
globalization and integration, industrial sectors and agriculture, education and research policies,
energy and environmental topics, etc. However, the most important part has been an exercise
taking form of economic policy formulation at the national level. This illustrates the conflicting
goals of economic growth and employment on one hand and the balance and low inflation targets
on the other hand and the use and impact of different economic policy instruments. These
courses have also supported effective innovation policies and increasing R&D investments for
improved competitiveness and new knowledge industries.
It is also important that the innovation policy questions are placed high enough in the agenda
of public and corporate decisions. In Finland the highest policy organization is the Science and
Technology Council chaired by the Prime Minister and including Ministers of Education and Trade
and Industries, and also the Minister of Finance. Research funding agencies the Academy of
Finland and Tekes, the National Technology Agency are independent of ministries and the Sitra
Foundation responsible directly to the Parliament.
2. Knowledge Economy
2.1. Economic theories
The world economy is going through a fundamental change driven by globalization, deregulated
capital markets, technological development and the digital revolution. These developments,
combined with digitalization, Internet and mobility affect all sectors of the society and speed up
transformation towards knowledge economies. New and efficient methods of work, production and
marketing displace large numbers of workers in traditional industries, that are going through
consolidation resulting in increased productivity and better profitability, but almost always in
reduced employment. The medium and high technology industrial sectors have shown employment
growth, which is of great economic and political importance.
Economic theories of knowledge industries are not well understood. They are characterized
great volatilities, the difficulty of accounting for intangible assets, and by nonlinear and turbulent
phenomena and hence difficult predictability. This provides opportunities for rapid growth but also
risks of sudden losses, as has been seen in the evolution of knowledge industries.
Traditional industries are often modeled by equilibrium theories dating back to the axiom
of diminishing returns by David Ricardo in the early 1800’s. The learning curves of typical
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manufacturing industries quickly level off and costs of products are dictated by raw materials,
energy, labor and capital costs.
Knowledge industries are very different. Often the manufacturing costs are next to nothing, like
in software and some biotechnology areas. On the other hand there are very significant development
and marketing efforts needed. Successful products can have growing rather diminishing returns,
or even profit avalanches, and companies can grow into world dominance in a number of years
rather than in decades.
Knowledge industries are also quite volatile. Quick gains can be quickly lost, and the
predictability is limited. The developments have positive feedbacks and nonlinear and stochastic
features. On the other hand, these very turbulent characteristics offer good possibilities for new
players, much more so than in traditional and capital-intensive areas, where market penetration
is more difficult.
It is also typical that high tech industries have narrow time windows and immediately
international or global markets emphasizing rapid development and large capital investments.
2.2. Technology transfer
Knowledge industries require access to the sources of knowledge, in particular to universities
and research institutes. Earlier it was often thought that economic interests contaminate pure
science and that capitalization of publicly funded research is unfair. Today everybody understands
that the creation and growth of new knowledge industries requires access to knowledge and is in
the best interest of the whole society.
Technology transfer takes in practice many forms Graduates moving from universities to
companies bring new knowledge, university-company collaborations have grown to the record
levels, publishing and patenting are important while sometimes conflicting, and new start up
companies are launched with venture capital.
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It can be estimated that on an average every million Euros invested in public research
produces one idea worth evaluating to the level of business plan. In Finland some two billion
Euros invested in research generate some 2000 such ideas. On the European level the some 100
billion Euros invested in public research generate about 100 000 ideas worth looking at.
Such quantities cannot be handled at the European level in Brussels or at the national level
in the capitals. Rather, this has to be done close to the source of knowledge at the universities
and research establishments. This is also necessary to secure the patent rights that can be lost
in Europe by publishing the results before filing patents.
Finland has about twenty universities, a rather large number for the small population but also
a powerful instrument for regional development. Specialized technology transfer companies have
been established within universities. These companies typically have a few million Euros as
working capital, which is enough to do the screening of potential ideas, patenting their principal
results, but not enough for making full-fledged investments.
At universities the intellectual property rights (IPR) still typically belong to the individual
researchers, while research institutes own the IPR. The trend is now to redefine the IPR
ownership, which especially with rapidly grown research investments needs to have most efficient
and fair means for the commercialization of the results.
2.3. Publishing and patenting
The classical indexes of science policy relate to the output measured in publications, citations,
higher degrees and impact and weighting factors. When measured with these indexes the European
research is at par with the United States and exceeds the results of the Japanese scientific output.
The links between scientific and technological research to the industrial competitiveness can be
measured with patent indexes. Here the European performance lags behind the US and Japanese
results. Hence the European ability to convert knowledge into industrial competitiveness and to
knowledge based industries lags behind the US performance. This is often called the European
paradox.
Knowledge and importance of patent systems are important not only to industrial researchers
but also to academic people. Good results have been obtained in Finland in patenting activities to
secure rights for commercialization and negotiations with new partners.
2.4. Venture Capital
Venture capital plays an important role in launching new knowledge-based companies. In
Finland this industry was established in mid 1980’s first with a strong support and investments
by the public sector, primarily Sitra. Thus an early start was obtained, maybe 5–10 earlier than
the commercial interests were strong enough. The basic idea of Sitra was capitalization of publicly
funded research, which has resulted in very good economic and structural developments.
Today the venture capital industry is quite significant. Total funds under management amount
to over billion Euro. Private capital makes up 90% of investments and the government related
sectors about 10%. More than 400 investments and 200 exits were done in 2003 with an average
amount of about one million Euro.
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3. Observations and Lessons Learned
3.1. Role of private and public sectors
The role of the public sector is traditionally to fund the generation of new knowledge by
basic research. It would then be up to the private sector to pick up the results and turn them
into economic activity. Today this linear model does not function well especially in knowledge
industries. The line between the academic and commercial research is often a line drawn on water
and one needs overlapping funding systems to secure good results.
In technologically successful countries typically 60% of R&D investments come from private
sources and the rest from government. Large variations still occur between different countries in
terms of funding source and the execution of research activities.
Indirect measures of research support have also been employed. Tax benefits or investment
incentives can play an important role to define macroeconomic conditions favorable to creation
and growth of new knowledge industries.
3.2. Traditional versus high tech industries
The division of industries in low and high technology categories can be very misleading. Today
all industries need to employ high technology contributions to maintain their competitiveness.
For instance pulp and paper industries are today very high tech industries. The paper
machines run at speeds of 120 km/h in manufacturing multicoated papers, sometimes with
electronic components imbedded. However, they are not characterized as high tech industries,
since they do not invest more than 4% in R&D. This they could not invest because the margins
are often smaller than that. Much of the development work for forest industries have been done
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 57 (57)
Research and Innovation in Finland—Transformation into a Knowledge Economy 57
in other industrial sectors and the results have then been injected into the forest industry sector.
Thus the forest industries have maintained their competitiveness and profitability, and have grown
into the world dominance.
Situation is very similar in other traditional industries and also in agriculture. The erosion of
employment cannot be compensated by creation of new industries if the traditional sectors are
left in decline.
It is also very important to secure the competitiveness of small and medium size companies.
More and more they also need to have export capabilities and face global competition. They need
to have access to the best technology but typically can not afford to have there own research
personnel and facilities. Hence they need access and collaboration with research capacities of
universities and research centers. Such links are particularly strong for small and medium size
companies in Finland.
3.3. National and international approach
International collaboration plays an ever more important role in research and knowledge
industries. Especially for high tech companies in small countries the markets are immediately
international.
At the European level the share of European collaborative research is about 15% of the total.
Much of this is invested in large facilities, such as accelerators for particle physics, astronomy and
space studies, whose costs exceed the capabilities of even larger countries. Many such activities
today require into global collaborations.
The benefits of international collaboration are many. Often the links created outlive the
research phase and form permanent networks. The leverage of collaboration is large, for instance
Finland pays about 1.5% of the EU research programs but is part of about 10% of research
projects. Thus some six times more knowledge is obtained than by working alone.
Very important benefit is the strategic advantage. Many questions today, such as climatic
change, mapping human genomes, control and cure of viral diseases, and telecommunication
standards cannot be addresses alone but require wide international collaboration. The very
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success of the European and especially Finnish telecommunication industry is based on wide-open
standards, where even competitors get together to define the best alternatives.
3.4. Telecommunication and network economies
In the future we will see the convergence of different platforms and channels into wideband
systems. Telecommunication has the potential of eliminating the disadvantages of peripheral
locations and becoming a great equalizer of opportunities.
Access through Internet and mobile communications helps to establish presence and collab-
orations on the global scale. In Finland this has been complemented by a free access to most
powerful computers by the university sector. This has accelerated the adoption of new design
and operational tools for all industries as well for service sectors, including banking and financial
services.
Knowledge economies are evolving towards network systems where small research studios can
be in collaboration with or serve as embryos for large international corporations. They resemble
biological systems with multiple interactions and specialized tasks for different subsystems.
The evolution towards network economies is accelerated by modern telecommunications linking
scientists, industrialists and policy makers all around the world.
3.5. Content industries
The explosion of the number of new communication channels has created a great demand for
new content, for instance in the mobile information society. Creative content industries represent
the next wave of evolution after technologies. The very paradigm of value chains is changing rapidly.
The monopoly of distribution companies is disappearing and the focus of investments is changing
from distribution to content production. Entrepreneurial companies seeking channel-independent
distribution will do increasingly content production.
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In the new technology driven part of the value chain huge investments of more than 100
billion Euros have been made in Europe in the license fees of the third generation of mobile
phones. Another 100 billion Euros will be needed for the wideband networks before the services
can begin. In comparison the investments in content production have been quite small.
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The content industries require local presence and global access. Not every country can have
global information and communication giants, but they all need to be active in content creation
based on local needs, languages and cultures.
3.6. Success Factors
The performance and the efficiency of the innovation systems remain difficult to measure.
Comparison of investments and results can provide guidance to best practices. Such studies have
been conducted to measure R&D intensity and GDP growth. The results show clear correlations
but also indicate complex relationships between the variables.
The success of creating new knowledge and converting it into economic and social benefit
depends on several factors. These factors are rather similar to those used when evaluating the
competitiveness of different countries or economic areas or when assessing the transition towards
knowledge economies.
Studies conducted at Merit Institute group these factors in four major areas including
research capacity, social and human capital, absorption capacity and technology and innovation.
Good overall success would be assured by strengths in all these areas. However, success can be
obtained, at least temporarily by different bias of the elements. Combination of two of these four
major elements could be characterized by supply, users, demand and creators.
Different countries depend on different combination of these elements. Finland belongs to
the group of technology suppliers, while Sweden in more in the knowledge creator group. Japan
is biased towards demand while Ireland high strong human capital and absorption capacity is
a successful technology user, as also illustrated by their economic growth despite of relatively
modest R&D investments.
During their economic development countries can and often need to develop new strengths
change their bias in response to changing global competition and domestic situation. Finland
for instance has managed to transform its earlier raw-material based economy towards more
diversified knowledge economy.
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3.7. Competitive Clusters
The chance of individual companies succeeding alone in the rapidly globalizing world is quickly
disappearing. Even largest companies today for alliances and networks all over the world, often
also with their competitors. We have seen this in the battle of telecom and software standards.
Competitive clusters are emerging as a model for success. They can be located in the common
areas like many high technology clusters in the world, but they can be also be localized in
different regions.
In the European Union for instance aircraft manufacturing has been completely restructured
around multinational Airbus Industries. Because of the huge development costs smaller companies
or small countries would have no role to play in the still rapidly growing industry. In Finland we
can no more build even small airplanes but we can build advanced components for large aircraft.
The cluster dynamics also applies to more traditional industries combining the strengths of
different players. Clusters are emerging also as a results of externalizing many activities when
aiming at better efficiencies and more flexibility.
The forest industry cluster in Finland but extending to many other countries is a good
example of competitive clusters in traditional industries. The partners benefit from the knowledge
base of the others and have gained dominant market share in the world in their respective areas.
Studies by Michael Porter and his associates indicated the importance of competitive clusters
also to their region. Studies of the United States divided into several hundred smaller economic
areas makes it feasible to draw conclusions also for smaller countries.
Clusters can be divided in local clusters operating in areas such as education, health care,
construction, and on the other hand to trading clusters with links and exports outside their own
areas. The trading clusters typically have higher productivity, much larger patent portfolios and
capacity to pay higher wages.
Trading clusters are also economic locomotives for their regions. In areas where their share
is high compared to the average the overall economic performance as indicated for instance by
the wage levels is much improved. For smaller countries this means that you must have strong
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export industries and external balance or surplus to be able to get all the tools needed for higher
productivity also in the local clusters.
3.8. Innovation systems
Good functioning of innovation systems requires a good integration and interaction of its
subsystems. Basic research at the universities needs to be coupled by technology transfer to
industrial companies and to the finance world for creation of new knowledge companies. Most
suitable partners are no more found in local towns but often have to be searched all around
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the world. Especially in the small countries, like Finland, the smooth co-operation between
different partners and stakeholders needs to be well established. Basic science discoveries need
to be protected and industry brought in early enough in the projects. For new knowledge based
companies the interaction between research and financial world is as important as that with
industries in traditional sectors.
It remains very much the function of national innovation policies to define the national goals
and the best strategies, maintaining and improving the competitiveness of traditional industries
and creation of new knowledge economies. Integrated innovations systems assuring generation of
new knowledge through research and development and ability to convert these results to economic
and social benefits are amongst the best methods available. Linking the economic and social goals
of the country to the new opportunities of knowledge economies and international collaboration
helps to catch and ride the knowledge wave.
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JAN G. LAMBOOY
THE FUTURE OF AN INNOVATIVE EUROPE:
THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS
1. Introduction
One of the principal attributes of Europe has been and still is the heterogeneity of its
populations, resources and cultures. Europe has long attempted to tackle this diversity through
war and peace, through competition and cooperation, as well as through political, military, cultural
and economic strategies.
Europe is now entering a new phase in its development—one based on ‘cooperative competition’
among countries and regions, for which it must accept the heterogeneity, cooperation and economic
competition between the various parts of this ‘new continent’. Europe is also confronted with new
and old challenges, such as the competition from East-Asia (based on the low costs of labour for
mass-production), the ‘Americanisation of the mass-media’, the communication revolution with ICT
as a venue for world-wide networks, the processes of individualisation and ad-hoc networks, and
the world-wide transport connections for mass-tourism and container transport. In the future, the
low birth-rates and the increasingly aging populations of most western countries and Japan can
give rise to tensions, because of the affordability issues involved in the growing needs for health
care, social security, and old-age pensions. In addition, the demographic structure of Europe
is changing by immigration from Asia and Africa. Immigration is measurable not only in the
demographical structure but also in the religious composition.
The future of Europe can be approached from various perspectives: economic, sociological,
demographic, political and institutional (including cultural and ethical issues). This chapter discusses
the possibility to develop knowledge as an important ‘driver’ for the solution of problems and as an
integrative force for the heterogeneity of perspectives. This statement rests on two assumptions.
The first one is that the development of knowledge helps us find new ways to realise ‘cooperative
competition’. The second assumption is that innovation is more than just the introduction of
new technologies, products and processes. It is not only ‘creative destruction’ (as Schumpeter
called the impact of innovation on markets and incumbent businesses) of an economic nature, but
it is also ‘creative construction’ in the institutional sense. If institutions are modernised to fit
present-day society, they can have a positive impact on social and economic potentials. Innovation
can be connected with technological, organisational, spatial and social issues. An example of this
interrelatedness is that, during the rise of capitalism in the 19th century, the increasing dominance
of manufacturing industry led to a strong urbanisation, the rise of labour unions, the rise of new
political ideologies (such as liberalism, socialism and conservatism), the end of monarchies, and the
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extension of world markets and colonies. Incomes have increased dramatically and consumption has
become an important part of life-styles. Cultural attitudes, art and educational systems have also
changed, although in a slower pace.
The post-World War II period displayed even more dramatic changes, interrelated with the
rise of new technologies (such as the automobile, the jet, TV and the computer), various new
chemical products, the enormous increase of medical knowledge, the impact of the independence
movements in the Third World, and the fall of the USSR. Other important developments were
the increased participation of people in education, the decline in the birth rates and the increase
in the share of elderly people and migrants from everywhere.
Changes in the economic and social structures are general and pervasive. They are an
inherent attribute of modern economic systems. Marx already considered change to be the most
important attribute of capitalism (Baumol, 2002, p.1). How do we cope with it? How do institutions
and enterprises, and how do workers and consumers react and adjust to all these new changes in
the contexts of their lives? How do politicians and political systems adjust? This process of change
can only partly be influenced by politicians, more in the sense of regulating the direction than of
really determining the outcome. Essentially, change is a self-organising evolutionary process with
undetermined outcomes.
This chapter will address some of these problems, using the Netherlands as a case study. In
the late 1990s, this country of about 16 million inhabitants showed a high growth performance,
whereas currently it is facing a period of low economic growth and many social, demographic and
spatial problems. Innovation and the fostering of the ‘knowledge economy’ are generally perceived
as the solution to the problem of keeping up in the ‘world game of competition’. However, following
the sociologist Amitai Etzioni (1988; 2004), some emphasise the need to develop new values, in
order to create more ‘community’ and less ‘competition’. This movement has relations with a very
heterogeneous group of supporters, among which various church organisations and ‘anti-globalists’
as well as some more conservative organisations.
First, the issue of economic growth will be discussed. Subsequently, we will deal with
institutional and political reforms.
2. Economic growth, technology and institutions
Economic theory explains economic growth as the result of the combined inputs of the
‘production factors’ capital (including natural resources and land), labour and technology. In this
view, economic growth concerns the increase of capital (investments in ‘capital goods’ such as
machines, mines, buildings and infrastructure), the growing labour force (the increases in both
number and/or quality) and the progress of technology.
According to many econometric studies, technology’s contribution to economic growth equals
at least 50%. This strong contribution can be related to the importance of knowledge and
innovation. We can reformulate the explanation by using knowledge and technological progress as
the principal sources of economic growth. Both the effect of growing investments in capital goods
and the increase in labour quality depend primarily on knowledge and innovation. Knowledge is
not a separate ‘production factor’; it is linked to people (‘knowledge workers’) and capital goods
(trucks, cranes, computers, mobile phones). Through the ‘intermediary factor’, the rise in the
productivity of labour and capital, this leads to increasing wealth. Economic growth can then
be defined as productivity growth, resulting in higher per capita incomes and higher profits.
Technology also can be redefined as the combined knowledge of workers and management to
make and use advanced capital goods, in combination with their competences to organise the
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process of using inputs to create outputs. The organisational forms used to realise these goals are
firms and inter-firm networks.
The process of growth requires the continuous improvement of knowledge and organisation.
However, new knowledge causes continuous changes in the process of invention, design, devel-
opment, production, transport and application of products. The economic effects are based on
innovation, which is the introduction of ideas, products and processes on markets. Organisations
like firms, hospitals, governments and universities need continuously to adjust to the altered
contexts. Innovation cannot be studied only by looking at products; it is also necessary to look
at the integrated process, from the invention to the final demand, as well as at the contexts
of markets, institutions and locations. Knowledge and innovation are part of the core of the
explanation of economic growth, even more so than just investments and the addition of labour.
But, investments can foster the development and dissemination of technological knowledge and
innovations, as was emphasised by the New Growth Economics (Romer 1986).
The traditional approach to explaining growth was based on the production factors capital
and labour. Technology was added in a later stage, and currently institutions are increasingly
considered to be another important factor in the explanation of growth. Nelson (1996) is one
of the economists who emphasise the importance of this factor. Nelson tried to find the most
important sources of economic growth, defined as productivity growth. He observes that ‘technical
advance is the main driver of economic growth’ (1996, p.1). But he also states (1996, p.1): ‘The
theory sketched here differs from the neoclassical growth theories in its attempt to encompass
what I believe are the central elements of the historical accounts of technical advance and related
activities and institutions’. And he emphasises that the growth process is a complex dynamic
system, with strong interactions among variables. Economic growth, technology and institutions
develop as an evolutionary process: ‘It involves the generation and testing of a variety of new
alternatives in competition with one another and with prevailing practice, with ex post selection
determining the winners and losers’. But he also underlines the importance of institutions for the
economic process: ‘in which technical advance and economic growth are seen as proceeding through
the operation of a complex set of institutions: some for profit, some private but not-for-profit, and
some governmental’; and ‘the prevailing set of institutions are seen as having evolved through
a complex set of processes that involve both individual and collective action’ (1996, pp.2–4).
Hayek (1973) also emphasised the importance of institutions as instrumental ‘sets of rules’
to enable economic subjects to act within acceptable limits of uncertainty. Economic institutions,
like property rights and a smoothly working financial system, create trust and reduce uncertainty
in markets. Only then can markets function properly. The government can create some of
the necessary institutions, but it must guard against over-regulation in order to prevent high
transaction costs. According to Hayek, the best institutions are the result of the coordinative
powers of the market participants themselves.
Hayek’s second condition for a smoothly functioning economic system is that economic subjects
are provided with the right information, via the markets and other informational channels. However,
the decision-making by individual citizens (consumers and producers) is a self-organising process
that cannot be determined by governments.
Douglas North, winner of the Nobel prize, has stressed that institutions determine the
‘incentive structure’ of people, for instance, the attitudes of people towards enterprises (North,
1990). It can be stated that markets and institutions can function differently in different national
contexts. Institutions also relate directly with economic values. People in different countries
regard entrepreneurs differently. In the USA, entrepreneurs are in high esteem, whereas in some
European countries entrepreneurs are not valued highly in social rankings. Sometimes even there
are strong interregional differences in attitude within one country.
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3. Institutional and structural reforms in Europe
The institutional structure can be considered as important factor for economic growth. But,
what exactly are institutions? Nelson (1996) seems to be a bit unclear on this issue, because
he mixes up organisations and institutions. However, it is necessary to distinguish between
institutions and organisations.
Firms, universities, hospitals, churches and governments are organisations, whereas an
institution can be seen as (1) a set of rules; and (2) values and norms. A ‘value’ is a basic and
generally shared belief about what ‘ought to be’, whereas a ‘norm’ is a derived rule on how to
apply values in daily life. In most countries, a value is hardly ever shared by all of the citizens.
Different political and religious organisations emphasise different values. These are the results
of social and political experiences and of the knowledge accumulated over hundreds of years.
The results are, however, also ‘context-dependent’, as is shown by the variations existing within
Europe. Europe has developed a heterogeneous mosaic of value systems in a structure of ‘living
apart together’. In the not too distant history this has led to military clashes and religious and
ethnic cleansing. The establishment of the European Union is a major endeavour on the road to
come to accept that various value systems can cooperate and compete, without military clashes.
This has to be safeguarded through laws and contracts (‘sets of rules’ and cross-border private
arrangements).
Certain kinds of organisations, like firms, basically work for profit, but dependent on and
constrained by institutions (e.g. acting in accordance with the law, and treating workers like human
beings). Other kinds of organisations, like political parties and churches, can emphasise their
particular values and norms. A state is an organisation based on a territory and a population, but
also on institutions like democratic values and human rights. The market is sometimes considered
as an institution, but it is not. It is just a mechanism that can have different results in different
institutional contexts. The ‘free market’ in its theoretical form does not exist. It always functions
within the constraints set by institutional forces and other contextual conditions. The free market
functions differently in the USA and in Europe, because of the different contexts of culture,
politics, laws and values. That is not to say that there are no common attributes to the functioning
of markets. In general, consumers anywhere will buy more when prices decline. And producers
anywhere will compete through prices and innovative behaviour to acquire a profitable market
share. But the political and institutional contexts differ.
One of the main institutional issues concerns the relationship between state and market.
A considerable variety of strategies exist. Many countries are currently engaged in debates on
how to find a country-specific solution, without becoming isolated in the world markets. The
debate relates to questions on privatisation, liberalisation and, more general, the governance of
society and economic development. Various theories on economic growth, on the knowledge-based
economy and innovation, and on the process of individualisation and ‘community’ values are
used in this debate. In general, the issue remains whether economic growth in ‘internationalised
economies’ has to change in another direction.
There are various options as to the direction of the choices that can be made by governments,
firms and citizens. For example:
1) The neo-liberal way of loosening the institutional ties, especially in ‘micro-reforms’ of the
labour market.
2) To stick to the ways developed under socialism, i.e., extreme state control and an emphasis
on re-distribution. This is opposite to the first-mentioned option.
3) To use the ‘green road’, i.e., to acquire a ‘sustainable’ economy with emphasis on the
environment.
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4) To put emphasis on ‘social values and ethics’, focusing on ‘communitarian thinking’, although
the issue of which economic structure belongs to this perspective is not clear. This option
emphasises abstaining from international competition, but stresses the goals of cooperation
and the sharing of international values (Etzioni, 2004).
5) To emphasise and improve the knowledge-based economy, yet maintain the market as an
important instrument, combined with centralised ‘guidance’ by the separate states and by the
European Union.
Of course, certain combinations of these views, but with differing accents, are possible.
Many people have accepted the alternative of the knowledge-based economy as a strategy to
becoming ‘competitive in the world market’, possibly combined with moving towards a society that
takes care of the ‘weak’, and with a sustainable environment, but not in the way in which this was
approached by the ‘old welfare states’ and the socialist states. Countries such as Denmark, Finland
and Sweden seem to be right on that way, combining this approach of innovative restructuring
with a strong growth record.
In Europe, the debate has received a strong impetus from the so-called ‘Lisbon-programme’
formulated in 2000, in which the European countries have set as their goal to foster a competitive
knowledge-based economy. Stimulating universities and research, and reforming institutions were
two of the main goals. In the European countries, especially the institutional reform has raised
many questions and has given rise to many conflicts. This debate often starts with the wrong
assumption, namely that the ‘modern economy’ no longer needs the goods-producing and goods-
handling sectors, because of the assumption that these are not ‘knowledge based’. In fact, the
existence of goods-production, goods-transportation and goods-consumption is not in contradiction
with the existence of a knowledge-based economy. In most modern economies, well over 50% of the
workforce and an even larger part of GNP is still connected with the production, transportation and
selling of goods. Even large parts of the services industry are based on goods, e.g. maintenance
and repair, wholesale, retail and transportation. But an even bigger misunderstanding would be
to think that the production, transportation and selling of goods is not knowledge-related. In
fact, knowledge is embedded in people as well as in (capital and consumer) goods. Research
and development largely take place in the laboratories of the manufacturing industry and in the
goods-producing agricultural sectors.
Transport, wholesale and retail firms belong to the sectors with the highest productivity
rates. Schumpeter already emphasised the growing importance of the large corporation as the
basis for a large part of R&D. Even now, in this period of innovative small entrepreneurs,
many new innovative firms are strongly connected with large corporations. Many entrepreneurs
and managers start their productive life at universities or in large enterprises. Inventions and
innovations are increasingly a result of relations in networks of scientists and entrepreneurs in
various sectors. The knowledge-based economy is based on goods and services. But even services
need computers, roads and rail, buildings and glass-fibre networks. This causes a need for space
in and around expanding cities. This is an important issue, more in particular in densely populated
regions. It has to be planned in a careful way, but it is not possible to build a knowledge-based
economy just on virtual chatting clubs on the Internet.
More fundamental is the debate on the provision of (former) public services. In many
countries, the state has retreated and the market has taken over. Schools, universities, hospitals,
airports, public transport, environmental planning and the intermediation of unemployed have
become entirely or partly ‘privatised’. This process means a fundamental change in the relationship
between the state and the market. The argumentation for this kind of policy is that the state has
to focus only on those functions which can be called ‘really public goods’ or ‘really collective
goods’, like defence, the decisions on the choice of laws and their enforcement, and the care for
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nature. In other cases, only a ‘market-failure’ to provide certain services can be taken as a ground
for deciding that the government has to do the job, possibly only temporarily.
In addition to economical and political dimensions, this issue also has ethical and philosophical
aspects. The concept of the ‘Welfare State’ was based on the view that the people with ‘the
strongest shoulders’ should take care of those with ‘weak shoulders’, the socially and economically
deprived. The current view is that this structure of redistribution has developed too far: it is
considered to have a heavy ‘overload’ of regulations, and the costs for society as a whole have
risen to levels that hurt both economic growth and individual responsibility. In more positive
wordings this means that ‘people have to be empowered, in order to decide for themselves what
kinds of choices have to be made’.
The debate on the dangers and advantages of the ‘strong State’ is not new. In the 17th
Century, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke emphasised the difficult choice between the need
to have the largest possible freedom of choice for the citizens on the one hand, and the strong
State (or the King) on the other hand, to secure the ‘common good’ by redressing the potentially
dangerous effects of individualism (Heugens, van Oosterhout and Vromen, 2003). It is interesting
to observe that economists tend to formulate this problem in a ‘digital’ way: there are only
two options, the state or the individuals on the market. In institutional economics and in some
Christian traditions, an emphasis is placed on ‘intermediate structures’, like cooperative farmers’
organisations, labour unions, churches, associations of universities, environmental organisations
and many other structures that stand midway between the state and the individual, be it for
a limited set of goals.
Although intermediate structures and interest groups have some elements in common, it is
good to emphasise the different traditions in Europe and the USA. In Europe, these structures
are primarily based on principles of responsibility and cooperation, whereas in the USA it is
mostly the lobby-groups emphasising their various interests. Governments sometimes use these
‘intermediate structures’ to solidify their basis in society by consulting them regularly. In many
European countries of the ‘welfare state’ type, a number of institutional arrangements have been
set up to create a platform for discussions and for the preparation for final political choices.
Another type of ‘intermediate structure’ is the ‘agency’, a decentralised organisation to perform
government-related functions. This kind of organisation is, in principle, completely determined
by government policies, although in practice they can develop a certain range of own goals and
means.
Europe-wide, the choice of a strategy to develop society and the economy is currently based
on the view as expressed in the ‘Lisbon-programme’, that dynamism and innovation have to be
acquired by reforming the entire building of the ‘State-Market structure’. This means that many
old structures, of both the welfare states and the intermediate structures, are either ‘reformed’
or abandoned. Most economists point to the examples set by Great-Britain, Australia, Sweden
and Denmark, where severe changes in the welfare state were followed by a period of new
entrepreneurial strength and strong economic growth. This view is also sustained by a majority of
political parties in Europe, even by the Social Democrats in Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands,
and Great-Britain. This majority also emphasises the positive civic effects of this change-oriented
policy, leading to the economic and institutional innovations that are necessary to foster the
‘knowledge-based economy’.
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4. The Netherlands: structure, problems and strategies
The country of the Netherlands shares many problems with its European neighbours. The
demographic changes with their concomitant future threat to the affordability of health care,
pensions and social security, in combination with the need to alter institutions and the economy in
order to be innovative and dynamic in an increasingly competitive world economy, are currently
basic issues for political decisions. Also, this densely populated and strongly urbanised country
with 16 million inhabitants needs a careful environmental, spatial and infrastructure policy. The
increasing share of (Islamic) newcomers in the cities has caused social and political unrest, as it
did in many other European countries. In the two largest cities Amsterdam and Rotterdam, this
share has increased to about 35%.
In this section we will focus on the economic structure and we will address the question of
how to approach governance in cooperation with certain intermediate structures.
The economic structure of the Netherlands is based on some strong clusters, such as the
agribusiness cluster (e.g. flowers, vegetables and dairy products, with e.g. Unilever as an important
corporation), the logistical-telecom cluster (telecommunication, ports, airports, wholesale, transport
and warehousing, with the Rotterdam seaport and the Amsterdam airport as important elements),
the business-services cluster (consultants, engineering firms, banks, insurance and other financial
services). We should remember that already in the 16th and 17th centuries (the ‘Golden Age’) the
Dutch were the first with a ‘bourse’ and an internationally recognised banking system.
The business services sector is still very important in the Netherlands. Apart from the
financial sector (with banks like ING and ABN-AMRO and the insurance company AEGON), it
also encompasses various smaller clusters, like those related with marine activities (the construction
of oil platforms, yacht-building), the design cluster (related with industrial design, entertainment-
related activities, e.g. radio-and TV-programmes; and the oil-chemical-pharmaceuticals cluster
(with large firms like Shell, DSM and Akzo). Other, in earlier stages isolated, manufacturing
industries (like Philips) and other electronics firms (like ASML) function in growing and deepening
clusters.
In general, it can be observed that the Netherlands has never been a real manufacturing
country. Most manufacturing activities have always been related with or dependent on other
clusters. An example is the formerly important wood products sector, based on the construction
of ships. Activities in the oil and petrochemical sectors were basically dependent on the large
seaports and on the past history of the Netherlands as a colonial empire. In the ‘Golden Age’,
the 17th Century, when the Netherlands had become independent (in 1648) after the 80-year war
with Spain, this country and specifically its western part, consisting of the provinces of Holland
and Zeeland, was probably the richest country in Europe, mainly due to its marine cluster and its
international trade. Dutch painters have expressed this wealth in many pictures (Schama, 1990).
The economic structure of the Netherlands today still reflects its past. Economic structures
do not change quickly; they are path-dependent and related with the knowledge base. In
other countries with a strong manufacturing tradition, like Germany and Sweden, this path-
dependency has resulted in a strong emphasis on technical education and a strong R&D-base.
The Netherlands has some strong knowledge bases, like in the agribusiness, the logistical-telecom
cluster and the financial services clusters. Even now, trade and transport, the agribusiness and
the financial activities are important pillars of the Dutch economy. The economic structure has
to develop further. The question is ‘in what direction’? This question is urgent because currently
there is a growing feeling that productivity and growth could suffer from globalisation, more in
particular by the competition by countries like China and India. The current economic problems
are low economic growth and high labour costs. However, when viewed over a longer term, the
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Dutch economy showed good results in the period of 1990–2000, with one of the best growth
results of the EU. The recession of 2002–2003, and the weak recovery since have caused a vigorous
debate on what to do, what strategy to choose.
There are two mainstreams, each with its own views on the future. One is that the present
problems have been caused by the over-optimistic (what Greenspan in the USA called ‘exuberant’)
years of 1997–2001, when wages, and the costs of social security and labour costs both rose very
rapidly, creating a structural overcapacity for the present period with low demand. The country
now needs a period of stability and policies to redress the results of that optimistic period.
Nothing has to be changed fundamentally. The labour unions and the ‘progressive’ parties sustain
this conservative view, although they accept the view that a more innovative economy is needed.
Others, however, including various parties like the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, the
employers’ unions and the federation of SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises), state that
the picture does not look so good, even if the country does succeed in redressing the financial
instabilities. This is because of the increased pressure from international competition, where many
international corporations are actively ‘outsourcing’ their production to countries like China and
India. These groups also stress the difficulties in finding ways to maintain the affordability of
old-age pensions, social security, and health care.
Although the unemployment rate in the Netherlands is relatively low (about 6–7%), the
real situation is better pictured by pointing towards the high share of this country’s non-active
population. A large part of jobs in Holland are part-time jobs, and a large share of the potential
workforce does not work due to ‘illness’ or early retirement. In relation to this low participation
rate, the average number of work hours per potentially active member of the labour force per
year in the Netherlands is even lower than in Germany. The productivity rate of those who do
actually work, however, is one of the highest in Europe. This is why the per-capita income in
the Netherlands still belongs to the top-five in the EU, after Luxemburg, Ireland, Denmark and
Sweden.
A broad platform of debaters in journals and on TV discusses the issue of how to find the
correct strategy to resolve the structural problems and to take up the new challenges. These all
share the view that innovation and a new dynamism have to be created, in order to safeguard
the wealth for future generations. But, the policies developed by the various groups are different.
Some look at the ‘neo-liberal’ strategy, where governments need to refrain from strong regulation
as to firms and individuals, whereas others tend to emphasise the need for ‘community-building’
and maintaining the more re-distributive measures, and abstaining from being ‘supporters of
the multinationals’. The Netherlands has a strong tradition of the government consulting the
‘intermediate structures’. Very important in this regard is the ‘Socio-Economic Council’, a formal
platform where the government consults with the labour unions, the employers’ federations and
representatives of ‘the Crown’, mostly economics professors. Wage-rises, social-security laws, and
even policy documents on spatial planning are discussed in this Council. This perspective of
the ‘Neo-corporatist State’ (often called the ‘Polder model’) has created a political equilibrium,
but at the same time an institutional lock-in, with resulting difficulties when changes in the
socio-economic structure were necessary. The current Government has attempted to diminish the
power of the intermediate structures in political decision-making, in order to be able to change
many structures faster and more fundamentally than before.
A widely accepted strategy is the development of a more innovative economy and the fostering
of the knowledge-based economy. Innovation is connected with creativity, but also with values of
motivated search and with risk-taking economic activities. Governments cannot really influence
this ‘value-attitude complex’ directly, but education and the promotion of entrepreneurship can
create positive social and political values. What governments can do is to systematically promote
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education and research, by providing funds and by creating incentives through taxes and through
diminishing inhibiting regulations. The debate is on how to execute this widely shared strategy.
The financial situation of the government is not so strong that it will be easy to extend the funds
to be allocated to the research institutes of universities and to enterprises.
Baumol (2002) emphasises the role of the market as a ‘self-organising system’. In his view, state-
subsidies are not really necessary. The market will show us where the most important opportunities
are. In our opinion, however, governments have more opportunities, because governments are
already important decision-makers in the political-economic field. The government is still one of
the strong players in economics, due to the role of taxes and expenditures. For instance, the
government still spends the larger part of the investments in infrastructure.
The Netherlands has problems that are similar to those of many other countries in the
EU. However, because of its specific economic non-manufacturing structure it cannot just simply
emulate others.
5. Conclusion
Europe faces various challenges that can be harmful if it does not approach them seriously.
One of the main challenges is how to cope with a future with a diminishing and ageing
population, in combination with increasing competition from Asian economies. There is a need for
enhancing an attitude of ‘cooperative competition’ with other European countries in an endeavour
of ‘creative construction’. At the same time there is a pressing problem of how to cope with
the increasing difficulty to afford the social security system and pension-systems of the welfare
state established in times of a relative closure of countries. The response lies in a combination
of techno-economic and institutional innovations, in order to enhance the competitive cooperation
between European countries. This requires a Europe-wide support for new approaches to construct
the knowledge-based economy that was set as a goal in the Lisbon-programme.
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POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION AREA:
Strategic Challenges
for our Science and Technology
A model of the innovation scene
For more adequate analyses of processes of innovation and technology transfer, a model of
the innovation scene may be useful. The general inspiration here has been an idea of a Triple
Helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1995). The model assumes that there are three main actors
on the scene: (1) Industry (companies), (2) Science (the R&D sector) and (3) Government (the
state). Each one has here an important role to play and none can be absent.
So, if we treat the innovation scene like a theatre stage, then we shall be able to distinguish
the actors who are in the foreground and those in the background. Having three main actors
mentioned above, we must not forget whom they play for. In this case, let’s assume that the
spectator is a buyer/user of an innovation mainly in a form of a new product or process. He/she
may be a consumer or producer, other than the innovator.
Thus, the concept of a triangle inscribed into a circle may be constructed as in Figure 1.
This theoretical model is very simplified and needs to be further refined. It is treated here as
a method of analysis and does not contradict the concept of the national system of innovation
(Lundvall, ed, 1992; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; Tidd, Bessant, Pavitt, 1997); see further.
The idea behind this triangle is, in short, that there are mutual relationships between the
three actors, like: negotiations, pressures and other interactions of various kinds. So, there exist
here unilateral influences and multilateral interactions (feedbacks); there are direct and indirect
influences. For example, as indirect relationships may be included co-operation between science
and industry via uttis.
Each of the main actors has a double role to play:
(1) industry submits demands for new scientific-technological solutions and offers supply of
innovations, both to consumers and to producers;
(2) science sells the results of the R&D work on its own initiative and replies to orders from
industry, so science offers a supply of new scientific and technical achievements;
(3) government mainly fulfills a regulation function in the national economy but sometimes also
plays a real role as a market participant (e.g. via public procurement).
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 76 (76)
76 Andrzej H. Jasiñski
And what about the user? He/she usually submits demands for innovations towards industry.
But to ensure an efficient functioning of the innovation scene, it should look like a modern,
interactive theatre stage where the spectator acts as an active partner. In this case, a future user
should play both inspiring and verifying roles in the innovation process.
To complete this picture, it must be added that, like in a real theatre, important roles are
sometimes played by actors in the background. Here we refer to uttis. They facilitate both
Science-Industry linkages, i.e. vertical technology transfer from the R&D sector to companies, as
well as horizontal TT between firms within Industry.
In most highly developed countries, uttis exist mainly in three forms:
(a) science parks and technology/innovation centres,
(b) bridging institutions and
(c) spin-off firms.
Their potentially major roles result from that that an innovation ‘stands on two legs’: one leg
still lies in R&D while a second already lies in Production. Thus, a permeable transfer between
the two spheres is here so important. In advanced market economies, good (i.e. wide and intensive)
co-operation between the R&D sector and industry creates favourable conditions for technology
transfer from science to the business sector and for TT among industrial enterprises, too.
The main relationships in the model may be shown in a simplified form as on figure on next
page:
This paper refers mainly to the government and its policy.
The national innovation system: Quasi-SWOT
In comparison with highly developed countries, the national system of innovation in Poland,
as a legacy after the previous system, still has several structural weaknesses but also some
strengths.
The main shortcomings are as follows:
• a very weak R&D potential within industrial enterprises (in-house R&D); this is perhaps the
greatest weakness,
• obsolete technologies and old equipment in many sectors, like electronics, telecommunications,
heave industry etc,
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• an insufficient number of technology-transfer brokers (bridging institutions) between the R&D
sector and industry,
• a very small role played by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the development
of technology,
• a lack of sufficient marketing experience among research institutions.
The main trump-cards of the Polish system of innovation are:
• a big potential of R&D workers (the R&D potential is not too big, as some might argue, but
it is situated in the wrong places: far from the market),
• a well-educated and skilled technical staff in the enterprises: relatively many engineers work
in the Polish industry,
• lower—in comparison with the West—cost of labour-force in general and including wages of
R&D workers,
• modern technical equipment in some sectors, like shipping industry, manufacturing of coal-
mining machines.
However, we should be aware of several potential threats but also of some opportunities for
the national system of innovation, and especially for research institutions. The background here is
the European Union.
The main possible threats, which can appear, are:
• a very strong competition from the side of research institutions both from old and new
member countries,
• a sharp competition from the side of experienced Western European institutions in the field
of certification in the Polish market
• a loss of some part of research contracts in the country which can be over-taken by Western
research institutes,
• a wider penetration of the Polish R&D potential by international competitors,
• an easier emigration (brain drain) of Polish researchers to Western countries,
• a smaller range of public financing for R&D (according the Union’s regulations),
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 78 (78)
78 Andrzej H. Jasiñski
• collapse of some R&D units which will not be able to stand the stronger competition and
limited financing.
The main potential opportunities are as follows:
• a gaining of a bigger number of research contracts from abroad due to smaller costs of
research projects which might be accomplished in Poland,
• a possibility to gain the European experience in the field of marketing of R&D and innovation,
• a broader access to the Union’s research programmes, projects and funds,
• improvement in research effectiveness via the involvement into European networks and data
bases,
• a lessening of the technological distance/niche to Europe.
Taking it into consideration, public innovation policy in Poland should be based on two
assumptions:
1) to eliminate the weaknesses of the national system of innovation and
2) to strengthen the system’s strengths.
The policy should, of course, try to use the opportunities and be prepared for the threats.
New strategic challenges
Poland’s integration into the structures of the European Union has created a new strategic
challenge which is significantly increasing the competitiveness of the national economy. It will be
impossible to cope with this challenge without a considerable increase in the economy’s level of
innovation. At the same time, a second strategic challenge has appeared, which is meeting the
so-called Barcelona target, resulting from the Lisbon Strategy (i.e., up to 3% of GDP on GERD
in 2010).
In Poland, unfortunately, the present state of affairs in these two areas is highly unsatisfactory.
In the period of transition:
— the level of the economy’s innovativeness did not show a desirable improvement: innovation
performance showed some progress between 1993 and 1999 but started to decline again in
2000 (see Figure 2), and
— due to the fact that GERD (in constant prices) in 2002 remained on the same level as noted
in 1989, R&D performance also remained flat; both total and government expenditures on
R&D declined in relation to GDP (see Figure 3). In 2002, the GERD/GDP ratio was only
0.59% (GUS, 2004).
In order to make progress and meet the above challenges, an active approach and close
cooperation are urgently needed among the three main actors (science, industry and government)
on the innovation scene.
According to Rothewell and Zegveld (1985), public innovation policy is a fusion of science
policy and industrial policy with the overall strategic goal of achieving and maintaining a high
level of international competitiveness for a nation’s goods. There are slight differences between
the terms ‘innovation policy’ and ‘science and technology (S&T) policy.’ Simply stated, the former
is focused more on innovation/technology while the latter focuses more on science. Nevertheless,
numerous authors use these concepts, in principle, as synonyms (e.g., Rothwell and Zegveld, 1985;
Stoneman, 1978; Gibbons et al, 1994). In this paper, both terms will be used interchangeably.
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Science and technology policy in brief
At least three arguments can be identified for an adequate public science and technology
policy in Poland in the period of transition:
• First, since technological innovation is a phenomenon which, nowadays, receives public support
(in various forms) in numerous advanced market economies, innovation should also receive
such support in Poland;
• Second, the vast majority of Polish research institutions and research facilities of large
companies remain state-owned;
• Third, without the government’s positive and active attitude towards science and technology,
both market transformation of the Polish economy and its integration with the European
Union would proceed more slowly. Market forces in the country are still too weak and too
slow.
Poland has acquired some experience with innovation policy in the period of transition. After
analyzing all relevant government documents concerning science and technology in the past decade
(Jasinski, 2004a), in Polish practice, four periods can be distinguished within the context of this
policy:
Period up to 1989
Numerous financial incentives existed as policy regulations addressed mainly to companies,
especially small firms, to stimulate research and innovation activities.
1990–1994 Period
When fundamental, political and economic, reforms began in Poland at the beginning of the
1990s, almost all of the previous instruments were liquidated.
1995–1999 Period
Beginning in 1995, some of the ‘old’ incentives for R&D and innovation were restored; the
list of fiscal preferences was even quite long.
2000–present Period
Since the beginning of 2000, some tools have again been cancelled and no new instruments
have been introduced.
As can be seen, a kind of wavering in current innovation policy occurred. This was a
short-term oriented policy. The reason for this may have been the lack of a long-term strategy
for science and technology in Poland, especially for the transition period.
In summary, several major features of Poland’s public S&T policy in the period of transition
can be identified:
• the lack of a national long-term strategy for science and technology,
• wavering in current policy,
• poor coordination between government agencies,
• the relative decrease in budgetary R&D expenditures; now only 0.34% of GDP (MNiI, 2004),
• the highly centralized character of the policy, particularly in regard to finances for R&D, as
well as the lack of a regional approach,
• inadequate support for applied research within funding decisions,
• overemphasis placed on support for science instead of innovation per se, and
• the lack of a technology transfer/innovation diffusion policy.
However, it is difficult to observe clear correlations between innovation activity and
innovation policy. Therefore, the situation in the field of technical change in Poland has been
two-dimensional:
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On the one hand, market forces are still too weak and market mechanisms are not yet fully
efficient: the relatively large share of the state sector, the weak SME sector, the shaky equilibrium
on some markets, the high level of monopolization, etc.
On the other hand, there is the government, which is still learning how to conduct S&T
policy in the transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy, but the
consistency of the policy is insufficient. However, the government’s approach has evolved in a
positive direction: from the belief in the role of the invisible hand of the market in the process
of technological change, to an appreciation of the role played by science and technology policy in
the development of a modern economy.
Therefore, science and technology policy in Poland should be much more oriented towards the
creation and diffusion of innovation. Such an approach will favor increasing the competitiveness
of Polish enterprises. Moreover, in the case of Poland, attention should be given to an additional
policy aim based on the second challenge mentioned above.
Against this background, we assume the following starting thesis for further considerations:
both public and private expenditures on R&D should now begin to grow more rapidly, whereas
business sector spending should grow much more quickly. This is de facto another strategic
challenge. Such an approach will also lead to improving:
(1) proportions between the state and the business sectors in GERD. To date, the share of
budget appropriations has been too large (61.1% in 2002) and the share of industry, in the
broad meaning, has been much too small (22.7%; GUS, 2004),
(2) the relationship between expenditures on basic and applied research. In the last couple of
years the share of basic science (38.8% in 2002) has been much too high in comparison with
applied science (25.7%; GUS, 2004).
This means that no improvement has occurred in either of the above during the transition
period.
The Lisbon Strategy in Poland
In April 2004, the government published a new document: Strategy for Increasing Expenditures
on R&D to Meet Lisbon Strategy Assumptions (MNiI, 2004). This strategy contains three variants
concerning the growth of expenditures on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of GDP until 2010, which
are presented below (see Tables 1, 2 and 3).
Variant I assumes that, by 2010, budget appropriations should increase three times and
non-budget expenditures almost seven times in comparison with 2004. I believe this option to be
the most desirable, as it allows the Lisbon Strategy assumptions to be met. However, in light of
Polish realities, this variant seems highly unlikely.
Variant II assumes that, in 2010, Poland will achieve the average GERD/GDP ratio currently
noted in the European Union (2.20%). I consider this option satisfactory but insufficient to cope
with both challenges set out at the beginning of this paper.
Variant III assumes that the declining trend in R&D expenditures will be halted and finally
these expenditures will begin to grow. According to this variant, in 2010, Poland would reach the
GERD to GDP ratio noted in 1990. In my opinion, this option is undesirable, even harmful, and
would be worse than the present situation (Jasinski, 2004b).
The Strategy emphasizes the necessity to considerably increase the country’s R&D expen-
ditures but provides no guarantees that this will be achieved. The document contains many
interesting, reasonable and useful proposals, although some of them lack details such as specific
methods, tools and sources for a desirable, significant growth in both budgetary and non-budgetary
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Table 1
The share of R&D expenditures in GDP—Variant I
Year GERD Budget appropriations Non-budget expenditures
2004 0.64 0.34 0.30
2005 1.25 0.55 0.70
2006 1.50 0.60 0.90
2007 1.80 0.65 1.15
2008 2.20 0.75 1.45
2009 2.60 0.85 1.75
2010 3.00 1.00 2.00
Source: MNiI, 2004
Table 2
The share of R&D expenditures in GDP—Variant II
Year GERD Budget appropriations Non-budget expenditures
2004 0.64 0.34 0.30
2005 0.90 0.55 0.35
2006 1.05 0.60 0.45
2007 1.30 0.65 0.65
2008 1.65 0.75 0.90
2009 1.90 0.85 1.05
2010 2.20 0.80 1.40
Source: MNiI, 2004
R&D expenditures. (Selected proposals are included, e.g., in Jasinski, 2003b). The document raises
many questions but provides few answers.
Back to the innovation scene
Results of deep empirical research (Jasinski, ed, 2002) allow us to formulate conclusions
relating to three main actors on the innovation scene in transition.
(1) The R&D sector as a source of technical change:
• insufficient structural changes,
• inertia of the previous system prevailng 45 years,
• an active attitude to defend the state of possession,
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Table 3
The share of R&D expenditures in GDP—Variant III
Year GERD Budget appropriations Non-budget expenditures
2004 0.64 0.34 0.30
2005 0.66 0.34 0.32
2006 0.68 0.34 0.34
2007 0.85 0.34 0.51
2008 0.85 0.34 0.51
2009 1.00 0.36 0.64
2010 1.00 0.36 0.64
Source: MNiI, 2004
• too slow and long-lasting the process of transition.
Firms as a place where most innovations are implemented:
• too small the demand for R&D and innovation,
• an underestimated role of technological change for the long-term development,
• a lack of free capital for investment in R&D and innovation,
• too small a market compulsion to innovate.
Government as a potential catalyst of changes:
a) Policy towards science:
• stability, i.e. no significant turns in science policy,
• a will to maintain and protect the R&D sphere,
• limitations in budget R&D expenditures,
b) Policy towards industry:
• instability and wavering,
• a lack of clarity as to a role of government in technical change processes,
• a set of policy instruments having a one-sided character, mainly fiscal.
The observations made through this analysis prove thatslow, gradual technological devel-
opment was taking place in the Polish economy in the transition period. The progress was
a resultant of activities of the three main actors and a result of the clash of positive and
negative tendencies on the scene. It was and still is a difficult, long-lasting period of a creative
destruction. The transition from a centrally planned economy to an advanced market economy
turned out not an easy and short process also in the field of science and technology.
However, not only the government can be blamed for the slow progress in processes of
innovation and technology transfer. All the actors share the responsibility for it. Also, there
was a lack of sufficient co-operation between them on the innovation scene . As regards the
government’s attitude, which is the main subject of our interest, co-ordination was lacking
in activities of various agencies responsible for science and technology policy and for its
adjustment to macro-economic policy. Of course, the state may only support market mechanisms
of technological change. Therefore, we have now the following practical state of the scene of
innovation (see Figure 4).
The other two players, apart from the government, behaved in different ways:
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• science—active defence of status quo, and
• industry—passive attitude towards R&D and innovation.
As a result, the three actors have not created a harmonious, integrated band. Links between
them, except science-government relations, are rather weak. Industrial firms are poorly interested
in co-operation with uttis. Public R&D institutions did not yet learn to co-operate closely with
private enterprises, and vice versa. Additionally, consumers and other users of innovation are
too rarely drawn into the research process. Therefore, our model of the innovation scene is still
fragmented. This is, to some extent, a relic of the past when all the actors were, in principle,
separated from each other.
So, a general picture of the innovation scene in Poland looks as follows:
1. Industry submits too small a demand for R&D and new scientific-technological solutions;
also, it offers relatively small supply of modern products,
2. Science, being insufficiently stimulated by industry to greater effort, offers too small a
supply of scientific and technical achievements of the highest level,
3. Government is not able enough to couple science policy with industrial policy into a
comprehensive S&T policy. Public policy towards the R&D sector is mainly demand-oriented while
policy towards industry—mainly supply-oriented, and it is not so easy to reconcile one with
another. In addition, the state does not know how to integrate S&T policy with macro-economic
policy in a contemporary market economy. Moreover, the government doesn’t adequately ‘take
care’ of uttis and consumers as innovation users,
4. Uttis still are sparse and weak; some of them are not expansive enough and tend to
disappear from the market,
5. User in Poland was often neglected by all the actors. He/she does not yet have a sufficiently
strong position in the market; his/her pressure on industry is not powerful enough.
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Policy recommendations
Taking the above into account, some policy recommendations can be formulated (Jasinski,
2003a). The proposals apply mainly to public innovation policy.
First of all, a good ‘climate’ for innovation is necessary and should be created by macro-
economic policies oriented at growth, employment, equilibrium and market competition. Such a
climate should create general economic conditions that are favorable for technological change.
The country’s long-term strategy for science and technology is equally important. The gov-
ernment should set realistic strategic goals and be responsible for their consistent implementation.
S&T policy should result from this strategy.
The key method of counteracting the decline in R&D expenditures would appear to be
mobilizing corporate research and innovation activities. An innovation-oriented entrepreneur/firm
should be the main object of S&T policy rather than a scientific institution. The science sector
should be treated—in this context—as the key element of the firm’s environment. Therefore,
re-thinking is required on the part of policy-makers. This is also a kind of strategic challenge.
The scale of state intervention in the S&T system should decline together with:
— the strengthening of market forces/mechanisms in the process of transition;
— the growing role of the private sector in R&D spending; and
— the increasing share of the banking system in financing R&D and innovations.
Science and technology policy should have a more regional character i.e., it should become
decentralized and regionally diversified. This will also serve to create regional innovation systems
(RISs).
Finally, integration of innovation policy is needed via the five Cs. This means that the
policy will be (Jasinski, 2003a):
(1) coordinated: the policy should be well coordinated among various government agencies
responsible for close cooperation in science and technology. A new semi-governmental body should,
in my opinion, be established, such as a Council/Committee for Science, Technology and Innovation
headed by Prime Minister;
(2) correlated: the policy measures addressed to the science sector should be correlated with
measures addressed to industry within innovation policy. Since Poland at present does not need
more scientific discoveries but more practical applications of R&D results in the form of new
products or processes, the policy priorities must be focused on applied research and, especially,
on experimental development and implementation work;
(3) comprehensive: important components of the policy-mix should address: (a) high-tech
sectors, (b) technology transfer in the broad sense i.e., including uttis (units making up
technology-transfer infrastructure) and foreign direct investments, and (c) R&D and innovation
in small and medium-sized enterprises, especially private sector enterprises. Policy instruments
should be much more differentiated to include not only fiscal instruments but also other financial
tools plus organizational measures, training, etc;
(4) compatible: the policy should be compatible with, or adjusted to, the macro-economic
policy-mix. Government documents concerning macro-policy and S&T policy should be prepared
concurrently;
(5) coherent: the national innovation policy should be coherent with the EU policy for
research and technology development (RTD). Such coherence is of significant importance in
the process of Poland’s integration with the European Union. (For more details on the European
Union policy—see Galar, in this volume, where he gives comments to The EU’s Third Report on
Science and Technology Indicators, Brussels, 2003).
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These five Cs may also be treated as strategic challenges for the Polish science and
technology.
Conclusion
From this paper, one can conclude that most strategic challenges faced by the Polish science
and technology result from Poland’s integration into the European Union. The Polish innovation
scene now is an element of the Union theatre. Therefore, numerous adjustment actions are
necessary to have the country’s science and technology system incorporated into the European
Research and Innovation Area (ERIA). In Poland, to cope with the above challenges, we should
follow the experiences gained by such countries as, for example, Finland (see Routti, 2004) or
Ireland (see: Cogan and McDevitt, 2000).
Bibliography
Cogan J D and McDevitt J (2000), Science and Technology Policy Evaluation: The Irish
Experience, SPRC, National University of Ireland, Dublin (mimeo)
Etzkowitz H, Leydesdorff L (1995), The Triple Helix: University—Industry—Government Rela-
tions, EASST Review, No 1
Gibbons M et al. (1994), The New Production of Knowledge, SAGE, London
GUS (2004), Science and Technology in Poland in 2002, Warszawa
Jasinski A H (1999), Main Actors and their Roles on the Innovation Scene, paper for Summer
Academy on Technology Studies, Deutschlandsberg, Austria, 11–16 July
Jasinski A H (2003a), Has Innovation Policy an Influence on Innovation? The Case of a Country
in Transition, Science and Public Policy, No 6
Jasinski A H (2003b), Postêp techniczny w okresie transformacji: Polskie doœwiadczenia i
perspektywy, Komitet Prognoz PAN, Warszawa
Jasinski A H, ed, (2002), Innovation in Transition: The Case of Poland, The Warsaw University
Press, Warsaw
Jasinski A H (2004a), Innovation Performance and Public Policy in Transition: The Polish
Perspective, International Journal of Technology and Globalisation, No 1,
Jasinski A H (2004b), Science promotion and S&T policy: Old practices and new challenges, in
Jasinski A H, ed, Transition Economies in the European Research and Innovation Area:
New Challenges for Their Science and Technology, The Warsaw University Press, Warsaw,
2004
Lundvall B A et al., ed (1992), National Systems of Innovation, Pinter, London,
MNiI (2004), Strategia zwiêkszania nak³adów na dzia³alnoœæ B+R w celu osi¹gniêcia za³o¿eñ
Strategii Lizboñskiej, Warszawa (mimeo)
Nelson R and Rosenberg N (1993), National Innovation Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Rothwell R and Zegveld W (1985), Reindustrialization and Technology, Longman, London
Routti J (2004), Research and Innovation in Finland: Transformation into a Knowledge Economy,
HUT, Helsinki (mimeo)
Stoneman P (1987), The Economic Analysis of Technology Policy, Clarendon Press, Oxford
Tidd J, Bessant J, Pavitt K (1997), Managing Innovation, Wiley, Chichester
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 87 (87)
WOJCIECH BURZYÑSKI
BENCHMARKING KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY IN FOUR OECD COUNTRIES:
SWITZERLAND, NETHERLANDS, FINDLAND
AND POLAND*
It is the creation of knowledge and the capacity to act,
which are the result of a process that is highly localized,
that determines competitive success.1
Michael Porter
Introduction
„To my mind we can build up four trajectories:
I. The trajectory of regional innovation systems
II. The trajectory of knowledge-based economy
III. The trajectory of geographical and structural clusters
IV. The regional trajectory
In each trajectory we should see three dimensions:
V. the theoretical dimension
VI. the methodological dimension
VII. the pragmatic dimension
The theoretical dimension is reflected in the conceptual framework and in the set of funda-
mental questions (paradigmatic questions) addressed to the objective reality. The methodological
dimension is related to the instrumental apparatus of our studies answering the question—how
effective and reliable is the whole pattern of applied measurements especially important in
comparative interregional and international research programmes. The pragmatic dimension
is reflected in the network of socio-economic policies developed and implemented by public
* An earlier version of this text—Benchmarking Knowledge-Based Economy in Switzerland, Netherlands, Finland
and Poland— was published as the Discussion Paper No. 86,. Foreign Trade Research Institute, Warsaw, in October,
2004, before the dissemination of the European Commission’s European Competitiveness Report 2004. Competitiveness
and Benchmarking as well as Facing the Challenges. The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment. Report from
the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok.
1 Porter M.E. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. The Free Press. New York 1990. p. 736.
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authorities. These three dimensions can be also outlined as a triadic interaction of theory,
measurement and policy.” 2
“Knowledge has become the driving force of economic growth, social development and job
creation as the primary source of competitiveness in the world market. As a result, the OECD
countries are in a process of transition from resource-based to knowledge-based economies.” 3
This paper benchmarks experience of the focus group of four OECD countries—Switzerland,
Netherlands, Finland, Poland—the Knowledge-Based Societies (KBS) developing the Knowledge-
Based Economies (KBE).
Moreover, questions have been posed for better understanding, monitoring and forecasting
KBE development as well as on feasibility of multilateral learning from the benchmarked countries’
experience.
The course of analysis is composed of the conceptual, methodological and pragmatic
dimensions. 4 In particular, apart from the methodological part, this paper comprises comparative
analysis of basic data, knowledge development and country profile scoreboards. In this
paper, descriptions of the knowledge-based society and the knowledge-based economy presented
by the OECD (knowledge-based economy), the World Bank Institute (knowledge assessment),
P.Drucker (entrepreneurship society) as well as P.A.David and D.Foray (knowledge society) have
been exploited, 5 though not necessarily in detail. In particular, it has been presumed that
the knowledge-based society represents the demand-side and the knowledge-based economy—
the supply-side in benchmarking countries’ performance. Finally, in line with dimensions of
measuring input, output and impact of science and technology, 6 the time sequence approach
to benchmarking development of KBE and KBS has been presented for countries, 7 with
application to regional studies as well.
1. The conceptual dimension
1.1. Assets of the benchmarking procedure
A note on interpretation of the benchmarking indicators is quoted here from the OECD
STI Scoreboard 1999 as a set of guidelines for further research:
2 Kukliñski A. Three countries—Four trajectories of European cooperation. A note for discussion. Annex I to
The Knowledge-Based Economy and Society Switzerland—Finland—Poland. Experiences and Prospects. Materials for
discussion. Warsaw, January 8th , 2004. This is also a note of gratitude to prof. Antoni Kukliñski for scientific
inspirations.
3 Managing National Innovation Systems. OECD. 1999. p. 3. Compare: “A knowledge-driven economy is one, in
which the federation and exploitation of knowledge play the predominant part in the creation of wealth.” (The British
Department of Trade and Industry, 1998). Poland is at the beginning of the road of creating elements of knowledge
economy. It has human capital capable of developing knowledge-based economy, however, appropriate institutional and
financial conditions should be established. Wy¿nikiewicz B. The knowledge economy—how far Poland could go? Report
on Management. VII edition. Knowledge-Based Economy. Education—Innovation—Infrastructure. L.KoŸmiñski Academy
of Entrepreneurship and Management. Conference. Warsaw. September 2003.
4 Compare: Kukliñski A. Development processes of the Knowledge-Based Economy in the Factographic Perspective.
[in:] Knowledge-Based Economy. The World Bank Perspectives. [ed.] A.Kukliñski. Warsaw 2003.
5 OECD STI Scoreboard 2003. Third European Report on STI EU. 2003. Drucker P. The Essential Drucker. 2001.
David P.A. Foray D. An introduction to the economy of the knowledge society. I.S.S.J. No. 171. 2002.
6 See e.g.:Goden B. Outline for a History of Science Measurement. Project on the History and Sociology of S&T
Measurement. Paper No. 1. 2000.
7 Application of the methodological proposals presented in this discussion paper would require e.g. simulating some
examples, involving practitioners, etc.
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• indicators only give a partial view of the reality. By nature, they only measure what can
by quantified and for which there are data. The need for internationally comparable data
further limits the number of indicators. In addition, many indicators do not reflect the quality
or efficiency of countries in particular areas. For example, a high R&D intensity does not
necessarily imply that R&D inputs are efficiently used;
• many variables are interrelated and have to be seen in a larger context, such as e.g. the
national innovation system or the global economic, political and social framework. Only a look
‘inside the black box’ and causal analysis could permit an identification of the reasons why
some countries obtain better results than others. This, however, goes beyond the scope of the
Scoreboard;
• some indicators play a more important role than others, but it is difficult to establish
a hierarchy due to a lack of clear criteria;
• many global indicators only reflect the performance of a few industries. However, an
average value for a given indicator may result from excellent performance in some industries
and poor performance in others;
• the interpretation of some indicators can be ambiguous. For example, outward foreign
direct investment flows should not be systematically interpreted as the result of weak
competitiveness of framework conditions unfavorable to domestic investment in the home
country. In contrast, the location of activities abroad may reflect internationalization strategies
of firms and be a sign of their dynamism and improved international competitiveness;
• country rankings should be interpreted with caution, especially when absolute differences
are small, since many indicators lack precision. But very low rankings may indicate potential
areas for improvement.
The above suggestions have been respected in this paper; furthermore—challenges resulting
from these remarks have been identified and met.
1.2. Benchmarking in reports on competitiveness
Two examples of country-level benchmarking published yearly by the Institute for Management
Development (IMD), Lausanne, and OECD, Paris, are referred to before the detailed insight into
databases. Below there are framework conditions for benchmarking in the relevant publications.
(1) The IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) looks at the relationship between
a country’s national environment (where the State plays a key role) and the wealth creation
process (assumed by enterprises and individuals). The WCY focuses on the outcome of interaction
of four competitiveness factors, which generally define a country’s national environment or
framework conditions (see p. 1.1 and Diagram 1).
Countries manage their environments according to what the IMD calls the four fundamental
forces: these four dimensions shape the country’s competitiveness environment. They are often
the result of tradition, history or value systems and are so deeply rooted in the modus operandi
of a country that, in most cases, they are not clearly stated or defined.
However, it is possible to integrate these dimensions into an overall theory, which is systemic,
that is, which also describes the relationships among the four axes. This theory does not aim to
quantify the competitiveness of a country, but rather to highlight a ‘competitiveness profile’, which
characterizes an economy and anticipates how it may behave.
A nation’s environment is the result on one hand, of facts, on which human efforts have
little impact, and on the other hand, of policies, which can be changed. On the basis of the
four factors and dimensions (Diagram 1) as well as more than 320 criteria, the WCY assumes
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that healthy performance in these dimensions creates a national environment that sustains world
competitiveness.
In particular, the IMD pinpoints technology stating that during the past two decades, the
technological revolution—computers, telecommunications and now Internet—has had a profound
impact on the competitiveness of nations. Moreover, the IMD clearly refers to both the demand-side
and supply-side of the impact of technology on competitiveness. Today, the notion of infrastructure
comprises availability of chap and efficient telecommunication systems, connections to the Internet
and development of mobile telephony (these are just a few of the new technological priorities
of nations that want to compete).
“Technology also impacts education by connecting schools to Internet, providing distance
learning, creating entrepreneurship attitudes as well as appropriate knowledge and skills.
Therefore, the priority of a competitive nation is to develop the people who will operate the
new technological infrastructure and strive to be on the leading edge of future developments.”
Furthermore, “the new technological requirements of enterprises have forced countries to give
a priority to technology. Attracting research centers, and developing cooperation between local
universities and enterprises, is becoming just as important for the competitiveness of country
as attracting FDI. The Internet allows companies to develop e-commerce, e-procurements,
auctions, and e-marketplaces across borders. This pushes countries to develop an advanced
technological infrastructure.” 8
Diagram 1 The Competitiveness Cube (as per IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook)
8 Some countries, such as South Africa, Mexico or Poland, are leapfrogging some technological infrastructure, for
example by focusing on mobile rather than fixed phones. See: Garelli S. Competitiveness of Nations: The Fundamentals.
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2003. p. 708.
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Concluding, “knowledge is perhaps the most critical competitiveness factor. As countries
move up the economic scale, the more they thrive on knowledge to ensure their prosperity and
to compete in world markets. How that knowledge is acquired and managed is each nation’s
responsibility. Indeed, nations do compete.” 9
(2) The OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (STI)—in particular 2001
edition (Towards the Knowledge-Based Economy) and 2003 STI edition, brings together the
latest internationally comparable data on the knowledge-based economy and focuses on the four
interrelated fields of economic activity (Diagram 2) and provides some 70 indicators of framework
conditions for developing knowledge-based societies and economies.
“Indicators that capture the changing relationships between science, innovation and economic
performance are crucial so that policy makers may make informed decisions, set priorities and
address the challenges of the knowledge-based economy.” 10
The OECD presents its approach towards the current transformation of factors of economic
development including governments’ tasks in creating framework conditions for benefits from
innovation systems. “The current wave of scientific discoveries and technical advances provides
OECD countries with unparalleled opportunities for economic growth and improved social
well-being. But the rapid increase in new scientific and technological knowledge only provides
economic and social benefits when it is effectively exploited and leads to innovation. Innovation
is a key driver of long-term economic growth, the primary basis for competitiveness in world
markets and part of the response to many societal challenges.
Diagram 2. The OECD STI Scoreboard focus on knowledge-based economy
9 However, this revolution challenges some of the basic functions of a State, rising such problems as i.a.: taxing
people who are making money on the Net; controlling ‘net companies’ that can operate in any given country without
being legally registered in that country’ ‘net companies’ easily bypassing country’s social legislation; protecting the
privacy of citizens; threats, blackmail, or plain actions using the latest technologies are becoming a reality for both
companies and governments. See: Garelli S. Competitiveness of Nations: The Fundamentals. [in:] The Competitiveness
of Nations in the Global Knowledge-Based Economy. H.H.Chartrand. April 2002. AAP Homepage.
10 OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2001. p. 3.
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“While public expectations from technological innovation are evolving in line with social
concerns (e.g. unemployment, sustainable development, ageing populations), the innovation
process itself is undergoing profound changes. Public policies must adapt effectively to such
changes. Governments face the task of strengthening innovation systems in order to take greater
advantage of globalization and the move to a knowledge-based economy.” 11
2. The methodological dimension: benchmarking country experi-
ence
2.1. Comparative analysis of basic data
The initial comparison of the four countries has been arranged for to expose at least
some of the basic economic processes, underlying development of the knowledge-based society
and economy. It includes the above mentioned attempt to distinguish between demand—society
and supply—economy (Appendix I). This presumption resulted in a number of conclusions and
questions.
In this paper the order of four countries in tables and figures reflects the currently available
and internationally harmonized measure—GDP per capita. Switzerland takes the first place, in
nominal and in purchasing power parity terms, followed by Netherlands, Finland and Poland
(Fig. 1), though Netherlands leads the four countries in terms of absolute value of GDP. Exports
from Netherlands (fob, total value, current prices) per capita—and in absolute value—exceeds
figures for Switzerland, Finland and Poland. Poland proves the best in the annual growth rate of
GDP and Finland—in public spending on education as % of GDP. Benchmarking consumer prices
average annual increase, savings ratio and most of living standards indicators (as well as for GDP
per capita) favored Switzerland.
11 Managing National Innovation Systems. OECD. 1999. p. 9.
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Furthermore, Netherlands, Switzerland and Finland—with quantitative disadvantage versus
Poland in number of employees—achieved impressive value of exports and reserves. Questions
to be posed may regard the size of countries, its impact on KBE development and welfare. 12
Suggested answers result from the benchmarking R&D expenditures by source of funding (Fig. 2)
and by R&D performing sector (Fig. 3) as well as business enterprise R&D intensity—expenditures
related to value added (Fig. 4). It proved that the business enterprise R&D expenditures (the
case of Finland and Switzerland) had been far more effective than government’s (the case of
Netherlands and Poland). “While the government and higher education sectors also carry out
R&D, industrial R&D is most closely linked to the creation of new products and production
techniques as well as to a country’s innovation efforts.”13
Benchmarking the four OECD countries by performing sector ‘s share of R&D expenditures
in national total confirms the above finding. Business enterprises in Switzerland and Finland
perform in R&D to a far larger extent than in Netherlands and Poland. However, it should be
noticed that governments in the four countries play more exposed role as sources of financing
R&D than as R&D performing sectors—with special regard to Switzerland (compare Fig. 2 and
3).
Moreover, benchmarking R&D intensity—allocation of value added to R&D expenditure—in
business enterprises discloses approximately ten times higher business R&D intensity in Finland
and Switzerland—and approximately five times higher in Netherlands—than in Poland. This
confirms the conclusion on necessity of combining quantitative with qualitative factors of KBE
development, in particular—total financial assets, venture capital as well as institutional framework,
managerial skills and attitudes.
2.2. Benchmarking knowledge economy framework conditions
On the World Bank Institute’s Internet site, Knowledge for Development, we read:
12 “Of the ten richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per head, only two have more than 5 mln people:
the United States, with 260 mln, and Switzerland, with 7 mln. A further two have population over 1 mln: Norway, with
4 mln and Singapore, with 3 mln. The remaining half-dozen have less than 1 mln people. What does such variation
imply about the link between population size and prosperity?” When small I beautiful? Economics focus. How big
a nation-state should be? “The Economist”. Dec. 20, 2003. Compare: Alesina A. Spolaore E. The Size of Nations. MIT
Press. 2003.
13 OECD STI Scoreboard 2003. http://www.oecd.org.
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“The knowledge assessment looks at 61 structural and qualitative variables to benchmark
how an economy compares with its neighbors, competitors or countries it wishes to emulate.
It helps to identify the problems and opportunities a country faces, and where it may need
to focus policy attention or future investments. The variables are proxies of four pillars of
a knowledge-based economy. In addition, the methodology includes several variables that track
overall economic performance, to show how well an economy uses knowledge for economic and
social development.” 14
14 Compare: Knowledge Assessment Methodology http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm.
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The World Bank Institute’s standard set of variables has been modified15 to obtain the
following composition of framework conditions for development of KBS and KBE, the hypothesis
being that amplification emerges between monitored processes, (Box 1).
Box 1. Variables for benchmarking knowledge economy
Performance indicators
1. Average annual GDP growth rate, 1990–99
2. Human Development Index, 1999
Economic Incentives and Institutional Regime
3. Tariff and non-tariff barriers, 2001
4. Property rights, 2001
Education and Human Resources
5. Public spending on education, as a % of GDP, 1999
6. Management education locally available in first-class schools, 2001
7. University education for competitive economy and labor market, 2001
Innovation system
8. FDI, as % of GDP; average 1990-99
9. Companies—universities research cooperation, 2001
10. Technical papers; per mill. persons, 1997
11. Venture capital locally available, 2001
12. High-technology goods, as a % of manufactured exports; 1999–01
Information infrastructure
13. Telephones—including mobile phones, per 1000 persons, 2002
14. Computers, per 1000 persons; 2002
15. Internet hosts, per 10000 persons; 2002
Source: based on http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm. (2002 KAM)
Note: The KAM uses 76 variables and offers a the standard, simplified set of 14 variables
Regulations of financial markets securing state financial stability, adult literacy, secondary enrollment, tertiary
enrollment and number of researchers in R&D from the KAM standard set of indicators have been replaced here
by: public spending on education, availability of management education in local first-class schools, adequacy of
university education for a competitive economy and labor market, companies—universities R&D cooperation, inflow
of foreign direct investment, availability of local venture capital.
It is also worth to notice that in the currently available 2004 KAM there are seven groups of variables
(described as ‘functional clusters’), namely: performance, economic regime, governance, innovation systems, education,
ICT, gender equality.
However, in the 2004 KAM we read: “In the Basic Scorecard three variables are used as proxies to describe
each of the four Knowledge Economy (KE) pillars: Economic Incentive and Institutional Regime, Education,
Innovation and ICT, plus two variables that describe economic and social performance.” KAM 2004 offers data on
components of Knowledge Economy Index (economic regime, education, innovation, information infrastructure) for
1995 and most recent
In any event, the above brief description of 2004 KAM confirms the explanations to 2002 KAM version (
exploited in this paper) as well as justifies the approach and conclusions based on the earlier version of the
interactive database.
Source: based on http//info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2004/home.asp
“The globalization of trade, finance and information makes it easier to narrow knowledge
gaps across countries. But the fast pace of change may widen the knowledge gap creating
a knowledge divide. If the gap widens, capital and other resources might flow to countries with
stronger knowledge bases, adding to the inequality.” 16
In order to illustrate strengths and shortcomings of the four countries, individual scorecards
are compared to each other (Fig. 5). The shape of diagram for each country results from
15 The objectives of the Knowledge Assessment Methodology / Matrix (KAM) are presented as follows: develop
a benchmarking tool to help countries assess how well positioned they are to use knowledge for development, make
the tool flexible so that a country can compare itself to its neighbours, competitors or others it wishes to emulate, help
to identify opportunities / challenges and where a country may need to focus policy attention or future investments.
http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm.
16 Dahlman C.J. Aubert J.E. China and the Knowledge Economy. Seizing the 21st Century. WBI Development
Studies. The World Bank. Washington D.C. 2001.
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 96 (96)
96 Wojciech Burzyñski
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 97 (97)
Benchmarking Knowledge-Based Economy in Four OECD Countries 97
benchmarking normalized variables (each of the 76 variables in the KAM is normalized on a scale
of zero to 10). 17 It merits attention that an economy should not necessarily aim for a perfect
score of 10 on all variables and be on the outer edges of the scorecard. Some variables reflect
performance, others reflect trade-offs which characterize different development strategies, still
others reflect the particular structural characteristics of an economy. 18
Main conclusions from this benchmarking state that:
• equal evaluation has been reached by:Switzerland, Netherlands, Finland and Poland in
the field of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, such as import bans and quotas as well as
strict labeling and licensing requirements; 19 Switzerland, Netherlands and Poland—in public
spending on education as % of GDP; Switzerland and Netherlands—in university education
for labor markets and number of Internet hosts per 10000 inhabitants; Switzerland and
Finland—in FDI as % of GDP and high-technology exports as % of manufacturing exports.
• individual leadership has been reached by: Switzerland—in management education locally
available, number of technical papers per mill. inhabitants and the number of computers per
1000 inhabitants; Netherlands—in FDI as % of GDP and high-technology exports as % of
manufacturing exports; Finland—in public spending on education as % of GDP, university
education meeting the needs of labor markets, companies-universities research cooperation
and number of Internet hosts per 10000 people; Poland—in average annual growth rate of
GDP.
• as many as nine variables have meaningly differ for Switzerland, Netherlands, Finland
and Poland, namely: average annual growth rate of GDP, public spending on education as
a % of GDP, management education locally available, university education meeting the needs
of labor markets, FDI as % of GDP, companies-universities research cooperation, availability
of venture capital as well as the number of computers per 1000 people and Internet hosts
per 10000 people.
Are these potential fields of sharing experiences or is it rather a starting point to consider
further research and qualitative analysis?
2.3. Country profiles
In order to follow the previously presented conceptual approach, the methodological and
analytical part of this paper has been supplemented by a distinction between demand (KBS) and
supply (KBE) indicators. Most of these indicators are based on qualitative surveys, so in this
respect they differ considerably both from the basic statistics (Appendix I) and the set of the
KAM variables exploited in the knowledge scorecards (Box 1 and Fig. 5).
The purpose for further division of demand and supply indicators into groups relating
directly to people and institutions (demand) as well as enterprises and business environment
(supply) was purely pragmatic. It corresponds with policies addressing creation and diffusion of
knowledge. 20 It may also contribute to feasibility of measures taken in mutual learning from
17 For details see: Normalisation Procedure for the KAM. http://worldbank.org/kam.
18 The Knowledge Assessment Methodology and Scorecards. http://worldbank.org/kam.
19 The score is part of the larger group of indices comprising The index of Economic Freedom provided
by the Heritage Foundation. The Index of Economic Freedom is a practical reference guide to the economies
of 161 countries, with detailed information about economic policy. It offers an annual in-depth examination of
the factors that contribute most directly to economic freedom and prosperity. Details of customs tariffs and
technical requirements, which may result from and may occur in the EU trade policy, are not mentioned
here.http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/Programs/kam2002/technical.ht m.
20 Compare: OECD STI Scoreboard 2001—Towards a knowledge-based economy. http://www.oecd.org. Information
and communication technology (ICT) continues to diffuse to households and businesses and electronic commerce
continues to gain in importance. OECD STI Scoreboard 2003. p. 7.
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the experience of other societies. Benchmarking the proposed groups of variables within country
profile scoreboard (Appendix II) has been a sample research exercise, subject to a discussion on
the composition of particular groups and their correspondence to input-output analysis. 21
For the chosen set of indicators, benchmarking has revealed the best level of particular
variables for each of the four countries in every part of the country profile scoreboard (Appendix
II). Each country has a potential to offer and share experience. From the ‘quantitative’ point of
view, Switzerland has revealed the potential for mutual learning in the case of three indicators,
Netherlands—in six, Finland—in seven and Poland—in three, of the total number of twenty four
fields covered by examined indicators.
There are equal values of three or even four countries in the case of the five remaining
indicators. Switzerland and Netherlands are equally evaluated in the field of property rights,
Switzerland and Finland—in soundness of banks, Netherlands and Finland—in Human Devel-
opment Index and availability of venture capital. It is also worth to notice once again, that the
four economies are equally unaffected by tariff and nontariff barriers to trade.
The benchmarking basic economic data (Appendix I and Fig. 1, 2 and 3) as well as development
of KBS and KBE (Box 1 and Figure 5), confirmed by benchmarking in the form of country profile
scoreboard (Appendix II) justify the conclusion on different composition of strengths of each of
the four countries. Furthermore, countries having undoubtedly different competitive positions on
the global market are equally opened to international competition. The more important it appears
to take advantage of benchmarking results by proposals in the field of pragmatic dimension of
the present analysis.
3. The pragmatic dimension: the time sequence approach to bench-
marking development of KBE
The proposed approach to benchmarking development of KBE is based on a set of indicators
prepared and published by international organizations. In this paper
• leading indicators relate to investment both in tangible and intangible assets,
• resulting indicators refer to knowledge dissemination and ICT,
• while indicators confirming the KBS and KBE development represent international economic
relations in the field of knowledge-intensive goods and services (Appendix III).
The development of KBS and KBE—as medium-term and long-term processes—may seem
isolated from short-term fluctuations. However, the similarity of notions used in the proposed
approach to those applied in a short-term analysis is not accidental. Modifications of speed in
ICT development result from ‘revolution’ of its technological background. 22 Waves on the markets
for ICT equipment, software and services are also directly connected with regulatory reforms
21 Compare: Multiregional and multinational systems [in:] Input-Output Techniques. Proceedings of the Fifth
International Conference on Input0Output Techniques. Geneva, January 1971. Mori S. Kikuchi J. Baba Y. Mitsuma
H. Development of Input-Output Model for Science and Technology Development—Numerical Evaluation and Policy
Implication. 1st Research Group. NISTEP Report No. 22.. Yamada M. Overseas Production of Japanese Firms and
Japan-US Interdependence. An Input-Output Analysis. Journal of Applied Input Output Analysis. Vol. 8 (December
2002). The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities. Manual on the Measurement of Human Resources
Devoted to S&T. Canberra Manual. OECD Paris 1995. Godin B. Outline for a History of Science Measurement.
Project on the History and Sociology of S&T Statistics. Paper No. 1. 2000.
22 See: New telecommunications technologies. After the telecommunications bubble. OECD Economic Outlook. No.
73. June 2003.
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and financial restructuring of the ICT sector23 and supports justification of the proposed time
sequence approach.
The comments on quantitative results of the time sequence approach to benchmarking
development of KBE (see: Appendix III) read as follows:
• of the eight proposed leading indicators the most favorable level has been noticed by:
Switzerland—in one case (number of technical papers per mill. inhabitants), Netherlands—in
four cases (gross capital formation as % of GDP, international telecommunication cost , FDI
as % of GDP and—ex aequo with Finland—in availability of venture capital (the only one
evaluated variable), Finland—in three cases (public expenditure on education as % of GDP
and total expenditure on R&D as well as—ex aequo with Netherlands—in availability of
venture capital) , Poland—as Switzerland—in one case (average annual GDP growth rate);
• of the four proposed resulting indicators—Switzerland had reached the highest level in
three cases (number of computers per 1000 inhabitants, Internet hosts per 10000 inhabitants
and patent applications gained by the US PTO per mill. inhabitants), Finland—in one case
(number of telephones per 1000 inhabitants);
• of the five proposed confirming indicators—Switzerland had achieved the most favorable
level in three cases (high-tech goods share in total exports and in manufacturing exports as
well as receipts for exports of technology), Netherlands—in one case (world market share of
exports of high-tech products, 2001), Poland—also in one case (average annual growth rate
of world market share of exports of high-tech products, 1996–2001).
Referring to sequence of KBE development in the four OECD countries, the most favorable
position in the field described by leading indicators has been achieved by Netherlands, in the fields
described by resulting and confirming indicators—by Switzerland. Finland and Poland have
reached a moderate position in the three discussed fields. These results require a discussion both
on the tools and data for the time sequence approach to benchmarking development of KBE.
Benchmarking in detail the technological intensity of exports (Fig. 6) has revealed:
• in share of high-technology goods in manufacturing exports—the leading position of Switzer-
land, followed by Netherlands and Finland as well as Poland (with share 3–4 times lower
than for the three other countries);
• in share of medium-high-technology goods—again the leading position of Switzerland, followed
by Poland as well as Netherlands and Finland, with share considerably lower than for
Switzerland and Poland.
Additional benchmarking average annual growth rate of high-tech exports and manufacturing
exports, 1992–2001, has resulted in pointing to Poland, with the highest rates in both cases,
followed by Finland, Netherlands and Switzerland (Fig. 7). These results to a considerable
extent reflect the already achieved position of high-tech goods in manufacturing exports of each
of the four OECD countries.
Like in an investment project, the time sequence illustrated by the proposed sets of KBE
development indicators:
• initially—involves more investment than brings income (leading indicators);
• consequently—promises more income than investment (resulting indicators)
• finally—leads to competitive advantages, with surplus in manufacturing trade, high-technology
products and technology balance of payments (confirming indicators).
In this context, as far as forecasting KBE development is concerned—even more important
for particular countries than their positions in rankings or scoreboards—are distances among
23 See The OECD-wide regulatory reform in telecommunications markets. The industry is in the middle of a deep
financial restructuring. After the Telecommunications Bubble. OECD Economic Outlook. No. 73. June 2003.
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compared countries, as measured by benchmarked indicators, institutional and financial framework
conditions included.
Benchmarking commodity structure of trade, by technology intensity, should be supplemented
by comparing difference between the cost of internal development and commercialization of
technologies and the cost of implementing technologies available on international markets,
considering also that internal investment in technologies may multiply local learning capabilities. 24
However, the sequence of events—from investment in education and R&D till production and
income effects for enterprises and state budget—requires not only “patience and time”, but also
intermediate financing.
4. Follow-up considerations
“Benchmarking should not be considered a one-off exercise. To be effective, it must become
an integral part of an ongoing improvement process with the goal of keeping abreast of ever-
improving best practice. Respective of the organizational context of a benchmarking initiative,
open and committed high-level support is a prerequisite for success.” 25
This paper contains a set of indicators was proposed and used for benchmarking development
of the knowledge-based economy, not neglecting the knowledge-based society. To meet the
analytical challenge of “individualizing” variables related to the knowledge-based society, the
economic approach of demand and supply was considered. Demand from the KBS for supply
from the KBE has been introduced into the benchmarking exercise—possibly, to the research
advantage—in comparison of basic statistical data, framework conditions and country profiles. 26
Benchmarking basic statistical data resulted in questions on size and prosperity of nations.
24 See: Arora A. Fosfuri A. Gambardella A. Markets for technology in the knowledge economy. I.S.S.J. No. 171.
2002. Managing National Innovation Systems. OECD. 1999.
25 See: O’Reagain S. Keegan R. What is Benchmarking? http://www.benchmarking-in-europe.htm.
26 Compare: Knowledge Assessment Methodology. http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm. (Available 2004 KAM).
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Benchmarking KBS and KBE indicators suggested the potential for offering and sharing
experience in creation societies and economies based on knowledge.
Benchmarking country profiles confirmed the above potential and proved usefulness of
qualitative variables to be exploited in further research projects.
Conditional answers to most questions asked in this paper provoked and inspired to propose
the time sequence approach to benchmarking development of KBE—also to be discussed and—
possibly—improved, resulting in better understanding the development of the Knowledge-Based
Society and Economy in their interdependence
Moreover, this paper has aimed at posing questions on possible change of the picture resulting
from benchmarking, that is, a question on feasibility of catching up, in the face of the scarcity
of catching up in modern economic history.
“In the current debate on the European Union enlargement there is an apparent mythical
belief that if the set of preconditions set by Brussels are fulfilled, rapid and sustained economic
growth would ensue, which would allow the newly admitted countries to catch up economically
with the better off European countries. An encapsulation of this thesis is the expression: “A
well functioning competitive market economy”, which would be able to withstand competitive
pressures inside the EU. Those who accept this thesis are ready to pont out to the experiences of
Ireland and Spain in Europe, in particular. But the evidence in this regard is not so conclusive.
In addition, there is glaring evidence worldwide as to the rarity of catching up. Thence, taking
for granted the above hypothesis can be misleading unless the possible sources of growth are
examined in a thorough and open-minded way.”27
It may be true that a country like Ireland might not have enjoyed the success without the
emergence of ICT, with its weightlessness and global applications. Nevertheless, it emphasizes the
extent to which the new economy is a great opportunity, provided the policies are right. 28
Membership in the EU does not automatically accelerate real convergence, but in combination
with proper internal policy it can help close the development gap separating Poland from
richer EU countries. 29 In particular, the design of programs to encourage private funding
of R&D has exercised the minds of policymakers in developed and developing countries, 30 but
manufacturing industry still plays a key role in Europe’s prosperity. It is, however, facing
challenges and there is a real concern about the risk that the Union is facing a process of
deindustrialization” 31.
“Innovation policy the European Union has developed strongly since the mid-1990s following
a period of awareness rising prompted by studies illustrating the relative gap—“the innovation
deficit”—in performance between the EU and its main competitors (notably the United States).
Given the EU policy context, the question of how the countries applying for admission to the
Union are faring in terms of developing and implementing an innovation policy is clearly of
considerable importance.” 32
27 Daianu D. Is Catching Up Possible in Europe? TIGER Working Paper Series No. 19. Warsaw, May 2002. p. 2.
28 Johnston D.J. The new economy: technology is not enough. OECD Observer. No. 221. Summer 2000. p. 5.
29 Huebner D. Impact of the Membership in the European Union on Economic Growth in Poland. TIGER
Working Paper Series. No. 51. Warsaw, April 2004. p. 25.
30 Poland and the Knowledge Economy. Enhancing Poland’s Competitiveness in the European Union. The World
Bank. Washington 2004. p. 37.
31 Fostering structural change: and industrial policy for and enlarged Europe. COM(2004) 274 final. Brussels,
20.04.2004. p. 2.
32 Innovation policy issues in six candidate countries: The challenges. European Commission. 2001. p. 9.
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The proposed and outlined approaches to thorough examination of sources of KBE
performance—enforced by monitoring and forecasting—should contribute to reliable answering
these questions. 33
Postscript—why going ahead in benchmarking knowledge-based
economy?
Companies and economies flourish because of pressures, challenges and new opportunities,
not a docile environment or outside “help”, that eliminates the need to improve. Progress comes
from change, not from preoccupation with stability that obstructs it, 34 answers Michael Porter.
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Appendix I
Basic statistics: international comparisons—Switzerland, Netherlands, Finland and Poland,
1999–2001
Indicator Unit Switzerland Netherlands Finland Poland
Population, total Thousands 7184 15926 5181 38646
KEY DEMAND-SIDE DATA
Gross domestic product
At current prices and exchange rates Bill. USD 239,4 369,5 120,9 157,6
— Per capita USD 33326 23212 23359 4078
At current prices and PPPs Bill. USD 216,5 443,2 130,3 370,2
— Per capita USD 30138 27836 25175 9579
Average annual growth rate, previous 5 yrs % 1,8 3,7 5,1 5,2
Gross fixed capital formation % of GDP 22,2 22,4 18,2 26,5
Public spending on education (a) % of GDP 5,2 5,1 7,3 4,4
KEY SUPPLY-SIDE DATA
Employment
Total civilian employment (TCE) Thousands 3908 7758 2326 14526
of which: agriculture % of TCE 4,5 3,3 6,1 18,8
Industry % of TCE 26,4 21,3 27,6 30,8
Services % of TCE 69,1 72,9 66,0 50,4
PRICES, SAVINGS AND LIVING STANDARDS
Consumer prices(b) average annual
increase rate over previous 5 years % 0,8 2,7 1,9 9,8
Gross saving ration(c) % of GDP 31,9 27,6 27,8 20,9
Living standards
Private consumption per capita, PPPs USD 17513 13681 11897 6160
Passenger cars, per 1000 inhabitants (a) Number 433 387 367 289
Television sets, per 1000 inhabitants (a) Number 461 495 519 423
Computers, per 1000 inhabitants (a) Number 348 201 182 82
Internet hosts, per 10000 inhabitants Number 6,4 6,5 7,2 4,2
Doctors, per 1000 inhabitants Number 3,4 3,1 3,1 2,3
Infant mortality per 1000 live births Number 4,6 5,2 3,6 8,9
EXTERNAL TRADE AND RESERVES
Exports of goods, fob Mill. USD 80578 211169 45604 31667
— as % of GDP % 33,7 57,1 37,7 20,1
— average annual increase rate, previous 5 yrs % -0,2 1,4 2,5 6,7
Imports of goods, cif: Mill. USD 82586 196458 33948 49022
— as % of GDP % 34,5 53,2 28,1 31,1
— average annual increase rate, previous 5 yrs % 0,7 2,0 2,9 11,0
Total official reserves Mill. SDR 26463 7357 5980 17876
as ratio of average monthly imports, goods Ratio 3,8 0,4 2,1 4,4
Note: the best (not necessarily maximum) values are marked bold.
a) 2002; b) 2001; c) for Switzerland and Poland—1999.
Source: own presentation, based on OECD Economic Surveys: Switzerland, Netherlands, Finland and Poland. OECD
Economic Outlook, Vol. 2003/1, No. 72. Knowledge Assessment Methodology http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm.
Multimedia World Atlas, “FOCUS” Weekly, http://www.focus.pl.
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Appendix II
Country profile scoreboard: benchmarking demand and supply in development of
Knowledge-Based Societies and Economies in Switzerland, Netherlands, Finland and
Poland, 2001
Indicator Switzerland Netherlands Finland Poland
DEMAND—Knowledge-Based Society
People-related indicators
Researchers in R&D (thousand) 21,0 35,5 14,0 53,0
Professional and technical workers, as % of the labor force 11,91 34,27 38,72 21,60
Flexibility of people to adapt to new challenges 6,14 7,55 7,63 5,37
Intellectual property rights protection 6,50 6,50 6,40 3,80
Well educated people do not emigrate abroad 6,34 7,19 6,54 4,62
National culture is opened to foreign influence 6,46 8,44 6,84 6,49
Human Development Index (HDI) 0,92 0,93 0,93 0,83
Institution-related indicators
Research cooperation business-universities 5,30 5,20 6,10 3,8
ICT expenditure, as % of GDP 7,48 7,13 5,88 4,90
Investment in telecommunication as % of GDP 0,34 0,55 0,49 0,85
Extent of staff training 5,90 6,10 5,80 3,80
SUPPLY—Knowledge-Based Economy
Firm-related indicators
Productivity growth (% change of GDP per person employed) 2,04 0,49 3,89 7,61
Private sector spending on R&D 6,10 5,60 5,80 3,90
Management education is locally available in first class business schools 6,10 5,80 5,70 4,70
Entrepreneurship among managers 6,60 6,92 6,91 6,04
Local competition 5,40 6,20 6,10 5,20
Business environment-related indicators
Tariff and non-tariff barriers 8,00 8,00 8,00 8,00
Soundness of banks 6,80 6,80 6,80 5,40
Adequate regulations & supervision of financial institutions 8,28 8,53 8,60 5,17
FDI, as % of GDP, (1990–99) 1,88 3,95 1,97 2,39
Availability of venture capital 4,70 5,50 5,50 3,00
University education meets the needs of a competitive economy 7,23 6,75 8,19 4,44
Administrative burden for start-ups 5,60 5,50 6,30 5,20
E-government 4,20 5,20 5,80 4,10
Note(1): HDI max. = 1.0. Qualitative indicators are based on the statistical score of a large samples group in
a particular country responding to the particular questions and—as a rule—1 = the most inadequate situation, 7 =
the most adequate situation.
Note (2): the best (not necessarily maximum) values are marked bold.
Source: own presentation, based on Knowledge Assessment Methodology, http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm.
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Appendix III
Leading, confirming and resulting indicators for monitoring and benchmarking
development of KBS and KBE—Switzerland, Netherlands, Finland and Poland
Indicator Unit Switzerland Netherlands Finland Poland
LEADING indicators
Public expenditure on education (1999) % of GDP 5,1 5,1 6,9 5,0
Gross capital formation (average 1990–99) % of GDP 0,3 22,0 19,0 21,0
Total expenditure on R&D (1987–97) % of GNI 2,60 2,08 2,78 0,77
Technical papers, per mill. Inhabitants (1997) Number 6,89 6,54 6,66 4,64
International telecommunication cost of call to USA (1999) $/3 min. 1,00 0,30 1,75 3,65
Average annual GDP growth rate (1990–99) % 0,6 2,7 2,4 4,5
FDI, related to GDP, (1990–99) % 1,88 3,95 1,97 2,39
Availability of venture capital (2000) Evaluation, 1–7 4,70 5,50 5,50 3,00
Human Development Index (2000) x 0,92 0,93 0,93 0,83
RESULTING indicators
Telephones, per 1000 inhabitants (2002) Number 461 495 519 423
Computers, per 1000 inhabitants (2002) Number 348 201 182 82
Internet subscribers, per 10000 inhabitants (2001) Number 31 25 18 8
Patents applications gained by the US PTO, per
mill. inhabitants (1995–02) Number 188 86 158 0,5
CONFIRMING indicators
High-tech goods in total exports (2001) % 21,1 22,3 21,1 2,6
High-tech products in manufacturing exports (1999–01) % 37,1 33,0 24,4 6,8
Technology balance of payments—receipts (2001) % of GDP 1,33 1,30 0,08 0,10
World market share of exports of high-tech products (2001) % 1,56 4,62 0,82 0,08
—average annual growth rate (1996–2001) % - 1,66 2,79 2,44 3,99
Note: the best (not necessarily maximum) values are marked bold.
Source: own presentation, based on Knowledge Assessment Methodology http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm.
Multimedia World Atlas, “FOCUS” Weekly, http://www.focus.pl.
Key Figures 2003–2004. Towards a European Research Area. STI. European Commission. 2003.
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MEASUREMENT
—AN OBSESSION OR A NECESSITY?
(inspired by The Third European Report on Science and Technology Indicators 2003)
Introduction
Does publishing a report on S&T measurement three times during 10 years necessarily mean
an obsession? Certainly not. The answer is not so obvious when we consider the affluence of
regional, national and cross-country reports:
Over the last decade, OECD countries and the European Union have been developing sets
of indicators to evaluate the evolution of economic, social and environmental phenomena, as
well as the quality of policies undertaken by public authorities. The indicators are widely used
to perform benchmarking exercises and to assess relative performances of national or local
communities. 1
So, for a commentator—and, possibly, a researcher—appears the choice stipulated as the title
of this paper—is it an obsession or a necessity? To make this distinction is vital, because of its
direct influence on attitudes: standing-by or joining the debate on statistics, knowledge and policy.
The Third European Report on Science & Technology Indicators 2003, European
Communities, has been enumerated among documents of the OECD World Forum on Key
Indicators regarding Knowledge Base on National and International Experience in the category
“supranational reports” matched with “knowledge, innovation and competitiveness”. Surprisingly,
no documents have been indicated to match “knowledge, innovation and competitiveness” with
“methodological issues”, which may be justified by the above quoted presumption of policy and
not technical orientation of the 2004 OECD World Forum on Key Indicators.
The reason for presenting this paper is approximately the same as—toutes les proportions
gardees—the recent OECD initiative to arrange for the World Forum on Key Indicators: to compare
experience in measuring development of science, technology and knowledge-based economies as
well as to suggest remarks and—possibly—new solutions in these fields.
In the impressive, introductory statements to the OECD World Forum on Key Indicators,
2004, we read: “In today’s rapidly changing, increasingly interdependent world, productive debate
and decisions require comprehensive, trustworthy and comprehensible information. It is for
this reason that the OECD, as one of the world’s leaders in the area of developing indicators
for policy-making, is organizing this World Forum. The purpose is to promote research- and
1 OECD World Forum on Key Indicators—Overview. http://www.oecd.org.
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information-sharing among countries, allowing them to compare strategies intended to measure
and assess the overall “position” and “progress” of a certain political entity (country, region,
etc.) vis-à-vis other similar entities. The Forum will be more policy-oriented, rather than technical
in nature, as indicator systems are about establishing an agreed set of figures for everyone to
use to assess the position and progress of their country.” 2
1. On an outline for a history of science measurement
The measurement of science and technology was fifty years old in 2000. It owes a large part
of its existence to the work of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the OECD in the
1950s and 1960s. 3 It is worthwhile to quote the mission of the NSF, which reads as follows: “to
promote the progress of science, to advance the national health, prosperity and welfare, and
to secure the national defense” 4. The measurement of science and technology, as a part of an
integrated system and the statistics on science and technology, emerged simultaneously at the
international and national levels.
Like social statistics, science and technology (S&T) indicators are produced mainly by
governments, but differ in a number of aspects. First, they have not been developed in order
to “control” individuals. Second, they have taken shape from the start at the international level.
Third, they reflect a consensus among states and its organizations.
However, the situation looks as it is likely to change, as governments focus attention upon
performance measures. 5 One objective is to determine the specific areas in which research ought
to be conducted, such as research fields and performing sectors. Another is to better “control”
the results generated by this work. Two types of measurements have been developed to meet
these objectives.
First, the counting of university innovation activities as a means of measuring the
commercialization of knowledge and the socio-economic relevance of research.
Second, the measurement of university collaboration with socioeconomic users, the
hypothesis being that increased collaboration translates into an increased probability of impact.
This type of measurement serves only as a proxy of impact measurement, however, impact
which itself remains difficult if not impossible to measure.
These new measurements are directly related to the aims of the last fifteen years of science
policy. During the 1980s science policy has gone from being a policy on science to being one in
which science must be made to serve socio-economic ends. It is no longer a matter of funding
scientific activity for its own sake, but rather one of funding whatever contributes to
economic progress and social improvement. This is well illustrated by the fact that the Frascati
Manual (1963) excluded innovation in the measure of research, while the Oslo Manual 6
2 What is the OECD World Forum on Key Indicators? 10–13 November, 2004, Palermo, Italy. http://ww.oecd.org/.
3 Given the centrality of science and technology statistics in science studies, it is surprising that no history of the
measurement exists in the literature. Godin B. Outline for a History of Science Measurement. Project on the History
and Sociology of S&T Statistics. Paper No. 1. 2000. p. 3. See e.g.: The Methodology of Statistics on R&D. NSF.
Washington 1959. The Measurement of Scientific and Technical Activities: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of
Research and Experimental Development (Frascati Manual). OECD. Paris 1963.
4 The NSF is an independent agency of the U.S. Government, established by the National Science Foundation
Act of 1950, as amended, and related legislation, and was given additional authority by the Science and Engineering
Equal Opportunities Act and Title I of the Education for Economic Security Act. http://www.nsf.gov/.
5 Technology and the Economy: the Key Relationships. OECD. Paris 1992.
6 Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Technological Innovation Data (Oslo Manual). OECD. Paris
1997.
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(1997) is entirely devoted to the measurement of innovation. In 1993, it was suggested that
in the field of technology Europe should redirect its $7 billion R&D budget from basic research
to market needs such as high-speed communications. European companies must join with
American and Japanese partners for access to new technologies and global distribution. 7
Moreover, according to B. Godin (2000), it would be a mistake to imagine, however, that
governments alone are involved in these measurements. They are also the subject of academic
interest, at least among those members of the scientific community who are interested in the
measurement of science and technology. The concept of National Innovation Systems designed
to understand scientific systems in all their interactions and complexity—a notion of which the
OECD is an ardent advocate8—can only come to truition if researchers possess the necessary
tools with which to understand science in all its dimension.
In any event, impact measurement is laden with considerable difficulties. The socio-economic
impacts of science and technology are diffuse, and are usually only apparent in the long-term.
They are also mostly manifest at the macro level: any link with the micro level would,
methodologically speaking, be difficult to establish. This is true, first of all, in respect to
quantitative indicators, while not necessarily—to qualitative measures. 9 In sum, the state of
impact measurement is comparable to the state of input measurement at the beginning of
the 1960s. It remains to be seen whether the present willingness of governments to measure
outputs and impacts will translate into efforts and investments similar to those which led to
both the Frascati Manual and to the subsequent surveys that are annually conducted by statistics
organizations and government departments. 10
Coming back to the future, we find signs of an increasing recognition of the vital role played
by research in the modern economy (Table 1) in the above mentioned Third European Report
on S&T Indicators 2003, with a significant subtitle: “Towards a Knowledge-Based Economy”.
Table 1
‘Actors’ in the modern economy
‘Actors’ in the modern economy Increasing recognition of the vital role played by research in the
modern economy
Citizens Are we becoming more and more aware of the impact of science and
technology on their daily lives?
Enterprises Appreciate the growing importance of research and new technologies
for their competitiveness
Expert analysts Recognize that knowledge is a key driver of growth, employment and
improvements in the quality of life.
Policy makers Are we accepting that measures to stimulate research and the
exploitation of knowledge must play a more central role in government
policies?
Source: own presentation based on: Busquin P. Preface. Third European Report on Science & Technology Indicators
2003. Towards a Knowledge-based Economy. European Commission. p. vii.
7 Europe’s economy. What must be done. Business Week. February 15, 1993. pp. 22–26.
8 See: Godin B. Outline for a History of Science Measurement. Project on the History and Sociology of S&T
Statistics. Paper No. 1. 2000. Appendix I.
9 Qualitative variables are vastly exploited e.g. in the World Bank Institute’s Knowledge Assessment database.
http://www.worldbank.org/kam.
10 Godin B. Outline for a History of Science Measurement. Project on the History and Sociology of S&T Statistics.
Paper No. 1. 2000. pp. 3, 23–25.
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The “go ahead” approach has been preferred here over the above mentioned “standing by”
attitude. Thus, the enumeration of actors in the modern economy with respect to the vital role of
research have been recognized here as an appropriate summary of these general deliberations on
science, technology and knowledge-based economy (KBE) development, and as a starting point to
the review of international organizations’ experience in measurement of position and progress in
the field of KBE, intentionally leaving for other occasions discussion on socio-cultural impact of
developing KBE.
2. The KBE measurement in Poland
Three approaches to the KBE measurement are presented here. The first case refers to
scientific and editorial activities of Prof. Antoni Kukliñski in the field of promotion the idea of
measuring science, technology and KBE development in Poland. The second case concerns the
experience of a research team—under the leadership of Prof. Leszek Zienkowski—cooperating
with the Central Statistical Office. The third case deals with examples of internal monitoring
by the Central Statistical Office as well as comparative studies, by the Foreign Trade Research
Institute, Warsaw,.
2.1. Conceptual framework—towards increasing creativity
A series of volumes on developing knowledge-based economy as a challenge for Poland and
Europe, as well as the global challenge of the XXI century was published in Poland, started in
the second half of 1990s. Contributions in these volumes, inspired and edited by Prof. Antoni
Kukliñski, mean the intellectual provocation in the country with a considerable share of low- and
medium-low technology industries in manufacturing. However, for this same reason it may be
argued that the series on KBE appeared ‘Just-in-Time’. 11 The last volume deals with the World
Bank perspective: exploits the knowledge assessment attitude, poses questions on the extent
and feasibility of implementing international experience as well as on framework conditions for
developing knowledge-based economy in Poland.
2.2. An assessment knowledge diffusion and use—approaches and variables
The research program focused on technological progress, endogenous growth and the
knowledge-based economy: Polish opportunities in the integrating Europe. 12
A set of six variables has been chosen in order to assess the position of Poland against the
EU Member States (then—the EU-15) in the field of knowledge economy. Comparison of data for
1995 and 1999 enabled to conclude on the rate of leveling the distance from Poland to the most
technologically advanced EU Member States.
The following variables served as proxies of the position as well as readiness to take advantage
of knowledge and new technologies: 13
GERD—gross expenditure on research and development, as % of GDP,
ICT—investment in telecommunication sector, as % of GDP,
11 See e.g. The Knowledge-Based Economy. The European Challenges of the 21th Century. Science and Government
Series No. 5 [ed.] A.Kukliñski.. State Committee of Scientific Research. Warsaw 2000.
12 Knowledge and Economic growth (Wiedza a wzrost gospodarczy) [ed.] L.Zienkowski. SCHOlAR. Warsaw 2003.
13 Compare: Smith K. What is the Knowledge Economy? Knowledge Intensity and Distributed Knowledge Bases.
Discussion Paper No. 6. Maastricht. United Nations University. Institute for New Technologies. 2002.
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EPO—patent applications granted by the European Patent Office / mln population,
INT—Internet hosts, per 1.000 population,
EDU—higher educated population, aged 15–65, as % of total population,
EXP—high-tech products as % of manufacturing exports.
Before choosing variables, the research team posed a question on the very idea of KBE—
illusion or reality?—and proposed comments by combining investment in research and development
with relative rise of real stock of intangible capital. 14
Furthermore, there are several scenarios of the knowledge sector development in Poland till
2040, differing by scope and structure of investment in R&D in the model of endogenous growth
of KBE, which emulates paths of Greece, Spain and Finland.
2.3. Cross-country comparisons and internal monitoring—approaches and vari-
ables
Cross-country comparisons may refer to studies performed in the Foreign Trade Institute,
Warsaw. For example, the Expert Meeting on “The Development of Knowledge-Based Economy
in Europe” 15 gathered experts from four Visegrad countries, four EU member countries, plus
experts from the OECD and the European Union, as the challenge of the highest quality of the
EU membership—as well as measurement of this quality—is still ahead. Thus, the Expert Meeting
addressed three groups of measurement problems: starting with a general debate on knowledge
and social capital in growth of economies (with case-studies of countries and regions), passing
through perspective of knowledge-based economy in the Central European countries, finally
focused on Poland in comparative perspective. The analytical input on Poland was generated
by the team of the Foreign Trade Research Institute, Warsaw16. These contributions respected
both endogenous and external factors of growth, including foreign direct investment, imports and
exports. The research programme is continued by monitoring KBE development in Poland as well
as by comparative studies. 17
Internal monitoring is represented by sets of data published by the Central Statistical
Office (CSO) regarding, i.a. cooperation of enterprises in industry and service sectors in
innovation activities with other enterprises and institutions. Innovation cooperation presumes
active participation in joint R&D and other innovation projects with other organizations—either
14 Compare: Abramowitz M. Dawid P. Technological Change and the Rise of Intangible Investments: the US
Economy’s Growth-Path in the Twentieth Century [in:] Employment and Growth in the Knowledge-Based Economy.
OECD Documents 1996.
15 The Expert Meeting took place in Konstancin, Poland, in June, 2001. It was held in the framework of the
Initiative 4+4+2.
16 This input included an introductory paper on Potential impact of Poland’s accession to the European Union
on development of the knowledge-based economy. The contributions reflected the need for research and decisions in
the fields of: generating, acquiring and disseminating knowledge (Education, science and human resources), results of
R&D and implementation of ICT (R&D and ICT—international perspective), technology structure of output and foreign
trade (KBE and the structure of output and trade of Poland and Trends in trade in high-technology products—eight
European countries), as well as identification of factors underlying international competitiveness—in the form of the
factor analysis model (KBE and competitiveness—the case of Poland)—amplified and completed by an overview and
conclusions (Government policies supporting development of the knowledge-based economy).
Swe i. Burzyñski W. R&D and information technologies—international perspective. [in:] The development of
knowledge based economy. The initiative 4+4+2. J.Kotyñski [ed.] The Expert Meeting. Konstancin, Poland, June
7th–10th 2001. Foreign Trade Research Institute. Warsaw. See also Burzyñski W. The Lisbon Strategy and opportunities
for Innovation-oriented development of Polish economy and enhancing export competitiveness. Foreign Economic Policy
of Poland 2002–2003. Foreign Trade Research Institute. Warsaw. 2003.
17 See also: Kukliñski A. Burzyñski W. Developing the Knowledge-Based Economy in Europe: the Perspective of
Eight Countries. TIGER Working Paper Series No. 49. Warsaw 2004. http://www.tiger.edu.pl.
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other firms or non-commercial institutions. Pure contracting out of work, where there is no active
cooperation, is not regarded as innovation cooperation.
The data have been collected by the CSO through a mail questionnaire and definitions
used in the survey were fully in line with those recommended by Oslo Manual and used in the
Community Innovation Survey in the EU. The target population was the total of firms employing
more than 9 persons in the following service activities (according to NACE): wholesale trade and
commission trade, transport, post and telecommunications, financial intermediation, computer and
related activities, architectural, engineering and other technical activities.
The strongest point of the Polish innovation system is the growing innovation expenditure
in the manufacturing sector, but the weakest point is still the low level of innovativeness in the
service sector and within SMEs in manufacturing as well as the lack of appropriate progress in
emerging effective innovative clusters, creating knowledge and commercializing new products and
processes. 18
3. Constant learning from international experience
The World Forum on Key Indicators—already mentioned—held in November 2004, being—as
a matter of fact—one of the OECD initiatives, is treated separately because of direct (not only
virtual) participation of experts and the unique wide scientific scope. The review of the scientific
programme of workshops reveals the range of issues relevant to key indicators and enables to
confirm the set of issues directly referring to science and technology measurement as well as to
knowledge-based economy (Table 2). It also points—more or less precisely—to beneficiaries using
key indicators, thus suggesting an answer to the main question of this paper as a necessity.
Within this general framework, but more precisely, the topic of workshops read as follows:
• Gender Statistics a Tool to Change Policies;
• Measuring Social Capital: National Experiences and International Possibilities;
• Rewarding Jobs: Government Policy and Work Incentives;
• Using Foreign Direct Investment Statistics for Policy Indicators;
• Health Care Performance: The Role of International Indicators;
• Indicators to Evaluate Agricultural Policies in OECD and non-OECD Countries;
• Territorial Indicators for Regional Policies;
• Improving Economic Indicators;
• Role of the Civil Society;
• Advocacy and Numeracy: Helping the Public to Use Statistics;
• Indicators and Benchmarking;
• Measuring the Environment;
18 The share of innovating firms for Poland is largely influenced by trade enterprises, as they constitute 68% of
the whole surveyed population and the share of innovating firms within them is considerably low—only 14%.
In 1997–1999, in order of decreasing frequency of established partnerships, the most popular partners for
cooperation were:
• domestic suppliers of equipment, material, components or software,
• domestic consultancy enterprises,
• other domestic enterprises within the enterprise group (branch).
Universities and research institutes appear to be of minor importance as partners for cooperation in innovation
activities with service firms in Poland. Moreover, for small enterprises, foreign firms were more frequently chosen
partners for innovative cooperation than Polish firms, which was not the case for medium and large firms.
See Innovation Activities in the Service Sector in Poland in 1997–1999. Central Statistical Office. Warszawa 2001.
Innovation Activities in Industrial Enterprises in Poland in 1998–2000. Central Statistical Office. Warszawa 2002.
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• Making Governments Accountable;
• The Information Society Measurement Issues and the Impact on Policy Making;
• Regional Indicators and Fund Allocation;
• Statistics for Society;
• Scoops and Statistics: Role of Media;
• Politics and Statistics;
• Using Knowledge to Boost Competitiveness;
• Measuring the Effectiveness of Public Services;
• Making Business Count;
• The Role of Central Banks;
• Planning for the Future;
Table 2
The OECD World Forum on Key Indicators—Knowledge Base Information, by Topic
Geographical coverage Methodological
issues
Subject Supranational National Subnational
Matter Comprehensive
Areas efforts
Social issues
Environmental
issues
Economic issues
Knowledge,
innovation and
competitiveness
Creating a System of Indicators
Source: http://www.oecd.org.
• United States: Evaluating Progress;
• Italy: Assessing National and Regional Performance;
• Measuring Australia: Lessons from the Key Indicators Initiative;
• Ireland: when EU indicators are not enough;
• Cross—Country Comparisons;
• Policy Coherence across Government: Role of Prime Ministers’ Offices.
Still further going in a search for a justification of affluence of indicators, i.a. measuring
science, technology and knowledge-based economy, it proved useful to disclose potential users of
information from producing and/or processing data in foresight exercises -the first place being
occupied absolutely by policy makers (Table 3).
In this context, as lessons from international experience, several issues—referred to in the
OECD World Forum papers—are worth attention and contributions: 19
19 As per OECD Workshops Scientitic Programme. The OECD World Forum on Key Indicators. Statistics,
Knowledge and Policy. http://www.oecd.org.
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Table 3
Foresight focus and possible foresight users
Foresight
Focus
Social Technology Business dynamics Territorial vision
Possible
Foresight
Users
Policy makers
Consumer
associations
Knowledge
infrastructure
Policy makers
Universities
Research
organizations
Industry
Policy makers
Industry
Chambers of
commerce
SMEs
Policy makers
Territorial
associations
Unions
Source: A Practical Guide to Regional Foresight. FOREN (Foresight for Regional Development Network). December
2001. p. 57.
• Statistics for Policy Making;
• Indicators for Policy Making;
• Statistical Indicators for Broad Policy Purposes in Ireland—Developing the Consensus Between
Statistics and Politics;
• Indicators and Benchmarking as a Support to the Decision-making Process: the Italian
experience in active employment policies.
4. New approaches to well-known data
Following the inspiration of i.a. the Third European Report on Science and Technology
Indicators 2003 and the OECD World Forum on Key Indicators 2004 as well as having reviewed
to a considerable extent the present ‘state-of-the-art.’, two new approaches to well-known data
are proposed, namely:
• adjusting the standard basic scorecard of the World Bank Institute’s Knowledge Assessment
Methodology to measure framework conditions of KBE development in the ‘new’ EU member
states;
• time sequence to assess stage and development prospects of KBE, by country or region.
4.1. The adjustment to ‘new’ EU member states
The affluent World Bank and other international institutions and organizations data-bases are
adequate to the variety of circumstances in any research comparing economies of e.g. extremely
different Human Development Index (HDI. 20.
There is a research tool within the framework of KAM (see p. 2.2.3), namely a standard
scoreboard, enabling to select a required set of indicators for intended comparisons. The KAM
standard scoreboard is composed of 14 indicators arranged in four groups—as for four areas
(or pillars) that are critical in the development of the knowledge-based economies. A set of
performance indicators serves as an introduction to and a background for assessment of KBE
development and are followed by indicators of:
• economic incentive and institutional regime (business environment);
20 Based on The knowledge assessment methodology & scorecards. http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm. See
also Anuja Adhar Utz. The knowledge assessment methodology. ECA Staff Training. Program on Knowledge for
Development. World Bank Institute. July 17, 2001. Dahlman C. The knowledge economy: implications for Poland.
World Bank Institute. June 17, 2002.
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• education and human capital;
• innovation system;
• information and communication technologies (ICT).
It was possible to propose an adjustment of the standard KAM scoreboard to better meet the
case of research exercises concerning ‘new’ EU member states. So, five indicators have been left
aside: 21
• regulations of financial institutions securing state financial stability,
• adult literacy,
• secondary enrollment,
• tertiary enrollment,
• number of researchers in R&D.
To stay with these ‘reasonable 15, the new set of indicators has been added (Table 4):
• public expenditure on education,
• local availability of management education in first-class schools,
• adequacy of university education for a competitive economy and labour market,
• R&D cooperation between companies and local universities in,
• inflow of foreign direct investment,
• availability of local venture capital.
In my opinion, the six new indicators better reflect a regional (or local) perspective
than the five indicators from the original set of indicators from the KAM standard scoreboard.
Moreover, this replacement of indicators enforces the four areas (or pillars) approach to factors
of KBE development. Furthermore, the proposed replacement preserved a balanced perspective
reflecting both differences as well as similarities of compared both countries and regions (in
new research programmes), though the new set of indicators is still a subject of evaluation and
modification, including further EU enlargement(s).
4.2. The time sequence approach
This case is intended as the input into the methodological issues and proposes a new approach
to well-known data on science, technology and economy (Table 5).
Indicators that capture the changing relationship between science, innovation and economic
performance are crucial, so that policy makers may make informed decisions, set priorities and
address the challenges of the knowledge-based economy.22 This paper develops indicators for
measuring the knowledge-based economy in several interconnected areas.
The pragmatic dimension of science and technology measurement is proposed here: the
time sequence for benchmarking development of the knowledge-based economy.
The proposed approach to benchmarking development of KBE is based on an available set of
indicators, which are prepared and published by international institutions and organizations once
a year, as a rule. In this paper:
• leading indicators relate to investment both in tangible and intangible assets,
• resulting indicators refer to knowledge dissemination and ICT,
21 Compare Kukliñski A. Burzyñski W. The Development of Knowledge-Based Economy in Europe: the regional
trajectory—model 4+4+4+22 [in:] The Knowledge-Based Economy in Transition Countries. Selected Issues. [ed.]
K.Piech. School of Slavonic and East European Studies. University College London. 2004. Kukliñski A. Burzyñski W.
Development of Knowledge-Based Economy in Europe: Innovation Systems in Four Trajectories of a New Research
Programme [in:] Creating Knowledge-Based Economy. Infrastructure—Organizations—Individuals. [ed.] W.Gasparski and
J.D¹browski. Leon KoŸmiñski Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management. Warsaw 2003.
22 For a country-to-country comparison see: Burzyñski W. Benchmarking Knowledge-Based Economy in Switzerland,
Netherlands, Finland and Poland. Discussion Papers No. 86. Foreign Trade Research Institute. Warsaw 2004.
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Table 4
Indicators used in the scoreboard, based on the WBI KAM
No. KAM Code Indicator and description
Performance indicators
1 p1 Average annual GDP growth rate, %, 1990–1999
2 p2 Human Development Index (HDI), 1999; [based on three indicators: longevity (life
expectancy at birth), education (adult literacy rate x 2/3 and combined primary,
secondary and tertiary enrollment x 1/3), standard of living (GDP per capita at PPP)]
I. Economic Incentive and Institutional Regime (business environment)
3 e4 Tariff and non-tariff barriers, 2002 (barriers to trade, a part of the larger group of
indices comprising The Index of Economic Freedom)
4 e5 Property rights, 2002 (based on a survey: “private intellectual property rights are well
protected?” 1 = strongly disagree, 10 = strongly agree)
II. Education and Human Resource
5 h7 Public expenditure on education, % of GDP, 1999
6 h13 Management education locally available (in first-class business schools), 2001 (based
on a survey: 1 = limited access or poor quality, 7 = among the world’s best)
7 h15 University education for labour market(meets the needs of a competitive economy),
2001 (1–7 scale, based on a survey)
III. Innovation System
8 i2 Foreign direct investment, inflow as % of GDP, 1990–1999 average
9 i8 Companies-universities research cooperation (close cooperation between companies
and local universities), 2001 (based on a survey: 1 = minimal or nonexistent, 10 =
intensive and ongoing)
10 i10 Scientific and technical journal articles, per million persons, 2001
11 i12 Venture capital locally available, 2001 (based on a survey: entrepreneurs with
innovative but risky projects can generally find venture capital in their countries; 1
= disagree, 7 = agree)
12 i14 High-tech exports, as % of total manufacturing exports, 1999 (e.g. aerospace, com-
puters, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, electrical machinery; based on OECD
classifications)
IV. Information Infrastructure and Communication Technologies (ICT)
13 t1 Telephones, per 1,000 persons, 1999 (telephone mainlines + mobile)
14 t4 Computers, per 1,000 persons, 1999
15 t10 Internet hosts, per 10,000 persons, 2000
Source: own presentation, based on the 2002 Interactive Internet data base—KAM.
http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm and the file:///A/The Knowledge Assessment Methodology and Scorecards.htm.
• while indicators confirming the development of KBE represent international economic
relations in the field of knowledge-intensive goods and services (Table 6).
The development of KBE—as medium-term and/or long-term processes—may seem isolated
from short-term fluctuations.
However, the similarity of notions used in the proposed approach to those applied mostly in
a short-term analysis is not accidental. Modifications of speed in ICT development result from
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Table 5
A) The CAUSE-RESULT approach to measurement of science, technology and
knowledge-based economy
Groups of indicators
Approach
CAUSE/INPUT RESULT/OUTPUT
European Investment in KBE
Commission Performance of KBE
OECD Growth of knowledge base
Information economy
Global integration
Productivity & economic structure
World Bank Economic regime & governance
Institute Innovation system
Education
ICT
Gender
Economic & social performance
UN ECE Global knowledge economy subindexes
Technology
Public institutions
Macroeconomic environment
Global knowledge economy index
B) The CAUSE-RESULT-IMPACT approach to measurement of science, technology and
knowledge-based economy
Time Group of indicators
Sequence LEADING RESULTING CONFIRMING
/cause /result /impact
Approach Investment in tangible Knowledge dissemination International trade
and intangible assets (diffusion) and ICT in knowledge-intensive
goods & services
Source: own presentation, based on OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard. 2003 edition. Source:
The Knowledge-Based Economy. OECD. Paris 1996. http://worldbank.org/kam . Regional Assessment Report. Towards
a knowledge-based economy. Country Readiness Report. UN ECE. New York and Geneva 2002.
‘revolution’ of its technological background. 23 Waves on the markets for ICT equipment, software
and services are also directly connected with regulatory reforms and financial restructuring of
the ICT sector 24 and support justification of the proposed time sequence approach.
Like in an investment project, the time sequence is illustrated by the proposed sets of KBE
development indicators:
• initially—involves more investment than brings income (leading indicators);
23 See: New telecommunications technologies. After the telecommunications bubble. OECD Economic Outlook. No.
73. June 2003.
24 See The OECD-wide regulatory reform in telecommunications markets. The industry is in the middle of a deep
financial restructuring. After the Telecommunications Bubble. OECD Economic Outlook. No. 73. June 2003.
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• consequently—promises more income than requires investment (resulting indicators);
• finally—it leads to competitive advantages, with surplus in manufacturing trade, high-
technology products and technology balance of payments (confirming indicators).
In this context, as far as forecasting KBE development (see p. 3) is concerned—even more
important for particular countries than their positions in rankings or scoreboards—are distances
among compared countries, as measured by benchmarked indicators, including institutional and
financial framework conditions.
Table 6
Leading, confirming and resulting indicators for monitoring and benchmarking
development of KBS and KBE
Group of indicators Units
LEADING indicators,
timing: average, 10–15 years and/or 5–7 years
Public expenditure on education % of GDP
Gross capital formation % of GDP
Total expenditure on R&D % of GNI
Technical papers, / mill. Inhabitants Numer
International telecommunication cost of call to USA $/3 min.
Average annual GDP growth rate %
FDI, related to GDP, %
Availability of venture capital Evaluation, 1–7
Human Development Index Numer
RESULTING indicators,
timing: most recent or 2–3 years
Telephones, / 1000 inhabitants Numer
Computers, / 1000 inhabitants Numer
Internet subscribers, / 10000 inhabitants Numer
Patents applications gained by the US PTO, / mill. inhabitants Number
CONFIRMING indicators,
timing: most recent or 1–2 year(s)
High-tech goods in total exports %
High-tech products in manufacturing exports %
Technology balance of payments—receipts % of GDP
World market share of exports of high-tech products %
—average annual growth rate %
Source: own presentation, based on Knowledge Assessment Methodology
http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm.
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Benchmarking commodity structure of trade, by technology intensity, should be supplemented
by comparing difference between the cost of internal development and commercialization of
technologies and the cost of implementing technologies available on international markets,
considering also that internal investment in technologies may multiply local learning capabilities. 25
However, the sequence of events—from investment in education and R&D till production and
income effects for enterprises and state budget—requires not only “patience and time”, but
also intermediate financing. There is also a fascinating analytical field of cultural indicators for
development, 26 to be addressed soon.
‘Follow-up remarks (on research projects in science, technology and knowledge-
based economy measurement)
1. In this paper it was presumed and—consequently—presented the conceptual and
methodological side of science, technology and knowledge-based economy measurement,
leaving empirical issues to new research project.
2. Even the leader—the OECD -puts forward significant reservations as to multilaterally
agreed ‘universal’ methods or sets of indicators:
A few countries have launched comprehensive national projects, sustained by the highest
policy authorities, to produce regular reports based on an agreed set of indicators covering
economic, social and environmental domains.
The OECD acts as a catalyst to promote research and information sharing among countries,
allowing them to compare strategies intended to measure and assess the overall position and
progress of a certain political entity (country, region, etc.) vis-a-vis other similar entities. The
World Forum project is not intended to develop any comprehensive set of international indicators
or reports. 27
3. Apart from the already quoted issues of using indicator by policy makers (see p. 3), there
are several areas for contribution in new research projects:
Composite Indicators: the Controversy and the Way Forward;
A Model to Benchmark Innovation Capacity—the Need for global indicators;
and—last but not least—
The Impact of Statistics on a Competitive and Knowledge-Based Economy.
4. It is appropriate to extend these considerations confirming that the science and technology
measurement is a necessity rather than an obsession and to quote one more justification of
usefulness of reasonably selected, workable sets of indicators:
There is no silver bullet that allows for achieving a higher level of competitiveness in
knowledge-based economies. But there is hope. Statistics, i.e. knowledge itself, is an excellent
means to identify strengths and weaknesses of an economy. Based on the evidence gained,
politicians can and should take measures to further develop the competitiveness of their
respective countries. 28
25 See: Arora A. Fosfuri A. Gambardella A. Markets for technology in the knowledge economy. I.S.S.J. No. 171.
2002. Managing National Innovation Systems. OECD. 1999.
26 McKinley. Cultural Indicators of Development. Occasional paper series on culture and development. UNRISD—
UNESCO. 1997.
27 OECD World Forum on Key Indicators—Overview. http://www.oecd.org.
28 Buergi-Schmelz A. The Impact of Statistics on a Competitive and Knowledge-Based Economy. Director General,
Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Statistics, Knowledge, Policy. OECD World Forum on Key Indicators. November 2004.
P. 2.
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THE CONDITIONS AND MODALITIES
OF IMPLEMENTING THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY PARADIGM
BY THE EUROPEAN UNION
1. Introductory remarks
The knowledge-based economy paradigm or principle has entered the vocabulary of economic
theory, strategic thinking and policy making. However, the true contents and the meaning of this
paradigm still remain largely entangled in doubts and discussions.
Doubts stem from the fact that the theory is as yet unable to discern this what makes the
difference between an economy that the theory had been, and still is, preoccupied with and the
new system termed the knowledge-based economy. Although the paradigm of the knowledge-based
economy is with us for quite a long time (in fact, formally, since the publication of OECD
inquisitive reports [OECD 1996; 1997] but in reality, since Friedrich A. von Hayek has written his
article on the uses of knowledge [Hayek v. 1945] or even since earlier times) neither neoclassical
nor institutional economics have managed to incorporate that paradigm into the set of their
key notions or suppositions. The ensuing doubts are even more aggravated by the absence,
in the economic theory tool-box, of analytical instruments or models (prescriptive or at least
descriptive, notional or formal) that would be capable of explaining how knowledge (together with
the knowledge generating sector) becomes the third important factor that complements labour
and capital in the processes of economic growth.
Economic theories of the main stream have very little to say about the ways and modalities
by which knowledge, basic and applied research, budgetary expenditure on education and research
interact with:
— business activities in manufacturing, finance and banking, commercial services in communica-
tion, transport and other branches of societal infrastructure;
— operation of the market in the short and long term horizons1;
— government structures, distribution of competences among its departments, pursued policies
and the selection of policy making instruments;
1 The preoccupation with equilibrium issues and the competition based on price mechanism, with the attending
disregard to competitiveness based on quality and innovative products on the part of traditional economics does not
help to perceive the knowledge-based economy in the right perspective.
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— the way in which public services in education, health protection or old age pension schemes
are functioning; and
— many other facets of public, political and economic life of societies and countries.
Discussions among and between the economists, technologists, educators, government experts
[EC 2003a; 2003b] and policy makers take place not only on the grounds of economic theory but
also within the plane of ways and means how the difficult but promising perspective of creating
the knowledge-based economy in the European Union and its individual member countries can be
realized within the foreseeable future.
Irrespective of these discussions we observe that the economic performance of the countries
of Europe when compared with the one of other countries is not satisfactory as far as the
paradigm is concerned.
2. The Lisbon declaration and its perception
The conclusions of the Lisbon summit of March 2000 [EC 2000] have created a new situation
that challenges data collection experts, model builders, academics and policy makers in governing
bodies of EU and its member countries. The efforts to meet these challenges are undertaken
by researchers (data gathering, analyses), thinkers (model building, theory formulation) and
administrators (structuring of Framework Programmes, e.g.).
We will shortly be half way down the road towards the date (2010) by which the enlarged
EU is to become the world leader in sustainable economic growth, innovativeness, employment
opportunities and social cohesion, [Rodrigues 2003, p. 16].
The pronouncement of this strategic goal signified in fact that the European Union has
entered a contest that had never before been proclaimed in such a way in the open. Albeit that
contest had always been taking place among countries and their economies. On many occasions it
was called the race towards economic leadership.
In the context of Lisbon Declaration it is quite obvious that the criteria to nominate the
winner of this particular race by year 2010 will be: the achieved competitiveness and the degree
to which economies are based on knowledge. Although other countries, outside the EU-15, have
not officially declared that they are entering the race we choose to call the whole exercise a sort
of a rallye in which neither participation rules nor the properties of the race course are fully
known. All we can say now is that the rallye had started long ago and it will continue well beyond
the year 2010. We shall return to this metaphor of the rallye in later parts of this article.
Some discipline into the race had been introduced by a series of publications initiated by
OECD [OECD 1976, 1991; 1992; 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 1996; 1997a; 1997b] 2. These publications have
greatly helped in comprehending the issues, offered useful definitions (Frascati and Oslo
Manuals) and have been serving as means of general orientation and guidance on the then yet
uncharted territories of research, inventions, innovation, technical progress and competitiveness.
The publications mentioned are not unrelated to writings of many earlier authors of whom
we would like to mention Joseph A. Schumpeter [1928; 1976], Vannevar Bush [1945], Jacob
Schmookler [1966], Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter [1977; 1982], Stephen J.Kline and
2 The publications on science and technology and their impact on economic growth are very numerous. We have,
specifically, selected these few to document the evolution of ideas that flourished within the context of the notion of
knowledge-based economy. It is worth observing that emphasis was put not so much on any investments into fixed
assets but on the importance of investments in education, in the so-called human capital (we prefer a term: human
assets or human intellectual assets), scientific research and technology development. Knowledge and human assets have
thus become a factor that fuels growth, alongside labour and capital.
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Nathan Rosenberg [1986], David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg [1989]. These authors, some of
them having been undeservedly forgotten for many years—like J.Schumpeter and his recognition
of the nature and role of innovation—have introduced a new dimension into economic thinking.
Their contribution together with ones of other writers [Gibbons et al. 1994 e.g.] towards the
understanding how the economy really works, apart from the obsessive preoccupation with the
general equilibrium theory is, as yet, not adequately appreciated by the main stream economics.
However the new thinking about economic processes started to be less concerned with equilibria or
competition based on price alone mechanisms. The notions of science, technology, use of knowledge
as production factor, and of human capital were entered into the vocabulary of discussions about
strategies how to enhance growth.
Let us return for a short while to our the metaphor. Racing is an exercise that requires
devoted and responsible approach, be it a field and track event, car racing or economic contest.
In each case, before the decision to enter the particular event is taken, a lot of preparatory
work—analyses, coaching, training etc has to be done. To visualise the extent of preparatory
effort one may try to imagine how much it is to be done to enter a motorcar rallye of the
type Paris—Dakar. Selection and upgrading of equipment, support systems, mapping of the
route, solutions to the navigation, communication and logistics problems are the areas which call
for harmonization and consolidation. The driver has to accomplish the final task in the contest,
and he has to be certain that the whole system is well tuned and will work flawlessly despite the
fact that the route is uncharted and many uncertainties are ahead. The challenges that are facing
the European Union economies are many times over more complex, difficult and are loaded with
much higher level of uncertainty.
The rallye to become the most competitive economy of the world is on. There are many
entrants and many categories of competitors. From the European perspective three participants
are the most important and they form number one category of competitors in the race. They
are EU, the US and Japan. They are called the Triad. The remaining entrants belong to other
categories and classes. Some of them have the potential to join the main class of participants
(large, economies, quickly growing GDP, large scientific research and R&D sector) in not so distant
future (India, China might be named as examples of such countries).
Each of the main class contestants is characterised by its own traditions, history, experiences,
political system, the modality by which its economy is operating, by its potential and strategy.
Each of them has its own failures and accomplishments recorded in the past stages of the rallye.
They know the route covered so far. They study it and try to envisage what lies ahead. The space
to be covered remains largely unmapped. There are no sign posts indicating direction or detours
and by-passes or warnings against dangers and obstacles. Some participants have their systems
tuned not well enough to match the performance of others. What evokes particular concern among
observers who have a stake in the position EU takes, is the fact that other contestants performed
better in the past, move faster at present and the gap that divides EU from them is not getting
shorter. Some stakeholders (among them members of the EU expert team) voice doubts whether
certain characteristics of other contestants (that had allowed them to keep ahead) are fully known
and understood: “interfaces between public research, technological development and commercial
exploitation have to be better understood if improvements are to be made;” (emphasis WŒ),
[EC 2003c, p.413].
These concerns have very complex, and profound at the same time, background. On one hand
we may ask a pertinent question whether there is something wrong with the economic theory
underlying the quest for leadership in innovativeness and becoming the knowledge-driven economy?
On the other, there are questions addressing the appropriateness of identification of differences
in political, economic and social institutions and mechanisms. In addition to resources (body of
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knowledge, stock of fixed assets, labour supply, human assets, social capital) and the resolve to
become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” [EC 2000, §
5] there is the transmission component in the system. If, other things being equal, transmission
in not working efficiently, then the particular economy is not performing pari passu (or faster)
with other economies.
3. The gap between EU-15 and other countries
As far as the economic theory is concerned we can safely assume that it is equally well known
in Europe as it is in the US and Japan. If economists and policy makers can not be guided in
their decisions by the economic theory (because of its inadequacies or misgivings), then it applies,
in equal measure, to all economies. We infer then that the failure in boosting the performance
of European economy can not be explained by the selection of wrong theoretical framework. If
these are not the resources, the resolve to win or the theory, what is it then?
Below we use few excerpts from the Third European Report. The observations and
assessments contained in them illustrate the situation of the race as it obtained in the very recent
past.
1. “According to [European Commission Report of Spring 2003], both the level of overall
investment in the transition to being a knowledge-based economy and its growth rate are still
significantly lower [emphasis WŒ] in Europe than in the US and Japan,” [EC 2003c, p. 23]
2. “Since the mid-1990s, the gap between EU and the US in terms of R&D investment has
increased significantly in favour of the US. The EU figure is below that of the US regarding
the volume and rate of growth of resources devoted to R&D, as well as the level and growth
of R&D intensity ... The gap has widened for the past eight years (emphasis WŒ) ...
Recently, the gap between the EU and the US has widened rapidly”, [EC 20032c, p. 85].
3. “...the gap between EU business sector R&D investment and that of the US has
actually increased (emphasis WŒ) during recent years... The US manufacturing sector has
a considerably higher R&D intensity than that of the EU”, [EC 2003c, p. 161].
4. “Almost all the Member States of the EU lag behind the US and Japan (emphasis WŒ) in
terms of their ratio of researchers to labour force and it will be difficult to catch up with
these two countries”, [EC 2003c, p.253].
5. Patents relative to the size of population, (as registered by the patenting offices of the Triad3)
show that “...the EU has slightly fewer than 28 patents, per million population which is well
behind (emphasis WŒ) the US (42) and Japan (69) 4„, [EC 2003c, p.333].
6. “The EU’s science intensity was much lower (emphasis WŒ) than that of the US especially
in European patents, where Japan posted the strongest science linkage of all”, [EC 2003c, p.
421].
7. Exports, imports and trade balances in high-tech products of the Triad members during
1995-1999 reveal a picture that requires comments [EC 2003c, p. 355 and 356]. During that
period the averaged annual growth rate of high tech exports amounted to 13.0% (EU-15),
14.0% (US) and 4.0% (Japan) while imports of high-tech products grew at 19.5% (EU-15),
16.3% (US) and 6.6% (Japan). The accumulated balances in this trade for the same period
3 The Triad is composed of the EU-15, the US and Japan. The respective data are drawn from the European
Patent Office (EPO), the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO).
4 There are marked differences among members of the Triad in the cost of obtaining a patent: on the average
European patents cost five times as much as US patents and 3 times more than Japanese ones (the average cost of
European patent in 2000 amounted to Euro 50,000), [EC 2003c, p. 354].
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amounted to deficit of 81.6 bln Euro (EU-15), surplus of 18.9 bln Euro (US) and surplus of
209.5 bln Euro (Japan). The situation characterised by the quoted above data was not healthy
at the period for which they were recorded. These and other data reveal that the EU is
unable to balance its high tech trade (emphasis WŒ) and has been greatly dependent on
high tech imports from its main competitors (in 2000 developed Asian economies recorded 41
bln Euro and NAFTA countries 32 bln Euro surplus in high-tech trade with EU-15!), [EC
2003c, p. 361] 5.
Given the indicated above lagging of Europe behind the US and Japan in:
a) overall investment to enhance the transition into knowledge-based economy;
b) volumes and growth rates of resources devoted to R&D;
c) dimensions and shares of business sector R&D expenditure in total investments into R&D;
d) the level of saturation of labour force with researchers and innovators;
e) low relative level of patenting activities;
f) low level of impact of scientific research on registered patents;
g) international trade in high tech products,
we need to ask question on why Europe is so deeply retarded and what can be done to
redress the situation. The first part of the question needs, perhaps, a much wider study on
European history, traditions, culture, societal attitudes as well as ideological vagaries of political
elites. It constitutes a promising area for specialist research conducted independently of present
day efforts to face the challenges of the future. We leave this issue, at the moment, untouched.
The second part of the question (means and ways of improving the status of Europe vis-à-vis the
US and Japan) can be approached with greater ease thanks to the Third Report. In Chapter 4
(Human Resources in Science & Technology) the authors address a topical issue of the availability
of personnel being able to generate outcomes that would help the European Union to become “
the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy of the world”.
4. Availability and deployment of human resources
4.1. Production of human assets
The Report emphasizes the crucial role human resources play in knowledge production,
dissemination and use—recognizing, at the same time, the ensuing shortages of human assets
in the European science and technology sector. “One way of increasing a country’s reserves of
human resources in S&T is to produce science and engineering graduates. Degrees in S&E field
of study, especially PhDs, formally qualify their holders for employment as researchers” [EC
2003 c, p. 186].
The Report (noting that the EU has, relatively, fewer researchers than the US and Japan)
appraises that if EU-15 is to catch up with the US in number of researches per 1000 labour force
by the year 2010, then it would need to educate, in addition to the current output, 835,000 more
researchers6 [EC 2003c, p. 189].
5 Trade balances in high-tech products reflect the absolute competitive position of an economy. Deficits in these
balances indicate inadequate contribution of R&D into productive potential. Probably only a fraction of EU-15 deficits
is used to reduce the gaps in technological development and innovativeness between EU versus the US and Japan.
The massive deficit will grow much bigger when similar statistics will be prepared for the enlarged EU.
6 The arithmetics behind this number is the following: 550,000 more researchers are needed to achieve in 2010 the
US number for 2000 and an extra 285,000 additionally, assuming that the US would continue the trend recorded in
the past. The number is then 835,000 researchers over the current numbers of output, during the rest of the present
decade!
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 132 (132)
132 W³adys³aw Œwitalski
Let us reflect, shortly, on this required number of additionally produced researchers by 2010.
If we assume that this goal would have to be achieved during seven years (2004–2010) then nearly
120 000 extra researchers would have to be educated each year. How many additional entrants
into academic degree level studies would guarantee that the societies of EU-15 would have 120
000 additional graduates to become researchers? Even if 100% of additional entrants become
researches then total number of graduates in each year would have to be increased by 5.5%, (in
2000 total number of graduates in all fields of study amounted, in the EU-15, to 2,143,500, while
for science & engineering graduates the figure was 555,647 persons). Another pertinent question
is: how many additional professors would be needed to provide education for this extra number of
students? We do not dare to answer this and several other questions that should also be asked.
Are the teaching facilities existent? If not, then when and in what disciplines the new facilities
should be created? Where from would we attract the additional educators? When the graduates
that are to become researchers will start fruitful professional careers? Would there be adequate
number of employment positions to absorb the increased number of researchers? The conclusion
from this reflection is that the task of catching up with the US by 2010 in terms of numbers
alone (not in terms of the results of research work) is totally beyond practical reach.
It is a great achievement of the Report that the issue of the gap in number of researchers
per 1000 labour force between the US and the EU-15 had been addressed, studied and that the
relevant statistics had been presented. But, at the same time, we have to state that the remedies
to improve the situation need to be sought with devotion and understanding. In connection with
this issue we would like to revert to Antoni Kukliñski’s thought concerning the strategic choices
that Europe faces at the beginning of 21st century: “Should the Lisbon Agenda be taken seriously
or this Agenda should be regarded only as a nice set of good intensions?”. [Kukliñski 2004, p.2].
All signs indicate that the proponents of Lisbon strategy were not aware of this what it
takes to become knowledge-based, most competitive economy in the world. When we think about
knowledge-based economies and societies then, immediately, comes into the picture the issue of
the body of science that should generate the most important component of knowledge. Scientific
approach in the outlining of the Lisbon strategy was, most probably, absent in the minds of those
who voted to approve it with such a short target date. We used the term “outlining” to indicate
that we do not see the designing effort in setting the goals as well as in indicating instruments
that should be used.
4.2. Deployment of human assets
Before we address another issue, albeit closely related to the one we dwelt upon above, we
want to mention that perhaps the line of reasoning how to break even with the US in terms of
researchers (whose task would be to generate new knowledge, to use it and to produce innovation)
should not rely on numbers alone, but also on the philosophy and methodology of how to use the
human resources in constructing the foundations of the knowledge-based economy.
On page 189 of the Report [EC 2003c] we find a very important question: “Does the education
system adequately meet the demand for highly skilled R&D personnel?” We do not find, in the
Report, a conclusive answer to this question. In the expectation that our present short note is not
merely reproducing figures and ideas contained in the Report but also could be an inspiration for
new inquisitive studies we would like to devote few thoughts to the issue of deployment of human
resources in S&T.
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 133 (133)
The Conditions and Modalities of Implementing The Knowledge-Based Economy... 133
In Figures 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 being accompanied by Table 4.1.1 the authors of the Report present
data7 on total number of researchers (p.181), number of researchers in relation to labour force
(p.182) and the distribution of human research potential among business, government and higher
education sectors in the EU-15, the US and Japan (p. 183).
The aggregate numbers alone evoke pessimistic, rather, feelings concerning Europe’s ability
to meet the objective set in Lisbon strategy. When we examine the numbers we can notice some
facts that reveal certain striking differences present in the researchers’ employment statistics
among the countries of the Triad.
We will limit ourselves only to the structural difference. We see (Tab. 4.1.1) that only 3.9% of
all American researchers are employed in government institutions (for Japan the percentage is
7.7%) while countries of EU-15 employ in the government institutions on the average, 16.3% of all
their researchers. These comparisons lead to astonishing constatation: EU-15 countries employing,
proportionately, more than four times more researches in government, should be more efficient in
designing policies to enhance economic growth, to reduce unemployment and to create conditions
for the full implementation of the knowledge-based economy principle. Other data indicate that:
1) growth rates in the EU-15 are much lower than in the US;
2) unemployment rates in the EU-15 are much higher than in the US;
3) more inventions, patents and innovations are generated in the US than in the EU-15.
So, the conclusions could be that:
1. policy makers in the EU-15 do not listen to the advice given by researchers and deploy
policies counteracting growth, reduction of unemployment and the stimulation of innovation;
or that
2. the statistics are wrong in classifying the employees of government institutions as researches,
these employees may hold academic degrees but they are simply undereducated bureaucrats
who do not comprehend the real challenges and therefore they are unable to provide advice
on what should be the goals of the governments concerned or to advocate instruments that
serve to achieve these goals, or that
3. the paradigms that govern the behavior of researchers and policy makers in the EU-15
drastically differ from those that are present in the minds of American policy makers and
researchers.
We tend to think that all three conclusions could be valid but the third one plays the most
important role in explaining the widely acknowledged fact that Europe is lagging behind the US.
When we analyse the figures that reveal the employment of researchers in business enterprises
we may find, that:
a) 85% of all researchers in the US are working for the business enterprises sector;
b) only 57% of all researchers in the EU-15 are employed in profit seeking enterprises, (the
corresponding figure for Japan is 67%).
These findings well correspond with numbers that characterise the share of researchers in
total labour force employed in the US and Europe. On the average there were 0.87% research
workers in the US (for Japan the figure was even higher: 0.97%) while in the EU-15 we had only
0.54% of researchers in relation to total number of employees.
Considering conclusions that were suggested in points 1o–3o above we are inclined to think
that both, the processes to educate researchers are wrongly designed in Europe (regarding the
7 We noticed that numbers contained in Fig. 4.1.1 do not tally with those included in Tab. 4.1.1 although they
pertain the same categories for the same year. For UE-15 the difference between Fig. 4.1.1 and Table 4.1.1 is 14,497;
for the US: 20,673; for Japan 15,747.
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curricula of university level training) and that the prospects for freshly doctorised (PhDs) people
are less attractive when employed by business enterprises in Europe than in the US.8
The line of reasoning goes thus the following way: in Europe we have to alter the
predispositions and objectives of educating the experts (inclusive of researchers and policy
makers) for governments and businesses.
Perhaps the principles of the liberalized market economy as well as the principle that
governments should not organize free rides for one part of the society at the expense of the
other part (calling it a policy of social justice) and should become an important part of policy
making and the philosophy that governs the attitudes of European universities, business and
public administration schools and technological academies?
Perhaps different teaching curricula should be adopted in social sciences and engineering
disciplines, so that people trained in economics, sociology etc would better understand the issues
that have to be coped with by the graduates of engineering and technology departments?
Perhaps such a change would provide a basis for developing a common language between
technologists and economists when they face challenges and attempt to solve problems that are
present in building the knowledge-based economy?
4.3. Ways of performance improvement
In changes that we contemplate here one aspect seems very important and deserving a specific
approach. The issue in question is that in research and innovative processes we always have to
deal with structures that are typical of project work. Project formulation, apart from the formal
skills needed for analysis and appraisal, requires good knowledge of design methods, procedures
and tools.
Mastering of the art of design in the technological and engineering sense, that is in the sense
by which the products of designing (be it a machine, a bridge, a new drug or a new household
appliance) are imprinted with:
— functional properties,
— composition of materials and parts,
— internal structure of components,
— reliability and performance characteristics,
— size, weight and shape,
— ease of manufacturing or construction,
— production and exploitation costs levels,
constitutes an indispensable element of technical education and occupies a large part of teaching
curricula in technical universities.
Students of engineering and technology are taught about properties of various materials,
about operations by which materials are given the required shape, smoothness and hardness, about
linking operations in chains to form processes, about managing and scheduling jobs to be done
and about conveying the knowledge about the products that are designed to other specialists that
design effective methods of producing these products. This knowledge and the required intimate
familiarly with various problems is highly specific. It has to be mastered if graduates of technical
universities are to become the creators of innovative products and processes. Yet there exists
abundant evidence that certain, sometimes even very attractive, innovative projects in engineering
or certain innovative products have failed to win the approval of potential buyers or users.
8 From other sources we know that employment and career opportunities in the US for young and older
researchers are much more promising than in Europe.
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Strategy designers, policymakers and experts that are supposed to assist policy makers,
normally educated in other than engineering faculties, are not, as a rule, trained in the art of
designing. Nevertheless they are expected to solve design problems that are by far more complex
and demanding than problems for which we educate our technologically minded elites.
The design of innovative political, financial, education, social insurance, public health protection
or national defense systems are in the hands, not infrequently, of those who had no chance to
master the art of designing. The problems of design of country-wide systems that serve social
purposes had universally not become the subject of monographs, manuals or text-books for
students of economics, business administration or politology. Nor even there exists a universally
accepted methodology of design work that would consist of:
— guidance on how to set attainable goals;
— instruction how to draft the modalities of achieving the set goals and objectives;
— methods of conducting the pre-feasibility studies of the suggested ways and means to put the
contemplated system into operation;
— specification of o tool box to help the design of products and processes of the system under
consideration in a similar manner as it is usually done in engineering of technical systems;
— methods of experimentation on models of societal systems to discern the operational properties
of the latter once these systems are implemented by political decisions.
The supposition derived from the observations presented above is that the potential losses,
suffered by the societies in terms of their well being as well as prospects for future economic and
social development when the designs for macro-scale systems are wrong, could be many times
higher than losses inflicted by cases when certain engineering projects fail to achieve the hoped
for quality or performance.
The conclusion, and also a recommendation, that follows from this working supposition is that
perhaps it is a time that in the quest to achieve the objectives of the Lisbon strategy we should
be less concerned with the numbers only but also should devote more attention to the cause-effect
mechanism and the philosophy of approach. Numbers have to be present in our analyses because
they define the point of departure, the trajectory of change and the objective. Nevertheless the
quality of project work and the approaches of newly educated experts and researchers towards
the challenges that are present in the rallye should dominate our thinking about the designs for
the future.
Perhaps it is a time to conceive an idea that the governing bodies of EU establish, similarly
like the governments of member countries establish state universities, a new university that would
teach a new breed of researchers, consultants and policy makers who would design systems that
would guarantee the highest probability to achieve the declared goals.
Perhaps then the project work, involving project formulation, design of its constituent parts,
phases, analyses, reformulation and final implementation in different scales of societal, economic
and political activities of EU, its member states and functional sectors (economy, knowledge
production, R&D, innovation) would then become the focal interest of researches, authors of
teaching curricula and case studies as well as professors of the innovative educational institution
set to define, address and solve the problems that face Europe of its stakeholders.
We are of the opinion that graduates in social sciences, medicine schools and in other,
non strictly, technical disciplines should also be educated in the design and experimentation
methodology. In the longer time horizon this additional training should generate positive effects
not only in operation of societal, or government systems but also may bring about better
understanding of ways how new knowledge is produced and in what ways it could be exploited
for the benefit of countries and societies.
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It has not escaped our attention that the understanding of design and experimentation
processes among e.g. economists may contribute to the development of a useful economic theory of
innovation, technical progress, and, on the whole, the theory of operation of the knowledge-based
economy.
5. The S—T—E triangle: where is the place for innovation?
When it comes to study linkages and interactions that are active in the SCIENCE—
TECHNOLOGY—ECONOMY (S—T—E) triangle it becomes evident that we are still gathering
factography [EC 2003a; b], formulating hypotheses on how data on the numbers of science and
R&D workers, scientific publications, patents etc influence the innovativeness, competitiveness and
rankings of countries in terms of the levels and rates of growth [EC 2003c; Kukliñski, Skuza
2003]. Efforts that aim at the outlining of policy making trajectories how to implement the
knowledge-based economy paradigm [Rodrigues 2003] are undertaken.
The frequently referred to “the European paradox” [EC 2003b, p.413] can be treated as
an indication that the processes by which corporations, industries, regions, countries and their
groupings gain absolute competitive advantage over their counterparts are not well understood
in Europe. It appears that they need not only descriptive [Porter 1990] but also prescriptive
treatment. Were it not, then policy makers would do without detailed investigations on facts and
cause-effect mechanisms that help to accelerate economic growth and assist certain countries in
attaining privileged position in the race for better living standards of their populations. What
is still missing in the landscape of studies and investigations are the workable models that
would explain in operational terms the astonishing performance of e.g. Japanese economy in the
1970s and 1980s in terms of innovativeness and competitive position in international trade or the
self-perpetuating pace of American economy during the whole of 20th and the beginning of the
21st century.
The linear model of science—technology—economy linkages (so easily rejected when Stephen
J. Kline had written his first articles [1985a; b], followed by S.J. Kline and Nathan Rosenberg
publication [1986] on chain-linked model), is still valid in many specific areas of relations between
science, technology and practical applications. The linear model (or its prototype yet to be
developed into a fully-fledged numerical formula) still commands relevance and strength in many
fields, where value and strategic judgments on efforts to improve the performance of state or
societal institutions are surmounting the commercial principles.
It is quite striking that since its inception, the in fact half baked idea of a chain-linked
model had not been enriched by clear specifications of explanatory and dependent variables as well
as by numerical identification of the relevant coefficients. The so-called model of chain-linkages
replicates, in the form of a block-diagram, certain paths by which flows of ideas, data, money,
inputs and various activities bring in innovation, first into the firm and consequently, into the
economy.
Ability to replicate the linearity of thinking and putting down in writing our knowledge about
the many trajectories that link science with business practices is only the first step towards
operational models. The block diagram as presented by the authors of the chain-linked model
offers, in contrast to the linearity of speech and texts, multi-dimensional map of influences and
dependencies. Many parallel links and feedbacks on figure 3 [Kline, Rosenberg 1986, p. 290] reveal
the complexity of the problem and mutual interplay of various phases, their outcomes and actors
performing their specific roles.
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This picture refers to virtually microeconomic domain of use of science in practical life. If the
line of reasoning present in the chain-linked model is to be further developed we need not only
refinements and detailed specification of this model. Equally important there seem to be models
that would take into account the processes and actors that are present in the macroeconomic and
institutional framework. The linear model, as the one attributed to Vanevar Bush is the one that
is rooted in the macro scale [Bush 1945].
The micro and macro approaches would probably not suffice. A meso scale model would be
needed to capture the specificities of industry-wide or region-rooted efforts to convert achievements
in the science sector into more efficient processes or better products.
One thing can be said now. The authors of the Third European Report are very correct in
their frank admission that “...there is a need to develop a more refined understanding of the
complex interactions and co-evolution of S&T along the different stages of innovation”, [EC 2003c,
p. 413].
This declaration states that the understanding of interplay among science, technology and
economy (STE) is no longer a matter of curiosity of researchers. It is a sine qua non condition of
rendering the knowledge about STE metabolism that would be usable in policy formulation and
extension.
The widely felt dissatisfaction with models proposed by the orthodox economic theory (in which
neither economic growth nor the nature of technological change through innovation is embodied
[Gomu³ka 1990]), that fail to explain the dynamics of factor productivity and competitiveness has
not, as of now, brought a new approach to the perception and understanding of STE phenomena.
Perhaps something is gestating and the next generation of models will soon be made known.
It is highly unlikely, however, that these new models would rely on symptomatic, describing the
surface of phenomena only, approaches that in the past were derived from the Cobb-Douglas
production function or econometric manipulations with data on output and R&D expenditure or
patent registration. What is needed is the organic modeling of cause-effect mechanisms. The
relevance of traditional econometric models is limited, the experiences derived from the application
of e.g. the two factor (capital and labour) production function tell us that it can not explain the
phenomena that are present in long term growth . Traditional econometric models illustrate only
the correlations that might have happened in the past.
Policy makers, presidents of corporations and managers are looking into the future. Their
decisions are based on perceptions of economic reality, as it occurs to them at present, as well as
on general strategies, assessment of potential of their systems relative to the potentials of their
competitors and on forecasts of purchasing power or demand for products they are in position to
deliver to the markets they focus on. The particular knowledge of this how researchers or model
builders explain the past events is probably totally irrelevant to them.
We can, therefore, formulate a postulate that the new generation of models that would be
useful in, the yet to formed, theory of competitiveness for business and for economic policies
should be based on the new composition of explanatory variables 9. From this postulate it follows
9 The variables that I have in mind would reflect individual, perhaps subjective to a degree (but definitely not
averaged over the whole industry or economy), projections of contemplated actions, relating the decisions to be taken
to the changes of employing new technology being in possession of a firm or having a potential to be developed
internally by the firm vis-à-vis the perceived moves by competitors and the projected changes in the market demand.
In an article dealing with the need to develop a new generation of models for a knowledge-driven economy it is was
suggested that a completely new modeling paradigm should be adopted. Taking into account the largely unstudied
by econometric investigation the area in which basic research, R&D, final engineering (products and processes) and
commercialisation of end effects of those efforts are interacting, together with the attending uncertainties (financing,
success chances, sources of repayment of incurred costs) it was proposed that gaming simulogy models are employed
[Œwitalski 2000, p. 163–167].
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that studies in the competitiveness of S&T sector of European economies might yield more useful
results when these new variables of business behavior models in firms are incorporated into
models of technology development.
6. An alternative reflection
Before we attempt to formulate the remarks that would conclude this contribution we feel
compelled to make a short reference to the meaningful article written by another author of
this volume. Roman Galar, in his insightful, frank and open, perhaps even bitter, appraisal of
implications resulting from the Report [ EC 2003c], addresses several issues that are very
important (see: Adaptive versus Managerial Approach to S&T Policy, contained in the present
collection of articles). Documenting his stance with historical examples, the author attempts to
present an alternative view of premises, methodology of deriving conclusions and of formulating
policy directives that follow from the assessment of the situation that obtains in the EU at present.
Professor Galar, inspired by Antoni Kukliñski’s dichotomies that are permeating the strategic
choices related to the future of Europe (see: Europe—the Strategic Choices of the XXI Century.
Six Methodological Reflections, also present in this volume), raises the issue of a dirigistic versus
leseferic modalities in introducing measures to improve the performance of S&T sector. That issue
touches the core of the contemporary understanding of the ways by which S&T structures and
policies influence the economy.
While there are no workable theories or models that would explain the working of
science/technology—economy interface, so these complex, and not fully understood (especially by
economic theory) phenomena and processes can only be grasped thanks to hunches and guesses.
We highly appreciate the weight and the background of arguments that R. Galar presents to
support his position in advocating the leseferic approach. Nevertheless we are of the opinion that
S&T policies can not wholly rely on no policies at all. The pragmatic solution to the problem
of a choice between dirigistic or leseferic attitudes in formulating the policies toward basic and
applied research, engineering, technology and innovation is, with all probability, more dependent
on the optimal mix of the two approaches then on any one of them, taken separately.
In some instances the linear model (pattern) of dependence between the expenditure on
research and the practical outcomes is more useful and appropriate. Despite all the shortcomings
(the contestable assumption that the supply push suffices to attain the targets, the requirement
that state’s budgets should finance the expenditure on S&T projects, the widely acknowledged
facts that a prominent role in advancing societal technologies is played by corporate funding
of research and that innovation is proliferating through processes of spatial and inter-industry
diffusion) the assumption that there exists a linear (or near-linear), relationship or dependence
between budgetary expenditure and the commercialization of new technology, in many cases seems
to gain the upper hand. In these instances the goal to catch up with the race leaders seems to
justify the dirigistic approach. In such cases the objective is set quite clear: attain the same (or
higher) level of excellence as other participants have attained. The criterion in funds allocation is
also straightforward: allocate funding in such an amount and in such a way that guarantees the
achievement of the goal with the minimum of expenditure.
Such instances may occur not so frequently. So we also need another approach. Many
policy makers and researchers tend to think that the so called chained-linked model can be
applied in lieu of the decisive moves to direct the areas and orientations of research. However,
the chain-linked flow diagram neither specifies the objectives nor provides the criteria for the
evaluation of progress or performance. The approach in question is, in its essence, behavioural. It
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leaves out the process of search as well as the act of defining the objectives to the operation of
invisible hand. Although that observation is deeply rooted within the leseferic paradigm it does
not offer any comfort when policy makers are forced to take position vis-à-vis the challenges
posed by the natural environment protection, depletion of fossil fuels or the threat of structural
unemployment.
The idea that multiple relationships among funding sources, direct actors working on
consecutive phases of an innovative project and the end-users of the project outcome can be
presented in the form of a block diagram (the chain-linked model as proposed by S. J. Kline
and N. Rosenberg [1986]) is quite fruitful but still should not be called a model. In our view it
is merely an illustration of the way of thinking about the process or a suggestion that indicates
the lines of further research. Without clearly set objectives or criteria to evaluate the ensuing
courses of action, this suggestion hardly can fulfill the role of an analytical tool for diagnosing
the situation or for drafting macroeconomic policies. In the absence of appropriate investigative
or prescriptive instruments we fully support R. Galar’s view that adaptative approaches, being
reinforced by efforts to produce social capital (as a supplement to the human one) and efforts to
create an environment that would enhance quality and social usefulness of research as well as the
wide acceptance of innovative behaviours is more promising than the dirigistic dispositions that
would empower bureaucrats to assume control over the delicate sphere contained in the S—T—E
triangle.
Roman Galar’s approach is based on broad philosophical assessment of implications that follow
from the structure of the Report and the intellectual inclinations of its Authors. In our contribution
we wanted to take a more technocratic perspective. We confined ourselves to numbers and their
meaning. We attempted to point to circumstances that question (in extreme situations invalidate)
the lines of the contemplated future actions that would follow from the Lisbon declaration in
the light of hard facts and the demanding reality. Galar’s insights into the pitch and key of the
declared policies as well as into the message that the “Lisbon strategy” and the Report proclaim,
go into the very intellectual foundations of deliberations over the possible shape of Europe’s
future. We think that the referred to paper corroborates our assumption that a better, and the
less concerned with solving the imminent problems of today, understanding of the metabolism
that is present in the S—T—E triangle on the part of researchers from both sides (technological
and economic) will eventually flourish in the emergence of practicable theory of innovation and
competitiveness.
7. Final remarks
When the practical issues of implementation of Lisbon strategy are taken into account then
policy measures would come to the fore in the new light. The important indications on what
problems the technology development policies (and, consequently science sector’s research effort)
should be focused on would not be derived from academic’s perceptions but rather from the
subjective expectations of those who take decisions in businesses, in administration and from the
modalities by which state or Union institutions are functioning.
The authors and back-office researchers contributing to individual chapters and dossiers of
The Third European Report [EC 2003c] have made a formidable effort and have achieved the
lasting and meaningful result. The breadth and minuteness of their investigations provides a very
good launching platform for further studies (new factography, hypotheses, fresh models, premises
to formulate a relevant theory of a knowledge-based economy). What will be needed to develop
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 140 (140)
140 W³adys³aw Œwitalski
the knowledge-based economy paradigm into the theory of knowledge-based economic behaviour ,
in my personal assessment, are two extensions of studies done so far [EC 2003a; b; c].
Extension one seems to be not very difficult: the issue of patents. We have here two parties.
The owners of patents and their buyers. Irrespective of the owner we have to discern the patent
users (owner and buyers). The patent rights users are the producers of goods and services. The
benefits that should ensue from the use of patents are: new products, higher factor productivity,
larger market share, improved profitability and a sustainable competitive advantage. Attempts to
include the statistics on actual patent uses by corporations and governmental institutions in the
Fourth Report would propel the knowledge on these issues to new insights and hypotheses.
Extension two would pertain the closed-loop mechanism. Better performance on the market,
in domestic as well as in international dimension, generates surpluses that should fuel both, the
business expenditure on R&D and engineering of specific projects as well as the government
financing of basic research and the functioning of institutions that help the economies concerned
to attain the status of a knowledge-driven economy.
Allowing ourselves to return to our starting metaphor, namely to the one that EU has
consciously declared its intent to win the competitiveness and knowledge-based economy rallye,
we would like to underline our conviction that the success depends not only on putting additional
cylinders into the inherited driving engine (i.e. producing higher number of graduates in science
and technology, in the expectation that they would become researchers) or mounting larger wheels
on EU’s vehicle (i.e. implementing Framework Programmes that encompass broader ramifications
for research areas to be covered) but, in equal measure, the success depends on :
1) achieving higher rating and more useful output from the already installed power;
2) putting-in more efficient transmission between the power plant (science, education, technology
and engineering sector) and the mechanism that safeguards effective performance (generation
of patents, innovation and technical progress in business, government administration and
social services sphere);
3) educating the sponsors (sources of funding) as well as other stakeholders to be more aware
of potential benefits when the system performs according to expectations and unavoidable
losses in case any part of the whole system is not using the resources and potential (human,
material and financial as well as knowledge and aspirations) in the right way;
4) improved charting of the territory that extends ahead by which the ensuing uncertainties
would be reduced while alternative trajectories or paths might help to take shortcuts on the
route or to select less bumpy roads;
5) better training of the drivers of the vehicle;
6) better communication among drivers, logistic experts and the support team.
When this thinking is introduced into strategic considerations how to win in the race for
leadership in knowledge generation, exploitation and commercialization then the chances for
success in achieving the objectives goals of Lisbon strategy would become higher although the
numerical goals themselves would still remain distant and uncertain.
Bibliography
Bush Vannevar, Science: The Endless Frontier, National Science Foundation, Washington DC 1945
EC 2000, Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 23–24 March 2000, Council Document 1000/1/00
EC 2003a, Science & Technology Policies in Europe, New Challenges and New Responses, Proceedings of
the STRATA Consolidating Workshop, Brussels, 22–23 April 2002, Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, Luxembourg 2003
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 141 (141)
The Conditions and Modalities of Implementing The Knowledge-Based Economy... 141
EC 2003b, Science & Technology Policies in Europe: New Challenges and New Responses, Final Report
from the STRATA Consolidating Workshop, Office for Official publications of the European Communities,
Luxembourg 2003
EC 2003c, Community Research—Studies, Third European Report on Science & Technology Indicators
2003, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 2003
Gibbons Michael et al., The New Production of Knowledge. The Dynamics of Science and Research in
Contemporary Societies, Sage Publications, London 1994
Gomu³ka Stanis³aw, The Theory of Technological Change and Economic Growth, Routledge, London 1990
Hayek Friedrich A. von, TheUse of Knowledge in Society, “American Economic Review” 1945, vol. 35
Kline Stephen J., Research, Invention, Innovation and Production: Models and Reality, working paper,
INN-1, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Stanford University, 1985a
Kline Stephen J., Innovation is not a Linear Process, “Research Management” 1985b, nr 4
Kline Stephen J., Nathan Rosenberg, An Overview of Innovation, w: The Positive Sum Strategy. Harnessing
Technology for Economic Growth, Ralph Landau, Nathan Rosenberg eds, National Academy Press,
Washington DC 1986
Kukliñski Antoni, Europe—the strategic choices of the XXI century. Four methodological reflections (a note
announcing the publication of a new volume, edited by A. Kukliñski and Z. Paw³owski), mimeo,
Warszawa 2004.
Kukliñski, Skuza 2003, Europe in the Perspective of Global Change, Antoni Kukliñski, Bogus³aw Skuza eds.,
OW Rewasz, Warsaw 2003
Mowery David, Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 1989
Nelson Richard R., Sidney G. Winter, In Search of Useful Theory of Innovation, “Research Policy” 1977,
nr 6
Nelson Richard R., Sidney G.Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Belknap Press,
Cambridge MA 1982
OECD 1976, Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Experimental Development. Frascati
Manual. The Measurement of Scientific and Technical Activities, OECD, Paris 1976
OECD 1991, Choosing Priorities in Science and Technology, OECD, Paris 1991
OECD 1992, Technology and the Economy. The Key Relationships, OECD, Paris 1992
OECD 1994a, Frascati Manual, OECD, Paris 1994
OECD 1994b, Main Definitions and Conventions for the Measurement of Research and Experimental
Development (RD); A Summary of the Frascati Manual 1993, Paris 1994
OECD 1994c, Patent Manual 1994. The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities Using
Patent Data as Science and Technology Indicators, OECD, Paris 1994
OECD 1996, Employment and Growth in the Knowledge-based Economy, OECD, Paris 1996
OECD 1997a, Industrial Competitiveness in the Knowledge-based Economy: The New Role of Government,
Paris 1997
OECD 1997b, Oslo Manual. The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities. Proposed
Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Technological Innovation Data, OECD-Eurostat, Paris 1997
Porter Michael E., The Competitive Advantage of Nations, The Free Press, New York 1990
Rodrigues Maria João, European Policies for a Knowledge Economy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2003
Schmookler Jacob, Invention and Economic Growth, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MAS 1966
Schumpeter Joseph A., The Instability of Capitalism, “Economic Journal” 1928, September
Schumpeter Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (part II, Chapter VII, Section 4: The Process
of Creative Destruction), George Allen & Unwin London 1979
Œwitalski W³adys³aw, The Knowledge-based Economy Paradigm: From Factographic Research to Model
Building in: The Knowledge-based Economy. The Global Challenges of the 21st Century, Antoni
Kukliñski ed., State Committee for Scientific Research, Warsaw 2000
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 143 (143)
Part Two
Education—TheKey
toTheFuture ofEurope
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 145 (144)
KRZYSZTOF PAW£OWSKI
EDUCATION—THE KEY
TO THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
Introduction
The transition into the 21st century highlights not only a noticeable economic transformation,
but also a societal one. Developmental trends in the global economy and demographic changes,
indicate a transfer of developmental propensity towards countries of the “Pacific Rim”. It is
increasingly clear that two new, giant entrants will soon enhance the group of developed nations:
China and India, which, due to the size of their internal markets, can affect the world’s economic
situation. They can do so in the near future, as well as influence global politics and culture.
Simultaneously, the end of the 20th century brought with it the increasing role of transnational
corporations, whose existence and developmental strategies are increasingly removed from the
widely understood political, social and economic situation, not only of those countries where the
TNC’s are headquartered, but also those where the corporations operate their production and
trading divisions. The global liberalisation of trade enhances such tendencies. Less and less
countries opt for economic isolationism, with the most notable change in this approach being
adopted by China where almost all of the Fortune 500 corporations have already located their
production, service and trading divisions.
The role of the nation state is constantly being reduced, especially in the case of small and
medium-sized countries. For many years Europe has been attempting to adapt to the new situation
by increasing integration processes between the national economies of its member states. EU
widening to 25 countries has brought a considerable expansion in the internal market and, in the
perspective of a decade or so, should bring about a clear economic development impulse, not only
for individual member states but also for the EU as a whole. Unfortunately, the positive long-term
economic and political changes within the EU are under threat from the demographic changes,
as all EU member states will experience a decline in their population numbers coupled with an
unavoidable ageing of those that remain. Such a situation highlights the need for the EU to focus
on the resources that form the basis for the Knowledge-based societies: people, especially those
most talented and innovative, and on systems that educate and shape such people. It seems that in
the current globalising economy combined with negative demographic trends, effective education
systems and the organisation of scientific research will become the keys to sustaining Europe’s
position in the world. Unfortunately, due to political reasons European education systems are
egalitarian in nature, while the dominant political doctrine is the democratic access to knowledge
and equality for all academic institutions. At the same time, modern times are times when those
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most talented are vital for science and the economy. What should be done in Europe so that the
tradition of equality isn’t compromised, yet those most gifted are effectively selected, educated
and offered conditions in which they can utilise their talent in the service of the nation state?
What should be done to draw in, just like in the USA, those most talented individuals from
the rest of the world, so that they would see Europe as a place in which to realise their scientific
and economic ambitions?
Europe in the changing world
The current organisational solutions in European science, systems of promoting young
scientists and ways of funding scientific research force the most gifted, ambitious and young
European scientists to seek better fortunes in American universities.
Over the last century, Europe has persistently lost its hegemonic status, and done so in all of
the most important areas of human activity: political, social, cultural, economic or that of scientific
research. We can make an analogy to the times of the Roman Empire. Greece as an area, which
just recently dominated the world was loosing its importance, Greek cities were crumbling, the
Greek fleet was non-existent, and primitive farming was re-emerging as the primary mode of
survival. While the state crumbled, Greek culture spread across the ancient world carrying forth
its amazing achievements in philosophy, mathematics and literature. Today, our modern world, just
like its Roman equivalent, has accepted, transformed and developed the greatest achievements
of European civilisation, including the institution of the University and scientific research, while
Europe as a whole is beginning to lose its place as a political, military, cultural and economic
power.
It is difficult to tell an enlightened European, who can look back on a glorious past, that we
can easily envisage a world without the considerable influence of geographic Europe. It is easy
to create a script, where Europe joins the global periphery. To illustrate Europe’s declining role
in world economic affairs, we can draw on much data1, but the exercise would be pointless—we
treat this process as fact visible to all who engage in analysing the present and future.
If we assume that, in the 21st century the world’s development will depend on the Knowledge-
Based Economy, then the expansion of scientific research, or widely-defined, the production of
knowledge and its application, will be the fundamental way in which corporations or countries will
acquire supremacy or at least a sizeable portion in the global division of the results of human
economic activity2.
To illustrate the level of scientific research development in a given country we can utilise
a variety of data or synthetic indicators. This work proposes to use the simplest of them all, which
clearly illustrates the position in the global race for scientific dominance—the percentage of the
entire number of Nobel Prize laureates (excluding the Peace and Literature prizes), generated in
10-year periods by Europe, the United States and the rest of the world.
1 Kennedy, P., (1989), The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York: Vintage Books; Huntington, S. P., (1996),
The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster; Oswald, S., (1991), The
Decline of the West, New York: Oxford University Press.
2 Read: Kleer, J., Liberska, B., Kukliñski, A., (et al), (1998), Globalizacja gospodarki œwiatowej, a integracja
regionalna. Konsekwencja dla Polski, Warszawa: Komitet Prognoz „Polska w XXI wieku” przy Prezydium PAN, Dom
Wydawniczy ELIPSA; Bo¿yk, P., (et al), (1999), Jaka przysz³oœæ Europy?, Warszawa: Komitet Prognoz „Polska w XXI
wieku” przy Prezydium PAN, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA; Ja³owiecki B. (2000), Brukselskie scenariusze dla Europy,
in: Strategia rozwoju Polski do roku 2020, Vol. 2, Studia eksperckie na temat 20-lecia 2001–2020, Warszawa: Komitet
Prognoz „Polska 2000 Plus” przy Prezydium PAN, Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA, p. 164–181.
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The process of globalisation and the development of the Knowledge-Based Economy will boost
the role of world leaders—corporations and countries that have direct access to research data and
its applications in the shortest possible time frame. The winners will be those, who can create
the best systemic conditions for the conduct of science and for utilising the results of scientific
research and who acquire the best scientists. That is the reason why the number of Nobel Prize
winners working in a given country is a clear illustration of the country’s scientific potential, and
thus its developmental opportunities. 3
The data speaks for itself, and should provide the necessary impulse for Europe to initiate
special actions. The number of Nobel prizes awarded to Europeans has declined from nearly
100% to 26% in the 1990’s while the number of Nobel Prizes awarded to scientists working in the
USA has exploded from 3% to over 60% in the same period. The number of Nobel prizes awarded
to scientists from outside Europe and the US is also steadily rising. Of course we could delude
ourselves that, when looked upon in absolute values, the decline is much smaller because we still
generate over a third of the laureates and six of the American laureates in the 1990’s came
from Europe4. But such explanations only weaken the message emanating from the graph above,
especially when we extrapolate the European decline into the future, even if we assume a relative
slowdown of the process. The message is stunning: should the decline in the number of Nobel
Prize laureates living and working in Europe persist, after 2030 the number of Prizes awarded to
the Continent ought to be marginal. The data presented is a shocking signal of Europe’s possible
marginalisation in one of the crucial areas of human activity—the development of science.
3 To simplify the analysis, numbers of laureates have been partitioned into 10-year periods: 1900–09, 1930–39,
1960–69, 1990–99, and those are the periods of relative stability in crucial areas of the world (therefore the decades
following both World Wars and the periods of turbulence that followed have been omitted).
4 Detailed data about the Nobel Prizes awarded in various areas can be found in: Braun T., Szabadi-Peresztegi
Z., Kovacs-Nemeth, E., (2003), No-bells for ambiguous of ranked Nobelists as science indicators of national merit in
physics, chemistry and medicine 1991–2001, Scientometrics, vol. 56, no 1, p. 3–28
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What the data says and why American universities are the best
The Nobel Prize data presented above, illustrates the increasing lead that American science has
over its continental European counterpart. To avoid any accusations of one-sidedness it is necessary
to quote additional data from B. Clark’s “Places of Inquiry”5. The US economy has roughly 25%
of global GDP, but American share of the global expenditure on R&D amounts to 38%. Also,
38% of scientific publications originate in the US, but the share of index citations is over 50%6.
In various disciplines, 18–20 US universities are places in the global top 25, while the top 10
is traditionally dominated by 8–9 of them. In the “electrical engineering” top 25 category, 20
universities are US-based, 4 in the UK and 1 in Japan. In the “economics” top 25, 21 universities
are US-based, 2 in the UK and 2 in Israel. New inventions and achievements originate from the
US: 72% of all new business methods based on the use of Internet originated from America7,
while US corporations were responsible for 60% of the top 100 innovations made between 1945
and 19708. Despite the fact that biomedical R&D is conducted all over the world, 75% of all
biotechnology pharmaceutical patents emerge in the US9. American domination is clearly visible
in the area of organising and funding scientific research: 89% of global venture capital belongs
to US investors, while half of the 17 well-known innovation centres10 are located in the US
(Silicon Valley and Boston Route 128 are the most famous) 11. When quoting such data we have
to remember that the USA never achieved the level of R&D expenditure that the European
Union has it eyes upon—3% GDP. The US case shows that excessive funding is not enough and
that effective systemic solutions are needed. The US economy has retained the status of the
world’s most dynamic economy, and over the last 50 years has increased GPD per capita by 2.5
times, despite the fact that it spent less than 3% GDP on R&D over this lengthy period.
A different argument illustrates the dominance of American higher education: in 2000/2001,
there were 23 705 American students in Europe, whereas the US hosted over 80 000 Europeans12.
But if we consider the overall population size and recalculate the data the US-Europe ratio would
be even higher. If we recalculate the number of European students relative to 1 million US
citizens, we receive 295, whereas there are 49 Americans for every 1 million European citizens
(six times less). It is appropriate to point out that a decision to undertake study in the US also
means the need to fund ones study, the costs of which are much higher than comparative study
at even the most expensive European institutions.
If we assume that top research universities in the US are the current world reference, we
should ponder upon what differentiates them from European institutions.
5 Clark, B.R., (1995), Places of Inquiry: Research and Advanced Education in Modern Universities, Berkeley:
University of California Press, p. 139.
6 JSI data for 1991–2000. ibid.
7 NSF, (2002), Science and Engineering Indicators 2002, Arlington, Da; Washington, DC: National Science
Foundation.
8 OECD, (1970), Gaps in Technology: comparisons between member countries in education, research and
development, technological innovation, international economic exchanges, OECD.
9 Porter, M.E., Schwab, K., Sachs, J., (et al), (2002), National Innovation Capacity, in: The Global Competitiveness
Report 2001–2002: World Economic Forum, Geneva, Switzerland, 2001, New York: Oxford Universitry Press p. 24.
10 Manuel Castells calls these centres „technopolis sites”, in: Castells, M., Hall, P., (1994), Technolpoles of the World:
the making of twenty-first century industrial complexes, London, New York: Routledge.
11 UNDP, (2001), Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technology Work For Human Development, New
York p. 32–34.
12 OECD, (2001), Number of foreign students in tertiary education by country of origin and country of destination,
electronic document: www.oecd.org, table C3.5; OECD, (2002), Foreign students enrolled in institution of higher
education in the United States and outlying areas, by continent, region, and selected countries of origin:1980–81 to
2000–01, electronic document: http://www.opendoorweb.org, table 415.
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 149 (148)
Education—the Key to the Future of Europe 149
The Author’s experience in creating and managing a higher education institution, situated
on the crossroads of two cultures and education systems—Polish and American—allows for the
formulation of five major factors that differentiate US universities:
1. Effective and professional management;
2. A shortening of the journey to scientific and academic independence of staff;
3. Financial and organisational stability;
4. Focusing research funding (both public and private) on the best research teams;
5. An academic atmosphere where scientists and students coexist; that situation creates attitudes
and character;
6. A much stronger relationship with the surrounding environment, especially with the economy.
Proposed changes to the European system
One of the most important characteristics of the American higher education system is its
internal differentiation. Alongside top research universities—where those most talented, and
often the richest, are educated, where Nobel Prize laureates and/or candidates conduct scientific
research—there is also a sea of colleges and universities whose primary mission is education. The
education system is analysed through a variety of rankings, which allow the prospective student
and academic to find an institution best suited to their needs and capabilities. Simultaneously, the
American system allows for the progression of students and staff to better and better universities
in line with their career objectives and abilities.
The European higher education system, especially the Continental one, due to the incorrectly
understood equality in access to funding, “dilutes” public financial support, which still remains
the dominant form of university funding, equally across all universities. This is undoubtedly one
of the fundamental reasons why there haven’t appeared any European elite research universities
capable of competing with the best American and British research institutions.
The model presented below shows the proposed changes in national education systems, which
focus on:
A. The creation of conditions for the emergence in individual EU member states of research
universities capable of competing with the world leaders, that can be achieved via funding and
organisational methods;
B. The creation of a system for staff development at the highest level, that are necessary for
effective and efficient national governance;
C. The identification and selection of scientific talent at the university entry level, followed by
the creation of opportunities for conducting scientific research at European universities, while
retaining the rule of equality of access to education.
In the system outlined below, the Author attempts to combine the best American solutions
with European values.
Fundamental assumptions of the proposed new higher education system are as follows:
1. The best universities selected by the government, receive funds for accepted students onto
“competency” programmes lasting 5 years, yet each year there is a public verification process
of elite-creating institutions. Universities or Faculties that lower their standards will be denied
follow-on contracts, while their place is taken by new entities that have raised their education
standards to the appropriate level. This system assures competitiveness and enforces the
sustaining or enhancement of educational quality. Governmental contracts for elite education
are signed with institutions regardless of their status, i.e. private or state-owned.
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2. The government decides about the scale of competency-based special scholarships based on
current demand and financial resources. We can assume that such scholarships will cover 5%
of all students accepted onto the 1st year in most nations to 10% in the richest countries.
This approach is based on the solutions applied in French Grand-Ecole’s, but doesn’t freeze
the process into an elite-educating programme, seeing that places are accessible only after
passing a stringent selection process. Five faculties/universities leading in each teaching area
would function within this system, allowing for the dispersion of “special” students amongst
them so that a monopoly never arises at a single institution.
3. The remaining 95% candidates study for free during the 1st year, which retains the principle
of democratic access to higher education. Individual institutions define intake limits and set
entry criteria, for example additional entry exams.
4. From their 2nd year, all students learning on normal terms pay tuition whose minimal amount
is defined by the government and the maximum amount by the university, taking under
consideration the real costs of study on a specific programme or faculty. The government
transfers to all universities (private and state-owned) a standard amount of funds per student,
via an “education coupon” or by an algorithm, as well as covering the operational costs of
state universities like investments, renovations, fixed and administrative costs, and internal
research. When retaking a year, students pay a much higher tuition, which ought to cover the
full cost of studying.
5. National and local governments create scholarship systems permitting the awarding of funding
based on study results as well as awarding social/poverty scholarships that cover the tuition
and study costs for students originating from poorer families.
6. The national government, through a special fund, covers the cost of doctoral studies, but also
awards high scholarships to the most gifted doctoral students, so that they become tied to
the European universities and consider remaining there to undertake scientific careers.
The nature of the proposed funding and organisation system is based on:
— Moving away from tuition-free studies for all students;
— Introducing a rule where only the state carries the financial burden of study for those most
gifted students and doctoral researchers, simultaneously strengthening European universities
so that they could compete with the best institutions in the world.
Detailed solutions regarding the new system of funding and organisation of higher education
for a specific country—Poland—have been explained in a previously published book13.
The proposed system foresees a much higher than standard funding for competency-based
studies and doctoral programmes from the state budget. Such a solution should gradually, within
a decade or so, strengthen the best Faculties and universities, in terms of money and people,
which conduct competency and doctoral programmes. Additional public funding for education will
permit hiring of increasingly better academic and scientific staff and bring about the return of the
highly individualised Master-Apprentice relationship. If this system will be accompanied by a well-
prepared system of research grants, then gradually, the best will be visibly strengthened—those
institutions that best find their way in the new conditions—and as a result gain much needed
international competitiveness.
An important part of the system must be its openness and the introduction of permanent
competition for access to additional funding. Every several years (5–7) universities should
undergo external evaluation by validation committees, while a special national-level accreditation
organisation would maintain an official ranking of Faculties conducting competency and doctoral
13 Paw³owski, K., (2004), Spo³eczeñstwo wiedzy—szansa dla Polski, Znak, Krakow
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programmes. The weakest and lowest-ranked institution would loose its license to the strongest of
the Faculties applying for the right to conduct competency and doctoral programmes that would
be additionally funded from public sources.
A very important part of American and British university dominance is their ability to draw
in students from the rest of the world, especially for their doctoral programmes. It is obvious that
such people strengthen the scientific potential of those universities where they undertake studies.
US and British universities have a fundamental advantage: they offer programmes in the most
popular global language, English. Yet, there is no financial barrier to the creation of a European
network of universities offering all, or their best, programmes taught in English. Such a network
would not only enhance much desired staff and student mobility within the EU, but would also
draw in students from elsewhere, especially in a situation where they would be able to continue
their studies in a series of universities operating in different EU member states. Tentative steps
are being taken in this direction within the framework of the Socrates-Mundus programme, but on
a small scale and with the simultaneous retention of programmes operated in national languages.
One of the reasons for the superiority of American universities over their European
counterparts is the high mobility of researchers and academics and the relative ease of their
employment and firing. Most European states are still dominated by the mentality promoting
permanent employment of people who have been awarded the state professorship, regardless of
their professional activity. In the American system, a professorship is tied to the institution and
the percentage of people being awarded tenure is clearly lower, while the evaluation of academic
and scientific activity is much stricter. As a result, there is increased competitiveness between
staff employed by American universities, which, when looked at through the prism of final results,
clearly has an effect on the quality of work.
When analysing the staffing policy of European universities their over-socialisation is clearly
visible. A popular model (virtually undoable in the USA) is one where a person’s entire professional
development is conducted within the confines of a single Department: from a student, through
doctoral study all the way to the state-awarded professorship. Such a system in no way enhances
effective staff selection nor stimulates the generation of conditions helpful in maximising the
effects of conducted research and its application.
Conclusion
Education, in its widest sense—from primary school, through university, all the way to
continuous learning—is becoming the key to the future for all societies.
This notion seems obvious, but maybe it is worth recalling the arguments in its support:
1. A good education system creates people capable of creative and innovative application of
knowledge.
2. A good higher education system boosts the development of scientific research and its
application in the economy.
3. An open and effective education system maximises value added—it is not only the increase
of knowledge in the minds of those being educated, but also of abilities to utilise it, both
amongst those most gifted as well as all participants within the education process.
4. A good education system, in the long run, brings with it social behaviours that can bring
about the emergence of an innovative Knowledge-based society.
Only an innovative Knowledge-based Society is capable of creating and innovative and
competitive economy. Only an economy capable of constant competition with the best in the
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approaching world, combined with an entrepreneurial, mobile and innovative KBS can help Europe
regain its competitiveness and thus become a global actor in the 21st century.
European politicians, still dreaming of realising the Lisbon Strategy, are left with implementing
the decision to introduce a series of reforms into the European academic world, including those
most fundamental—introducing competition and the concentration of funding for research and
university development in the best institutions.
The reward is not only the position of the European academic establishment in the race
for global leadership but also something much more important—the position of the European
economy in the global competitive system and the chance to acquire the potential to effectively
compete with the best.
Reforms are difficult to implement, because they go opposite to the centuries-old traditions
of academic autonomy and overturn politically correct notions of equal access to higher education.
Yet, without them, the goals set in the Lisbon Strategy will remain forever on the horizon, possibly
a horizon moving further and further away.
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A NOTE ON EDUCATION, GROWTH
AND PUBLIC FINANCES
Introduction
Average GDP growth rate of the European Union countries during the 1980’s and 1990’s has
not been outstanding, both in absolute terms and relative to the US.
Since both economic theory as well as empirical research indicate that education and human
capital belong to important factors driving sustained growth of nations, hence it seems that one
of the possible reasons for such an unfavorable outcome for the EU could be attributed the
significant difference between the level of human capital in EU, as compared to US (see, for
example, Sapir, 2003).
Therefore, for the European Union (and other) countries, it is important to understand what
factors influence the level and accumulation of human capital. Among the policy issues that arise
in this context is the question of the influence of public education expenditures on the level and
accumulation of human capital.
This paper is intended as a brief survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on the
impact of education1 and public education expenditure on the rate of economic growth and human
1 The emphasis of this paper is on education, rather than on more extensive concept of human capital that
includes also training. This reflects the focus of the existing cross-country empirical research—the nature of training
varies considerable across countries which makes very hard to capture it in international data (Temple, 2001a).
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Table 1
Educational attainment of the total population aged 25 and over in EU-15 and US: average
years of school and percentage of the population aged 25 and over that has completed at
least post-secondary level of school
% of the population aged 25 and over
Average years of school that has completed at least
post-secondary education
EU-15 average US EU-15 average US
1980 7,32 11,91 5,5 18,0
1985 7,54 11,71 6,5 20,4
1990 8,07 12,00 7,6 27,3
1995 8,43 12,18 9,1 28,1
2000 8,75 12,25 11,0 30,3
Source: Barro & Lee (2000) dataset
capital accumulation. The question that this paper tries to answer, is the following: can public
sector, by raising expenditures for education, stimulate the accumulation of human capital, and
hence growth rate of an economy.
The first part of the paper discusses the theoretical and empirical links between human
capital and growth. The proposition that human capital may lead to sustained long-term economic
growth stems from the so called “endogenous growth theory”, including the seminal works of
Lucas (1988) or Romer (1990). Voluminous empirical research, although not uniformly, confirms
the importance of the level and the growth rate of human capital for economic development. In
the words of Temple (2001a, p. 81): “Over the last ten years, growth researchers have bounced
from identifying quite dramatic effects of education, to calling into question the existence of any
effect at all. More recent research is placed somewhere between these two extremes, but perhaps
leaning closer to the original findings that education has a major impact”.
The second part of this paper focuses on the possible impact of public education expenditure
on human capital formation and growth rate of economy. The empirical research on this subject
is far from being conclusive. While some studies find evidence that public resources allocated to
education may increase the GDP growth rate, other works reach opposite conclusions namely
that public education expenditure does not influence or even depresses growth. Several studies
focus not on the growth rate, but on the impact of public spending on education attainment of
population; these studies also do not reach uniform conclusions.
Thus the third part of this paper presents some additional empirical evidence on the influence
of public education expenditure on the level of human capital. The results of a simple regression
analysis show that public expenditure on education is not a significant determinant of education
attainment in developed and developing countries. Hence the conclusions from this paper are the
following: public expenditure on education does not notably affect human capital and thus the link
between public education expenditure and growth seems to be weak.
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1. Education and growth
“Economists have long stressed the importance of human capital to the process of growth”
(Maniw et al., 1992, p.415). However, traditional neoclassical growth models, like Solow-Swann or
Cass-Koopmans models (see, for example, Romer 2000, or Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999) hold
that sustained growth can only be driven by technological progress, which is an exogenous factor
left unexplained by the model. Thus, paradoxically, neoclassical growth models cannot explain the
process of economic growth. This paradox was resolved by a new wave of research, initiated by
the seminal contributions of Romer (1990) and Lucas (1988), which had induced economists to
reconsider the theory on economic growth.
The “new growth” or „endogenous growth” theory, contrary to the neoclassical models,
indicates that returns to a broad concept of capital, including human capital are not necessarily
diminishing and thus growth may go on indefinitely explained only by accumulation of factors
of production (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999). Among the endogenous models, several emphasize
the importance of human capital to growth, including the models developed by Lucas (1988) and
Romer (1990).
The Lucas model (1988) assumes that production depends on the level of physical as well as
human capital. The presence of human capital implies that the returns to broad concept of capital
are not diminishing, because human and physical capital complement each other in the production
process. Hence, the feature of the model is that “it exhibits sustained per-capita growth from
endogenous human capital accumulation alone; no external engine of growth is required” (Lucas,
1988, p. 19). Temple (2001a) notes that this feature makes it hard to treat Lucas’ concept of human
capital as the level of education, measured by years of schooling—it is rather the equivalent to
knowledge or to quality of educational attainment, which might be constantly increasing over time.
Another theoretical work that exemplifies the importance of human capital is the model
developed by Romer (1990). Similarly to neoclassical models, Romer (1990) assumes that the main
mechanism of growth is technological change. However, in Romer’a model technological change
is a result of work and research effort of educated inventors (thus technological progress is not
exogenous). The model thus implies that per capita growth rate depends on the level of human
capital, which determines the capacity of a country to develop new technologies. Other theoretical
models (Benahbib and Speigel, 1994) provide evidence that human capital is also crucial for
countries that concentrate mainly on imitating the technology of richer, more developed countries,
as opposed to developing original technology on their own. These models show that the ability
to benefit from new ideas “imported” from abroad also depends on the level of human capital in
home country, as it determines the speed at which new ideas can be utilized by home country.
Despite differences—note that the Lucas model (1988) emphasizes the accumulation of human
capital as the engine of growth, while in the Romer model (1990) growth depends on the level of
human capital—both models stress the importance of human capital for economic development.
Many empirical works try to verify these hypotheses. Obviously, the results of these studies
depend heavily on the quality of data, which in case of human capital leaves much to be desired.
It captures only certain aspects of human capital, often ignoring the quality of education and is
flawed with measurement error (Engelbrecht, 2003). Hence, it must be stressed that the results
of empirical studies are unavoidably biased.
The articles that concentrate on the influence of the level of human capital (in the spirit
of Romer’s model) almost uniformly confirm that education positively affects economic growth.
Among these articles is the work of Barro (1991). Using econometric methods applied to a large
cross section of countries, the author proves that the level of human capital, proxied by school
enrollment rates, has a significant positive impact on the rate of economic growth. Similar results
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were also obtained by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999). Using a sample of 97 countries in years
1965–1985 they find, that the level of human capital measured by years of schooling is significantly
and positively related to growth.
Another influential article is the study by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). Their empirical analysis
also indicates that the level of human capital is important for growth; moreover they postulate
that the mechanism through which human capital influences growth is different in rich and poor
countries: in a sub-sample of rich countries, the level of human capital positively affects domestic
innovation, while in the poorest countries’ sub-sample, level of human enhances technological catch-
up process. Additionally, they also provide evidence that human capital encourages accumulation
of physical capital and through that also contributes to growth.
Another interesting study is the article by Hanushek and Kimko (2000). While the other
studies test for the impact of level of human capital measured usually by the school enrollment rate
or average years of schooling, these authors concentrate on human capital (or schooling) quality.
Using scores from international students’ tests in science and mathematics, the authors have
constructed a “quality index” for OECD as well as several developing countries. In the estimated
regression, they include the measures of quantity as well as quality and the results indicate that
both of these measures significantly and positively affect per capita growth rates of economies.
Engelbrecht (2003), using several different measures of education attainment, also confirms
the importance of the level of human capital to growth. Interesting, the author shows that in the
sample of OECD countries (i.e. rich economies) the role of human capital, in technological catch-up
process is also important, what contrasts with the findings of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994).
Another strand of studies follows Lucas (1988) approach and tests for the impact of human
capital accumulation on growth. The evidence delivered by these studies is not as uniform as
that provided by articles mentioned above. The works by Benhabib and Spiegiel (1994) and
Pritchett fail to find a positive relationship between the rate of accumulation of human capital
and growth. Moreover, Pritchett finds that the accumulation of human capital may even affect
growth negatively! However, several authors have argued that these results are mainly due to
mis-specification of the model and measurement errors. Krueger and Lindahl (2000) hold that
the results of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) are mainly the consequence of measurement errors
in data on human capital that they use. Controlling for the errors, they find that both the level
and the change of human capital increase the growth rate. Similar conclusions were reached by
de la Fuente and Domenech (2001). They have compiled a new, more reliable education data
set for OECD countries and using this new, improved dataset, they have found that changes in
human capital positively affect changes in output. Bassanini et al. (2001) have extended de la
Fuente’s (2001) dataset to include subsequent years and have reached similar results—namely that
accumulation of human capital matters for growth. Also Engelbrecht’s estimations (2003) indicate
that “human capital matters for economic growth, both directly, through its accumulation, and
through its role in facilitating diffusion” (Engelbrecht, 2003, p. 49)
The empirical evidence thus does not allow one to jump to easy and straightforward
conclusions, however most of the studies indicate that education matters for growth.
2. Public expenditures on education, economic growth
and human capital
Since education seems to stimulate economic growth, one is tempted to pose another
question—can the government increase the growth rate by stimulating the level as well as
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the growth rate of human capital by means of public expenditure on education? To put it in
other words: are public educational expenditures important for growth? The empirical evidence
concerning this subject is blurred. Some studies find that public educational expenditures increase
economic growth, while some studies find a reverse effect. There are also studies that do not find
any statistically significant relationship.
The latter view is held by Easterly and Rebelo (1993), who aim at uncovering the growth
effects of several fiscal variables. They estimate a regression using a sample of 100 countries in
1970–1988 and find that while the coefficient of public education is positive, it is insignificant.
However, Hasson and Henrekson (1994) reach quite opposite conclusions. They estimate
a regression for OECD countries and show that public education expenditures increase economic
growth. Kneller et al. (1999) reach similar conclusions also estimating a regression using data
from OECD countries. The proposition that these expenditures matter for growth is also upheld
by the work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999).
On the other Devarajan et al. (1996) estimate a regression, which indicates that public
expenditure on education depresses economic growth. Their result is robust to sample selection—
the negative coefficient is present when they estimate the regression using data on developing
countries only, as well as on developed and developing countries together.
Such divergent conclusions indicate that there is no simple relationship between education
attainment and public expenditure on education. Thus another strand of literature tests the direct
effect of public education expenditure on education level and quality. Conclusions stemming form
these works are also not uniform.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) run a regression analysis for a sample of OECD and developing
countries that indicates that neither public expenditures on education nor total public expenditures
exert significant impact on the quality of human capital, measured by international students’ test
scores. Similar conclusions have been reached by Gundlach et.al, (2001), who analyze data for
OECD economies. Woessman (2000) using microeconomic data from OECD countries concludes
that “what is clear that there certainly is no strong and systematic relationship between resource
use and student performance” (Woesmann, 2000, p.52). He stresses that not resources, but
institutional structures of the schooling system are an important factor determining students’
performance: “for educational policy this means that the crucial question is not one of more
resources but of improving the institutional environment of education to ensure an efficient use
of resources.” (Woesmann, 2000, p.79).
Hence it seems that public expenditures on education do not affect it’s quality. However,
empirical research indicates that quality as well as quantity of education matter for growth.
Therefore it might be possible that public education expenditures affect quantity of education and
through that have influence on the rate of growth.
Gupta et. al (1999) finds that education expenditure is a significant determinant of gross
secondary enrollment rates in regression estimated using data from developing and transition
economies. Similar conclusions were reached by Baldacci et. al. (2002), who additionally find
that public spending is a significant factor influencing all levels of enrollment rates. Hence, the
literature suggest that public education expenditure may matter for the accumulation of human
capital, but not for its quality.
In the next section I report results from a few simple regressions, which try to provide some
additional evidence on this issue.
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3. Public expenditure on education
and human capital—empirical analysis
A preliminary look at the data for OECD countries indicates that indeed the relationship
between total (public and private) expenditure on education and amount of human capital is not
straightforward.
In order to study the influence of public education expenditure on human capital formation,
I run a few simple regressions. The estimated equation is based on a simple partial equilibrium
model derived by Jacobs (2002) that analyzes the mechanism governing individual decisions
concerning education. Jacobs (2002) shows that these decisions are governed by several factors.
Among them are direct costs of education—the higher they are, the less time a representative
agent spends on education. Hence, public education expenditure can be viewed as a device
that lowers private costs of education and increases time spend studying. Another factor that
influences agent’s choices concerning education is taxation—taxes affect costs as well as returns
from investment in education, and it can be shown that they reduce the optimal time invested in
education. GDP per capita is also of importance, because as household’s income rises, the relative
cost of education is reduced (see, for example Gupta et al., 1999). I have also included a variable
that indicates the rule of law, as it quite straightforward to show that the decision of how much
time an individual commits to acquiring education is affected by the probability of future higher
wages. An unstable legal environment and weak rule of law will probably attribute to a perception
that future earnings are unsure (because for example they might be confiscated, stolen, etc.) and
consequently lower the amount of time spent studying. Unstable, badly functioning legal system
is a disincentive to invest in human capital
I estimate the following function using cross-section data for sample of OECD and developing
countries.
Si = α + β edu/gdpi + γXi + ui (1)
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where:
S is average years of schooling for population over the age of 25 in 1990–1999
edu/gdp is total public expenditure on education, as percentage of GDP
X are other variables:
— average GDP per capita, in years 1990–1995
— average taxes, as percent of GDP in years 1990–1995
— dummy variable equal to 1 for advanced countries
— dummy variable equal to 1 for transition economies
— index for the rule of law (higher value of index represents better rule of law)
All variables are in logs. To avoid disturbances from short-run fluctuations, I use data
averaged over several years. Equation (1) is first estimated for the sample of developed and
developing countries, then for a sample of developed countries only and finally for developed
and transition economies. The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with White
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors. Table 2 shows the results.
Table 2
Regression results, dependent variable: average years of schooling
Sample of developed
and developing
countries
Sample of developed
countries
Sample of developed
and transition
economies
Constant 0.680
(1.355)
1.025
(1.661)
0.477
(0.605)
Public expenditures on
education, in % of GDP
0.046
(0.515)
–0.053
(–0.376)
–0.053
(–0.314)
Taxes, in % of GDP –0.110
(–1.770)
–0.127
(–1.548)
–0.134
(–1.496)
GDP per capita 0.149
(3.400)
0.107
(1.153)
0.192
(1.808)
Rule of law index 0.108
(2.872)
0.345
(3.774)
Developed countries’
dummy
0.236
(1.935)
Transition dummy 0.697
(4.12)
No. of observations 35 22 27
Adjusted R-squared 0.791 0.63 0.46
Source: Own calculations
t-statistics shown in parenthesis
The regression analysis indicates that public expenditure is a statistically insignificant.
determinant of the average level of schooling. It even becomes negative, although still insignificant,
in developed countries sum-sample. It seems therefore, that public education expenditure does
not influence human capital accumulation. Neither the exclusion of outliers nor manipulation of
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variables (including average GDP per capita and average taxes from 1980’s 2) affects this main
result.
All other variables have the expected signs. Noteworthy is the negative effect of taxation on
human capital accumulation, which is significant in the whole sample. This indicates that high
level of taxation (observed in many EU countries) might depresses accumulation of human capital
and hence growth.
4. Conclusions
The theoretical as well as most of the empirical analyses indicate that human capital is an
important factor determining the growth of nations. One is thus tempted to conclude that public
expenditure on education should be an effective mechanism of promoting growth and development.
However, the empirical research on the influence of this kind of government spending on
human capital and growth is far from conclusive. Some works show that public expenditures on
education stimulate the growth rate, while some reach opposite conclusions.
The studies that relate public expenditure directly to education indicators, also do not deliver
uniform conclusions. The results of simple empirical estimation conducted in this paper indicate
that the link between public spending on education and human capital accumulation is weak.
Hence, this result also indicates that there are no easy answers to the question of how to stimulate
human capital accumulation in EU countries. Simply increasing public education expenditure will
probably not do the job.
What is needed is a change of the existing institutions and, possibly also a decrease in the size
of taxation, which of course cannot be done without reducing the size of government spending,
hence without reforming the welfare state.
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SIMONE ARNALDI
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE RELATION
BETWEEN EDUCATION
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
A Comment to Siwiñska’s “A Note on Education, Growth
and Public Finances”
Opening my short comment to Dr. Siwinska’s article, I would try to recapitulate the main
findings of the paper. In very simple terms, Joanna Siwinska tests two correlations: (1.) between
education (as a measure of human capital) and growth; (2.) between public expenditure in education
and growth. The first correlation exists and is positive, while the second does not. The hypothesis
the Author wants to test is the intuitive policy assumption that, if education stimulates growth,
then public expenditure in education has necessarily a positive impact on growth. However, as
regression analysis counterintuitively rejects the second correlation and, then, the hypothesis is
falsified. The brilliant argument is clear and, as far as I understand, it reaches its purpose.
Since I am not an economist, then I do not want to use my scarce knowledge on
macroeconomics. Rather, as a sociologist, I would try to present some thoughts about the implicit
representation of education and culture that are behind the article.
I start my remarks from commenting the link between education and human capital. Economic
theory uses different measures of human capital and they relate to education in a more or less
complex way, both quantitative and qualitative. Indicators seem to range from simple quantitative
measures (e.g. average years of schooling) to more sophisticated indexes considering the quality of
education processes and the specificity of the competences and skills that fomr human capital. For
instance, Enrico Gori lists three dimensions of human capital: (1.) general academic competences
and skills to be learnt during the school years; (2.) field—specific competences and skills to be
learnt partly at school and partly at workplace; (3.) management competences and skills to be
learnt basically at workplace. 1
I do not want to evaluate the different definitions2, but only to observe that they are focused
on the cognitive aspect of education processes, i.e. on the teaching and learning of competences and
skills. However, education as a process and education systems function primarily as reproductive
agents of the social and cultural order, or better they reproduce the social order through cultural
1 Gori E., “L’istruzione e investimento in capitale umano [Education and investment on human capital]” in Vittadini
G. (a cura di), Capitale umano. La ricchezza dell’Europa [Human capital. The wealth of Europe]. Milano: Guerini e
Associati. 2004. pp. 71–101.
2 A complete and interesting panorama is in the work by Vittadini mentioned in note 2.
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transmission. 3 Sociological literature on this topic focuses particularly on social mobility and social
inequality that derives by the education processes. However, I would like to consider a different
aspect that is inherent to the cultural dimension of reproduction.
In fact, culture, as a socially organised inventory of meanings4, surely includes a cognitive
dimension, but also a normative one5. It means that, through education, not only competences but
also value codes are distributed. This normative dimension is omitted when considering human
capital, but it may be relevant to determine the link between public expenditure on education
and growth. For instance, what I consider as dependent on this normative dimension, is pro-social
and cooperative attitude, community cohesion, positive attitude towards innovation, etc. In sum,
it depends on our values all the sets of value judgements and scales of preferences which orient
also our economic behaviour at micro (individual) and macro (aggregate) level. 6
In my opinion, these attitudes, which are normative rather than cognitive, concur to create
the climate of “confidence and trust” that Jean-Marie Rousseau partially overlaps to the concept
of “social capital” and considers as a distinctive trait of some experience of catching up in
territorial development in Europe (e.g. Ireland). At the micro-level, favouring the transmission of
values which strengthen confidence in the future, pro-active and pro-social attitudes can positively
influence the individual investment in education and “accumulation” of human capital. Further,
this is so much important in an age when “the triad cause-effect-gain, that is commonly used as
pocket model of the world in planning one’s own career” does not work satisfactorily and “some
more fundamental model, involving some set of community oriented values, must be implemented
to provide for social stability”. 7 At the macro-level, this contributes to avoid the risks of the
3 Sociological literature on this topic is enormous. A few classics are: Bernstein B. Class codes and control.
Theoretical studies towards a sociology of language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1977; Bourdieu P., Passeron
J.C., Reproduction in education, society and culture. London: Sage. 1990; Willis P., Learning to labour. How working
class kids get working class jobs. New York: Columbia University Press. 1981.
4 The definition rely on the definition of culture as “social organisation of meanings” given by Ulf Hannerz’s book
Cultural complexity (Hannerz U., Cultural complexity. New York: Columbia University Press. 1991).
5 Cognitive and normative perspectives on culture are the two mainstream approaches in contemporary anthropology.
Two classics representing these contrasting positions are respectively: Geertz C. The interpretation of cultures. New
York: Basic Book. 1973; Kluckhohn C., Kroeber A.L., Culture. A critical review of concepts and definitions. New
York: Vintage Books. 1963. A convincing synthesis between the two approaches is by the Japanese sociologist Raymond
Bachika. His “functional distinction of cultural meanings” is presented in his paper “Differentiation between culture
and religion”, presented at the International Conference of Crossroads in Cultural Studies at University of Tampere
(July 1–4, 1996).
6 According to these perspective, economic, as well as social, variables and the relations among them are the result
of stable patterns of behaviour emerging from the individual to the systemic level (with feedbacks of course). As an
empirical confirm, we can find historical experiences that challenge our current way of thinking about economy and
growth. For instance, in a book first published in 1923, the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss offers a fascinating
description of how economic behaviour can be based on wealth destruction instead of wealth accumulation. It is the
system of potlàc “the purely ritual destruction of accumulated wealth, to obscure the rival chiefs”. The potlàc is
a system of “rights and duties of consuming and returning, which correspond to rights and duties of giving and
receiving”. We get the same result if we move backwards in time rather than far in space. In fact, Johann Huizinga
outlines a fascinating picture of late medieval society in Bourgogne and Flanders. In those times, “in waste greediness
marries the ancient pride, and the latter was still strong and alive: the feudal and hierarchical ideal did not loose
anything of its splendour yet; the joy of luxury and ceremony, of sumptuous and magnificent life was still purple”
(Huizinga 1987:25).
The book of Marcel Mauss (Essai sur le don), who was a disciple of Emile Durkheim, was first published in the
Année sociologique, II series, 1923–1924, vol.1. Quotations are from the Italian edition: Mauss M., Saggio sul dono
[Essay on gift]. Torino:Einaudi. 2002. Quotations from Huizinga are from the Italian translation of the original Herfsttij
der Middeleeuwen published in Flanders in 1919: Huizinga J., L’autunno del Medioevo [The Autumn of Medieval Age].
Firenze: Sansoni. 1989.
7 Galar R., Falkner A.H., “An evolutionary viewpoint on university reform” in Arnaldi S. (ed.). Science, research
and competitiveness. Perspectives on internal market integration in Central and Eastern Europe. Trieste: Goliardica
Editrice. pp.49–69.
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NEGA-development, which Rousseau defines as: (1.) negligence of public authorities to internalise
development strategies; (2.) evading the responsibility to connect the development actors on
the territory; (3.) grudging about the current model of development; (4.) anomie and inertia,
which spreads across the whole community. 8 According to Rousseau, this positive environment
allows territories to be increasingly and progressively independent on public assistance in their
development and, ultimately, it creates a positive multiplier effects for public expenditure.
After presenting this short discussion about the relevance of socio-cultural aspects of education
and human capital, I would like to end the comment without a proper conclusion, but only with
a suggestion about future research both in sociology and economics. Rousseau applies his
paradigm of social capital and NEGA-development to territorial aspect of economic growth and
social cohesion. However, this perspective may offer interesting insights on models of virtuous
relations between public expenditure on education, human capital accumulation and economic
growth. Expanding research on human capital including values in addition to competences and
skills may hence give answers to the question left open about the positive correlation between
public expenditure on education and growth.
8 Rousseau J.M., “Research, competitiveness and society: the regional aspects. The Trieste Touch in a promising
new enlarged Europe?” in Arnaldi S. (ed.). Science, research and competitiveness. Perspectives on internal market
integration in Central and Eastern Europe. Trieste: Goliardica Editrice. pp. 137–158.
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STEFAN KWIATKOWSKI
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
IN EUROPE
The lost Ego of Hidden Masters?
1. Invocation
Institutions of higher learning have overlooked, or have even neglected, the consequences of
rapidly changing role of knowledge and of its capitalization in the form of intellectual and social
capital. Besides new knowledge and skills acquisition, an individual student while in the school,
changes his attitudes, motivations, and even perceptions. These are extremely important elements
of his/her potential to acquire both explicit and tacit knowledge. Yet, very few universities have
attempted to measure that human potential and to monitor its changes. Still fewer have even
considered ways and means to link ever changing human capital imbedded in individual students
with their own structural capital. The reasons and ways to do it are suggested and explained
below. If followed, they might result in universities becoming the real centers of knowledge based
economies. This would be to the benefit of individual students, of universities, and of societies at
large, developing into “knowledge creation based”.
2. Rationalization
Professor Antoni Kukliñski is again calling for a grand research project titled this time “The
Multiple Ego of KBE in Europe”. He distinguishes four groups of “grand actors” in the process
of development of KBE in Europe:
— The European Union
— The transnational corporations
— The national governments
— The self-governments of autonomous or semi-autonomous regions.
Honorable and Dear Professor, I know, you will tell me, and above all, you will tell our
readers that universities, or more broadly—Institutions of Higher Learning (IHL)—are subsumed
by each of the above mentioned “groups of grand actors”. Yet, IHL have become so important
element of KBE, and their modes of operation have undergone so dramatic changes, that it seams
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absolutely indispensable to pay specific attention to those institutions and to their benevolent or
malevolent influence on societies and economies at large.
Two groups of factors seem to be of utmost importance when studying the IHL and their
role in shaping the KBE in contemporary Europe:
— their historically unparalleled ‘numerical’ growth,
— the nature of their product, and main characteristics of their function of production.
Numerical growth of the IHL can be exemplified by dramatically growing scholarization rates,
rising direct employment figures for both teachers/researchers and auxiliary staff, significant
indirect employment creation impact, new innovative venture creation by academic and other
intellectual entrepreneurs, new niches of business developed and sustained by constantly growing
consumer demand (e.g. restaurants, dormitories, computers, travels, books, cloth, entertainment),
expanding capital investments in both academic and auxiliary infrastructure, etc. In some countries,
particularly the USA, IHL have become the solid pillars of stability of financial markets, owing
their financial muscle to rarely declining numbers of potential tuition payers. In short, it could be
claimed that IHL have become one of the most important, if not the most important, segments of
contemporary KBE in Europe and elsewhere. As such, IHL have a very specific nature of their
product, and main characteristics of their function of production are different from those of the
more traditionally oriented producers of consumer and industrial goods.
Traditional industrial firm transforms financial capital. Its social and economic role can be
reduced to new material wealth creation. Knowledge, as the substance element of intellectual
capital serves as a facilitating factor in the process of transformation of particular forms of
financial capital. Within the knowledge dense environment intellectual capital is needed, however,
to secure and sustain high efficiency of financial capital transformation. But contrary to the title
of the famous book of Nonaka and Takeuchi knowledge itself is rarely created anew within an
existing industrial company. It is rather rooted within a given employee, and it is up to the
commercial company, or to any other organization, to devise a structure and stimuli conducive to
sharing this employee owned knowledge with his/her collegians. 1
The rooting of intellectual capital originates at the IHL (and at the schools of lower educational
level beforehand). The main function of those institutions is transformation of intellectual capital.
Their social and economic role can be reduced to new knowledge creation and dissemination.
Money, as the substance element of financial capital, serves as a facilitating factor in the process of
transformation of particular forms of intellectual capital. It is needed to cover expenses implicated
in creation of material environment conducive enough to dissemination of existing knowledge, and
to creation of the new one.
Apparently, despite unavoidable faults, failures and limitations, IHL are doing quite well in
almost all corners of the world. The number of students is permanently growing in both developed
and developing countries, and in economically deprived regions of the world completion of higher
education is still perceived as the best way to social and economic advancement, worth scarifying
whatever available financial resources. Money is certainly a problem—for various reasons both in
the richest and in the poorest countries and regions—but universities and other institutions of
higher education have developed many ways to successfully cope with financial constraints and
limitations. Also, a growing number of student population results in larger numbers of academic
teachers and supplementary staff. Almost around the whole world, the sector of higher education
is responsible for a growing share of employment. And these employees are growingly vocal and
more effective in presenting and defending their rights and privileges resulting from increasing
importance of their social roles of broadly understood educators.
1 Nonaka Ikujiro, Takeuchi Hirotaka, 1995, The Knowledge—Creating Company, Oxford University Press
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Yet, individual IHL, and their whole systems, are quite vulnerable and exposed to imminent
crisis caused by historically unparalleled myopia. As improbable as it might seem, most institutions
of higher education have overlooked or have dared to neglect the consequences of rapidly changing
role of knowledge and its capitalization in the form of social and intellectual capital. Each one of
literally hundreds of books and reports addressing phenomenon of knowledge based economy has
a chapter or section devoted to the role of higher education and of individual IHL. Yet, these very
institutions seem to be ignorant about how much is being done outside their walls, and how very
little inside them. Thus, they seem to be unaware of how much of their traditional business might
be soon taken away from them by different institutions still appearing much worse positioned to
perform it equally well, yet ready and eager to perform it hic et nunc.
3. Justification
Ivory Tower is not Gone
From knowledge creation and dissemination perspective the metaphor of ivory tower seems
to be still quite enlightening. Three levels of activity can be distinguished within the academic
ivory tower.
At the very top there is a new knowledge creation level—new facts, new discoveries, new
laws, new solutions. The carriers of that new knowledge are patents, publications, occasional
pronouncements. Those at the top of the tower can see well beyond its walls. It is also possible
that they are seen themselves, at least by the few privileged (naturally not students exclusively).
The only problem is that IHL have long ago lost monopoly for developing new knowledge. Big
industrial and government research centers and even high technology firms (especially in such
quickly growing and knowledge intensive fields as information and communication technologies)
seem to be much better positioned and endowed to cope with the unknown, and to enrich the
existing body of knowledge. However, the culture of the ivory tower might be still in place, and
efforts to prove that some groups of university brains are able to provide cutting-edge results
of research might be continued not without success. Nonetheless, very few IHL can claim and
prove continuous and organized participation in new knowledge creation. There are obviously
many more who are home to incidental break-through discoveries and findings. Serendipity also
requires previous investments—material, financial, institutional, and human, however. Since they
are costly, time consuming, and risky, it seems prudent to assume only few leading universities to
engage in discussed here activity.
Somewhere below the top of the tower we find another kind of activity, specific for university
and unquestionably still dominated by it. We shall call this activity ‘packaging and repackaging
of knowledge’. Systematizing would certainly be more exact and more in tune with the language
of science. We use another terminology, however, in order to emphasize a concrete end product
character of this particular activity. It leads towards creation of textbooks, manuals, procedures
and standards of assessment of individual students and of whole institutions.
Those engaged in this kind of highly regarded activity do not necessarily conduct research.
Neither are they expected to teach regular courses. But they have to have understanding of both
the body of science, and of the nature of teaching processes and methodologies. To the general
audience of students (and of their teachers) they are what critics and theater directors are in
literature available for the general public. They interpret the meaning of a particular theory or
discovery, present that theory within the context of existing body of science, and show implications
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for further research, and for practice. Furthermore, it is up to them to decide which particular
piece of theory deserves more or less attention and coverage within the teaching process.
The bigger and more diversified the system of higher education is, the more widespread is
this prestigious kind of activity. There are simply many packers. We might then expect competition
between individual scholars and between whole institutions with regard to their products. But
even centralization and homogenization of national systems of higher education does not eliminate
rivalry between different products (especially textbooks and manuals) since same content might
be presented in different language, manner and context.
Needless to elaborate, the competition we are now discussing is rather asymmetrical. Assuming
equal talent and understanding of the subtleties of teaching processes, it is probably proximity to
cutting edge research and new knowledge creation which decides the quality of a given product
of particular knowledge packer.
Consequently, as might be expected, those few IHL which prove continuous and institutionalized
participation in new knowledge creation are also home to new knowledge packaging. There are
obviously many more IHL where such packaging is attempted. Since this activity is relatively not
expensive and institutionally not risky, it is rather much more widespread than new knowledge
creation performed at the top of the ivory tower.
Finally, at the very bottom of the ivory tower, probably least impressive but definitely the
most important activity is performed. We shall call this activity ‘dissemination of knowledge’.
The main forms of dissemination of knowledge are various courses and programs, lectures (both
regular, taking place within a given course of studies, and also occasional ones), special thematic
presentations (both oral and written), and media appearances.
The activity we are addressing now constitutes the very essence and raison d’ètre of any
IHL. Unlike with respect to two previously discussed activities—new knowledge creation and
knowledge packaging—dissemination of knowledge cannot be absent in any IHL. But paradoxically,
in absence of the other two activities, dissemination of knowledge cannot be described by the
ivory tower metaphor, which assumes integrity and co- habitation of all three main activities of
IHL.
From Ivory Towers for a Few to Plato’s Caves for Many
Fully inhabited at all three levels, and animated with all three kinds of mentioned above
activities, ivory tower seems a wonderful way to both understand and design university of the þ
past. Although clearly separated from its environment, such institution could still listen to and
observe environmental changes. From the heights of the tower one could see and reach far. And
separation does not necessarily mean absolute closure. Quite to the contrary, universities were
traditionally created to serve societal needs of change and modernization. This seemed to be the
cornerstone of Wilhelm von Humboldt early XIX century undertaken university reform which
started with foundation of University of Berlin. Still, university was designed to have numerically
limited student audience and a limited number of competitors, and to offer prevailingly private
products (with high marginal cost of any additional student or any new course). Such an elite
university could function well through processes of reconciliation of dialectical controversies
between simultaneous separation from its immediate environment and openness to new ideas and
concepts, stemming from omnipresent research, emanating new ideas and concepts.
Such a closed/open institution when deprived of internal springs of ideas derived from new
knowledge creation, and at the mercy of outside suppliers of knowledge packages, immediately
looses development related ivory tower characteristics. Devoid of its upper levels, ivory tower
becomes a flat barrack behind a high wall. What might be perceived from the outside as still
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monumental structure, for those behind the walls resembles a cave. Alike inhabitants of Plato’s
Cave, both students and their teachers see the world not as it is but as its shadows look. And
what they cannot see, they learn about from the books coming from the outside world, and read
to them exclusively by the properly called readers.
If the view of the world the students learn about is distorted, it is neither individual student
perceptions nor limited abilities of reader/ professors, which should be blamed, but rather the very
construction of the institution. Ivory tower disappears. What comes is a custody camp separated
from environment by a solid wall. Needless to elaborate, so conceived institution can accommodate
many more students than disappearing ivory tower. But it is definitely not the only possible
alternative to the ivory tower metaphor (or even design model).
A Conducted City Bus Tour
For various reasons and not without exceptions, both briefly sketched above concepts of IHL
are fading away. Elite university with a relatively closed student audience and prevailingly private
products gives way to mass oriented mega-university with relatively open audience and prevailingly
public product. Marginal costs of additional courses or additional students are negligible here, so
there are very few if any numerical limitations of the size of student population. There is a quickly
growing number of competitors at each of the three discussed above levels of academic activity—
new knowledge creation, knowledge packaging and knowledge dissemination. From perspective of
the whole national or regional systems of education, this results in more flexibility and innovation.
From the point of view of individual student (or his/her parents), it brings confusion and lack
of orientation. Different compatibility and quality assurance mechanisms of both internal (within
individual IHL), and external (government, professional associations, industry or media) character
are designed and introduced to reduce confusion regarding mutual positions of various IHL. With
regard to internal structure and delivery system of individual IHL, they might be probably best
described by the conducted city bus tour metaphor.
Passengers can board the bus at any of the designated stops. They buy tickets in advance
or when boarding the bus for the first time. Together with the ticket they get the map of the
city with clearly marked stops. They can leave or enter at their will at any designated stops.
They can also complete the whole tour without getting off. Since ticket is valid for the whole
day, they can “redo” the tour, either in parts or the whole tour again without interruption. There
are no alterations of the itinerary. Also no preferred seat is guaranteed. Neither is money back
guaranteed in case of heavy rain, snow, passenger sickness or another disaster.
Once on board, a passenger is guided by a recorded voice in the language of his choice
(contingent on availability). The quality of the voice is rather low. But the outside noise makes
following the voice extremely difficult anyway. There are no repetitions, although they might be of
use since some passengers have problems with understanding and keep nagging their neighbors
in hope of help. Needless to say, there is nobody other than your neighbor to address a question
to. The driver has one universal answer to all kinds of questions—“take the next bus please”. This
answer he mastered in all possible languages.
What features of contemporary mega-university is this metaphor highlighting? To handle the
mass audience of students, university cares more about what it provides for all than about what
is provided for the individual one. The courses (what a nice parallel with a tour route!) are run
regardless of problems experienced by individual students. It takes probably a long time for
eventual changes in course content or delivery mode. Ignoring eventual complains and problems
experienced by the few, the university has ‘to press on regardless’, leaving eventually lost or
dissatisfied students on their own. In order to survive, they have to find their own way through
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a dense web of various programs, departments, advisory services, lines of their often unknown
colleagues waiting to see professor coming for his/her office hour fifteen minutes late, and leaving
fifteen minutes ahead of time. Those who learn the system, who gain the knowledge how to get
the best out of it, survive and flourish. With time, some of them might be even co-opted by the
university where they will probably exhibit behavior mode so well known from their own, previous
client perspective. Some will fail and end as dropouts. Some, hopefully the fewest, will learn how
to work around the system, how to cheat on exams, miss classes, ride on somebody’s back, and þ
still continue. Finally, the last and probably the biggest group is composed of those who learn not
to care, not to expect too much, just to conform and be satisfied with what is provided. They are
not necessarily passive individuals. But they are neither rebels nor do they find academic world
(as they see it!) attractive enough to devote time to thoroughly study on their own. So instead of
investing their time to library studies and to attending extracurricular courses, they enjoy sports,
arts, politics, internet, bear and love. Needless to say, some of them work.
Sometimes, after few years with university, the members of just described biggest group
of its students will be graduating (probably along the members of the other groups). Will they
remember the names of their reader/professors? Will they be able to associate the authors of the
books on the shelves of a bookstore with the names of their teachers? Will they have the habit of
buying and reading professional literature? Will they ever again visit their old university for just
an occasional lecture or two? And will they visit any other IHL for the same purpose?
Suppose there is no positive answer to any of the above questions. So what? Another crowd
of freshly arrived tourists gathers at the bus stop. Why to worry about what was before and is
now gone? New commencement is just about to start. It is again time to pour old wine into new
glasses! After all, is there any other way to successfully cope with constantly growing cohorts of
new students?
A Gigantic Switchboard or a Thousands Volume Annotated Biography
Nonaka and Takeuchi were the first to suggest that for an industrial enterprise knowledge
creation is the key to gain and sustain competitive advantage. According to them, the essence
of (wrongly conceived, as explained above!)) knowledge creation process is transformation of
individually possessed tacit knowledge into collectively shared (and modified) explicit knowledge,
which is then transformed again into tacit one2. In the similar vein, Edvinsson and Malone
postulated that corporations start managing their intellectual capital 3. Leif Edvinsson became the
first ever appointed corporate director for intellectual capital at Skandia Corporation. Few years
after publication of his seminal book, already rich in practical experience, he observed that the
crucial problem in managing intellectual capital is how to handle a creeping conflict between
human capital (used by organizations but possessed by individual employees), and structural capital
possessed and used by organizations. The main source of structural capital (procedures, recipes,
techniques, structures, information, data bases) is employee possessed knowledge and information.
Successful initiation of the continuous process of transformation of human into structural capital
requires mutual trust, which is the basic element of social capital 4.
So much about the corporate world, and on its involvement in managing processes of creation
of new knowledge, and of new intellectual capital. How is all of that related to the IHL, however?
Let us repeat what we already observed in the very beginning of this text—most institutions of
higher education have overlooked or have dared to neglect the consequences of rapidly changing
role of knowledge and of its capitalization in the form of social and intellectual capital.
2 Nonaka Ikujiro, Takeuchi Hirotaka, 1995, op.cit
3 Edvinsson Leif, Malone Michael, 1997, Intellectual Capital, Harper Business
4 ibidem
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What should be clear from our previous analysis, and what is probably obvious, the only
activity specific for all IHL is knowledge dissemination. This activity is aimed at creation and
at enhancement of human potential at each individual (personal) level. Thus an IHL can be
perceived as a social mechanism for transfer and transformation of knowledge. That knowledge
is of prevailingly explicit, verbalized character. Only transmission of this kind of knowledge can
be programmed, planed, formally structured, and even controlled. Some of this knowledge has
mainly theoretical character. Some leads towards development (and improvement) of concrete or
more general skills. Example of concrete skill might be dexterity in concrete computer program
use and applications. Example of more general skills is social flexibility.
Besides new knowledge and skills acquisition (or rather as a result of it) an individual changes
his/her attitudes, motivations and even perceptions. These changes greatly affect his/her potential
to acquire both explicit and tacit knowledge. Needless to say, they are extremely important
elements of his/her human potential. Have universities attempted to measure that human potential
and to monitor its changes? Maybe they have, maybe they are very serious about it, maybe they
developed quite sophisticated concepts and measurements, maybe they even learned to work with
individual students on enhancement of their individual potential. But these significant achievements
can be probably observed in þ athletic departments only.
Human potential, say probably most academic leaders, is synonymous with human capital.
“What university provides is mere opportunity to learn. Those who know how to use this
opportunity, will tremendously erich their human capital. But human capital is individually
possessed, and individually managed. It cannot be managed by university”.
Such seemingly correct statement is obviously shortsighted, conservative, and dramatically
false. Unlike in the corporate life, within IHL there is no imminent conflict between human
and structural capital. Human potential, constituting the essence of human capital, is obviously
possessed and managed by individual students and alumni. But information about its current,
previous, and possible future level, about all past, and possible future modifications, might
constitute elements of structural capital of a given IHL. And provided there is a mutual trust,
and transparent, mutually acceptable rules concerning gathering and use of all information about
individual students and alumni (not an easy assumption, obviously), not even conflict between those
two kinds of intellectual capital (human and structural) is not imminent, but their co-existence,
reinforcing each other should be expected.
Imagine the most up-to-date polyclinic with the best physicians and most qualified nurses.
Imagine you visit it for the first time. Imagine how long it takes for the interview with the nurse
and the doctor. Imagine how hesitant is your physician to prescribe a given medicine. How many
questions, requests to show results of previous examinations, which you anyway lost somewhere.
Imagine your level of dissatisfaction. Imagine how do you feel thinking you might have to go for
a surgery there.
Imagine you become a steady patient, you regularly visit different physicians, you have your
own record, your own history, you are known by heart (though you do not have to be a cardiac),
and by name. Imagine you get seriously sick. How much time will it take now for your doctors
to decide what to do? And suppose you get sick far away from your clinic. Suppose you call
your doctor. Will he be able and willing to suggest what you should do? Or perhaps you feel so
well you forget your regular check-up? Will you feel puzzled receiving a call from your doctor?
Or receiving a call from your nurse, suggesting checking-up with the doctor about some newly
developed treatment?
It is more than twenty years since General Electric opened a phone Answer Center at
Louisville, Kentucky. It was opened to handle client claims, and its only goal was to reduce client
dissatisfaction. By the end of the 90-ties, the Center was opened whole day, all year round. 200 GE
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representatives were receiving and responding to 15. 000 claims per day from dissatisfied clients.
Computer data bank contained descriptions for 2 million problems and their solutions. It was
taking only two seconds to match concrete problem with available possible solution. For no-ready
solution 12 on-site experts with minimum 5 years experience in handling client complains were
constantly available. Four on-site computer programmers kept up-dating the data bank with new
problems and new solutions. Initially the Center was used exclusively to handle client complaints.
Today it is also used for employee training and orientation, and in new product development5.
Technically it is quite easy to imagine that each student entering university (at whatever
program, whatever level, and for whatever time period) receives one record where all information
about his/her activities and achievements is stored. By the same token his/her human potential
(knowledge, skills, attitudes, perceptions, motivations) is continuously measured and assessed with
results fed into the data bank, but also—and first of all—with counseling and guidance following. It
is up to each individual who leaves university as a graduate, dropout, or as a transferee to another
IHL to continue information exchange with his/her original data bank. This continuance enables
not only updating information about each person who whenever studied at a given IHL but also
permanently enlarges and enriches potential network which can be used by concrete university for
upgrading its programs and courses, and also for matching potential needs of employers, alumni,
and current students. Thus university might become a sui generis ‘switchboard’ connecting and
matching possible partners in educational, political, social or business activities.
Everything suggested above is probably much easier to implement technologically than socially.
Absolutely indispensable is trust, transparency and assurance that no information contained in the
“Thousands Volume Annotated Biography” will be made available to anybody without agreement
of involved person. With constantly growing number of persons involved, that trust, which is
very difficult to achieve, might easily disappear. So it would probably take rather long time
for such a system to be operational. But probably it could be developed gradually, with special
attention to necessary feedbacks and quick reactions to finding educational activities of university
dissatisfactory for students, parents, employers or other clients. Quick reactions and feedbacks
would have to constitute the very basis of the system since its role would not be that of
a historical registry, but rather a monitoring one, absolutely indispensable in knowledge creation
and dissemination.
This graduate build-up of the system would probably make its client friendly and cooperative.
With time, while completely operational, the system would not only create additional employment,
but would first of all greatly enhance both efficiency and effectiveness of human capital formation,
and by the same token would place IHL at the very center of new phenomenon which Leif
Edvinsson prophetically calls Societyentrepreneurship 6.
Based on networks filled with trust and understanding, and clustered around the university
all members of the cluster have some experience with, such a society would probably provide for
much less risk and much more opportunity to enterprise.
4. Proclamation
Institutions of Higher Learning (IHL) are “sleeping giants” of the emerging global human
capital (HC) market. Giants, because they are the major creators of HC. Sleeping, because they
5 Hauseman R.C., Goodman J.P., 1999, Leading with Knowledge
6 Oral communication
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are not conscious of imminent changes just about to take place on the human competencies
market.
In modern times, IHL have always been the largest producers of HC. Greatly increasing
scholarization rates, and proliferation of new kinds of postgraduate studies make IHL undisputable
leaders of human competencies creation. Strangely enough, they keep very low profile as HC
providers. In particular:
— they do not keep track of specific competencies of their alumni,
— they do not advise those alumni how, when and how to replenish their HC,
— they seldom act as advisors to employers, recommending not only specific alumni for particular
jobs, but also specific learning menu for specific alumni in specific positions.
The reasons for such renunciation of growingly important market functions are various. Lack
of tradition, and fear of gap of trust are just the simplest to realize. But the most important
ones seem to be lack of imagination, deficit of knowledge concerning future market and societal
changes, and fear of unknown. Still most striking reason of negligence to act seems to be
underestimation of potential of information technologies, and myopia with regard to their place on
future market of HC.
As on any other market, producers of HC are just one player. The other one are users of HC.
Strangely enough, IHL are both producers and users of HC. And even more strangely, their role
of users of HC is continually growing (alongside growing scholarization rates). But this “user”
role can grow at much higher rates even, provided IHL realize there are other important roles
to be played on this market:
— packaging HC,
— servicing (renewing) HC,
— promoting HC,
— investing HC, etc.
If not performed by the IHL, these important functions will be taken by other specialized
institutions—headhunters, trainers, and other middlemen, quite often at higher cost, less compe-
tence, and with missing feedback for improvement of HC creation processes taking place within
the IHL.
In short, the main reasons for IHL not assuming more active role on the nascent HC market
are lack of knowledge, short-sightness, and lack of tradition. All of this translates into significant
knowledge gap.
In order to gain necessary knowledge, extensive and intensive research should be undertaken.
This pioneering research should be closely linked with experimental applications, thus following
Gibbons suggested Mode2 (research performed within the context of application
The first two parallel steps should be following:
— developing questionnaires measuring the level of particular skills and competencies,
and applying them to individual students from the very beginning of their studies to
graduation,
— establishing individual records for each particular student.
Such longitudinally conceived study should result in constantly growing data bank, allowing
following actions:
— changes in particular modules of instruction leading towards specific competencies (possibly
in consultation with potential employers),
— modifications in educational mix offered to particular students (make-ups, refreshers, electives),
— guidance and placement of alumni,
— shadowing and advising alumni concerning new knowledge acquisition (students as repeated
customers), and new job availability,
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— advising employers concerning potentially available employees, and possible further educational
back-up.
Most probably a plethora of new research avenues will open immediately henceforth. But it
seems quite premature to think about them right now. The most important thing at this very
moment seems to be taking two first steps. CARPE DIEM! Lest unique opportunities be not
vanished together with (temporarily?) lost Ego of Hidden Masters.
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ANTONI KUKLIÑSKI
UNIVERSITIES DRIVING
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The Challenges of The XXI Century
I. The New Paradigm
In the path-breaking publication of the European Commission1 we find the following
formulation:
“Europe’s leaders already acknowledge that the transition towards a knowledge-based economy
involves a fundamental structural change, and that all the challenges facing Europe need to be
reconsidered in the light of this new paradigm.”
To our mind—the construction of this new paradigm can be interpreted as a sequence of
three following assumptions:
Primo—knowledge is changing itself into an integrated driving force of the development
of the economy and society. The scope and scale of this process is unprecedented in historical
experiences.
Secundo—we see a powerful virtuous circle constructing the bridge mechanisms and the
mechanisms of mutual enforcement linking the processes of the development of the knowledge
based economy and the knowledge based society.
Tertio—the new paradigm will transform itself into a material power creating the strong
Europe of the XXI century2. In this transformation an important role is allocated to the
mechanisms of integration of spontaneous and guided development.
In the already quoted publication we read3:
“In other words, while there is reason to be optimistic about the huge potential benefits
from developing human resources in combination with new technologies and new forms of
organizations, one should, however, be aware that the knowledge—based society may not be
sustainable if left to itself. Its effects on multiple fields must be dealt with through a multi-
dimensional and combined effort at the European, national and regional level. Moreover, in
different areas Europe is facing great challenges and also seems to be ill-prepared to adapt
1 Third European Report on Science and Technology. Indicators—2003. Towards a knowledge economy. European
Commission 2003, Brussels, p. 1.
2 A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds) Europe in the perspective of global change. Polish Association for the Club of
Rome. Warsaw, 2003. (compare Annex One)
3 Third European Report on Science and Technology ... op.cit., p. 4.
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successfully to the rapidly changing landscape. Demographic, social and economic challenges
need to be reconsidered in the light of this fundamental transition.”
In this context we should notice “the knowledge economy growth into knowledge society” and
vice versa. The observation of P.A. David and D. Foray4 is especially interesting:
“The knowledge economy’s growth into the knowledge society hinges on the proliferation of
knowledge-intensive communities.”
The challenge of the new paradigm and the challenge of structural transformation is a grand
dilemma not only for Europe but also of the European Union5.
The Conference in Liege should be seen in the broad substantial and institutional framework
of a grand scheme of European activities and policies contributing to the construction and
development of the New Paradigm of Europe of the XXI century.
In this context the formulation—Universities driving6 regional development—is related to the
double challenge:
— primo—for the European Regions
— secundo—for the European Universities
The double challenge is expressing well the demand side of the equation (the region) and the
supply side (the University).
II. The region
It would be very interesting and instructive to find out how numerous and strong is the
community of European Regions—which are recognizing the key role of the University in regional
development.
I would like to present a hypothesis that the affirmative answer will be given by regions
displaying the following characteristic features7:
1) a globally minded region seeing the transformation of European space in global context, and
recognize itself as a direct actor of the global scene,
2) a region dominated by the “catching up” psychology not being trapped by the inertia of
“lagging behind” psychology,
3) a region where the knowledge intensive communities8 are a growing phenomenon leading
to the recognition of knowledge based economy and society—as the main driving forces of
regional development,
4) a region where the regional elite 9 is able to design and implement consecutive visions of the
strategic choices leading to the durable development of the region in long term perspective.
Naturally this list of features can be formulated in different ways. There is no doubt however
that only a minority of European regions (let us say 25%) will recognize the University as a real
4 Paul A. David, Dominique Foray, An Introduction to the economy of the knowledge society. .I.S.S.J. no 171,
March 2002.
Compare also: K. Muller, KBS and its socio-cultural pattern. The situation of post socialistic countries (in:) A.
Kukliñski (ed.) The Knowledge based economy. Warsaw 2000.
5 Compare: A. Kukliñski, The First Pillar of the European Union, (in:) A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds) Europe in
the perspective of global change. Warszawa, 2003.
6 Naturally in practical terms even in best conditions the University will be only a co-driver and never a solo
driver.
7 Compare: A. Kukliñski, Towards a new model of regional policy (in:) “Studia Regionalne i Lokalne”, Nr 4,2003,
Warsaw.
8 Compare: P.A. David and D. Foray, op.cit.
9 Compare: A. Kukliñski, K. Olejniczak, The regional elites (in:) T. Zarycki, G. Kolankiewicz (eds) Regional Issues
in Polish Politics University College, London 2003.
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or potential driving force of regional development. This minority will change itself into a majority
when the New paradigm will change itself from a noble goal into a strong reality.
III. The University in Millennial Perspective—the four traditions
In the almost millennial tradition of the European University we can indicate four splendid
chapters:
1) The chapter of the medieval University establishing this institution as an characteristic feature
of European civilization. The University to the present day should be seen as a Universitas
of magistrorum et scholarum. The genius loci of the medieval university is an inspiration for
the genius loci of the XXI century.
2) The chapter of the elitist and liberal university of the XIX century. In this time the European
University was the world leader educating the global elite10.
3) The chapter of the democratic university emerging from the golden time of welfare state in
Europe.
4) The chapter of the entrepreneurial university11 of the last decades of the XX century being
a response to the challenges of globalization and the crisis of the welfare state (compare
Annex Two)
IV. The typology of Universities
According to the recent estimation12 there are about 4.000 higher education establishments in
Europe as a whole attended by over 12,5 million students. This is a grand galaxy of institutions
representing different levels and capacities of the academic performance.
From the point of view represented in this paper we accept the following criteria of typology:
— primo—the spatial dimensions in the activity of the University
— secundo—the main functions in this activity
The Universities are multidimensional both in spatial and in functional perspective. The
diferentia specifica of each University is expressed in the differences in the relative power and
weakness of each dimension and each function.
From the point of view of this paper let us consider the question in what conditions—the
regional dimension—is the leading dimension and in what conditions the regional dimension
is only a supplementing dimension?
10 A. Kukliñski, The European University in the global landscape of the XXI century (in:) Science and Education
in Transition—An International Expert Meeting, Vienna 1998, Budapest 1999.
11 B. Clark, Creating entrepreneurial universities, London, Pergamon 1998.
12 The role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge Communication from the Commission Brussels 2003, Com
(2003), 58 final.
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Table 1
The typology of Universities
The creation of
Spatial Scientific technological
Innovation Human capital
dimensions knowledge knowledge
Local
Regional
National
European
Global
V. The region and the regional University
in the European landscape of the XXI century
In the development of strong and dynamic Europe a very important role will be performed
by the growing galaxy of globally minded competitive and innovative regions. The expansion of
this galaxy is determined by two processes:
1) the constant transformation of some strong regions into stronger regions. The global
competitive scene is pressing the strong region to be stronger or to face the ’verdict’ to join
the ranks of weak regions,
2) the constant transformation of some weak regions into strong regions as successful actors of
the global scene. The global success of Europe of the XXI century will be achieved inter alia
via these two processes and the quality of regional performance.
Since these processes of improvement are taking place in the global environment of knowledge
based economy and society—the regional Universities must be seen as an innovative institution
upgrading the regional scene.
The regional University is acting in four fields which are upgrading the regional scene:
1) the development of knowledge and innovation—upgrading the competitive performance
of the enterprise,
2) the development of human capital via the education of open minded innovative person-
alities,
3) the development of social capital via the promotion of the climate of trust linking
different actors of the regional scene,
4) the development of the innovative and creative identity of the given region.
The regional University should be seen also as a scene of creative interaction of four
communities which are responsible for te effective performance of the given region:
1) the Business Community
2) the R and D Community
3) the Governance Community
4) the Community of Education and Culture
For the clarifying of presentation let me outline the following table
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 179 (179)
Universities driving regional development 179
Table 2
The Regional University, Functions and Communities
Functions Communities
Edeucation
Business Governance R&D
The development of and Culture
Knowledge
and innovation
Human Capital
Social Capital
Regional Identity
The Regional University is facing two dilemmas:
— primo—the democratic versus elitist university
— secundo—the conventional versus entrepreneurial university
VI. The empirical perspective
The conceptual framework of this paper can be seen in a much more comprehensive empirical
framework presented in two publications. The first one is a special issue of the well known
UNESCO Journal, Higher Education in Europe13. The second one is the excellent paper published
in Regional Studies14.
In the final version of my contribution I will present the most important element of these
two publications.
VII. The research priorities
To my mind the most important type of regional university is the university described by J.
Boucher et alia 15—“as single player university in peripheral regions”. We need a comprehensive
13 Higher Education in Europe ... No 3/2003, UNESCO Cepes. New Higher Education Institutions and Their Role
in Regional Development.
Compare especially the papers of H. Lönnberg, F. Sole Parrelada, K. Paw³owski and A. Kukliñski.
14 G. Boucher, Ch. Conwayand E. Van Der Meer, Tiers of Engagement by Universities in their Region’s
Development. Regional Studies, December 2003, Great Britain.
This paper is presenting the findings of a research project on the role of Universities in regional development
draving the evidence from 14 regions in seven European countries. This project wasimplemented in the context of the
EU founded Forth Framework Programme.
15 G. Boucher et alia, op.cit., p. 892.
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research programme analyzing the performance of 100–200 regional universities of this type. The
majority of these regional universities are located in the huge European periphery incorporated
recently into the European Union.
Warszawa, ¯oliborz
March 20th 2004.
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Annex One
The fundamental idea of the University
Some reflections of Jaroslav Pelikan16
I. The storm breaking upon the university: the university in crisis
The title of this section is derived from the title of Chapter 2 of “The Idea of University” by
Jaroslav Pelikan (1992). His observation (p. 11) about the history and the contemporary situation
of the university is worth quoting:
“The ‘storm breaking upon the university from the North’ was the utilitarian attack on the
traditional Oxford curriculum, to which Newman responded with his insistence that knowledge
is an end in itself. But there is a storm breaking upon the university again, and this time from
north, south, east, and west. A critical reexamination of the idea of the university—not simply
of John Newman’s idea of it, or of someone else’s idea of it, but of the idea itself—has become
an urgent necessity.”
The present storm breaking upon the university is much stronger than the storm observed
150 years ago by John Henry Cardinal Newman. The present utilitarian attack can destroy the
“dignity of science” (Kukliñski, 1996) which is the foundation of the idea of the university. In the
evaluation of the present utilitarian attack, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between
the short-term and the long-term utility. The long-term perspective should never be lost in the
evaluation of the mechanism of the development of the university.
Again, a quotation from the words of Jaroslav Pelikan is in order (1992, p.34):
“Yet today it is necessary to sharpen, more than Newman did, the polemical point that
utilitarianism is a threat to utility, and that therefore a rigid application of the utilitarian
criterion could deprive the next generation of the very means it will need for the tasks that it
will face, which will not be the tasks that this generation faces and which therefore cannot be
dealt with by those particular instrumentalities that this generation has defined as ‘useful’.”
II. The business of a university
Stressing the dangers related to a narrow-minded utilitarian approach, it is necessary to
recognize the fact that the university is not only the alma mater but also a smaller or larger
business corporation.
The basic dilemma in this field is well defined by the same author (Pelikan, 1992, p. 71):
“It is, of course, a play on words, but also far more than that, to note, in introducing
a discussion of the business of the university, that the university is business, and big business.
Each year the debates over the budget for higher education in various countries and in individual
states make it clear all over the world that the university must be included in the catalogue of
major industries in any modern society, involving a significant percentage of its income and
expenditure and occupying an important place in the service (or the “not-for-profit”) sector of its
economy. The most successful leaders of modern universities have been those who have come to
their task from the “business” of teaching and research, but have then learned to administer the
university as “business” without being overwhelmed by it.”
So, it is necessary to recognize that the university is a business, but one should avoid being
overwhelmed by this fact and pushed into narrow utilitarian approaches that world, in the long
run, destroy the idea of the university.
16 J. Pelikan, The idea of the University. Yale University Press, 1992. Reproduced from: A. Kukliñski, The role of
university in stimulating regional development and educating global elites in Higher Education in Europe, op.cit.
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Annex Two
RECiFER
Research Centre for European Regions
Nowy S¹cz, Poland
Memorandum
I.
The Region will perform an active role in Europe of the XXI century as the main pattern
stimulating the development of knowledge based economy and society. In this context we will find
a pressing demand to change the scale, scope and intensity of innovative studies analyzing the
performance of European Regions.
These studies should try to outline a new paradigm as a set of new questions and new
answers to those questions.
Perhaps the role of the locomotive in the development of the new paradigm could be performed
by RECIFER having strong links of cooperation with the European Union, OECD and the World
Bank. Poland could be seen as a good choice for the location of this Centre.
II.
The mission of RECiFER is related to the design and implementation of the following
activities:
1) testing the hypothesis that the main element of regional dynamics is the creative interaction
of the KBE and KBS,
2) testing the hypothesis that the organic model of regional development is the best choice of
the XXI century,
3) testing the hypothesis that the replacement of the lagging behind psychology by the catching
up psychology is the main problem of regional policies in Europe,
4) testing the hypothesis that the regional elite is an important factor of the regions success or
failure,
5) testing the hypothesis that the main problem of European space from Atlantic to the Urals
is the centre periphery gap. The development of KBE and KBS is the main historical vehicle
to diminish or even eliminate this gap in longer perspective.
III.
These five hypotheses would be tested in:
— primo—general studies covering the totality of the European Space—from Atlantic to the
Urals,
— secundo—monographic in depth studies analyzing the performance of 100 well selected
regions in Europe. These regions will be transformed into sui generis laboratories of
economic, political, social and cultural change seen as an endogenous organic processes.
The RECIFER will create and develop an efficient information system covering not only the
EU but also the totality of Europe from Atlantic to the Urals. From this point of view the location
of Centre close to the Russian and Ukrainian scene might be a great advantage.
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IV.
The knowledge based economy and society create a new paradigm of the development of
Europe of the XXI century. The region is the best framework for analysis, monitoring and
foresight of KBE and KBS in Europe.
We need not only the analytical power but also the intellectual imagination to analyze the
regional dimension in the grand transformation of Europe of the XXI century.
I am convinced that this analytical power and intellectual imagination will be developed by the
growing communities of persons and institutes promoting the transdisciplinary field of regional
studies enriched by forty years of outstanding experiences. RECiFER will be a new member and
humble servant of this community deeply involved in intellectual and pragmatic processes which
are the driving forces in the emergence and development of a new paradigm in the studies of
European Regions functioning in the framework of the global mega space of the XXI century.
Brussels, January 24th 2004.
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KRZYSZTOF PORWIT
COMMENTS TO KUKLIÑSKI’S PAPER
“Universities driving Regional Development”
I am sharing most of opinions and suggestions expressed in this paper—considering them as
inspirations for farther discussion as well as for more research (Particularly welcome is an idea
for a reserch center as outlined in Annex One).
In my comments I am trying to indicate several issues which raise doubts or seem
controversial. They refer to the main substantive fields touched in Kukliñski‘s paper i.e. in part
I —to some issues of interdependence between presumable merits of a knowledge-based economy
[KBE] and the desired features of regional development in Europe whereas in part II—to the
roles which—in that context—may be performed by universities.
I. Knowledge-based economy and regional development
(1) I am afraid that the opening section of the paper may lead to an interpretation, which
will be too optimistic, or even misleading, in its implications for the practice. It seems certainly
justified and desirable to emphasize a crucial role of knowledge as the source of factors likely to
enhance development and progress in economic and societal matters but new ways of enhancement
implicit in the notion of KBE can gain their validity only within a specific set of other features
of economic and social matters. I prefer to remember that an essential role of human capital 1 in
these matters was already acknowledged much earlier, although without wider attributes included
later into the notion of KBE. The contents of a KBE are composed of various elements, but
those typical for a new model coexist in any real case with others which in many aspects are still
reflecting the influence of somewhat older features (from “older worldviews”). The latter are not
yet tailored according to modern fashions of flexibility (imposed by ubiquity and speed of changes)
but they exist as remnants of approaches which used to be more concerned with conditions
favourable for desirable performance of labour or of human capital. These changes in worldviews,
viewpoints, prioritiies, and in models and descriptions, can be seen as symptoms of adaptation
to important changes in technologies and in challenges facing economies and societies, especially
under impacts of globalization. The viewpoint and language of KBE correspond to historically
newest and relatively most complex real conditions and, at the same time, they reflect relatively
strongest potential available now in most developed economies (such as most of OECD members).
However, we should try to work out some ways of linkage and coexistence between contemporary
1 Still earlier, the factors of human labour, its quality and productivity were considered as main and ultimate
sources of growing abilities to provide decent subsistance and hopefully welfare for the mankind.
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global worldview, its KBE counterpart and a variety of sub-worlds with respectively differing
levels of development (i.e. also with historically earlier features of labour—human capital—KBE
arrangements) 2. Similar diversity can be seen even among some regions of countries (in respect to
some relatively backward parts of more developed countries and—on the other hand—to leading
regions of generally less developed countries) Anyway—one should remember that we are not
entitled to count on a direct and simple “transplantation” of KBE devices from leading areas to
regions relatively backward . We cannot asume a mechanistic relationship as if more “inputs”
of knowledge would necessarily produce more “outputs” of success (in terms of more desirable
effects identified with economic and social indicators of development and welfare).
In another perspective one may note that reminders of merits expected with KBE and its
desirable effects would not be convincing as long as one doubts in rightness of the criteria of
desirability (e.g. if they are supposed to derive value only, or above all, from commercial premises
and to be expressed primarily in money terms). Transplanting operations are also likely to fail in
practice as long as there is not enough attention for preventive activities and remedies which would
be considered feasible in defence against most relevant opposing forces and obstacles. Arguments
in favour of KBE seem too shallow if considered mainly as means to convince politicians and
public administrators , i.e. to create more favourable climate for more ample allocations of public
funds to KBE promoting projects. The practice usually does not change in response to appeals
but it rather depends on and follows various impulses and processes of wider scope, which take
place in human minds and societal relations3. Thus it seems that wishing to obtain practically
feasible effectiveness of endeavours aimed at KBE promotion one should be aware of numerous
parallel conditions, which usually reflect impacts of exogenous forces as well as many aspects of
historical experiences (which impose symptoms of path dependence) and also pertain to qualitative
features of accumulated assets (particularly in terms of non-tangible capital of the kinds called
not only “human” but also “social” and “institutional”) Relevant are also the terms of some social
consequences of necessary transformations (or reconstructions) of these and other assets, which
are an aftermath of earlier stagnation or earlier patterns of mis-development. and at present
become useless or even harmful
(2) The term “New Paradigm” (as a title of the initial section) seems somewhat ambigous,
in particular when it refers to suggestions for presumably welcome interplay between KBE and
something which at present is nothing more than a vision of a future “knowledge based society”
(KBS). Questions arise where to look4 for indications what can be considered as a comparable
2 The following excerpt from the initial section (Chapter 1, p.1) of Third European Report on Science &
Technology Indicators 2003. Towards a Knowledge-based Economy, European Commission, Luxembourg 2003 indicates
at main characteristics of knowledge at present in comparison with the past : “Of course knowledge per se is not
a new asset; it has always been a basis for human activity. However, what is radically new is the pace of its
creation, accumulation and diffusion resulting in economies and societies following a new paradigm. Working and
living conditions are being redefined; markets and institutions are being redesigned under new rules and enhanced
possibilities for the exchange of information. Moreover, knowledge is not only becoming the main source of wealth
for people, businesses and nations, but also the main source of inequalities between them. In other words, while
knowledge is the key to increased competitiveness, it could also lead to a reduction in social cohesion and increassing
economic disparity between regions, countries and continents”.
3 Let me quote excerpts from a comment in Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd catalogue Politics and Public Policy
2004 related to a book of Australian authors D.Rooney, G.Hearn, T. Mandeville and R. Jones onPublic Policy in
Knowledge-Based Economies. Foundations and Frameworks, EE 2003 which read: Knowledge is a product of human
social systems and, therefore, the foundations of the knowledge-based economy are social and cultural. Communication
is central to knowledge creation and diffusion and <Public Policy in Knowledge-Based Economy> highlights specific
socal and cultural conditions that can enhance the communication, use and creation of knowledge in a society.
4 Inspirations and reference planes can be found—for instance—in the studies of Nobel Prize 2001 winners Joseph
E. Stiglitz and George Ackerlof, whose main thoughts were included in the articles : J.E.Stiglitz “information and
the Change in the Paradigm in Economics” in American Economic Review. 2002. vol. 92, nr 3 (June), G.Ackerlof
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paradigm presently existing for that interplay (and for each of its both sides i.e. for economic
and social sub-systems) and which of its features are supposed to be replaced or transformed on
a suggested way to a reign of knowledge? In my opinion a warning should be added that a belief
in KBE-KBS approach, as a way favourable for mankind‘s future, seems too one-sided without
certain reservations. The latter should remind that practically feasible effects from increased
knowledge intensity in human activities (economic, social, political etc) are very much dependent on
qualitative features in their institutional foundations (as “rules of the game”) and still deeper—in
the informal branch of institutions (behavioural ethics) and their axiological base.
Is it justified to expect an optimistic vision of a presumably “virtuous circle” which will
consist of mutually reinforcing improvements in knowledge intensive economies and societies? The
expectations were ambitious—as a picture of Europe 2010 was assumed to show “the most most
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (cited by Kukliñski, p.1) but
unfortunately that picture hardly corresponds to a realistic assessment of the situation prevailing
in Europe now and in a foreseeable future (also in the European Union, before and after the
enlargement) 5.
This vision was assumed as feasible within Lisbon strategy (in 2000) 6 but it was accompanied
by many indications of difficulties, obstacles and challenges which were already visible or likely to
arise. According to an assessment in 2003 respective programmes (to implement the vision) were
set to launch ten kinds of actions (Third European Report...[op.cit. pp 20–21), which were listed
under three headings:
(i) Further consolidation and unification of the economic environment (mainly—quality of markets
and of public finances),
(ii) Stimulating the creation, absorption, diffusion and exploitation of knowledge (mainly—
promotion of research & innovation, education and forerunners of knowledge society, encour-
aging innovative business)
(iii) Improvements in working conditions, in social protection and cohesion, i.e. active employment
policies, in promotion of information society, in striving for social inclusion (as a remedy to
the ailment of social exclusion).
The chances to reach the goals of the vision were clearly dependent on successes in
implementing the aforementioned remedial actions. Otherwise essays to reach the vision were
bound to encounter too serious obstacles with resulting failures in these features of KBE which
are crucial for societal welfare and peace. The projects to develop KBE will resemble then a case
“ Behavioural Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behaviour” in American Economic Review—ibidem. Examples of
other approaches can be found in the stream of evolutionary and institutional approaches in economics which were
presented and discussed by Andrzej Wojtyna “Nowe kierunki badañ nad rol¹ instytucji we wzroœcie i transformacji”
(New directions of research on the role of institutions in growth and transformation) in Gospodarka Narodowa
(National Economy) 2002. nr 10 (134). The last metioned contribution refers mainly to G.Roland Transition and
Economics, Politics, Markets and Firms The MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 2000, and to D. Rodrik Development
Strategies for the 21th Century in Pleskovic B, Stern N. eds Annual World Bank Conference on Development
Economics 2000 The World Bank, Washington DC 2001.
5 Important observations and conclusions concerned with Polish transformation (after 1989) and with some relevant
problems “on the eve of EU accesion” have been presented lately in a seventh volume in Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
series “EU—monitoring” “On Course? Poland on the Eve of EU Accesion” eds. Miros³awa Marody and Jerzy Wilkin,
Kraków 2004. Attention has been concentrated there in particular on the qualitative features of human capital, not
only from the viewpoint of professional qualifications but also with respect to dependence of the effects on the quality
of social capital. (chapter II, pp 69–120)
6 Ambitious goals set within Lisbon (2000) strategy were based on the assumptions of gradual striving to overcome
numerous obstacles and stand-up to difficult challenges (as discussed in Chapter 1 Facing the Challenges of the
21st Century inThird European Report op.cit. (pp.1–36). Apparently these tasks have been much more difficult than
expected.
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 187 (187)
Comments to Kukliñski’s paper “Universities driving regional development” 187
of ideological wishful thinking—with small chance of success and only with a partly understandable
justification that ambitious goals (set through the vision) would at least provide a favourable
climate in European countries (and nations) to strive for a stronger competitive position, nearer
to the top of global ratings.
[It seems useful to remember that there are some merits in teleology expressed by ideological
promises7 but also some well known dangers, which follow from ommision of inevitable dark sides
in a given ideology as well as from a neglect of serious counteracting forces and obstacles which
prevent desirable features to materialize. At any rate—it seems evident that all future oriented
studies (foresights, visions etc) are likely to suffer if there are no steps taken to identify main
opposite forces, to reflect how to tackle them and to envisage the ways and means, feasibility
chances for some preventive and remedial actions]
(3) Comments offered above seem justified in view of diagnostic statements, which are cited
in Kukliñski‘s paper [(Annex One, part VII, pp. 11–12)] where we have a description of “The
dramatic crisis of Europe” with specific symptoms of seven ailments8. One of them is directly
concerned with economic matters and it reads that : “ Europe is losing competitive advantage in
the development of knowledge-based economy” (i.e. contrary to the task of gaining advantage, as
it was supposed to happen according to the goals set (in March 2000) by the Lisbon strategy) 9.
Other fields (besides economic) diagnosed to be in a state of crisis are the following:
demographic (with many sad consequences of Europe being “ a dying continent”), scientific,
cultural, military, concerned with European governance and with European identity.
It seems obvious that we have here a wide spectrum of observations which are indicating at
ailments of various nature. They are related mainly to the issues which are subjects of scientific
research within human and social branches of science.. The latter are considered as “soft” ,
less universal and decisive, not so precise as “hard” sciences as potential sources of knowledge.
Nevertheless they are certainly helpful in our essays to identify the roots of societal crises and
to alleviate resulting tensions—especially if we keep in mind the consequences of that “softness”.
They are also better fit for a strife of improvement in these actions foreseen by Lisbon strategy
which were under headings “further consolidation and unification of the economic environment”
and “better working conditions, better social protection and cohesion” (Third European Report...,
op.cit. p.21)
In this context I would venture a hypothesis according to which it would not be justified
to maintain that more successes in the development of KBE would allow to check the above
mentioned ailments or to implement more effective remedies. It is possible to assume that greater
knowledge intensity would cause some increments in rationality of manifold choices, by making
respective variants clearer and more distinct, and respective procedures—more transparent.
However, other arguments must indicate that the practice consists also of frequent cases of
negligence, of irrationality or of fraudelent attitudes, which can even mean that knowledge is
misused as a way to reach goals intrinsically evil. At any rate there are sufficient reasons to argue
that the practice of making choices (decisions) is determined not only by an extent of knowledge
but also by a hierarchy of accepted values and their interpretations, by specific preferences and
motivations Consequently—ex ante one cannot be sure what criteria of choice and what aims
will determine all respective kinds of processes alongside of their Increasing knowledge intensity.
7 Refering to the challenges and obstacles which were indicated in the Third European Report (op.cit. ., see
footnote 2) I venture this general comment as an advice to concentrate in presently proposed research activities not
on extensions of distant goals but rather on overcoming of obstacles, as seen through shortcomings in the recent
practice and through concepts, how to tackle them more effectively.
8 Compare: A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds) Europe in the perspective of global change, Warsaw 2003, p.511.
9 Similar critical tones—although slightly less explicit—can be noticed in the Third European Report (op.cit...
“Conclusions” p.31)
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One can only use various indirect ways of guessing about the nature of choices made in specific
conditions and under specific influences. In this context we can see some relevance of increments in
knowledge intensity (in the sense used in notions of Knowledge-based Economy and Society).This
is an additional aspect of relevance (besides those aspects which refer to professional qualifications
of people active in a variety of their roles in society); it is related to specific conditions which may
influence decision making (or in simpler terms—making choices) 10.
(4) I suppose that the lines of thoughts in my comments presented above may serve as
a good starting point for certain suggestions concerned with additional points which—in my
opinion—deserve attention in the approach to the problematique outlined by A. Kukliñski in
sections II and V—concerned with the prospective positions of regions and regional universities
“in the European landscape of the XXI century”. (I am presenting here only short outlines of
these suggestions—as possible topics for future research).
(i) In my opinion on should try to “upgrade” the role of regions and regional approaches
to development within the whole structure of prospective studies on the future of Europe (in
the world of to-day and of to-morrow). Obviousely this would mean that respective diagnostic
research will be useful, in particular oriented on existing and potential development factors.
Regional approach and viewpoint seem to be of crucial importance in consideration not only
of the issues subdued to the aims of gaining more competitive advantage in global markets
(mainly in respective spatially conditioned infrastructural arrangement) but also (or even—in
particular) the issues which may serve the aims of improving social cohesion and social inclusion
by means of strengthening regional markets and local suppliers as well as by means of paying
more attention by businesses to local actors as so-called stake-holders having mutually common
interests with firms—also larger and operating on various markets. Successes in attaining such
regionally oriented goals may seem mutually exclusive (either—or) to goals oriented globally,
but in fact there are strong opposite arguments, valid in a longer perspective. Without solid
foundations in regional success the global position of a larger (national country) economy would
become endangered. In other words processes oriented towards both kinds of goals may assist
each other (as complementary and producing extra effects, valuable from a societal perspective).
Unfortunately there are many examples of serious obstacles and counteracting forces, which are
caused either by a “foot-lose” attitude of globally oriented businesses prefering mobility and
flexibility (without any concern for respective regional stakeholders) or by local “lagging behind”
tactics to get public support i.e. by unsufficient motivation to get actively engaged in “catching
up” or else—by a too strong competition (often—pressure) of global businesses in activities to
win local markets etc. Altogether—there are valid arguments that in such circumstances some
consciousely prepared and concerted actions are useful (public and private alike) for essays to
promote development.
Nevertheless—such projects have proved more feasible if the earlier mentioned obstacles are
not yet too strong and universally prevailing (the point is that preparing and setting such project
in motion need to have something of a “critical mass” of available civic, entrepreneurial,. popular
and political support).
(ii) In that context—the next suggestion indicates at evidently valuable experiences which have
been already gained in the field of “Regional Foresight” projects (as described in documents of
10 This context was indirectly discussed by Richard G.Lipsey (Sources of Continued Long-run Economic Dynamism
in the 21st Century (pp 33–76) in The Future of the Global Economy. Towards a Long Boom? OECD 1999.I have
in mind an emphasis placed by the author on enhanced abilities to disentangle the notion of production function,
which may be considered as one of the hopes to obtain radically more effective economics by replacing a “black box”
assumption through more complex information structures. Too much optimism in this hope was due perhaps to an
approach concentrating on technological knowledge without sufficient interest in other aspects (such as above mentioned
values in practically taken criteria of choice)
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European Commission) 11, as a useful background and outline for regional development activities.
Its important feature is reflected in endeavours to abstain from paper-work wishful thinking but
to concentrate on feasible actions and contributions, in particular—informations which help to
specify the substance of a “critical mass” of participatory support for development as well as the
nature of the roles offered by particular participants.
Interesting hints come also from a section with warnings about conditions (prevailing in
a given region) which should persuade to abandon an idea to engage in foresighting (e.g. too
strong doubts in chances of feasibility, insufficient local support, probabilty of persistent quarrels
between potential participants with very different opinions and preferences). Besides—foresighting
is advisable only in a climate which seems promising for longer lasting continuous efforts; it does
not make sense to connect this tool with occasional isolated short term attempts.
Wishing to identify quality of existing conditions it is advisable to find out (as far as it is
posible) the features which characterise specific aspects contributing and summing up to diagnose
of institutions and of Social Capital in a given region.
— Institutional capital—the capacity of the formal institutions in a region to concentrate on
problem solving, capacity to act. speed in decision making, organisational flexibility and
intelligence and inter-organisational relations
— Cultural capital—the heritage of traditions, values and beliefs, language, social relations etc
— Symbolic capital—the potential to mobilise energies to the task of region building, generate
self-references, buil corporate teritorial images
— Psychosocial capital—a key element of which is trust (in the community and in its development
potential, and in enabling cooperation in setting up groups and associations
— Cognitive capital—the collective know-how (as opposed to individuals‘ human capital), much
of which resides in the knowledge infrastructure (universities, research centres) and firms12
(iii) My third suggestion reminds that our present topics will have to be analysed in ways
which take into acccount various far reaching and strong ties which connect all discussed aspects
of regional development activities with their environment, conceived in a wide sense of various
external conditions and exogenous influences. I have in mind here not only obvious issues concerned
with dependence of regional life (and its future) on manifold exogenous impacts, constraints and
enhancing factors13 which are already sufficiently identified and described . Assuming that such
issues are included into a generally accessible knowledge I think that we are obliged to keep
track with implications of new symptoms .This leads however to farther reaching suppositions that
there are already certain problems of serious nature, which are continuousely arising as sources
of conflicts (in societal and cultural matters, being potentially fatally dangerous for mankind).
In assessments of socio-economic matters there are ever arising conflicts between criteria of
rationality taken from a perspective of monetary global arrangements and values, and—on the
11 I am refering to “Practical Guide to Regional Foresight in the United Kingdom” eds. Ian Miles and
Michael Keenan, PREST, University of Manchester, published by European Commision DG RTD, Directorate K.
Brussels—Luxembourg 2002. The contents of this book refer not only to experiences from several regions in the UK
but also from regions of other countries :Finland, France, Spain as well as “Baltic String” (including areas from
Denmark–Sweden–Germany). The limited framework of this text does not permit to devote now much space to these
experiences but I hope their usefulness will be discussed else where , what will assist relatively less advanced regions
to prepare conditions for take-off attempts.
12 see Practical Guide... op.cit. p. 31—the text cited from conference papers—OECD Seminar at the Institute for
Regional Development, University of Seville—1999
13 As examples we have here the ties of regional endeavours with various actions envisaged in European Commission
strategies and projects, as well as those led by governments of respective countries,
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 190 (190)
190 Krzysztof Porwit
other hand—other criteria of rationality concerned with mitigating discrepancies in human quality
of life (as measured by respective indicators) 14.
There are diverging views whether the quality of democracy and its chances to survive (not
to degenerate into totalitarian plagues) depends on the role of humanistic values in the nature of
institutional order, and interpretations of such values (in particular of “liberty” and “justice” as well
as implications of human rights)—or the assesment should be quite opposite—that value-loaded
criteria would increase dangers?
In a more general approach—one can meet various assessments of present “modern” and
“postmodern” tendencies in societal sciences. Can we assume that human civilization develops into
ever improving mutations? or it is facing dangers of doom, unless some forces of revival appear?.
These seemingly too general and vague issues exert serious impacts on numerous aspects of every
day life (among others—the humanistic sense of redefining and of redesigning which is mentioned
in citation used in footnote.(2). In my opinion much more attention in academic discussion should
be devoted to approaches and arguments linked to wider foundations which are not limited to
atheistic understanding of science and knowledge. 15
II. Few words on potential roles of universities
(1) It seems to me that in deliberations on a vision of future European universities one should
not forget about the areas for potential concern in Universities which are related to the issues
presented in particular in section (4) above.
(2) A. Kukliñski‘s paper discusses these roles of universities, which are expected to generate
growingly important contributions to regional development. It is assumed that such contributions
will provide adequately sound endogenous motive power forces for development . These forces
will have solid roots if a sufficiently strong knowledge-base prevails. There seems to be an
implicit assumption that knowledge-based, largely endogenous, development drivers will suffice
independently from exogenous conditions and will be effective notwithstanding some obstacles
which may be caused by global impacts and challenges. I think that more attention should go
towards some exogenous factors which either help or impede to get effects of knowledge-based
development forces.
Less developed European countries (and regions) encounter such impedements which are
caused by manifold circumstances which are considered unfavourable by potential investors,
entrepreneurs or other decision makers, who otherwise could be engaged in innnovatory,
knowledge-intensive development projects. On the one hand it happens that potentially available
endogenous resources (in poorer regions) are directed towards other aims, either politically more
urgent or financially more promising. Although such decisions are less effective from the viewpoint
of future regional development, they are often preferable for politicians responsible for decisions.
On the other hand there are cases of conflicts (in aims) between general criteria of policy adopted
by the European Union in the field of assistance offered to poorer regions (by wealthier ones)
and the criteria of business according to which the stronger firms (from richer regions) are likely
to abstain from any activities which would create their own competitors in poorer regions (or
would otherwise decrease their sales there).
14 These issues are tackled e.g. in studies of Amartya Sen and their symptoms are visible quite often in many
notes and reports published in “The Economist”
15 I am sharing the views which were lately presented by J.H.H. Weiler in a book the title of which (in Italian) is
“Un Europa cristiana. Un saggio explorativo”, Polish language edition was published by “W drodze”, Poznañ 2003)
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Nevertheless, in general there are no reasons to doubt that development forces go together
with intensive demand for knowledge. This means also that development is associated with stronger
expectations for adequate supply of knowledge coming from various units in a knowledge-producing
sector. In most cases that sectors abilities depend to a large extent on universities so the quality
and strength of the latter certainly matters. However, one may wonder whether promotions
extended to universities and to other parts of the knowledge sector can be seen as a decisive
impulse for development; it may serve rather as an important complementary factor which makes
development stronger.
Altogether—these arguments are certainly backing a view that universities and their contri-
butions to knowledge production and dissemination are potentially growing in importance. Does
it justify suggestions that wishing to promote development one should think, how to improve
systemic arrangements to match corresponding increments in demand and supply of knowledge
(with adequate quality of knowledge contributions).? The notions of matching demand and supply
are useful in general arguments as a metaphor, but this does not mean that this can be directly
implemented through respective programmes and policies. I think that we are dealing here with
an interplay of forces where the tasks of harmonization prove exceptionally difficult because
neither a logic of market nor of direct balancing accounts can sufffice (as in plans used by public
administration).
(3) I am sharing the views expressed in Annex Two—in particular a warning that “The present
utilitarian attack can destroy the <dignity of science> (Kukliñski, 1996) which is the foundation
of the idea of the university...”. I am arguing—however—for more emphasis on reminding,
that if one wants to defend “dignity of science” then attention must be concentrated on keeping
an institutional order, first of all—such behavioural rules in human interactions which honour
personal dignity of every human being. This is the crucial condition for decreasing pathologies
and distortions in social and economic aspects of an institutional order. Various symptoms of
disorder which prevail in institutional matters are particularly detrimental to such fields of
economic and social activities where the qualitative effects are heavily depending on mutual trust
among people involved (in particular—because of relatively long lasting processes, with wider
lags [time intervals] between inputs and outputs, contracts and their effects etc). This seems
particularly relevant as far as
the long-term perspective is crucial in opinions on university‘s prospects (this is emphasized
in Kukliñski’s paper).
At the same time, however, I am inclined to be cautious in accepting the view that an
entrepreneurial university is inevitably the best response to contemporary challenges. This
notion and approach may be accepted if meant to imply sufficiently professional qualities in all
organisational and managerial aspects, but without forgetting basic public (and common good)
relevance of universities functions.
Consequently, I am afraid that business—like foundations may lead to various conflicts with
assumptions of a public mission (compatible rather with a non-profit type of activity, with an open
range for private sources of financing).
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CONSTRUCTING XXIST CENTURY’S ECONOMIES
BY RESHAPING THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY
The European Union of 2004 I hereby intend to foresee within this new century is one of
the most prosperous regions of the world. It hosts by far the greatest concentration of economic
command functions world-wide which are central both to the prosperity of its diverse territories
(regions, cities and networked urban and rural areas) and to Europe as a whole. European Union
is also endowed with enviable regional diversity as it comprises many types of cities and numerous
urban and rural regions with very different individual characteristics and socio-economic functions.
This regional diversity offers an important asset in terms of competitiveness.
However, at the moment, information technology already allows nearly borderless communi-
cations, exchanges of knowledge and collaboration, regardless of location. New opportunities are
opening up and new threats are being created. As the economy grows everywhere, there is more
and more a constant risk of socio-economic conflicts and also strong connections to technological
development and social structures worldwide. Expansion in China and other heavily populated and
emerging countries will also accelerate the use of finite natural resources, thereby boosting prices.
Globalisation implies mutual dependence among countries. The world’s economies are bound
together by trade, investments, financial flows and well-educated people, who are more mobile
than ever. Meanwhile there is regional and sectorial specialisation, based on local and regional
conditions, history and competencies. Entering a new era, Europe should wonder how its future
should be foreseen.
Stopping delocalisation and/or Catching up with high attractive
economies?
On the one hand, European countries gradually stop manufacturing less sophisticated goods
(clothing, shoes, etc.), which are now largely produced in developing countries, especially in Asia
and particularly in China. The European countries are therefore seriously threatened by this
growth. The big worry used to be the relocation of jobs abroad. The fact is that, throughout the
West, there are fears that China will be the main provider of high-tech services, not to mention
the rapidly developing nations increasingly competing with the old industrialised countries. The
race to cut prices, partly in response to pressures from big retailers, which means that it is
more and more difficult for Europe to decide between productivity and job creation. In order to
create wealth and jobs, it is essential to take advantage of expanding markets and to develop new
products and services.
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On the other hand, although the standard of living of Europeans gradually caught up with
that of the Americans in the three decades after World War II, namely “Les Trente Glorieuses”, it
appears that the trend has dipped since the 1980s. Economic growth has continued in the United
States, despite events such as the high-tech bubble and September 11th. It became worthwhile to
observe the different paths taken by the two major Western blocs, by disentangling the reasons
normally given to explain the poor results achieved in Europe: inflation, high interest rates, less
flexible markets, industrial decline... In this view, the key to economic recovery in Europe is
in knowledge investments and in the way that innovations are achieved and implemented. What
matters most now is to give priority to innovations in products rather than in processes, i.e.
attempting to improve or copy innovations in existing products.
However, in 2002, per capita GDP in the European Union was roughly 25% below that of the
US. In many Western European countries, hourly productivity rates are very high, but working
hours and the employment rates are particularly low, while the demographic decline further
deteriorates this phenomenon.
While these observations provide an intriguing point of departure, it is not enough to say
that capitalism is a constructed system. As Polanyi 1 famously put it in 1957, “the human economy
is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and noneconomic. The inclusion of the
non-economic is vital... The study of the shifting place occupied by the economy in society is
therefore no other than the study of the manner in which the economic process is instituted at the
different times and places.” Nonetheless, this temptation to make our economies as competitive
as those of other leading world powers might be causing the more prosperous EU regions to cast
off the ballast of the other regions that they feel are dragging along with them.
In the very end, it seems that the best way of achieving sustainable development involves
a commitment from all parts of the societal spectrum within the territories which cover the
European area. According to Brundtland2, the pursuit of sustainable development is defined as
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs”. Thus, it is understood in the context of spatial development,
meaning in particular, reconciling the social and economic claims for spatial development with the
area’s cultural functions through efficient complementarities between places.
Complementarities for Europe mean that cities, towns and rural areas should make the
best use of their joint assets to improve the attractiveness and coherence of territories overall.
They should not focus solely on economic competition but should also embrace culture, education
and knowledge, and social infrastructure. With this in mind, the European Commission sees
a possibility of playing a decisive role without needing to wade in heavy- handedly at local level or
to impose an administrative straightjacket, but by trying to attain a development destined to last.
For every complex problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat and... wrong! Although the
Commission’s strategy mainly consists of strengthening the competitiveness of the EU economy
at an interregional level, it is no less concerned to improve the performance of the less-favoured
regions. The Union has its eye constantly on the goal of economic and social cohesion without
ever neglecting to ensure, or giving up hope of ensuring, that the results will be lasting.
1 Polanyi K., 1957, The economy as instituted process. In Trade and market in the early empires: Economies
in history and theory, eds. K. Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg and H. W. Pearson, New York: Free Press
2 United Nations’ Report, WCED, 1987
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Creating the future together
Nevertheless, complexity is no reason to give up the ambition of long-term, strategic
thinking—on the contrary, such thinking is becoming more and more necessary. The most
important players must participate and need to be given opportunities to influence tangible
decision-making processes.
Of key importance is that the vision and the goals will fit together with what and how much
is at stake, and, at least, what changes will be needed. These factors are vital to ensure its
credibility. It is thus important to discuss how the task of drafting such a vision might take place.
There is a need to adopt a more long-term style of thinking about fundamental issues concerning
what society the European citizens want to build so, the fields to be prospected conduct to make
active, intelligent long-term choices.
Social action is embedded in ongoing and multiple networks of interpersonal relationships,
rather than being carried out by narrowly rational, atomised actors. An enduring concern with
networks represents one of the central threads of the new economic sociology. Even though, it is
often unclear whether networks represent a method, a metaphor, or a micro-sociological theory.
On many previous papers3, I personally tried to focus on the importance of societal relations
and the value of local exchanges in economic development by claiming that the best way of
achieving sustainable development involves a commitment from all parts of the social spectrum
and that less favoured regions should find their own way forward away from a technological
determinism paradigm.
Thus, in order to sustain my claim, I utilised, among others, recent EU data from the
“Innovation Scoreboard” (DG ENTREPRISE of the European Commission) combined with an
OECD confidence index to make comparisons between Ireland’s and the Portugal’s performances
with the Structural funds and established a causal link between innovation capacity, R&D
investments and divers components of social (dare we say “societal”?) capital. In fact, this concept
of social capital deserves more detailed exploration? It is still not very clear in what sense
it is used here and there, since it is no one single meaning of it that everyone agrees on.
However, the climate of confidence among local partners often comes down to the possibility which
individuals have of weaving relationships and spinning contracts at their own pace, of finding their
own dignity thereby and of mutually bestowing credibility on their political, public and private
institutions. Thus, by ploughing over and cultivating a broad field of exchanges and partnerships,
this social capital which boosts confidence and mutual trust among local actors seems most suited
to bringing effective solutions to local problems.
The way forward for less favoured regions is away from an “assisted” mentality which gives
priority to policies based on traditional physical infrastructures towards innovation promotion
policies based on intangibles which focus on building social capital in the form of a) an ability to
internalise a regional strategy and renewal or revival of local identity, b) a capacity to coordinate,
participate and link up the threads of interrelationships and of interactive and smart connections,
and c) acceptance of a culture aimed at reinforcing human capital , investing in knowledge and
the thirst for creativity in each and every firm.
3 Rousseau Jean-Marie, The social dimension: an essential factor in sustainable regional development, in Social
Capital, innovation and regional development, The Ostuni Consensus, 2004;
Rousseau Jean-Marie, Environnement, développement et dimension sociale, Société de la connaissance, in ACCES
International 2003;
Landabaso Mikel & Rousseau Jean-Marie, Collectivités et dimensions mondiales, Les étapes décisives, in ACCES
International 2002:
Jerme André & Rousseau Jean-Marie, Nouveaux comportements, nouvelles opportunités : les leviers essentiels,
Illustrer les territoires, défendre l’emploi, in ACCES International 2002;
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At this stage, it is likely useful to refer to the needs for further devolving responsibilities
for economic development to the local and regional levels, improving regional governance
and institutional capacities, promoting innovation policies with a special focus on SMEs and
entrepreneurship and cultivating “the resource of resources: people” in order to play an active
part in the “new geography of talents” in the making.
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Developing High-Technology Communities
Most of the regions face major, momentous changes created both by domestic and international
driving forces—economic, technological and societal. A large number of powerful trends and driving
forces will affect us all—opportunities as well as new risks and threats—that it cannot influenced
more that marginally, by adapting to them.
To an increasing extent, we are leaving the old industrial society behind us and are entering
a society based more on information, knowledge and expertise. Globalisation comes with increased
competition for this knowledge. Enormous investments are being made in educational systems
and in other knowledge-related programmes around the world. Each region must compare itself,
compete and collaborate with the best environments, regardless of where in the world they are
located.
It seems essential to assist business leaders, university heads, economic developers and
other key community players to better understand some of the processes involved in developing
a supportive environment to grow small, high-technology businesses. All the growing technology
clusters are small firms, and except for a few major companies, technology firms and small firms
are synonymous. The success of regions’ ability to create and expand high-technology businesses
is due to multiple factors that include:
• a rich research and development base,
• active university promotion of science and technology to local businesses,
• availability of a skilled workforce, an involved business community,
• and improving public support.
In addition, the strategic effort of the region may result in better networking among business
leaders, a closer working relationship between the universities and the business community, and
improved communication between the public, academic, and private sectors.
The public authorities, in co-operation with universities and companies, implement programmes
aimed at promoting science and technology in schools and disseminating technological know-how.
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One ingredient of the region’s success is the inclusive cooperative spirit of these industry
organisations.
• Lessons for any Community
Although most communities cannot recreate the beauty and climate of Californian or
Mediterranean regions, there are some elements which has contributed to the region’s economic
turnaround which communities can learn from and apply to their own environment.
• Networking of technology firms appear to help develop and maintain small, technology
suppliers in the region.
Technology luncheons, award events, and other opportunities for firms to interact, offer an
opportunity for service providers to create a relationship with growing technology firms and to
better understand their needs for further support and development.
• Small firms, in business services and technology, are the driving forces of the region’s
economic turnaround.
Small firms stand for almost all the new jobs created. The region’s economic landscape is
being reshaped by a committed and cohesive private sector, a rich research base that involves
university-collaboration, and an active community leadership.
New attitudes and shifting values
Foresight in any technology domain has often to struggle with the so-called “Zeitgeist”
dilemma, i.e. being a prisoner of the spirit of the time and “believing that the big issues or
technologies of today will also be big tomorrow”. It is the extrapolation that what is “hot”
today will remain so in the future. But, as seen above, the influencing factors are of social,
economic, political or technological origin and it becomes crucial to understand the nature of
these critical factors. Such relationships and dependency between different factors is complex,
while the factors are of different nature and often difficult to link. Even if the US is nowadays
outperforming European countries as regards many indicators, the present “American hegemony
is also threatened by a decline, as the EU and Asia are catching up in the pursuit of excellence”,
as recently stated US National Science Foundation 4. Thus, we should say that this European
knowledge society is able to foster economic growth, but on two conditions:
• first, people must be farsighted and bold to anticipate changes, (perhaps) even to create them,
rather than merely putting-up with them;
• next, people must look beyond technology.
When futurists miss important trends, this is partly because they do not take into account
changes in values. Attempts to rectify this problem achieve only limited success. Shifting values
may be the result of changes in demographics or in the spirit of the times. Foresights must be
drafted in a dialogue with many different groups in order to provide a reasonable picture of how
the future will look. It is easier to analyse changes in attitudes and behaviour than values. Such
changes can be tracked in patterns of consumption, education and lifestyle.
Public institutions also clearly influence the values and attitudes of a population. In some
countries, this discussion unfortunately deals most often with the impact of the tax system on
people’s incentives to work; get an education and run a business. There are also studies that show
that in those countries conditions stimulate creativity and problem-solving.
Territorial dynamism, which is increasingly being attributed to a certain kind of social capital,
while new, is certainly not a panacea, but is starting to give particular significance to those
4 Science and Engineering Indicators 2004
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regions that are able to seize on the reserves of competitiveness in their business sectors and,
what is more, the attractions of their area. The climate of confidence5 among local partners
often comes down to the possibility which individuals have of weaving relationships and spinning
contracts at their own pace, of finding their own dignity thereby and of mutually bestowing
credibility on their political, public and private institutions. By ploughing over and cultivating
a broad field of exchanges and partnerships, this social capital which boosts confidence and mutual
trust among local actors seems most suited to bringing effective solutions to local problems.
According to Annalee Saxenian6, Silicon Valley has had a regional network-based industrial
system that promoted collective learning and flexible adjustment among producers and encouraged
experimentation and entrepreneurship. We must admit that functional boundaries within firms are
porous in a network system, as are the boundaries between firms themselves and between firms
and universities.
While Saxenian’s comparative analyses of Route 128 and Silicon Valley have delved deeply
into the regional roots of industrial practice, new economic sociologists tend to boil down such
effects to network contexts. So, the Californian case speaks to Granovetter 7 (2002) as an account
of “an extraordinary amount of trust among companies and individuals who are nominally
in competition with one another.” The Boston case, in contrast, is read as a representation of
another type of network relations: here, the absence of trust is associated with the regional
economic malaise. While there is extensive discussion of networks in Regional advantage,
Saxenian’s account did not rest on such narrow foundations—it is a “thicker” economic geography
than Granovetter’s reading would suggest. Her multifaceted interrogation of regional production
cultures drew attention to what Michael Storper8 has called their “super-additive” properties,
the social “glue” that holds together these mesoinstitutional systems beyond the bare bones of
network architectures.
Meanwhile, the overall goal of a territory is to be a genuine community site, which allows all
the partners as much to learn from others, as to learn together. The business climate fosters the
creation, dissemination and adoption of knowledge (either codified or tacit) and increases the local
competitiveness. While business must be conducted at a higher and higher spread and a faster
and faster speediness, no technology could supplant the face-to-face contact on a regular and
routine basis. Thus there is a high necessity of proximity, as well as a climate of confidence and
trust.
The ‘digital’ takes over from the ‘societal’ order?
The information society has only emerged over the past decade, but over the coming fifty
years it should expand and find its way into most areas of economic, social and cultural life. This
in turn can have substantial implications on land use changes, the need for transport and mobility
of individuals whilst most probably increasing the need for goods distribution; and potentially
dramatic socio-economic shifts. Although there is not enough evidence yet, the broad use of IT
technologies is expected to have a polarising effect on territorial development.
5 According to James Coleman, social capital can be thought of as all the links (bilateral contacts, diverse
connections, networks, etc.) that individuals, entities or groups maintain with their environment, inside a given territory.
This involves confidence and reciprocity among the socio-economic components and brings different people into contact
in an ‘exchange space’.
6 Regional Advantage, 1994, Harvard university Press, London
7 Granovetter M., 2002, A theoretical agenda for economic sociology. In The new economic sociology: Developments
in an emerging field, eds. M.F. Guillién, R. Collins, P. England and M. Meyer, New York: Russel Sage
8 Storper Michael, 1997, The regional world, New York: Russel Sage.
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However, a large number of objections and arguments remain to be overcome regarding
the exact impact of human and social factors on consolidating the growth and progress brought
about by the emergence of the information society. At the same time, some are appealing to
the appearance and multiplication of “clusters” to support their thesis that our culture is “going
digital” in step with the globalisation of the economy.
The name ‘Silicon Valley’ is resonant with echoes of information technology, electronics and
the Internet, with planetary trade optimised in a globalised economy, and is felt to have become
the very model of its kind, a genuine paragon of the prosperity and attractiveness attainable by
a successful region. A recent myth has it that the virtual world has transcended all geographical
barriers9 a little as though the idea of “digital” is increasingly in opposition to and independent
of the societal constraints holding back people themselves.
Even today, a century after Alfred Marshall, many economists continue to predict the
ephemeral nature of societal concentrations and the impending abolition of distance. However,
without denying the benefits of its digital element, the continued presence of the local and social
dimension in this particular context reflects essentially a network-style structure. Everything in
Silicon Valley, from the blossoming of inspired ideas to the phenomenal amassing of wealth, has
contributed to causing the transformation of societal networks into digital ones.
But in the end the success of Silicon Valley, according to John Seely Brown and Paul
Duguid10, “needs to be understood not at the level of the individual participants, but at the level
of their joint interactions.” The two economists find that the Valley is above all “an interdependent
ecology built around a particularly responsive kind of knowledge.” It cannot be, they say, simply
“an entirely self-organised ecology of micro-organisms running wild.”
This suggests the conclusion that Silicon Valley, although it has capitalised on cultivating the
more or less spontaneous outgrowths provided by the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, has benefited
just as much from the ‘visible hand’ of local government and institutions... The institutional
environment in which businesses are swimming doubtless owes its ability to achieve major
commercial and economic performance as much to the capacity of self-organisation as it does to
the judicious political choices by the regional public authorities and local intermediate bodies.
Why do we essentially talk about a Learning Economy and
a Knowledge Society?
Introducing advanced technologies can only take place successfully when it is accompanied
by organisational change and competence-building among employees. The key to economic
performance is to promote learning at different levels of the economy. We found that firms that
introduced ICT without combining it with investments in the training of employees, with change
in management and with change in work organisation got a negative effect on productivity growth
that lasted several years.
Paradoxically it may be argued that as long as the economy remains new it will be much more
difficult to obtain productivity growth than in an old economy. It is adequate to call the current
era for ‘a learning economy’. What is at stake is the capacity of people, organisations, networks
and regions to learn. Learning to cope with and use the full potential of the new technologies is,
in a sense, to transform them from being new to being old.
9 Kevin Morgan, “The exaggerated death of geography: localised learning, innovation and uneven development”,
I.R.E. Conference at Stratford-upon-Avon, June 2002.
10 John Seely Brown & Paul Duguid, “Local Knowledge: Innovation in the Networked Age”, 2002.
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At the bottom of the skill pyramid, the easy access to a ‘hidden’ reserve of nonemployed
illegal immigrant workers has made non-inflationary expansion possible in the service sector. At
the top of the skill pyramid, the unique position of the USuniversity system has attracted bright
and hard working young people from all over the world to science and engineering studies.
Understood on a broad context, innovativeness is not restricted to high-tech industries alone
but can also be achieved by traditional low-tech sectors. Due to their small size, SMEs often
innovate through interaction with other firms and universities and research institutes (i.e. systems
of innovation). SMEs that innovate through sciencedriven R&D (e.g. in biotech) tend to collaborate
with partners across the world in search for new and unique knowledge.
SMEs innovating through engineering based user-producer learning tend to collaborate with
nearby partner. Here, innovation often involves the application of existing knowledge or new
combinations of knowledge. Through vertical collaboration firms co-operate with suppliers and
customers throughout the value chain. Through horizontal collaboration firms develop co-operative
arrangements with competitors.
A poor capacity to absorb innovation supply
In the light of these shared weaknesses, essentially with matters related to SMEs, it seems
useful to point out the major role of the SMEs in the comparative landscapes of the United States
and Europe.
Actually, the Europe’s largest weakness compared to the USA would be lying at the door of
SMEs, while increasing the innovative assets of such a category is the key to qualitative growth
and new jobs. If you compare large European and American companies, you will be struck by
that the amount of research they do is more or less equivalent. However, in the case of SMEs, the
ratio is 1 to 3, sometimes 1 to 8 (depending on the indicators), i.e. American SMEs (which account
for only 45% of US’s GDP) have an average between 3 to 8 times more resources available for
R&D than their European competitors (whereby SMEs account for 65% of GDP).
Europe urgently needs to launch new initiatives to turn its SMEs into high-innovation
companies! For increasing the European competitiveness of its economy, regions have to find out
the way to irrigate these broad fields with innovation. And this remark conducts to wonder about
the capacity of such fields to absorb a potential advantage of irrigation.
That is precisely the point that Dr Luc Soete11 stressed by noticing how far Europe’s lower
growth and its innovation deficit can, to a large extent, be attributed to the under-performance
of SMEs and their poor capacity to absorb innovation supply.
The “STRAT-ETAN Expert group”, in association with DG Research at the European
Commission, compared each of the 15 European (EU) countries and the US within a scoreboard
of four axes (each one defined by three relevant indicators):
• “Research capacity” (Scientists and Engineering Graduates as a percentage of working
population, Public investments in R&D as a percentage of GDP, Number of Publications per
million population);
• “Technological and Innovative performance” (Business expenditures in R&D as a percentage
of GDP, Number of Patents per capita, Innovation expenditures as a percentage of total sales);
• “Human capital” (Percentage of GDP spent in Education, Percentage of Working population
with Third level degrees, Participation in Life Long Learning);
11 Benchmarking national research policies: The impact of RTD on Competitiveness and Employment, STRATA-
ETAN Expert group, Prof. Dr Luc Soete—MERIT Institute—Maastricht
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• “Absorptive capacity” (Weighed average of Sales of New-to-market products as a capacity to
adjust to technical change, Labour Productivity based on Worked hours as a percentage of
GDP, Relative Trade performance in High Tech Goods).
Using these proxies, the expert group attempts to link in four bilateral diagrams the
performances of each country. What first emerges quite clearly is a series of substantial
performance gaps between Northern Europe and Southern Europe in “Human capital”, “Research
capacity” (more specific to public efforts) and the private “Technological and Innovative
performance”.
However, quite strikingly, it is member states’ “Absorptive capacity” which seems to not “fit
the bill” with little relationship towards either “Technological and Innovative performance”, nor
towards “Human capital”. Since we knew that top regions achieve a really competitive advantage
by a high capacity to create and absorb new knowledge, this study demonstrates that the crucial
factor, in addition to the first three ones, seems to be the “Absorptive capacity” whereby the US
and Ireland outperform the other countries.
Trust, as a cornerstone for regional promotion of innovation
Understanding innovation as interactive learning implies that co-operation is necessary for
the competitiveness of SMEs. It is defined as features of societal organisation, such as networks,
norms and trust that facilitate action and co-operation for mutual benefit. SMEs tend to have little
management resources and may thus undervalue participation. This involves a conflict between
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individual short term firm interest and the collective long-term interest. Another way of building
social capital is through participatory, bottom-up policy making.
Successful co-operation in innovation requires a fine-tuned and difficult to achieve match
between academic knowledge and the concrete practice of SMEs. Policy makers need to recognise
the overall key importance of education for SME innovation. Measures could be taken to target
regional education to the skills and knowledge which SMEs need by. In a learning economy, initial
education more than ever needs to be supplemented by the continuous training of employees.
Does Europe really act for entering into the Creative Age?
Policies attaching special interest to improving the social climate should always be preferred
to the seedy and deleterious use of those smoke-and-mirror devices we call tax relief, or to
utility endowments which more or less amount to real estate. A proper collective intelligence,
accompanied by a search for consensus through wide-ranging consultation of local actors, is the
precondition for success at every step. In our modern democracies, the commitment of the regional
public authorities to motivating local actors for socio-economic development should take the form
of supporting and backing the local institutions. Action in this form by the Community and national
authorities should begin, in a spirit of subsidiarity encouraging local contributions, by freeing the
regions and their local authorities from direct intervention and interference from outside. Such
an approach will come from a renewal of confidence to which the European Commission can fully
subscribe based on new strategies emerging from the regional level, and designed to:
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• support the public authorities and the local people in their desire to proceed to internalise
their own development and start a process leading clearly to a recovery of local identity;
• generalise the expansion and dissemination of intelligent and interactive connections within
regions, with a view to spreading the knowledge-based economy into local businesses—in
particular SMEs—while at the same time avoiding “cathedrals in the desert” caused by too
many local “fiefs” and institutions with no link to the local context;
• provide a real impetus to promoting a culture open to entrepreneurship, i.e. a culture
deliberately looking towards knowledge and preparing for the future by turning this knowledge
to account. A recent report12 written by R. Florida and Irene Tinagli extended these concepts
originally developed for the US (“The Rise of the Creative Class”) to the European context.
It explores trends in creativity and economic growth in 14 EU states compared with the US,
by providing new data on the extent of the so-called Creative Class. With a new composite of
measures of overall competitiveness performance—the Euro-Creativity Index, based itself on
three types (“3T”) of performance: Technology, Talent and Tolerance.
Although it is demonstrated that the US has the highest percentage of its national workforce
employed in the creative class and Ireland has seen far and away the greatest growth in creative
occupations, these last two countries are among the badly performing in the final ranking. This
seems essentially due to the fact that such a benchmarking statement takes into account (within
its “3T” assessment), the Tolerance criteria. However, since Technology and Talent were up to now
criteria we are familiar with, Tolerance, more related to permissiveness and new moral values,
could be more debatable criteria.
As Olivier Galland13 yet showed, if it is true that trust and permissiveness can go together,
this openness is selective and may be combined with a decline on social integration.
12 Europe in the Creative Age, Richard Florida and Irene Tinagli, February 2004
13 Les dimensions de la confiance, Futuribles no 277, juillet–aoþt 2002
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This sociologist also stated that the discrepancies between different degrees of altruism and
confidence in institutions account for the dimension of integration and the anomie phenomenon
described by Durkeim. Considering these three dimensions of confidence, namely “trust the other”,
“trust the institutions” and “altruism” (sharing common values), he can distinguish from the
other countries particularly standing out:
• Ireland for its high moral standards and high level of social integration (societal identity and
sharing values),
• France which is permissive with an exceptionally low level of trust.
After Durkheim14, it has been argued that sociological arguments are those which, by
definition, are not reducible to such individualistic bases, since they relate to those “social facts”
that necessarily adhere to collective, group, or associational entities. The domain of sociological
inquiry is correspondingly defined as those “ways of acting, thinking, and feeling that are social
in the sense that ‘their sources is not in the individual, their substratum can be no other than
society’” (Durkheim, 1938).
Methodological considerations aside, the concern remains that the networks-andembeddedness
paradigm seems to tend itself to soft-focus treatments of capitalism, in which the roles of power
and inequality are not so much denied but gently sidelined through the privileging of the horizontal
relations of trust, reciprocity, and associativity.
So, retaining the “3T” principle of R. Florida and I. Tinagli as relevant, we should be tempted
to just replace the last “T” of “Tolerance” by a “T” of “Trust”, composed with three measurable
and credible indicators, namely:
• “Trust”, from OECD survey,
• “Absorptive capacity” of Dr Luc Soete and
• “Altruism” of Olivier Galland.
This benchmarking exercise is not intended to just compare regions, but should help the
regions to help themselves in constructing a real advantage with respect to its own identity,
namely the Regional Constructed Advantage:
• with the Technology side, they will have a Tool-KIT (Knowledge, Intelligence, Technology),
• while with the Talent side, they benefit from a NET-Process (Networks, Exchange and Talent,
specifically reinforced by the 3M force: mobility, multi-disciplinarity and “melting-top”)
• and with the Trust side, they organise a Top-Priorities schedule (Trust Oriented Policy).
Under this process, the convergence of a co-ordinated regional policy should lead to the
emergence of a building Innovation capacity, while the economic landscape will be reshaped by an
active community leadership and a committed and cohesive private sector.
Today, European regions, whatever are they, wherever they come from, either wealthy and
dynamic regions or lagging behind regions, either from western member states or eastern new
members, all these regions may not realise how extraordinarily fortunate they are. They are
lucky in that the key resources needed today to promote growth are no longer essentially
physical, material or financial. These resources are intangible in that they relate to the capacity to
stimulate knowledge and creativity, that is to say what we recognised above as factors underlying
Technology tools, Talent motions and Trust behaviours. These assets of creativity are extremely
volatile and any attempt to capture them, any constraints may cause evaporation and endings-up
by killing them altogether. Freedom to think and expression of one’s difference are prerequisites
for creativity in all fields. Beyond a certain level of technical competence, among the critical
conditions for growth are respect for people and the practice of democracy. The critical significance
of intangible resources generated by human beings give all the regions a huge opportunity since
their potential wealth lies in their institutions, enterprises and citizens.
14 Durkheim Emile, 1938, The rules of sociological method, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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Could Knowledge either reshape the European society or fit with
the society?
Many people have a strong interest in pursuing constructive dialogue about the future, and
naturally they also do so. One challenge is to further broaden people’s involvement in this dialogue.
Recently, debate on how we should generate growth has moved into the foreground, and the issue
is now being widely discussed.
Growth is not an objective in itself, but a means for achieving something else. In current
discussion of growth, regions are often portrayed either as pacesetting places that just intend
to top the international ranging lists on knowledge intensity, innovative talent and prosperity or
as places in decline that are losing the race for economic growth with competing other regions.
Many decision makers discuss Education and R&D investments in economic terms and wonder
why they do not lead to faster growth. “Education costs money”, Sir Claus Moser, the celebrated
British statistician, once said. “But then so does ignorance”. Human resources are not always and
everywhere being used at their full potential and a broad sense of commitment in our society
must be created.
Business with high value-added and complex, knowledge-intensive activity have to be located
all over the European union with good development conditions including strong knowledge
environments, a good business climate, good availability of skilled labour and a good living
environment. While the pace of social change is accelerating within Europe, the built environment
and physical infrastructure are ageing. There is a need of concentration of resources and
fresh thinking to renew the infrastructure area. systemic changes and specially tailored regional
solutions are required. Both the driving forces and the obstacles are political, institutional
and social rather than technological. Meanwhile, technological development is creating necessary
preconditions and new possibilities. New mechanisms are needed for infrastructure planning,
construction, maintenance and operation. Europe must attract top-flight expertise from the rest
of the world to our business clusters and cutting-edged environments, since more people can feel
they are helping to build for the future. Here everyone can make a difference.
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It is crucial that the European regions will preferably invest in research and technological
development, so that they will be able continuously introduce new products and retain a lead in
the market. They will also have to invest in efficient production, so that their products will have
high value-added... It is also important that they invest in products and services that are difficult
to imitate and that are not so easily moveable.
Is there a risk that a growing number of highly educated people will leave their European
country and that a growing number of poorly educated people will move here? A strong research
and development position in a number of fields, creativity, a well-established social welfare system
and comparatively efficient public institutions are some of the strengths that Europe enjoys—and
that Europe must continue to improve, since European people want to keep a chance to surviving.
European countries must set priorities and focus mainly on business with high value-added, for
example advanced manufacturing operations, complex products that require sophisticated systems,
know-how and the provision of services with a high knowledge content that cannot easily be
duplicated. Another possibility is to carve out niches in specific fields of application where we have
the potential to build up and maintain indepth expertise.
A new Power, able to arouse more Trust than Dread...
Could we invoke a “Europeanising Europe”, since Spinoza spoke about “naturing nature”
opposed to a “natured nature”?: a continuing Europe, unforeseeable and able to absorb promises
and uncertainties of what is new, in order to reinvent previously unimaginable solutions.
The European identity will be able to construct itself under the personality where liberty
is the prior principle. On the contrary, a too much “Europeanised Europe”, opposed to this
“Europeanising Europe”, would be just nostalgic and unfertile, while history, always acting and
building itself, could be allowed to invent new ways for its future by expanding the whole set of
its “possibles”. That is a likely reason why the European Constitution will never change anything
about the European identification although it overcame so many difficulties. Such a Constitution is
wrong while deleting or erasing the irreducible plurality of people and nations on our continent.
By the way, it is amazing to observe that the two finalist teams of the Football Euro Cup are
among the more modest European partners, those whom some people would dare to call “small”
partners, forgetting these countries constitute, at the same time, huge realities of civilisation,
symbolised by two inexhaustible words: Hellenism and Lusitanism! Those who don’t understand
would risk denying the complex reality of Europe, whose unity can only be observed through the
diversity of the people who make it up.
Another dimension could be explored with the impressive and fantastic work of the economist,
François Perroux15, namely The Europe without shores. According to him, it would be impossible
to definitely limit the European borders because of its ‘ecumenical mission’ obliging it to respect
the diversity of the others, by fidelity to its own internal diversity.
A shoreless Europe is a sui generic reality, refusing to risk a unique model, too similar to an
imperial structure. The project of Europe should be intensive in liberty for others, by inventing
a new kind of power, able to arouse more trust than dread. Thus, it should be possible to claim
open identities as regards rich and however problematic conditions of a Union, whose opportunity
lies in its paradoxes, that is to say a Union able to reconcile what seems not possible elsewhere.
15 Perroux François, L’Europe sans rivages, Œuvres complètes, Presse Universitaire de Grenoble, réédition novembre
1990
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THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL*
Introduction
There is a growing consensus on the importance of social capital in promoting regional
competitiveness, even though the definition of the concept itself, not to speak about the way
it should be measured or utilised in policy making is still subject to debate in academic and
policymakers circles alike.
According to OECD (2001) social capital refers to “networks together with shared norms,
values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups”. In a recent
World Bank study (Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002) social capital is defined as “institutions,
relationships, attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to
economic and social development”.
In general four main features of social capital can be distinguished: (a) Social capital is
a market-based social exercise based on trust, reciprocity, shared norms and institutions; (b) Social
capital can provide a relational infrastructure for collective action which facilitates cooperation
within and among groups as well as enlarges a capacity for networking leading to mutual benefits;
(c) Social capital can improve collective processes of learning and constitutes a key element
of knowledge creation, diffusion and transfer—all processes critical for innovation and regional
competitiveness; (d) Finally, social capital cements value-based networks stimulating successful
regional clusters as well as regional innovation strategies and policies. The issue is especially
important for the less-favoured regions that have weak social capital and little understanding
of science and knowledge, yet face fundamental economic, technological and social change, as
concluded in the “Ostuni Declaration”.
From the regional development point of view, social capital can be seen as collective capacity of
key socio-economic players in the region (e.g. individuals, companies, authorities, research centres,
business support agencies, etc.) to form and effectively use networks or other forms of cooperation
on the basis of shared interest, trust and reciprocity in order to enable and accelerate the process
of regional learning and knowledge-based development. In this sense, some authors (Heitor, M.
2003) argue that national or regional learning depends on the existence of social capital, which
is defined by networks and institutions which govern the interactions among the nodes of the
networks, be it people or organisations (firms, universities, local government, etc.).
* Forthcoming (2005) in «Social capital, innovation and regional development», several authors, edited by Professor
Aldo Romano—eBM School at USUFI and Mikel Landabaso, EU Commission.
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It is nevertheless important to underline that in our view “shared interests” is an integral
part of the definition of social capital, which is a notion that can help convey a more “economic”
significance to this concept, over and above the “civicness” which has traditionally been attributed
to it. Shared interest is a as powerful as “trust” in cementing cooperation arrangements among
different institutional actors. Moreover, trust is often the natural consequence of understanding
each others agenda where development is not understood as a zero sum game of contending
parties.
Others (Roman, C. 2003) think of it as the ability of a given social group to access information
(from internal sources, by buying, renting, transfer or copy) and incorporate it into its own
production processes (from design and production to distribution and re-engineering), including
their capability of managing such processes, through cooperation and networking. That is the
collective ability to transform information into knowledge (and invention in innovation) and
knowledge into action for economic development.
Still another more metaphorical way to look at social capital, which would give us a flavour of
its (micro) economic significance, would be to define it as the trust-based cooperation relationship
that would systematically solve the “prisoner’s dilemma” to its optimum collective result. That
is, the answer to this (denunciation) dilemma would probably be different and less predictable in
a context where self interest is purely driven by market forces in an abstract world of isolated
and competing individuals than in a context where other considerations related to interdependence
and collaboration are embedded in a social and institutional framework which nurtures cooperation
through networks and socially penalizes the breach of confidence (a social ecology). This is
probably the reason why the “blurred” concept of social capital has come more and more to the
forefront of economic debate, not surprisingly in the development economics field in particular,
as we move from a perfect competition world of neoclassical economics to an imperfect world of
economic policy where history, institutions, culture and politics also matter.
In this sense, some authors claim (Asheim, B. 2003) that “in the (successful) Scandinavian
development model, the socio-institutional framework had a primacy in relation to changes in the
techno-economic paradigm, which means that the promotion of co-operation was the dynamic force
for societal change in contrast to competition driven by technological development”, which leads
him to conclude that in the particular field of regional development and innovation “a broader
understanding off the innovation process as a social, non-linear and interactive learning process
means a change in the evaluation of the importance and the role played by socio-cultural and
institutional structures in regional development”.
The debate on the importance of social capital for regional economic development relates, as
stated in the Ostuni declaration, to a widely recognised need to rethink traditional redistributive
regional policies as regional development policies which focus on growth opportunities by
exploiting untapped regional potential wherever it exists. The latter rely not only on investments
in tangible infrastructures but more and more on intangibles that have to do with the valorisation of
entrepreneurial culture and innovation promotion through the generation, diffusion and exploitation
of knowledge in a particular regional context, among others. In this sense, some authors (Arboníes,
A. 2003) advocate for a shift in policy focus “from content to process and from infrastructures to
connections, social capital being an indicator of collaborative capacities in a region”.
This responds to the Lisbon and Gothenburg Strategies by highlighting the importance of
sustainable development based on economic, physical, environmental and social capital as key
elements of the mutually complementary ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ regional infrastructure. In this sense,
some authors (Pezzini, M. 2003) consider social capital as important as financial capital in promoting
economic growth and think of regional competitiveness as the result of an uneven distribution
and capacity to valorise local collective goods, including inter-firm relations and the valorisation
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of natural and cultural resources. Others (Kuklinski, A., 2003) go as far as to state that “social
capital is the main engine transforming weak into strong regions”.
Initially social capital was present mostly in political and social science literature. Subsequently,
it was incorporated into economic writing as so-called intangibles became considered a crucial
factor for economic development, which led some authors (Cooke, P. 2002) to state that social
capital is a key missing ingredient of economic development, that can be built up through efforts
of policy makers. Hence, social capital is considered an asset, just as other traditional forms of
capital. It is attained through the processes of interaction and learning that take place in society.
However, unlike other commodities, it cannot be traded or exchanged (Maskell 2000) and, we
could add, is fragile and requires permanent renovation.
In the precise context of clusters, for example, it has been argued (Arzeni, S. 2002) that
innovation is based on collaboration, proximity and networks and spurs through a process of
mutual learning, emulation, positive role models and personal contacts. That is social capital in
the form of trust, collaboration and social-civic exchange are key to cluster development and firms
within clusters benefit from many elements associated with social capital: lower transaction costs
due in some cases to personalised negotiations, fewer bureaucratic procedures, lower information
costs stemming from local and personal information flows, better co-ordination because of direct
contacts and often trust-based relations among economic agents. In this sense, it is argued that
social capital in clusters leads you to the “know-who” that allows you to build the “know-how”
(Rosenfeld, S. 2003). In a “geographically bounded concentration of interdependent firms” this
knowledge holds the key to potential business opportunities. In view of all the above it would be
interesting to further explore and understand to what extent and in which ways social capital
does create/strengthen the systemic relationships that generate synergies and external economies
within clusters which help promote innovation and regional development.
More generally, it is argued that social capital can help in the creation of an efficient regional
innovation system which facilitates the generation, diffusion and economic exploitation of knowledge
in the form of new or improved economic activities (products, processes and services) in a region.
In this sense, social capital demonstrates far-reaching externalities for economic performance.
Authors point to at least two significant positive consequences of social capital for firms or
localities. First, it enhances and accelerates a process of exchange and creation of knowledge and
innovation (e.g. Landry et al 2001:74, Maskell 2000). Second, it significantly reduces inter-firm
transaction costs, such as search and information costs, bargaining and decision-making costs,
contracting and control costs (Maskell 2000). Social capital can be seen therefore as one of the
crucial factors for gaining competitive advantage by regions. Moreover, recent analysis which try
to evaluate social capital in different countries and regions (Rousseau, J.M., 2003) through a proxy
of “confidence indexes” tend to demonstrate that it is precisely the more advanced regions and
countries which have the biggest amounts of this type of capital while less favoured regions rate
badly, suggesting that the causality runs from weak social capital to less development potential.
In short, in the knowledge-based economy, regional diversity is an asset. Policies aimed at
empowering regions to exploit it strategically in order to face up to the challenge of globalisation
are critically important for their economic well being. Surely building the collective capacity to
establish a shared vision about the future, jointly exploiting scarce resources in a synergetic way
and pooling expertise and commitment together is a way forward for less favoured regions willing
to offer new economic opportunities to their citizens. Social capital is a notion that is placed
at the crossroads of these efforts. Understanding it better to be able to nurture it and use it
appropriately is necessary for these efforts to fructify.
In this sense, it is worth even rapidly sketching what would be the academic route and
causal relationship which might lead some of our more orthodox colleagues to pay attention to
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social capital and regional governance issues within their own scientific framework. One way of
approaching this might be the following: within new growth theory the main explanation for
increasing returns to production factors, which is key to explain cumulative processes of economic
growth, is knowledge spillovers. The latter has been progressively recognized to be spatially
bounded, not least because of the “tacit” and “sticky” nature of certain types of knowledge and
the territorial nature of much of the process of knowledge accumulation and learning, once the
circular and systemic model of innovation, rather than the linear model, is considered to be a more
realistic reference of what goes on in reality in the business world. The latter is particularly
true in the case of less developed regions, with relatively lower rates of formal R&D investments
and personnel, and where innovation is less “radical” and science-based, as it may be the case
of leading regions where most of the “excellence” R&TDI infrastructures, universities, high-tech
industries are located and which are by far those that concentrate the highest number of patents
(e.g. out of 213 regions in the European Union, 50% of the total patent applications to the
European Patent Office were applied for by inventors from 20 regions from 1997–2002, with 13
concentrating half of all high-tech patents, and the top ten regions account for a third of R&D
expenditure in Europe with 30 regions being responsible for half of it (Eurostat 2004)).
Within this framework, “inter-regional knowledge spillovers are considered to arise when actors
involved in the innovation process such as universities, the business sector and the government
sector tie close links leading to fertilizations and feedback relations” (Greunz, L. 2003). In short,
knowledge spillovers are generated and further developed within efficient regional innovation
systems which facilitate “links” and “cross-fertilization” among the key innovation players, not
least by connecting SMEs to a responsive R&TDI knowledge base. Thus, public-private cooperation,
business networks, university-enterprise connections and clusters can be of outmost importance in
generating these spillovers and therefore in increasing the knowledge generation, diffusion and
absorption capacities in a region. From the policy perspective it also means that action oriented,
open, consensus-based and participative strategic planning processes led by regional authorities
with a sufficient degree of autonomy/power and acting within a “development coalition”, to use
Asheim’s term, can become key ingredients of the process of generating knowledge spillovers .
In other words, an innovation-friendly business environment underpinned by sound regional
governance structures and the availability of social capital—understood as “as the collective
capacity of key socio-economic players in the region (e.g. companies, authorities, research centres,
business support agencies, universities, etc.) to form and effectively use networks or other forms
of cooperation on the basis of shared interest, trust and reciprocity in order to enable and
accelerate the process of regional learning and knowledge-based development” becomes essential
for developmental efforts to fructify. Why not then try to understand better how the interactions
between knowledge spillovers generation, regional governance and social capital operate? Why not
try to integrate the organizational, institutional, cultural and political aspects associated with this
process into our economic theories about regional development?
Social Capital and regional policy options
If social capital is potentially so beneficial, then the immediate question that appears is: can
social capital be generated or reinforced through public policies? If yes, what kind of public
policies? Until now, evidence from research and pilot policy actions such as RIS (Regional
Innovation Strategies) suggests public policy can contribute to social capital building (Mouton, B.
2003). One of the unexpected conclusions of the evaluation of these projects was that their « policy
» dimension contributed significantly to promote public and private partnerships and business
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networks, as well as improve the institutional capacity of regional administrations in charge of
innovation.
Networking among regional stakeholders and establishing a joint regional agenda in the field
of innovation through social capital building is one of the most visible results of the RIS/RIS+.
All regions involved in the programme decided to support clusters and business networks in
their actions plans as a result of the RIS/RIS+ exercise, as well as promoting collaboration
and exploiting synergies among the different institutions and policies of their regional innovation
systems. For example, in Wallonia, 5 pilot clusters led by firms in collaboration with research
centres and sectoral association were developed under RIS. In Yorkshire & Humber, 15 sectoral
business networks were all animated by entrepreneurs and directly integrated into the activities
of the newly created regional development agency. In Northern EU (Finland and Sweden), cross-
border business meetings among firms of the two countries took place in order to operationalise
the ‘multipolis’ concept. In Tuscany they developed a cultural heritage cluster involving private
firms, universities and R&D laboratories. Finally in Halle-Leipzig-Dessau, a public-private dialogue
in the chemical sector developed into co-operation between big firms and regional SMEs and
the establishment of a network of 50 firms in the plastic sector, preparing the creation of
a Technological institute for polymers.
One key lesson stemming from the RIS/RIS+ and the European Regional Development
Fund Innovative Actions experiences that followed is the importance of the role played by
“neutral partners” and “regional champions” in building social capital through the creation and
dynamization of networks and joint actions at the regional level.
Regarding “neutral” partners it is worth mentioning the critically important role played by
the European Commission in providing not only funds but also, most importantly, legitimacy to
a group of individuals (social innovators) committed to changing things, which operated outside
the established institutional framework. The EU launched an strategic planning process based on
the condition of the establishment of a dedicated public-private partnership through a bottom-up
process which liberated latent regional energies in the form of new ideas and shared political and
financial commitment to a common vision. Thus it provided a window of opportunity for regional
stakeholders to collaborate and do things differently while preserving their independence from
established institutional and political inertia.
In terms of social capital, it is important to note that knitting collaboration links among
regional stakeholders is more easily done when incentives are proposed and an institutional
framework provided in such a way that the first stages in particular in the building of the
new networks and relationships are “protected”, while trust among participants is established
and strengthened. Many such “development” networks do build on trust and trust by its own
nature requires time and personal contact. Providing a framework for both conditions to happen
is therefore essential. Empirical research (Koschatzky, K. 2003) has demonstrated that “innovation
networks require a certain awareness of the need for co-operation as well as trust and a lot of
time”.
The EU Commission was able to do that precisely because it was perceived as a neutral
partner with no hidden agenda or vested interest in the region. That is an institution playing
outside the power games of the region which was capable of offering at the same time a financial
incentive, a methodology and some legitimacy to start building collective action around a shared
regional vision. It is interesting and surprising to see in how many regions different regional
stake holders met for the first time under this common umbrella, discovered how many interest in
common they shared and identified opportunities for joint action. In regions so diverse as Galicia,
Weser-Ems or Yorkshire and the Humber many business and public R&TDI institutions which
were directly related to a particular value chain of an important regional production activity met
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for the first time ever, got to know each other and decided to start collaborating in their own
(enlightened) self-interest as well as indirectly for the general regional good. In short, giving an
institutional impulse by an appropriate “neutral” partner which stimulates a social capital building
process not for its own sake but as a prerequisite for attaining a particular economic objective
(the promotion of regional innovation in this case) is critically important.
In terms of regional champions, the most successful strategies and innovation action plans
that ensued had in common the leadership of a committed individual(s) that enjoyed the legitimacy
and respect (trust) by a large number of regional stakeholders to take action and think outside
the box, carrying behind many other actors. Many of those that followed these pioneers at the
beginning did it mainly for two reasons: first, in case there was something in it for them (financial
return) and two, to avoid the opportunity cost of not being there if the (new) “thing” did work. In
a sense it was a self-discriminatory process which ended up identifying the most committed and
capable innovators in many of these regions. Moreover they were able to work, thinking outside
the box, protected by the institutional framework provided by the Commission for a number of
years.
In terms of social capital this may mean that the nodes of the networks which are established
are not all of the same level or have the same significance. Some are the initiators which are
instrumental and catalytic with very many connections and capacities to link, while others are
rather followers with a secondary importance. That is, there is a hierarchy of nodes and different
quality of the trust relationship among the participants that has to be taken into account when
trying to stimulate social capital building. Thus identifying those that are critical for further
growth as central nodes around which a net can be knitted is one of the first tasks a social
capital policy should undertake. In this sense the active participation of leading industrialist in
regions such as Shannon, Belgium Limburg or Cantabria, as chairmen of the RIS management
committee carried with them a number of business partners and institutions that otherwise would
not have participated in the operation, or at the very least would have been reluctant to take
an active stance. Trust on champions set the grounds for other more horizontal types of trust
building among regional stakeholders, which so far did not know each other in many instances. It
is interesting to note that RIS was a fully publicly funded operation and therefore those regional
governments that took the stand of being an equal partner with the private sector by delegating
the Chair to a leading industrialist in the region took a risk that paid in terms of legitimacy for
attracting active participation from other regional stakeholders. In fact it is also interesting to
point out that many of these industrialists come from multinational companies and engaged in this
‘civic’ task of leading a regional innovation strategy, which is difficult and time consuming, out of
a sense of regional belonging and willingness to contribute to their region’s well being through
their professional management experience. None of these busy people was paid to do the job, of
course.
Regarding regional leadership, it is interesting to note that some authors (Marinazzo, M. 2003)
use a “regional enterprise” metaphor to claim that regional policies “should shift the analytical unit
fro innovation from products and processes towards the capacity of a region to train, recognise
and nurture leadership capable of leading a region and its processes of innovation change”.
Currently, RIS+ strategic reflections throughout the Union show that the provision of
a regional framework for inter-firm cooperation is of paramount importance for the promotion
of innovation in SMEs in particular. Innovation flows through the formal and informal regional
networks created through social capital building. These networks help translate knowledge (codified
or tacit) into economic opportunity, while at the same time build up the necessary bonds and
linkages among persons and institutions so as to exploit the synergies that catalyse regional
innovation.
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Regarding regional institutional capacity building, RIS and RIS+ provided a new institutional
framework for a more efficient use of public and private funds. The RIS and RIS+ have often
contributed to a better institutional co-ordination of public financiers of innovation, in partnership
with the private sector. In Wallonia a new decree for technological centres, detailing approval
conditions for these centres, including a charter on prices for services they offer. In Overijssel,
a new official convention was signed by the regional development agency, the regional government
and the regional office of the national agency for innovation (Syntens) for the promotion of
innovation. In the Canary Islands RIS+ public-private partnership prepared a “Quality charter”
for technology transfer offices in universities. Weser-Ems has created a number of sectoral
competence centres in strategic fields for the regional economy by combining public and private
efforts and concerns in a number of sectors, including information and communication technologies
as well as traditional ones such as agro-food, tourism, maritime industry, etc.
Empirical evidence shows that social capital building requires a shift from a traditional
top-down approach towards a more open form of governance involving all relevant stakeholders.
The fruits of such partnerships should reach all policy fields relevant for economic, scientific and
social development (an integrated approach) and acknowledge the desirability of a long term action
horizon (a strategic approach). Evidence points to the fact that specific indirect policy measures
are most effective in social capital promotion.
An analysis of content of the nearly 100 European Regional Development Fund Innovative
Actions proved that regions themselves have a particular interest in measures designed to
support cooperation between SMEs (networking and clustering activities) as well as improving
cooperation between regional R&D institutions, especially Universities, and local companies, hence
enhancing regional innovation systems. It follows that new policy efforts should be made to create
mechanisms and structures through which regional stakeholders can (begin to) develop more and
new purposeful conversations about joint solutions to common problems (Morgan, K. 2003).
Social capital and Regional Governance
Directly related to the social capital debate is the issue of appropriate regional governance for
efficient regional development planning and policy delivery. In this sense, regional governments are
progressively playing a more influential role in the conception and implementation of territorially
based policies in the EU as well as in the USA. Innovation policies to foster the knowledge-based
economy are a good illustration of this. Moreover, some recent GDP trends from EU countries
point at decentralised national economies performing better than centralized ones, including
a higher capacity to resist in economic slumps. It would seem that in the post-fordist era and
under the pressures of globalisation, scale and labour cost are becoming less relevant competitive
assets that the capacity to compete in niche markets through timely response to market demand,
customisation and quality. In this new scenario, regional diversity is a competitive asset, which
can be better exploited by a decentralised institutional system.
As recently stated by the OECD (Conclusions of the Chair, High level Meeting, Martigny,
Switzerland, July 2003) “Both global economic growth and social cohesion require increasing the
competitiveness of regions, especially where potential is highest. The comparative advantages
that drive innovation and investment are as much a regional characteristic as a national one.
For regions to succeed, they must harness their own mix of assets, skills and ideas to compete
in a global market and develop unused potential.” In this sense, regional governments have an
strategic position for harnessing these regional assets, and in particular, setting up public-private
co-operation networks which are essential for knowledge-based economic development and creating
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a suitable climate for effective innovation adapted to regional SME needs. They are well placed
to co-ordinate different elements (policies and institutions) of the regional innovation system in
particular, beginning with a thorough analysis of the actual developmental needs of regional firms
and the principal obstacles facing them, including raising awareness of the need for innovation in
the first place. In short, regional governments are key players in these policies.
In other words, ‘national’ innovation policy for SMEs is difficult to implement without a very
close relationship (co-ordination and synergy) with regional governments, which have a detailed
knowledge of key R&DTI regional actors and the needs of the productive base. Inversely, it is
essential that regional innovation policies be co-ordinated with the major national and international
research and development systems, including, universities and major public research institutions
and laboratories, as one of the main sources of knowledge.
A second characteristic is that such policies cannot be effectively developed without the direct
participation of the private sector in planning and implementation and without the agreement and
active support of other actors in R&TDI in the region, semi-public agencies, technology centres,
universities and trade unions.
Finally, these policies must be based on new forms of institutional organisation that are
more dynamic, horizontal and flexible, not only for the purposes of planning but also for project
implementation. These characteristics are more easily achieved when a fair degree of trust
and collaborative capacities exist among regional stakeholders. Thus social capital may have
a direct influence on “institutional thickness”, allowing for the design and implementation of more
demanding and ambitious regional policies.
The public sector must provide leadership, rather than control, on these policies and must play
the role of ‘promoter’ of and ‘catalyst’ for economic development. It must be able to co-operate
closely with the private sector and others active in the region as an equal partner. It must also
be capable of reacting and providing creativity and must allow for the amendment of policies
and programmes on an on-going basis as lessons are learned from experience. That is why the
institutions and agencies responsible for implementation must be given a considerable degree of
autonomy and (political) trust and need to have a high level of professional experience in the field
(development economists and technical experts rather than general administrators responsible
exclusively for implementation and auditing).
To ensure that these policies bear fruit they require strategic planning based on wide
consensus in a stable public-private partnership and a firm commitment from the principal R&TDI
and business services providers (the regional “knowledge infrastructure”) in the region so as to
ensure that the policies will be sustained over the long-term and benefit from adequate resources.
There are no universal magic formulas for this type of policy (neither must they be affected
by doctrinal fashions: yesterday technology parks, today clusters, tomorrow ...), instead specific
policies are required for each region, which will be principally demand led and conceived using
a balanced bottom-up approach. There are no best practices, but only good practices, from which
lessons can, in certain cases, be learned that can then be adapted to suit the particular situation
in each region.
Conclusions: tentative ideas for an on-going debate
The social capital debate is not anywhere near from being closed. In fact we are just
scratching the surface with far more open questions than answers, and still a long ways from
being able to operationalize this concept in such a way that we can sell the concept and associated
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policies to regional politicians in a “policy package” which they can buy, support and eventually
fund.
Regarding open questions, let us mention but a few. Some are related to the understanding
that trust and reciprocity, which are at the roots of the social capital concept, are all “nice” and
desirable civic values which deserve to be promoted in their own right. But how do they fit with
the economic rational behaviour and (enlighted?) self-interest which are in the economic nature
of SMEs, in particular in less favoured regions with relatively close markets and little inter-
firm cooperation tradition and business networks/associations?. Moreover, do cluster relationships
necessarily sit on trust and reciprocity or are they purely enforced by economic rational behaviour
in view of expected advantages (e.g. lower transaction costs, cooperation as a strategy to deal
with global competition) which may vary with the life cycle of the cluster?. Is social capital
purely a “sociological” concept, understood mainly as “civic capital”, as in the early social capital
literature, or can we give a more economic and operational interpretation of such a concept along
the lines of “relational capital” and “institutional thickness”, in terms of creating/restoring the
public-private relationships, networks and institutions through which knowledge and innovation
my flow and thus contribute to an efficient regional innovation system, on the basis of shared
interest.
Finally, is social capital as cholesterol? is there a good type and a bad type, in terms
of economic development? The bad type (more of the “bonding” type) may prevent regional
innovation and creativity and foster “defensive” conservative values and parochial attitudes in
an ever increasing globalise economy subject to accelerated technological change. Clientelist
governments, corporatists attitudes in business associations, “guild”-type sectoral approaches and
short-sighted protectionist policies and barriers might be part of it.
The good type (more of the “bridging and linking” type) may facilitate regional change
by promoting proactive adaptation to changing conditions through coalitions of key regional
partners, sharing common visions, pooling scarce resources and exploiting synergies. Strategic
planning exercises which are open, transparent and inclusive, institutions that provide appropriate
environments for interactions (business fora, clusters, technology forecasting, etc.) among regional
stakeholders, the promotion of a shared can-do culture supported by policy mechanisms that
foster innovation and creativity, supporting public-private partnerships to build a common agenda
for action, raising awareness about collective challenges and opening a bottom-up process of
participation in policy design and assessment, might be part of it.
To sum up, the argument in favour of developing a public support policy to enhance social
capital from the regional development perspective goes as follows:
a) if regional competitiveness in less favoured regions does depend critically on rising their
innovation capabilities (and thus contribute to cohesion at EU level),
b) and if the latter is in turn dependent on their capacity to promote business networks and
interactions among the R&TDI regional stakeholders, including linkages to external (global)
sources through which knowledge exchange and innovation opportunities are created. That is
on the existence of an efficient regional innovation system.
then understanding, using and measuring social capital is essential because it is widely
recognised, as seen above, as the enabling factor for these interactive learning processes and
closer co-operation and networking to occur at the regional level.
Social capital would then be both, what allows a regional innovation system to be knitted
together filling the missing links (bridging) between regional players and institutions active
in the R&TD field and the “oil” that makes the (regional innovation) system run smoothly
and progressively faster. Thus accelerating the transformation of knowledge into innovation and
regional competitiveness.
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If social capital is mainly a question of building cooperation, public-private in particular, and
trust among regional stakeholders that activate interactive learning and knowledge flows within
a regional innovation system, then one way in which public policy could strengthen regional social
capital would be to:
Provide an institutional framework for regional stakeholders to meet (a relational infras-
tructure), to get to know, understand each other and approach their agendas (incentives for
networking) and develop a common vision on the basis of shared interests by providing them with
a common task—challenge in the form of an innovation strategy—whose outcomes, in the form of
action plans and projects, might be shared by all participants in a (plus sum) win win situation.
Thus invest in an interactive strategic planning process as a means for building social capital,
in which the public sector provides the financial incentives and the institutional framework that
facilitate regional stakeholders co-operate on the basis of trust and reciprocity.
In conclusion, availability of social capital and good regional governance are key to regional
development efforts and policies in the knowledge-based economy. Those regions that are capable
of building social capital and establish and operate good governance structures, based on public-
private cooperation and inter-institutional coordination, are likely to be much more cost-efficient in
the use of regional policy monies. They will also be much better placed to build a knowledge-based
economic development path for their regional economy.
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ANTONI KUKLIÑSKI
TOWARDS A NEW MODEL
OF REGIONAL POLICY
Introduction1
In this paper I will try to outline 3 theses2:
1) In the experiences of the XX century the model of socially minded regional policy—was the
dominating phenomenon.
2) In the experiences of XXI century the model of globally minded regional policy will be the
dominating phenomenon.
3) The transformation from the old to the new model is taking place in the great Sturm und
Drang Periode of the years 1980–2020.
This historical turning point can be described as a quartet of mutually interrelated transitions:
— from Fordism to Post Fordism
— from Modernism to Post Modernism
— from the Keynesian Welfare State to the Schumpeterian Workfare State
— from industrial to information society
These transformations are embedded in the processes of globalization3 which are changing
very deeply the global competitive arena4 and the relative position of Europe in the landscape of
the XXI century5.
In the latest publication of the European Commission we find the following charismatic
formulation6:
1 This paper is a follow up of my short presentation in the framework of the last panel of the Ostuni
Conference—Rethinking Regional Development Policies. The role of social capital in promoting competitivness in less
favoured regions, Ostuni, Italy July 2nd–5th 2003.
I am very grateful to dr Mikel Landabaso for the inducement to prepare this paper. Naturally all the weaknesses
of this paper are related only to the responsibility of the author.
2 A. Kukliñski, Regional Policy and the Information Society. Third EU/CEEC Information Society Forum, Brussels
October 9th–10th 1997.
3 Compare: W. Krull, debates on Issues of our Common Future. Velbruck Wissenschaft, Gottingen 2000.
H. Bünz, A. Kukliñski, (eds) Globalization. Experiences and prospects. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Warsaw 2001.
4 Compare: J. Guinet, National Systems for Financing Innovations, OECD 1995.
5 P. Lang, Union européenne et globalization des echanges. Acces International, Brest 2002
A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds) Europe in the perspective of global change. Polish Association for the Club of Rome.
Warsaw 2003.
6 European Commission, Third European Report on Science and Technology Indicators. Towards the Knowledge-
Based Economy. Brussels 2003.
Compare also: J. Delors, Les responsibilities mondiales de l”Europe. Acces International, Brest 2002.
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“Europe is facing a crucial period in its history. It is confronted with a number of major, and
sometimes very conflicting, challenges and choices, and the various paths it decides to follow will
crucially affect the future shape of European society and its role to the world.”
* * *
“Europe’s leaders already acknowledge hat the transition towards a knowledge-based economy
involves a fundamental structural change, and that all the challenges facing Europe need to be
reconsidered in the light of this new paradigm. At the Lisbon European Council of March 2000,
they adopted a new strategic goal to transform the Union by 2010 into ‘the most competitive
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’. However, in this transition to a knowledge-based
economy, Europe is already lagging somewhat behind the US, and can learn a lot from the US
experience. The aim should not be to imitate the US, but rather to seek to define the European
way to the knowledge-based economy. As the Lisbon Conclusions state: ‘The Union must shape
these changes in a manner consistent with its own values and concepts of society’.”
The challenge of the new paradigm must be recognized not only in the terms of verbal
declarations but also in the terms of a deep transformation of the institutional structures
and systems of policies designed and implemented in the framework of the European Union.
In this intellectual and pragmatic climate we are trying to outline the following topical sequence
of this paper.
I. The XX century as the golden age of a socially minded regional policies
II. The transformation of regional policies and the emerging model of globally minded
regional policies
III. The region as a framework for development of knowledge based economy and
knowledge based society
IV. The new model and perception of regional governance
V. The special role of social capital
VI. The new model of cohesion policies
VII. Regional policy as an instrument of transformation of the European space
VIII. The research priorities
IX. The intellectual equipment of the new model
Naturally this outline is not a comprehensive vision of all most important problems related to
the transition from the old to the new model of regional policies. I hope however that even this
modest inducement will be useful in our theoretical reflections and pragmatic discussions.
I. The XX century as the golden age of socially minded
regional policies
The model of socially minded regional policy was developed by the industrial society and by
the welfare state. Two ideological and pragmatic principles were incorporated in the construction
of the Keynesian Welfare State:
— the principle of full employment and
— principle of social justice
These two principles were applied not only to the sphere of interpersonal relations but also
to the interpretation of the regional scene—and especially to the relations between strong and
weak regions.
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The Doctrine of Diminishing Interregional Disparities (D.D.I.D.) was generally accepted as
the theoretical and pragmatic foundation in the broad domains of regional policies and regional
planning. The essence of this Doctrine may be formulated as follows:
For political, social, moral and economic reasons the society and the state should not
tolerate such movements of the spontaneous market forces which generate and multiply long-term
disparities between more and less developed regions.
The basic framework of this model was formulated in Europe and North America in the
middle thirties—as an reaction to the tragedy of the Great Depression. The rapid diffusion of
this model in the global scale took place in the years 1950–80. The most comprehensive analysis
of this model was presented in the UNRISD—Mouton regional Planning Series (12 volumes)
published in the years 1971–847. This model was absorbed and transformed in an innovative way
by the consecutive incarnations of the European Union in the last decades of the XX century. This
model was an important inspiration for the European Union in the design and implementation of
cohesion policies related to selected countries and selected regions.
In 2001 The European Commission has published8 a splendid monument of conventional
wisdom presenting the experiences and prospects in the field of cohesion policies. I would like to
outline a view representing a critical approach in the framework of non conventional wisdom. In
this perspective the cohesion policy has four features.
It is a structural policy, a mechanistic policy an introvertic policy and a fragmentaristic policy.
The structuralism of this policy is related to the assumption that the increase in the
cohesion of the European Union is achieved via the implementation of the doctrine of diminishing
international and interregional disparities.
The mechanistic character of the cohesion policy is related to the construction of a clearly
defined system of strictly defined quantitative indicators incorporating such and not other
fragments of European space. The advantage of this system is its clarity and objectivity. The
disadvantage is the stiffness of the system in which a region meeting the criteria of selection in
de facto terms cannot be excluded from the system even in case of long term consecutive practice
of obvious waste of structural founds. In this situation some weak regions can de facto represent
a view that the situation of the lagging behind region is better then the situation of the catching
up region. The success of the catching up region is at the same time the exclusion of this region
from the system of cohesion policies which in practical terms means the loss of a permanent
stream of income “internalized” by the demoralized elites of the given weak region. This is the
dilemma of lagging behind versus catching up regional psychology.
Introvertic character of the cohesion policy is explained by the assumption that the
implementation of DDID is a more important challenge than the challenge of global competitiveness.
The fragmentaristic character of cohesion policy is related to the fact that this policy
is embracing only some fragments of the European space losing the holistic perspective of the
totality of this space as a fragment of the global space.
Presenting these critical comments I am not forgetting that in the perspective of conventional
wisdom the cohesion policy is a very great achievement of the European Union of the XX century.
7 Compare: A. Kukliñski, Regional Development—Regional Policies—Regional Planning. Problems and Issues.
Regional Studies, Volume 4, 1970, Perganon Press.
A. Kukliñski, General History of Regional Policies. A Proposal of a World Wide Comparative Study (in:) A.
Kukliñski and J.G. Lambooy (eds), Dilemmas in Regional Policy, Amsterdam, Mouton 1983, pp. 13–23.
A. Kukliñski, Regional Policies—Experiences and Prospects. International Social Science Journal, UNESCO, May
1987, No 112.
8 European Commission, Unity, solidarity, diversity for Europe, its people and its territory. Second Report on
Economic and Social Cohesion, Volume 1 and 2, Brussels 2001.
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II. The transformation of regional policy and the emerging model
of globally minded regional policy
The Sturm und Drang Periode of the last 25 years has produced an intellectual and pragmatic
climate of constant erosion of the foundations of socially minded regional policy. This process of
erosion found a constructive counterpart in the process of creation of a new model of globally
minded regional policies well grasped in the title of a recent volume—“Regions, globalization and
the knowledge based economy”9.
The region must be a efficient actor on the global scene. This is the regional “to be or not
to be”. In this situation the globally minded regional policy is the only one possible choice in the
conditions of the XXI century.
III. The region as a framework for the development of knowledge
based economy and knowledge based society10
The Lisbon Agenda taken seriously and realistically is a great inducement to build up a new
model of regional policy for Europe, the model of globally minded regional policy. In this context
two types of interaction could be observed:
1) the region as a stimulating environment for the development of KBE and KBS,
2) the KBE and KBS as a driving force for the sustainable development of the region
The virtuous circle of mutual enforcement of KBE and KBS is also very important. I like the
formulation concerning the knowledge economy growth into the knowledge society and vice versa.
Let us quote in this context the hypothesis formulated by P.A. David and D. Foray11:
“The knowledge economy’s growth into the knowledge society hinges on the proliferation of
knowledge-intensive communities. These communities are basically linked to scientific, technical,
and business professions or projects and, as said, are characterized by their strong knowledge
production and reproduction capabilities, a public or semi-public space for learning and exchange,
and an intensive use of information technologies. Only when increasing numbers of communities
displaying those very characteristics are formed by citizens, users, and the uninitiated being
brought together by a shared interest in a given subject, will the knowledge society really begin
to develop. But the challenges outlined above are going to be all the harder to meet.”
The follow up of this line of thinking we find in the challenging formulation of S. Boisier 12:
“Sociedad del conocimiento, conocimiento social y gestion territorial”. I am convinced that the
European Commission should organize a pathbreaking conference—“The Lisbon Agenda and the
new model of regional policy for Europe”.
9 J.H. Dunning (ed.), Regions, Globalization and the Knowledge—Based Economy. Oxford University Press, 2002.
10 Compare the thought provoking contribution of M. Landabaso and J.M. Rousseau, Invention, creation: les etapes
decisives (in:) Acces International, Brest 2002.
11 P.A. David, D. Foray, An introduction to the economy of the knowledge society. I.S.S.J. No 171, March 2002.
12 S. Boisier, Sociedad del conocimiento, conocimiento social y gestion territorial. Revista del Cesla, No 4, Warsaw
2002.
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IV. The new model and perception of regional governance
In the last decades we found a general practice to replace the concept of regional government
by a broader concept of regional governance13 which inter alia is an integration of some elements
of the classical doctrine of government and the new doctrines of management.
In the classical regional development doctrine, the leading analogy of the region was a quasi
state. Now we should consider regions also, or first of all, as a quasi-firms. This observation
may be found in the path breaking paper of S. Boisier 14 introducing the concept of regional
management in the following context:
“A vision of the region as a quasi-firm means applying some corporate procedures to the
region mutatis mutandis, particularly those of the ‘large corporation’, one of the few contemporary
organizations that uses the modern concept of planning effectively.”
This point is very well taken. The region of the XXI century must internalize and develop
the important experience of transnational corporations in the field of strategic planning15. This
internalization is very important from the point of view of the construction of the new model
of regional policy. Maybe a proposal could be considered to organize jointly with the European
Commission and OECD a conference on regional governance as an element of the model of the
new regional policy.
V. The special role of social capital
There is no doubt that social capital should be recognized as an crucial element in the
construction and implementation of the new model of regional policy. Let as quote an important
fragment of the Ostuni consensus16:
“First, it was agreed social capital is especially relevant for regional development. In this
context social capital is a market-based social exercise based on trust, shared norms, and
institutions. Second, it facilitates cooperation within and among groups as well as enlarges
a capacity for collective action leading to mutual benefits. Third, it improves collective processes of
learning and constitutes a key element of knowledge creation, diffusion and transfer—all processes
critical for innovation and competitiveness. Finally, social capital cements value-based networks
stimulating successful regional clusters as well as regional innovation strategies and policies. The
issue is especially important for the less-favoured regions that have weak social capital and little
understanding of science and knowledge, yet face fundamental economic, technological and social
change.”
The Ostuni post-conference volume will create a rich and comprehensive documentation of
this point of view.
13 Compare: OECD, Governance of the XXI century. Future Studies, Paris 2001.
Compare: H.J. Braczyk, M. Heidenreich, Regional Governance Structures in a Globalized World, (in:) A. Kukliñski
(ed.) European Space—Baltic Space—Polish Space. Part One, Hannover 1997.
14 S. Boisier, The Elusive Goal of Regional Development: Between the Black Box and the Political Agenda. Essays
Series Document 95/30, Latin American and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning, Santiago de Chile,
March 1997.
15 Compare: A. Kukliñski, World Society of Planology (in:) A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds), op.cit.
16 Ostuni Consensus, The Ostuni Conference, op.cit.
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 228 (228)
228 Antoni Kukliñski
VI. The new model of cohesion policies
The new model of regional policies is creating a strong demand for a new model of cohesion
policies. Let us try to outline five elements of this model.
The first element is the network vision of cohesion as a system of flows of persons,
commodities, and innovations which are the direct indicators in the cohesion of European space.
This is a much more difficult and complicated way to measure cohesion as a process of integration
of the European continent into one organic totality having a clear identity in global scale. We have
to start time and money intensive studies analyzing the development of the cohesion of European
space defined in this way. This studies will inter alia answer the question how quick is the
disappearance of iron curtain 17 which has deformed so deeply the European space of the XX
century. This is the matter not only in analytical terms but also and maybe first of all a new
system promoting the cohesion of European space in the framework of institutional solutions
created by the European Union.
The second element is the organic vision of cohesion policy which is building the unity
of Europe on the foundation of the creative interpretation of the immense European wealth
expressed in the diversity of European culture and economy. The organic cohesion policy will
support the endogenous activities of the weak regions to overcome their weakness and achieve
a new position in European and global scale. The organic cohesion policy should bring salvation
to those regions which really want to achieve the salvation in the sense of overcoming the very
heavy limitation created by the part experiences. This is the shift from lagging behind to catching
up psychology. A documented and reliable will of the region will be the basis for the decision of
the European Commission. The mechanisms of automatic support of all regions which fit into the
framework of established quantitative criteria will simply vanish.
The third element is the holistic vision of cohesion embracing the whole territory of the
European Union and in more distant future the whole territory of Europe from Atlantic to the
Urals. The main historical task of this cohesion policy is the elimination of the developmental
gap—separating the European center from the European periphery. This is the most fundamental
problem of the cohesion policy of the XXI century18.
The fourth element is the extravertic vision of cohesion policy which is constantly trying
to answer the question how to improve the position of our continent in the dynamic pattern
of ruthless darvinic global competition especially in the framework of the strategic triangle
America—Europe—Asia. In this context we should formulate a thesis of global cohesion of the
XXI century. In this cohesion Europe will be not transformed into a continent of new periphery in
relation to America and Asia. The spectrum of the new periphery was consciously or unconsciously
present in the minds of European leaders formulating the Lisbon Agenda19.
The fifth element is the vision of the cohesion policy as a long term strategic vision. In
the discussions and decisions related to the new cohesion policy it is not enough to apply the
framework of medium term thinking. We have to use the framework of long term thinking for
example for the years 2006–2025. Only in this context we can build up a grand vision of a real
cohesion of the European space.
* * *
The XXI century will constantly create new European and global situations not known
in the experiences of the XX century. Therefore we need a new cohesion policy which will
17 A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza, op.cit, p. 144–146.
18 A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza, op.cit, p. 145.
19 European Commission, Third Report, op.cit.
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not be a continuation of the cohesion policy known from the experiences of the XX century.
The power of inertia of the old cohesion policy is very strong. But in same place we must
start the movement in the direction of a new policy—“In principio erat verbum”.
VII. Regional policy as an effective instrument of transformation
of the European space
The evaluation of regional policy must in each case answer the fundamental question—how
effective is this policy as an instrument incorporated into the processes transforming the European
space.
This question should be answered in relation to the experiences of the XX century. This
question must be incorporated into the hypothesis concerning the transformation of the European
space in the XXI century.
VIII. The research priorities
It is necessary to build up a list of fundamental problems which should be discussed via
theoretical reflection, empirical studies and pragmatic recommendations. Maybe the following list
of problems can be regarded as a starting point of our thinking in this field:
1) The measurement and evaluation of the efficiency of the model of socially minded regional
policies designed and implemented in the framework of the experiences of the XX century.
2) The Lisbon Agenda as a stimulating environment for the processes which create the model of
globally minded regional policies of the XXI century.
3) The role of the new perception of governance in the development of the new model of regional
policy.
4) Social capital as a new approach to incorporate the social dimension into the new model of
regional policy.
5) The new cohesion policy in the framework of the new model of regional policy.
6) The holistic character of the new model of regional policy and the challenge of the
center-periphery gap in Europe.
7) The regional problem and regional policy in Europe in comparative perspective—The Atlantic
Regional Policy Forum (see annex).
Naturally this list of problems in not comprehensive or unique. I hope however that the
evaluation and development of this list will lead to the formulation of a Grand Research,
Conference and Publication Programme which will create a valid intellectual equipment for the
new model of regional policy.
IX. The intellectual equipment of the new model
We have an immense wealth of publications and contributions related to the analyses and
evaluation of the old model of regional policies. The intellectual equipment of the new model is in
the process of statu nascendi 20. But we have a long way to go to reach the goal of intellectual
20 Compare: D. Christopoulos, Regional Behavior. Ashgate Publishers, 2000.
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and pragmatic satisfaction in this field. The simple answer that the methodological and conceptual
apparatus of the new regionalism21 will do the job—is wrong. The new regionalism is definitely
an exciting intellectual venture but it is still weak in pragmatic dimensions. Nevertheless the new
regionalism can be seen as a potential input into the intellectual equipment of the new model of
regional policy.
Conclusion
Europe must assume the role of the grand global player of the XXI century. This is not
an option—it is a necessity22. The European regions are expected to create crucial contributions
promoting the global role of our continent23. In this context the globally minded regional policy
is the only rational choice based on long term strategic and geopolitical considerations.
This should be our final motivation in all activities related to the design and implementation
of the model of globally minded regional policies.
£añsk, July 26th 2003.
See also the two contributions of S. Boisier quoted in this paper.
21 Compare: B. Greenslade, Les regions un lien vital pour l’Europe future. Acces International, Brest 2002.
A.E.G. Jonas, K. Ward, A World of regionalisms? Journal of Urban Affairs, Volume 24, No 4/2002.
S.M. Wheeler, The New Regionalism. Key characteristics of an Emerging Movement APA. Journal Volume 68, No
3, Summer 2002.
A. G¹sior-Niemiec, Europeanization and Myth—making. (New) Regionalism in Poland. Warsaw 2003.
22 Compare: H. Bünz ,A. Kukliñski, (eds), op.cit., p. 286
23 Compare: J. Chobert, Europe et mondialisation: le role de villes et regions. Acces International, Brest 2002.
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Annex
ANTONI KUKLIÑSKI
ATLANTIC REGIONAL POLICY FORUM
A Memorandum
I.
In broad Braudelian perspectives Atlantic could be seen as Mare Nostrum of the Western
Civilisation of the XXI century.
In this perspective new approaches and initiatives could be formulated in order to promote
the interaction and co-operation of social sciences representing the experiences and methodologies
developed in Europe, Latin America and North America.
II.
This creative interaction could be developed in the framework of three dimensions:
• Methodological
• Empirical
• Pragmatic (policy dimension)
In this spirit I would like to propose to consider the establishment of an Atlantic Regional
Policy24 Forum as a scene of comparative reflection on the development of regional policies
in Europe, Latin America and North America with particular concentration on the historical
and prospective experiences of the years 1950–2025.
24 Compare: A. Kukliñski, Regional Development—Regional Policies—Regional Planning. Problems and Issues,
Regional Studies, Volume 4, 1970, Perganon Press.
A. Kukliñski, General History of Regional Policies. A Proposal of a World Wide Comparative Study (in:) A.
Kukliñski and J. G. Lambooy (eds), Dilemmas in Regional Policy, Amsterdam, Mouton 1983, pp. 13–23.
A. Kukliñski, Regional Policies—Experiences and Prospects. International Social Science Journal, UNESCO, May
1987, No 112.
A. Kukliñski, Regional Policy and the Information Society. Third EU/CEEC Information Society Forum, Brussels,
9–10 October 1997.
A. Kukliñski, W. Or³owski (eds) The knowledge based economy. The global challenges of the 21st century. Volume
IV. Science and Government Series. State Committee for Scientific Research Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2000.
A. Kukliñski (ed.) The knowledge based economy. The European Challenges of the 21st Century. Volume V. Science
and Government Series. State Committee for Scientific Research Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2000.
A. Kukliñski, H. Bünz (eds) Globalization. Experiences and prospects. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Warsaw 2001.
A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds) Europe in the perspective of global change. Polish Association for the Club of Rome.
Warsaw 2003.
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III.
The proposed Regional Policy Forum would be a scene of creative interactions of three
communities—the academic community, the political community and the business community.
The activities of this Forum will be supported by a comprehensive long-term Programme
(research—Conferences—Publications).
IV.
In this Programme the following topics could enter into the scope of analytical reflection and
pragmatic policy oriented activities:
1. The global panorama of the XXI century. The Atlantic versus Pacific Community.
2. The growth and decline of the centre-periphery gaps dividing the Atlantic Community. The
Atlantic Core versus The Atlantic Periphery
3. The integration of the Atlantic Community. The integration of Europe and the integration of
North and Latin America.
4. The role of the visible and invisible hand in the transformation of space in Europe, North
America and Latin America. This could be the set of general and monographic studies related
to mega-spaces (Russia, USA, Canada, Brazil), macro-spaces (Ukraine, Poland, Germany,
France, UK, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Chile), micro-spaces (The Netherlands, Hungary, Ireland,
Denmark). This network of monographic studies will cover the examples of 20–30 countries
representing three continents.
5. The changing network of global metropolitan regions reflecting the role of the three continents
in the global information society.
6. The emergence, development and transformation of regional policies in the mega, macro and
micro-spaces in Europe, North America and Latin America.
7. The European Union as an innovative machinery transforming the individual European macro
and micro-spaces into the a new phenomenon—the European mega-space. The differentia
specifica of the new European mega-space in relation to the mega-spaces created in the XIX
and XX century (USA, Canada, Russia and Brazil)
8. Towards an Atlantic Model of Regional Policy in the XXI century.
9. The role of regions in the development of the Atlantic Civilisation of the XXI century.
V.
The discussion on the new future of regional policies in Europe should be incorporated into
a broader comparative framework created by the proposed Atlantic Regional Policy Forum, which
will be at the same time and excellent example how to build basis of intellectual and pragmatic
co-operation in the Atlantic Community of three continents.
VI.
This memorandum was presented in Dresden—May 21st 2003 in the Institut für ökolo-
gische Raumentwicklung. I am very grateful to Professor Bernhard Müller for the friendly
and creative development and promotion of this initiative which is very important from the
point of view of the emergence of a new model of regional policies.
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REGIONS AS LABORATORIES
OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?
In a attempt to evaluate and discuss cross-border cooperation in Europe, the author in the
1990’s has put forward six theses (Drewe, 1996).
1. Cross-border cooperation is essentially a voluntary action.
2. Socio-economic complementarity is a key factor in cross-border cooperation.
3. Without a strategic vision and strategic projects there is no real cross-border cooperation.
4. Given the spatial proximity of the regions involved, cross-border cooperation requires a common
spatial planning perspective.
5. The creation or reinforcement of an innovative milieu is a necessary though not a sufficient
condition for successful cross-border cooperation.
6. Be that as it may, cross-border regions are (remain) eminent laboratories of European
integration.
It is thesis 6 that has been chosen as title of the present article, however, mind the question
mark. Because in order to be or become a real laboratory, a number of conditions must be fulfilled
in border regions.
1. Cross-border cooperation, a voluntary action
Cross-border cooperation in Europe today has proliferated thanks to the European Union’s
program of Interreg. This holds for the 15 member states, their internal boundaries as well their
external boundaries with non-EU countries (as shown in figure 1).
With the present enlargement this proliferation will be further intensified. From 2006 onward,
cross-border cooperation will be funded under Objective 3 of the Structural Funds. The present
third edition of Interreg is made up of 3 strands: cross-border cooperation (A), transnational
cooperation (B) and interregional cooperation (C). According to the EU ‘crossborder cooperation
between adjacent regions aims to develop cross-border social and economic centres through
common development strategies’.
Does this proliferation testify to an increasing voluntarism or is the explanation rather banal
with frontier regions being eligible for cofinancing under the Interreg program? It depends on
how one does proceed, whether the starting point is the cofinancing or the development strategy
of a given border region:
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This is a matter of ex-post evaluation. One would have expected an evaluation of Interreg
I before engaging in Interreg II and of the latter before adopting the third edition of this program
(an evaluation of Interreg II has only become available in 2003 half way through Interreg III).
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 235 (235)
Regions as Laboratories of European Integration? 235
Moreover, the same holds for the transition from Interreg to cross-border cooperation as part of
Objective 3 from 2006 onward. Each time the budget has increased. Decision making clearly suffers
from a lack of transparency. Voluntary—according to Webster’s—means ‘proceeding from the will:
produced in or by an act of choice (action)’. The real test of this is provided by cross-border
cooperation without Interreg funding and cooperation that continues once the funding stops. The
question however is whether the expost evaluation allows for detecting ‘bad practice’ and whether
the regions in question are excluded from further funding.
2. Socio-economic complementarity, a key factor
Cooperation is the opposite of competition. But in order to be durable, each of the partners
must profit from cooperation. The socio-economic position of the partners may be strong, medium
or weak. Weak may coincide with eligibility for Structural Funds interventions (under one of the
old Objectives 1, 2 or 5b or the new Objectives 1 or 2). Anyhow, the socioeconomic position is
closely linked to the issue of economic and social cohesion (see European Commission, 2004): with
special emphasis on the newcomers to the European Union.
Focusing on the extreme of strong and weak, three combinations can be distinguished:
strongstrong, weak–weak, strong–weak. None of these is exactly stable. The first two are prone to
competition. How are, for example, two weak frontier regions dealing with candidates for foreign
direct investment? The combination of strong and weak regions tends two breed dependence of
the latter, suffering from a ‘big-brother syndrome’. Let us take as an illustration the Euroregion
of five regions (figure 2).
It is a very complex mix of strong, medium and weak regions if performance is measured in
terms of per capital GDP and unemployment rate (table 1).
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Table 1
Economic performance EUROREGION of five 2001 / 2002: two main indicators
Regiona GDP / head (PPS) Unemployment Rate
2001 2002
U 15 = 100 EU 15 = 100
Rég. Bruxelles-Cap. / Brussel Hfdst. Gewest 217 186
Vlaams Gewest 106 63
Région Wallonne 77 135
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 83 172
Kent 90 54
a NUTS level 1 in italics; Kent = level 2 region
Source: European Commission (2004), 188, 192, 198.
One might question the Euroregion as a case of cross-border cooperation (Heddebaut, 2001).
More important, however, is the general question of achieving a durable cooperation. It is a matter
of identifying complementarities among the partners. A so-called SWOT analysis can help with this.
This type of analysis deals with the (internal) strengths and weaknesses of the partner regions
as well as the (external) threats and opportunities. The latter are (partly) linked to globalization.
If strengths and weaknesses and, to a lesser extent, threats and opportunities are not equally
distributed among frontier regions the trade-offs become possible which is another word for
complementarities. A SWOT analysis could focus for example on the areas listed as priority
actions for Interreg III: urban, rural (incl. coastal) development; entrepreneurship, SMSEs, local
development; labor market integration and social inclusion; RTDI, culture, info/communications
networks; environment and (renewable) energy; transport infrastructure; institutional capacity
building. Of course, this list is not exhaustive and one can select priorities.
3. Strategic vision and strategic projects
Unlike a cross-border cooperation ‘inspired’ by the availability of cofinancing at the European
level, it is preferable to start from a strategic vision and strategic projects. This requires
a strategic planning approach, for example, mixed scanning as shown in figure 3.
The essence of mixed scanning is the oscillation between vision (aims) and strategic projects
(feasibility, ex-ante research). Without a strategic vision there are no strategic projects, but only
ad hoc projects. And without strategic projects a vision remains an abstract planning exercise. As
far as the analysis is concerned, the SWOT analysis can provide a focus, not only as a way of
establishing cross-border complementarities. Translating for example priority actions for Interreg
III into strategic projects and investigating their feasibility, one can focus on the relevant SWs
and OTs instead of engaging in an analysis ‘to whom it may concern’. Another potential source of
inspiration are good practice experiences elsewhere in Europe.
Commission européenne (2002) lists examples from the domains of transport and telecom-
munication; environment; economic cooperation; training and employment; culture, tourism and
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information; public administration. Whether a project classifies as good practice can only be
answered after an ex-post evaluation. It should be noted that evaluation is an integral part of
mixed scanning, that is the triplet of ex ante, monitoring and ex post.
4. A common spatial planning perspective
In 1999, the Informal Council of Ministers responsible for Spatial Planning has adopted the
European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), adding a territorial dimension to sectoral
European policies. (Commission européenne, 1999).Although the EU does not have a mandate for
spatial planning, the ESDP indicates directions for spatial planning in border regions. In fact,
cross-border corporation is a means to concretize and may help to implement the strategic vision
of the Informal Council of Ministers of achieving a balanced and sustainable development of the
territory of the EU. The ESDP lists policy aims and options that can serve as guidelines for
a common spatial planning perspectives in border regions:
— polycentric spatial development and a new urban-rural relationship,
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— parity of access to infrastructure and knowledge,
— wise management of the natural and cultural heritage.
Thesis 4 can be illustrated by cross-border agglomerations, in particular by a French initiative
that has started in 1997 (MOT, 2003; see also <http://www.espaces-transfrontaliers.org>). For an
overview see figure 4.
In terms of practical experience there are five outstanding cases: the French-Belgian ‘Métropole
Lilloise’, the European Development Pole (PED) of Longwy, the French-Swiss agglomeration around
Geneva, the Bask Eurocity and, finally, the Eurodistrict Strasbourg-Ortenau.
An early example of a common spatial planning perspective is given by the French-Belgian
‘Métropole Lilloise’, (COPIT, 1994). Figure 5 refers.
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COPIT stands for a cross-border cooperation of intermunicipal bodies (‘intercommunales’): one
from France and two each from Flanders and Wallonia. Five question have been put forward by
COPIT (1994, 12). They seem to be relevant to planning in other border regions, too:
• Do to think that the emerging French-Belgian metropolis could be a reality in 2020?
• Are you ready to engage in a common reflection on the development of this metropolis?
• Does this metropolis possess poles of excellence to be valorized, poles between which
complementarities should be stimulated and on which a cross-border strategy can be based?
What role do networks play in this strategy?
• As to these strategic questions how do the partners of COPIT want to work? How to organize
this process?
• Finally, in order to complete this strategic dimension by the everyday dimension of urbanism:
do the partners of COPIT wish to organize them to improve their dealings with decisions on
urbanism with a cross-border impact, to improve the exchange of information and to listen to
each other?
A key concept in this is that of intercity networks which comprises four interacting elements
(Drewe, 1994).
— the complementary qualities of the constituent cities;
— the actual flows of goods, persons and information between them;
— the physical links or material infrastructure (this is where, for example, where Trans-European
Network projects come in);
— the immaterial infrastructure, that is various forms of organizational links allowing for
consultation and the exchange of information.
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5. Innovative milieux
What is exactly an innovative milieu or environment and why is it such an important strategic
project? Innovative milieux, in brief, are based on the synergy of business firms (sometimes in
particular of SMSEs), knowledge centers (universities, research institutes and other institutions
involved in R&D) a territorial authorities (cities and regions). The concept ties in with work of
‘GREMI, the Groupe de Recherche Européen sur les Milieux Innovateurs’ from 1986 onward:
<http://www.unine.ch/irer/Gremi/accueil.htm>. Milieux are about local interactions which promote
technological innovation.
The group has focused on case studies and one the first cases revealed as good practice has
been a border region to wit the Arc Jurassien (cf Maillat and Schneiter, 1994). Throughout its
work the researchers of GREMI have emphasized the importance of proximity: human resources
linked to a territory; a complex network of rather informal contacts between local actors;
a synergy anchored to a common (political) culture. Milieux are about local interactions which
promote technological innovation: new or improved goods, services and processes. To produce these
innovations the relevant economic knowledge goes beyond ‘technology’. It also comprises design,
management, organization, marketing, logistics, administration and finance (see e.g. Province of
Flevoland, 1996).
Why have innovative environments all of a sudden become of primary importance? They are
not exactly new and one might ask why it took the EU so long to discover the ‘Europe of
Knowledge’ or the knowledge-based economy for that matter. Being on the European agenda
since Lisbon is only one of the reasons why milieux have increased in importance. There two
more reasons, one of them is linked to globalization, the other to the current spatial distribution
of innovative capabilities. How can a border or any other region cope with globalization? Scenarios
can play an important part in the management of uncertainties helping to find levers of action.
Recently, a French group has developed scenarios with regard to networks of ICT, energy and
transport, embedded in global scenarios (Crozet and Musso, 2003). A first scenario, called Global,
introduces the external shock of globalization. One way of reacting to this shock is described
by the so-called Global scenario depicting a dual world of transnational top companies and local
innovative milieux with the latter making all the difference with regard to competitiveness. As
to the distribution of innovative capacities across the EU territory, ‘islands of innovation’ still
exist (European Commission, 2002 a). ‘Various indicators’.—the relative scale of R&D expenditure,
employment in research activities and the number of patent applications, in particular—suggest
that there is a wide gap in innovative capacity between the strongest regions in central parts of
the Union and others. (According to the latest figures, 8 of the 213 NUTS 2 regions in the present
EU account for around a quarter of total R&D expenditure in the Union and 31 are responsible
for half.) There is a similarly wide disparity between the accession countries and the EU 15
average and, within the former between capital city regions and others’ (European Commission,
2004, xii-xiii).
It should be noted, however, that the statistically available regional indicators stress the input
rather than the output of innovations. Be that as it may, the disparities in innovative capacity
runs counter to ‘parity of access to knowledge’. The development of innovative capabilities is part
of ‘a rich-get richer phenomenon’ (Barabási, 2002; Drewe, 2004). But ‘how do latecomers make it
in a world where only the rich get richer’? The Union has developed a variety of programs, in
particular concentrating on latecomers among the regions as well as SMSEs. The rich can take
care of themselves.
‘Regional programmes of innovative actions’—generally speaking—have three priorities:
• to encourage regional economies based on knowledge and technological innovation;
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• to stimulate the information society at the service of regional development;
• to strengthen regional identity and sustainable development (cf European Commission, 2002
b, 4)
The proof of the pudding, of course, is in the demand-led synergy of local actors. The creation
of an innovative milieu is essentially a social innovation (cf Klein and Fontan, 2003). What has been
said here about innovative environments holds for all regions in general, but needs to checked out
in particular for border regions in especial those involving new member states.
6. Outlook
What is, is possible. That is why success stories or good practice cases can provide important
reflections on border regions as laboratories of European integration. However, for example is no
proof. Whether a case qualifies as good practice depends as a matter of course on critical ex-post
evaluations. But the author of this article is entitled to nominate himself a few success stories:
• the International Scheldt Faculty (ISF) as a bottom-up, cross-border knowledge infrastructure
between the Zeeland and Flanders (Drewe,1998) It does not go without saying that centers
of higher education and research, companies and politicians join forces across a European
border.
• The EuroAirport Basel-Mulhouse-Freiburg. It is a cross-border airport with a trinational
function. It does not go without saying that a ‘big brother’ (Basel) accepts an airport
located on French territory with Switzerland not even being a member of the EU (see
<http://www.euroairport.com>).
• AVANTIS, the European Science and Business Park which is a joint venture of Aachen and
Heerlen. The park is also connected to knowledge centers in the larger euroregion of Meuse-
Rhine (with Maastricht and Liège). It does not go without saying that competition with regard
to industrial location is replaced by (cross-border) coperation and that this involves a strong
German partner and a relatively weaker Dutch partner (see <http://www.avantis.org>).
These three cases could be subject to a test in order to check on each of the five theses.
Maybe that the five conditions have a wider meaning, too. Problems of ‘cross-border’
cooperation may also exist within countries, say, between regions, between municipalities (within
agglomerations) or even between neighborhoods within cities. Moreover, there is another potential
field of application with a European dimension, that is transnational and interregional cooperation
(strands B and C of Interreg). The basic difference between these strands is the proximity of the
partners which is essential in cross-border cooperation and absent in interregional cooperation. In
the latter case a common spatial planning perspective (thesis 4) does not apply. Spatial planning
may also be important in the case of transnational cooperation, but in a different way from border
regions. Strand B is about ‘better integration within the Union through the formation of large
groups of European region.’ The relevant spatial planning framework in this case is provided by
the ESDP. Transnational and interregional cooperation can profit from ICT in general and the
Internet in particular. This also holds for adjacent regions. Hence the importance of positioning
the partners on the Internet infrastructure (see Drewe, 2002 for details).
The position of a given node or city on the European net depends, first of all, on the number
of direct, binary connections. Of course, the importance of links varies. To gain more insight into
the position of a node, the direct connections need to be weighted for their capacity or bandwidth.
And they need to be weighted for multiple paths, too. The latter depend on the proximity of
a node to an Internet exchange point. The more (peering) Internet service providers associated
with an exchange point, the more weight it pulls. The endowment with Internet infrastructure
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is also a rich-get-richer phenomenon favoring capital city regions (Drewe, 2004). But there are
ways in which non-hub border regions can strengthen their position. Take for example the
internet exchange points in France and in the Netherlands. International data flows from a border
region usual travel via the dominant exchange points of respectively Paris and Amsterdam.
In order to lessen their dependence on these national hubs, some border regions in both
countries have created their own exchange points, specialized in cross-border flows of information
(see <http://www.ep.net/naps eu.html>). In concluding, a word about European integration which
we have assumed to be an aim worth striving for through cross-border cooperation. European
integration is subject to major uncertainties. The French group (Crozet and Musso, 2003) quoted
earlier as author of the Global and the Glocal scenario have developed five scenarios, the remaining
three of which are about the future of the EU:
— a strong, centralized Europe,
— a strong, subsidiary Europe (‘multisubsidiarities’),
— the return to the nation state.
The last of these scenarios means that Europe has failed. In that case one does not have to
worry about cross-border or any other cooperation for that matter. Competition will do.
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DANIELE IETRI
FRANCESCA SILVIA ROTA
THE ITALIAN MOSAIC
FACING COMPETITIVENESS AND INNOVATION
1. Introduction1
Towards the end of the 20th century, overall changes took place in the fields of economy and
politics inducing European governments to reflect on the future of the continent.
For the purpose of this article, we think it is significant to call attention to how these
changes contributed to arise competitiveness among territorial systems. From our point of view,
this competitiveness constitutes in fact a crucial challenge the globalization process issues to
territories (cities, regions, metropolitan systems), especially if we consider that the influence of
competition tends more and more to be described as an element exogenous to the enterprise that
can be related to the network of relationships characterizing the territory the business is located
in.
With reference to Europe, the competition is as common within the continent as it is between
Europe and the rest of the world, and it presents main challenges in the development and
promotion of a new European knowledge economy and society2.
In this paper, we will attempt to describe the way (better the ways) the Italian economic
system will face these challenges. Initially, we will provide a synthetic outline of the development
of industrialization in Italy over the past century, paying particular attention to the dialectics
between the facts and the representations of this historical process, and between the policies and
their outcomes. This statement will allow us to call attention to how a common representation of
the functioning of the Italian economic system, which is substantially based on a dualistic image of
the country, actually does not coincide with the diversity of development models that characterises
the Italian case. Some of these models will be thus analysed as “tesserae” composing the
Italian “mosaic”, stressing the advantages and disadvantages of this type of diversified production
system in relation to the challenges issued by competition and innovation. In particular, we will
implement the suggestions of Antoni Kukliñski 3 to reason on the contribution of self-governments
of autonomous or semi-autonomous region to the construction of the European knowledge society.
1 The paper is the result of the contributes of both the authors. As to the final drawing up of the work,
paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7 are to be attributed to Daniele Ietri, paragraphs 1, 2, 5 to Francesca Silvia Rota.
2 See: A. Kukliñski, Strong or Weak Europe—in this volume.
3 See: Kukliñski A., Europe—The Strategic Choices of the XXI Century. Seven Methodological Reflections—in this
volume.
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The characteristics of the Italian development models will be analysed from the interpretation of
the territory as the producer of knowledge.
2. Facts and representations
The decisions assumed by policy makers, as well as ’everyday life’ choices, are profoundly
influenced by representations. Before acting, subjects make different decisions according to their
interpretation of the decision context and the relations among phenomena. The larger the level of
sharing around a representation, the larger will be the belief that it coincides with realty, that is to
say, with the facts. Actually, by fact we mean anything that occurs: each action being carried out
or that has been carried out is a fact. Applied to the socio-economic context of a given territory,
an increase in the percentage points of the GDP is a fact; a variation in the unemployment rate
is a fact; the opening or closing of a plant are also facts. In other words facts are single events,
significant for the ongoing processes, that are described in their individuality, without contrasting
them to others.
The representation instead removes itself from the significance of the facts: it recombines
them within a certain interpretive framework through the identification of logical concatenations
of diverse natures. The representation can be also combined with a mental image, i.e. to the
reconstruction of a perception or sensation reproduced in absence of what originated it.
The representation can then remain concealed within the individual’s mind that generated it or
be transmitted or shared. Transmission occurs mostly in social sciences like economy, anthropology,
sociology, etc., where the analysis of regularities and of concatenations of events is proposed in
a narrative mode.
The representation as a narration is also at the base of policy planning: representations rather
than facts determine the choices made through policy instruments; furthermore, decisions made
by public administrations at all levels tend to be communicated through general images of the
future, “visions”, that are high-impact narrations. The result is that misleading representations can
lead to inappropriate decisions: this condition occurred for instance in the history of the Italian
industrialization process between the 1960’s and 1970’s, eventually contributing to the aggravation
of a unbalanced national development situation that has yet to be resolved.
3. From one to “Three Italies”: a brief history of the Italian indus-
trialization process and its representations
The reconstruction of the industrial dynamics that involved Italy from the beginning of the
1960’s cannot fail to include an analysis, no matter how synthetic, of the economic structure of
the country between the years before and after the Second World War.
During the 1950’s, census statistics demonstrated a concentration of industrial activity in
north-western Italy, especially in the northern area of Piedmont and Lombardy, with a notable
polarization in the cities of Turin and Milan, and in Liguria. The surrounding regions, like the
Valle d’Aosta, eastern and southern Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, and Emilia-Romagna, were instead
represented as a sort of extension of these main areas, characterised by less intense levels of
industrialization. Intermediate levels of industrialization were also identified in two Provinces of
central Italy (Ancona and Terni) and in Venezia-Giulia, in correspondence to the Province of
Trieste.
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This presence of industries and the resulting high level of employment in manufacturing
activities corresponded to an opposite situation in southern Italy and the Islands: the southern
regions of the country were in fact described as regions characterised by a substantially uniform
condition of industrial backwardness, except for certain peripheral urban centres like Naples and
Salerno.
The consequences of these contrasting representations even contributed to the exacerbation
of the gap between industrialized and non-industrialized regions, reinforcing the image of an Italy
divided in half, sustained by experts and politicians and apparently confirmed by statistical data4.
Halfway through the past century, the difficult situation of the southern regions and the
Islands became increasingly obvious: the extremely high levels of unemployment, the lack of
industrialization and the highly inefficient organization of landowners (based on a few extended
estates) that characterised this part of the country induced the Italian State to intervene directly
in support of the Mezzogiorno regions5. Initially, the enacted support actions tended to favour
sectors like agriculture, trades, and tourism6, via economic policies mostly following the theoretical
interpretations dominant at that time (mostly the polarization theory): although some geographers
were indicating a representation of Italian industrialization in terms of variety, the economists’
interpretations focussed on the simplified image of dualism. This dualistic interpretation was not
due mainly to socio-economic studies, but rather to the use of macroeconomic models founded
on the contrast between categories like dynamic or stagnant sectors, big or small businesses.
In a world represented by “simple” categories, the belief in the existence of a single possible
development model, in which the territory was commonly assumed as a static support for the
subjects’ actions, spread largely. The proper development model was thus identified with the
“winning” one of the more industrialized regions: from a policy point of view this meant the
“simple” repetition of northern-style production system in the backwards southern regions.
Industrial and infrastructural investments were therefore directed to industrial nuclei and
development areas, producing a concentration of investments in urban agglomerations and along
coastal routes7.
4. The emerging of the Third Italy
With the 1970’s, the development model affirmed by the mainstream economic theory entered
in crisis. As soon as 1967, the geographer Calogero Muscarà8 clearly identified a three-way
division of the Italian industrial territory, contradicting the dualism supported by economists:
— North-western Italy, characterised by income and industrialization levels higher than the
national average and relatively low employment in the agricultural sector;
4 Muscarà, C. “Geografia della trasformazione italiana: dal ‘miracolo economico’ alla ripolarizzazione dello spazio
geografico”, in Valessi, G. (ed.) L’Italia geoeconomica, Utet, Torino, 1987, pp. 123–177.
5 By Mezzogiorno we mean the southern area of the country that, in Italian political tradition, was the object of
specific State interventions known as “Interventi per il Mezzogiorno”.
6 See Muscarà, C., op. cit.
7 Only a little more than 20 percent of the Mezzogiorno territory was involved in the economic-political
interventions of the Italian government. Almost all of the investments were furthermore concentrated in coastal areas,
reinforcing the image, proposed by Rossi Doria in 1956, of a territorial organization of southern development based on
the contrast between the enrichment of the coastal zone (the “flesh”) and the progressive impoverishment of the inland
regions (the “bone”). Rossi Doria, M. Riforma agraria e azione meridionalista, Edizioni Agricole, Bologna, 1956.
8 Muscarà, C. La geografia dello sviluppo, Comunità, Milan, 1967.
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 248 (248)
248 Daniele Ietri, Francesca Silvia Rota
— “Mezzogiorno”, or southern Italy, was the periphery of the Italian territorial system, with
more than half of the population employed in agriculture and with low levels of income and
industrialization;
— “Middle” Italy, a sort of belt of the industrial heart, characterized by a variety of combinations
of production structures and distributions of wealth.
As early as the decade following the conflict, it was indeed in the Middle Italy that
a manufacturing apparatus, composed mostly of small and mid-sized businesses with high
intensities of labour and low intensities of capital, developed. However, as at that time small and
mid-sized businesses were considered a secondary element (useful for big business or ‘interstitial’)
and negligible (since they were involved in production ignored by larger units) in relation to the
industrialization process, there was no recognition of the importance of their role until nearly the
middle of the 1970’s.
When the crisis of the fordist-taylorist production model clearly appeared, it was especially
in Italy that attention turned towards the role of small and mid-sized businesses: this lead to
the finding, for example, that the increase in industrial employment between 1951 and 1971 was
concentrated for more than three-quarters in firms with fewer than one-hundred employees and
that industrialization, which was originally “confined” to the north-western regions of the country,
began to expand towards Tuscany, Veneto, and Emilia-Romagna, where the model of the small
and mid-sized firm was undoubtedly dominant, if not exclusive.
In 1977, Arnaldo Bagnasco proposed the famous model of the “Three Italies” 9, which referred
the internal differences of the Italian system to the presence, in specific areas, of different forms
of industrial production organization: the large businesses in the north-west, the model of small
and mid-sized businesses in the centre and north-east, and industry not yet developed in the
south.
Even in this model, the idea of a peripherality of the north-eastern systems was not altogether
eliminated, although the debate in literature was concentrated on the search for an effective
interpretation of the new course being taken by emerging development (Figure 1).
The proliferation of studies on the issues of peripheral economy on one hand and the takeover,
at the beginning of the 1970’s, of implemental regional reform of the constitutional dictate on
the other, were some of the reasons why “multiregionality” definitively replaced the dualistic
interpretation of the the regional heterogeneity in the Italian industrialization process 10.
In the new interpretation that spread around the 1980’s, the local dimension constituted a key
concept for the interpretation of development. Associated with the affirmation of this model there
was then the well-known proposal to use the industrial district as a key to reading the economic
processes going on in the country.
Two fall-out theories followed:
i) The local system was assumed to be an integral unit of production, corroborating the
multiplicity of development directions;
ii) The rediscovery of territoriality as a fundamental condition of the organization of society and
production allowed the convergence of various disciplines (economy, geography, social sciences)
in relation to the common problem of development.
In comparison to the 1960’s, the lens through which the accumulation and development
process of the country was observed had changed: the criteria of interpretation had modified
radically and there had been a progressive passage from an explicative model based on processes
isolated from their historicized context, that is to say, removed from its historical specificity, and
9 Bagnasco, A. Tre Italie: la problematica territoriale dello sviluppo italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1977.
10 Conti, S. and Sforzi, F. “Il sistema produttivo italiano” in Coppola, P. (ed.) Geografia politica delle regioni
italiane, Einaudi, Torino, 1997.
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decontextualized, or indifferent to the diverse concrete situations, to a model that recognized the
differences and roles of the territory in determining different development patterns.
5. The “unsaid”: known and unknown realities of Italian capitalism
For all the 1990’s, the favourable results (in terms of employment and production) of light
industrialization processes in the regions of central and north-eastern Italy were interpreted in
terms of district success, i.e. of development models based on small and mid-sized manufacturing
units, organized in networks, and with close ties to the territory11(Figure 2). This is an image that
contrasts the development model of systems of hierarchical and vertically integrated firms and
that presupposes the recognition that the forms of business organization, like those for production,
are the result of structure and historical conditions different from place to place 12. If on one hand
there was therefore the recognition of the ontological possibility of different development models,
on the other the image of Italian capitalism extracted from the literature did not seem capable
of restoring this difference13: according to a tendency that still exists today, it seemed rather to
fall again into the “trap” of identifying just one dominating economic model and to consider the
production mechanisms identified for the Italian case sound also for other contexts14.
11 See Becattini, G. Distretti industriali e Made in Italy—Le basi socioculturali del nostro sviluppo, Bollati
Boringhieri, Torino, 1998.
12 Fuà, G. L’industrializzazione nel nord-est e nel centro, in Fuà, G. and Zacchia C. (eds.) Industrializzazione senza
fratture, il Mulino, Bologna, 1983, pp. 7–46.
13 It is mostly Italian literature, including: Becattini, G.Distretti industriali e made in Italy, Bollati and Boringhieri,
Torino, 1998; Clementi, A., Dematteis, G., Palermo, P. C. (eds.), Le forme del territorio italiano, Bari, Laterza,
1996; Dematteis, G. Sul crocevia della territorialità urbana, in Dematteis, G., Indovina, F., Magnaghi, A., Piroddi, E.,
Scandurra, E., Secchi, B., I Futuri della città. Tesi a confronto, Franco Angeli, Milan, 1999. Among the publications
produced internationally, see: Brusco, S., The Rules of the Game in Industrial Districts, in Grandori, A. (ed.), Interfirm
Networks. Organization and Industrial Competitiveness, Routledge, London, 1999. Bagella, M., Becchetti, L. (eds.) The
Competitive Advantage of Italian Districts: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses, Physica Verlag, Heidelberg, 2000.
Datar, Réseaux d’entreprises et territoires. Regards sur les systèmes productifs locaux, La documentation Francaise,
2001.
14 Lamoreaux, N., Raff, D., Temin, P., “Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American
Business History”, in American Historical Review, 2003.
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Although the industrial districts had and continue to have an important role in the Italian
economic and productive system, the weakness of generalizations and simplifications directly
behind the identification of the primacy of the district model of development lead us to prefer
a more complex interpretation15.
In our opinion, the image that best describes the Italian development is that of the mosaic.
This representation will allow us to reason in terms of the discontinuity of the development of
Italian society (based on the consideration of the link between the development model and the
different spatial and temporal contexts in which industrialization was formed) and to capture
some unknown realities of Italian capitalism that have been ignored or simply downplayed by the
literature.
Two situations emerge in particular16:
— the fragmentation of northern and central Italy; this acceptation emphasises the various
situations that mark the richest part (in terms of employment and gross domestic product) of
the country;
— The tumultuous and growing South, whit some cases of local development arising above the
mostly rural realities.
5.1. The fragmentation of northern and central Italy
Overcoming the historical subdivision between north-west and north-east-centre (NEC), the
economic system of this part of Italy is distinguished by the presence of different yet closely
inter-related development models:
a. the new high profile of the large metropolitan realities of the Po River Valley, characterised in
the past by the Fordist business model: Turin and Milan. These are highly dynamic realities
where, above all over the recent years, there are ongoing innovative processes of attraction
and concentration of activities, functions, and population;
b. the transformation of small and mid-sized business systems in the north-east regions
characterized by a polycentric urban organization;
c. the emergence of auto-organization forms in more “peripheral” areas of the economy.
a. In the case of the metropolitan areas of Turin and Milan, the literature proposes
images somewhat stereotyped, focussed particularly on the problem of the relationship between
the industrial past and the future: they don’t consider, for instance, some important changes
that occurred above all in the relations between public administrations, regional and national
governments, local economic and social forces, and the citizens, and which in many cases lead to
a profound redefinition of the metropolitan area’s image.
The productive model of Turin represented in the literature was that of a city of big, vertically
integrated industries: one of the most significant examples in Europe of the “one company town”,
whose destiny was inextricably linked to that of one of its main manufacturing firm (FIAT). In the
beginning of the 1980’s, the city entered into a phase of decline and restructuring caused mainly by
a significant demographic drop and an overall differentiation in specialization sectors in the local
economy. Also due to the de-verticalization process of big businesses, new specializations began
to emerge from the Turin productive fabric and to acquire increased visibility on an international
level: the production and transmission of knowledge progressively replaced the manufacturing
production as a driving force of development. In this way also the terms under which competition
15 The classification of Italian businesses as elements of a new historical phase of capitalism appears fragile. In
fact, they present various distinctive traits that make them similar to the businesses of the third capitalism: flexibility
and familiar organization, that supply a loophole for tax evasion and labour legislation, but also problems of succession
in the administration and an intrinsic reluctance to use public capital and transform it into external expertise.
16 Barca, F., speech at the “1a Conferenza nazionale dell’alta dirigenza statale”, Rome, 3–5 February 2003.
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with other cities was approached change: not only according to locally available material resources
(infrastructures, specialised centres, businesses) and immaterial ones (know-how, human resources,
social capital, etc.), but also according to organizational and institutional aspects. During this
time, being aware of this ongoing change, the City of Turin, with the involvement of main local
economic forces, undertook some significant initiatives aimed at guaranteeing a boost for the city
on an international level: Turin was the first metropolitan area in Italy to adopt a strategic plan17,
multiplying investments in infrastructures and in marketing as well as in negotiated planning
initiatives aimed finally at identifying development opportunities related to something other than
the automotive sector.
In the solutions proposed, the role of the “traditional” automotive sector was not however
denied, but rather reinterpreted with a view to the passage from “industrial area for automotive”,
characterized by of a network of small and mid-sized sub-suppliers subordinate to FIAT, to
a “technological district for automotive” 18. According to this new vision, the relationship
between FIAT and the Turin’s industrial fabric underwent significant modifications: the number
of businesses depending exclusively on big firms significantly reduced and there was also evidence
of forms of technological transfer towards sub-supplying, which improved in quality and in
independent research and design capacity.
The model of the Milan area proposed in the literature is instead that of the large economic
and financial centre. In fact, the most common activities in the Milan metropolitan area are
advanced services like consultancy, management, banking and financial services, etc. Not only: the
Milan area presents itself on the international panorama also as the centre of modern district
concentrations in the sectors of design19, fashion, biotechnologies, and material science research.
These concentrations that require the presence of an adequate structure for technological-scientific
research and production are conceptualized through the interpretive categories of metadistricts or
thematic districts 20. Metadistricts identify the network of relationships set into play by district
economies in order to project themselves towards global markets, giving life to productive contexts
that are no longer circumscribed by a specific territory or linked to the principle of spatial
contiguity: they imply thematic horizontal areas of intervention determined according to the
intersectorial integration of different production systems defined according to the identification of
a production chain.
In the metadistricts there is a concentration of public and private initiatives aimed at boosting
competitiveness in the Milan system: activities for innovation centres, territorial marketing
initiatives, and development agencies. This gives rise to an image of a unitary, modern, and
competitive setting of international calibre. In reality, however, the Milan area is also the
sum of many local identities and local communities composing the complex infinite city of the
“Lombard foothills”. The Milan area economic system (and that of Lombardy by extension) is
thus portrayed as a diffused model of “molecular capitalism”, which involves much of the foothill
region and within which dynamics of financial-economic power define the emergence of a “nouvelle
bourgeoisie” facing the challenges of modernity by connecting with global flows in the production
and commercialisation phases.
17 http://www.torino-internazionale.org/.
18 See Enrietti, A., Lanzetti, R. “Il distretto dell’auto: definizione, dinamica e politiche”, in Rolfo, S., Vitali, G.
(eds.), Dinamiche competitive e innovazione nei settori della componentistica auto, Franco Angeli, Milan, 2001.
19 Bertola, P., Sangiorgi, D., Simonelli, G. (eds.), Milano distretto del design—Un sistema di luoghi, attori e
relazioni al servizio dell’innovazione, Ed. Il Sole 24 Ore, 2002.
20 With the resolution of October 5, 2001, the Lombardy Region identified the metadistricts (or thematic districts)
in terms of thematic areas of horizontal interventions not limited by the territory and pushed towards a forceful
intersectorial integration, characterised by the transfer of knowledge to the applied field. For further clarifications, see:
www. lom.camcom.it/servizi/distretti-new/index metadistr.htm.
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b. An important element that contributes to the image of a “fragmented Italy of the north
and centre” is indeed given by the transformation in the perception of small and mid-sized
business systems, that commonly connote the Italian industrial system. In contrast to the proposal
contained in some literature, this fabric does not fully overlap with the typology of traditionally
understood industrial districts.
Above all, in the north-eastern regions we see that innovative poles characterised by the
presence of specific competencies and openness to markets crossing national borders21 are forming
next to traditional districts of Made in Italy.
To this view, a significant case is that of Veneto that, even though it is part of the regions
historically included in the Third Italy, it has recently developed policies in favour of innovative
capacity. In 1991, the regional development agency Veneto Innovazione was founded in order to act
as “control room” for regional innovation strategies. Following opportunities instituted by regional
and national laws for financing and facilitation of technology transfer, three science parks were
also financed: VEGA (Venice), GALILEO (Padua), and STAR (Verona) 22.
The Veneto science parks have initially aimed exclusively at high technology sector businesses;
then, at a second phase, they set out actions for technology transfer also in mature sectors that
actually characterise most of the industrial panorama of Veneto.
The structure planned a priori by decision-makers was supposed to be hierarchically
organised in poles, nodes, and points. A single subject was to operate as process supervisor
(Veneto Innovazione), coordinating the activities of the three science parks. The lower levels of the
hierarchy were supposed to include multidisciplinary innovation centres (public and private) and
specialized ones. The regional system of innovation in Veneto was soon modified into a progressive
specialization of the parks: culture and local self awareness as well as protectionist measures
played an important role in the differentiation and specialization of the initiatives.
The graph in Figure 3 represents the most significant relations between the subjects of the
Veneto system involved in the development of innovation policies. A relevant degree of polycentrism
can be noticed: the central role of Veneto Innovazione is “counterbalanced” by the presence of
the science parks and public universities that occupy equally important roles. Geographic position
plays a significant role as well: Venice, Padua, and Verona are located less than 100 km from each
other, along an important infrastructural axis.
Another important innovation system on north-eastern Italy is that of the region of Friuli-
Venezia Giulia. Without going into detail concerning the actors and initiatives in this region,
it should be emphasized how the two regions of north-eastern Italy dealt with the issue of
technological innovation with very different logics. If in Veneto there is an emerging polycentrism,
in Friuli we can see how the initiatives and financing are mostly concentrated in Trieste and in
the AREA science park of the city. In this region, the role of universities (Udine and Trieste)
seems to have notably diminished, while industrial associations, the Chambers of Commerce, and
regional agencies specially constituted to deal with economic development issues in mountainous
areas have increased their activities. In Figure 4 the subjects involved in the innovation policies
in the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia are represented.
21 Corò, G., Rullani, E. (eds.), Percorsi locali di internazionalizzazione. Competenze ed auto-organizzazione dei
distretti industriali del Nordest, Franco Angeli, Milan, 1998.
22 The VEGA park was the first to be financed in the Veneto region: it was constructed in an abandoned area, also
allowing the requalification of a part of the port of Mestre, which was once occupied by petroleum-chemical industries.
The businesses in the park operate in sectors like new communications and information technologies, environmental
chemistry, new technologies for the conservation of cultural heritage, biotechnologies, and nanotechnologies. The STAR
park in Verona is, instead, based on a very different principle: the park does not have a fixed structure (in terms
of facilities and staff), but operates through consultants who work to create synergies and partnerships between
businesses with the purpose of starting up joint projects.
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We find, therefore, how regions that are apparently similar in production and socio-cultural
structures have, through the work of administrators and to the merit of different regional
systems23, interpreted the “strategic choices” for the new century according to profoundly
different logics.
c. The images of northern and central Italy are distinguished for the emergence of forms of
auto-organization in the more “peripheral” areas of the economy.
23 Friuli-Venezia Giulia (together with the Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Sicily and Sardinia) is a region with
a so-called “special statute”: this status attributes the regional government a higher number of specific competencies
and a series of dispensations, also fiscal, in comparison to national legislation.
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This refers, for example, to the experience of the Mountain Communities24. These are
local organizations constituted among mountainous and partially mountainous towns (even if
they belong to different provinces) for the improvement of mountain regions and for the
individual and associated discharging of their own and assigned functions. At the origins of the
institution of Mountain Communities there was the recognition of the isolation, backwardness,
and economic marginality that, at the beginning of the 1980’s, distinguished part of the Italian
mountain territories. Massive migratory flows also determined the “greying” of the population
and a progressive abandonment of the settlements. Over the years, the representation of the
mountain was profoundly modified and attention to mountain areas changed from their description
as a weak territory subject to disintegrating forces, to the recognition of the mountains and
their differentiated local systems as socio-economic resources25. The institution of Mountain
Communities belongs to this cultural passage: through adhesion to the Community, mountain
towns reached the “critical mass” necessary to actuate territorial interventions, reinforce their
own economy and construct a distinct identity. Furthermore, even though they are characterised
by an economy based mostly on small and very small units, it is not possible to identify a single
typology. Mountain Communities, which are distributed throughout the Italian territory, are
distinguished above all for their role as agents to promote development and mitigate imbalances.
Due to these aspects and the recent recognition obtained following the constitutional reforms
that favour the discharging of the functions of small towns and mountain towns in an associated
form, Mountain Communities constitute important ‘tesserae’ of the Italian mosaic.
5.2. The tumultuous and growing South
The experimentation of a new light industrialization26 process in the Italian Mezzogiorno is
conducted by involving mostly the coastal areas, where positive signs of activity could be found as
early as during the 1950’s. Regarding initiatives that generate economic value, there was mostly
a spread of district type organization for production based on a network of small businesses.
The districts in the Mezzogiorno, however, have little in common with those characterizing the
production system of the Third Italy. From the results of some important empirical analyses27,
24 Mountain Communities are present in all Italian regions. However, the results of a recent study by the sociologist
Renzo Gubert on the activities conducted by the Mountain Communities over the 1980’s and 1990’s, indicate that the
Communities of the north and centre present a more pronounced physiognomy than those in the south which, with
the only exception of the region of Sardinia, do not excel for any intervention and even have fewer frequencies in
terms of interventions undertaken. Gubert, R. (ed.), Il ruolo delle Comunità montane nello sviluppo della montagna
italiana. Un’analisi valutativa, Franco Angeli, Milan, 2000.
25 See: CENSIS, La montagna come risorsa. Geografia, società, governo e programme per lo sviluppo dei territori
montani, Rapporto finale—sintesi, ‘Collana verde’ n. 83, Rome; INSOR (1992) Montagna 2000, Franco Angeli, Milan,
1991; EC, ESDP. European Spatial Development Perspective. Towards Balanced and Sustainable Development of the
Territory of the European Union, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1999;
Ferlaino, F., La montagna nei programme europei d’integrazione territoriale, Working paper n.157, IRES, Turin, 2002.
26 Bodo, G., Viesti, G., La grande svolta. Il Mezzogiorno nell’Italia degli anni novanta, Donzelli, Rome, 1997. Di
Felice, M. L., Sanna, L., Sapelli, G., L’impresa industriale del Nord Sardegna. Dai pionieri ai distretti: 1922–1997,
Editori Laterza, Bari, 1997. Cersosimo, D., Donzelli, C., Mezzo Giorno. Realtà, retaliation e tendenze del cambiamento
meridionale, Donzelli editore, Rome, 2000. Viesti, G., “Le strade dello sviluppo: come sono nati i distretti industriali
del made in Italy nel Mezzogiorno”, in Economia e politica industriale, 2000, p. 106.
27 For an account of recent regional districts in southern Italy, see: Trigilia, C., “La ricerca dell’Imes
sull’associazionismo culturale nel Mezzogiorno”, in Meridiana, n. 22–23, 1995; Cersosimo, D., Donzelli, C., “Mezzo giorno
e mezzo no. Realtà, rappresentazioni e tendenze del cambiamento meridionale”, in Meridiana, n. 26–27, 1996, pp.
23–73; Bodo, G., Viesti, G., La grande svolta, Donzelli, Rome, 1997; D’Antone, L., Straordinarietà e Stato ordinario, in
Barca F. (ed.), Storia del capitalismo italiano, Donzelli, Rome, 1997; Bevilacqua, P., Riformare il Sud, in Meridiana,
n. 31, 1998, pp. 19–44; Cassano, F., Paeninsula. L’Italia da ritrovare, Laterza, Bari, 1998; Viesti, G. (ed.), Mezzogiorno
dei distretti, Donzelli, Rome, 2000.
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there is evidence of the presence of a large variety of district typologies in southern regions,
among which the technological district of the Etna Valley in Sicily stands out. The southern
districts demonstrate a variety of development models that, until a few years ago, were mostly
unknown because they were concealed behind the generalized definition (that was often associated
with a negative impression) of the Mezzogiorno. The southern areas and islands of Italy today
present themselves as a reality characterized by enormous variety and animated by endogenous
micro-local initiatives, expressions of a rich business fabric, even if submerged, or initiatives
promoted by public actions.
This image, characterized by dynamism, by an elevated number of start-up businesses, by
a burgeoning territorial concentration of productive activities, and a spontaneous development
that moves from underneath, counteracts a vision still linked to tradition that insists on the gap
between north and south as evidenced by the distribution of indicators like the per capita GDP.
6. Territory, competitiveness and innovation
Phenomena like market expansion, access to new competitors made easier by telecommunication
technologies, and the division of labour, which thanks to progress in transport and communications
involves increasingly distant places, make the maintenance of leadership more difficult and require
an incessant strengthening of the factors of competitiveness. The maintenance of avant-garde
positions on international markets is linked to the maintenance of the identity of the manufactured
goods, or to that peculiar something that local systems of small and mid-sized businesses are
capable of incorporating into their productions and that competitors cannot replicate. That depends
directly on the process of accumulation and transmission of knowledge produced locally.
This is a suggestion that has recently been faced in scientific debate and has found much
support, especially in political discourses. To say that a territory produces knowledge is never
a simple question. As emphasized by Giuseppe Dematteis 28, the idea of the territory as a producer
of knowledge can also fuel resistance: while it seems evident that the territory produces things in
the form of industrial products (machines, fabrics, food, etc.), the idea that it produces knowledge
is less immediate. But not only: because knowledge is a mental fact: in accepting the metaphor
proposed, the idea that the territory becomes something similar to a person is also implicitly
accepted29. This finds confirmation in an interpretation of the territory as a “living element”
that is not limited to being a mere, passive support of man’s action. The territory constitutes
an intelligent environment characterized by a competence that we could define as topical, that is
heavily localized: the territory, according to geographical interpretation, is presented as the result
of a co-evolutionary relationship in which experiences, capacities, and know-how is continually
accumulated30. The know-how may be technological, but not only: places are also depositories of
other forms of know-how accumulated locally, like architecture, museums, languages, traditions,
and institutions. Even these types of non-technological knowledge can be used to produce added
value and increase productivity.
Through the metaphor of the territory as a producer of knowledge, we can explain the
emergence (or even only the survival), in Italian capitalism, of paths of local development that
are “alternative” to traditionally district-based ones. Non-technological knowledge, although linked
28 Dematteis, G., Ferlaino, F. (eds.), “Il mondo e I luoghi: geografie delle identità e del cambiamento”, Ires
Piedmont, Turin, 2003.
29 Idib.
30 A measure used to quantify the concentration of innovative activities is patents. However, some authors maintain
that this data is limited to the quality of the functioning of the patent offices, therefore losing credibility.
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to the territories and their histories (know-how, tacit and widespread knowledge), are used in
economic processes as development factors.
A fundamental component of the interpretation of the territory as a producer of knowledge is
the role of networks that develop within local systems and with other systems. In various parts of
Italy, the territory generates true geo-communities according to at least three different options31:
a. by developing synergy to promote a common objective: the synergy can be positive if the
local community is mobilized to attain an image or carry out a project useful to the public,
or negative in the form of obstructionist movements;
b. integrating in order to compete. Increased international competition causes increases in the
number of integration among different production systems: these are mostly spontaneous
“bottom up” initiatives that result in some industrial districts, especially in central areas of
Italy, elaborating coordinated development strategies;
c. creating alliances in order to grow. Alliances of this type develop according to very different
modalities and dimensions. In particular, horizontal types of alliances are seen—that is to
say alliances between territorial systems of the same level (towns with towns, regions with
regions, etc.) and vertical types of alliances between different territorial levels.
The geo-community may be defined in terms of a vast, inter-provincial area with intrinsic
common denominators to be reinforced, and where it is possible to identify a collective subject
that assumes direct responsibility for the future of development and territorial reorganization32.
In Italy there is such a constantly growing number (from the “Lombardy-Veneto-Emilia Hinge”, to
the geo-community of “la Maremma”, from the Infracom experience on the Verona-Trieste axis, to
those of the “axes of territorial development” of the Lombardy foothills and the Adriatic-Marche
line) that it can be seen as the most distinctive trait with which Italy faces ongoing change.
The scopes pursued by the geo-communities are numerous and vary from place to place: the
development of infrastructure, fair events, the promotion of tourism, cultural, research, and
technological innovation poles, economic “typicity”, production systems. The choice of development
alternative to the formation of alliances and cooperative relationship networks passes through
competition. However, it seems that most Italian cases choose a cooperative option rather than
a competitive one: it is probable that the scarcity of resources and absence (typical of the history
of the organization of the Italian administrative machine) of large inter-administrative agencies
with independent management and accounts plays in favour of this option, as do those who operate
in other examples of European urban realities.
A proper example of this are the negotiations started to create the horizontal “MITO” city
between Milan and Turin. These two metropolitan poles that, together with the city of Genoa, in
the past were already projected into a perspective of joint development, especially of an industrial
nature, today return to confront the possibility of identifying common logics. The cooperation will
be facilitated by the construction of the high-speed railway between the two cities and will be
carried out along broader lines: high formation, health care metadistrict, fairs and conventions,
cultural systems, and media. Possible extensions may be developed with the cities of Genoa and
Venice. Among the first strategic collaborations to be hypothesized there is, in fact, the proposal
for an international architectural competition for the design of the city of MITO, which would take
place at the 2006 Biennial. Venice, on the other hand, has already been actively seeking horizontal
alliances for some time now. A recent research33 concerning the development of regional capital
31 CENSIS, XXXVII Rapporto sulla situazione sociale del paese, 2003, http://www.censis.it/
32 ibid.
33 Rullani, E. and Micelli, S., “Immaterial production in Venice: towards a post-fordist economy”, in Musu, I. (ed.),
Sustainable Venice: Suggestions for the Future, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
2001.
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cities identified some possible scenarios, among which was the realization of a single metropolitan
area between Venice, Mestre, the port of Marghera, and also including Padua and Treviso. In
this scenario34, it was emphasized how these cities are so close as to form a continuum: the
progressive specialization of each reality would allow businesses and inhabitants of the area to
exploit services and opportunities offered by an “extended” urban area. The specialization of
Venice and the post-fordist transition are the factors that push the city to look not only at the
“local” metropolitan area, but also and above all at its integration and competitive capacity in the
“global” network; and one of the elements upon which the city intends to base its own course of
“sustainable” development over the long term is yet again the production of knowledge, innovative
capacity, and investments in scientific research.
Among the other cases of cooperation between cities we can mention the case of the region
of Tuscany, which is working to develop strategic alliances and clusters of small and mid-sized
businesses in the automotive and motorcycle component sectors, and the one of the cities of La
Spezia, Trento, and Pesaro, which have constructed an alliance finalized at reinforcing the exchange
of experience in the processes of construction and actuation of strategic plans. Significant cases of
alliances among regions are those of the Third pole of Central Italy with the regions of Abruzzo,
Marche, Molise, and Umbria, and the constitution of a new macro-region in the north-west among
Piedmonte, Lombardy, and Liguria35.
Regions, Provinces, and Towns are finally active in the development of vertical types of
alliances to be actuated above all through participatory planning instruments.
7. Possible paths of development
In the first part of this paper we attempted to reconstruct the dynamics and the representations
that have distinguished Italian industrialization over the course of the 20th century: from the
dualism between the developed north and the underdeveloped south to the “three Italies”, from
the phenomenon of peripheral economy to the rediscovery of industrial districts. More specifically,
we have seen how the facts and the representations have not always found confirmation in
the works of academicians and in political discourses. Often intervention policies elaborated
and enacted then proven to be of dubious results or even detrimental. Finally, by introducing
the metaphor of the “Italian mosaic”, we have proposed a representation, or better still, an
interpretative logic, that we believe can truly reflect the reality of the contemporary Italian
economy.
With regard to the challenges of competition and innovation, the mosaic geography of the
Italian economy implies advantages as well as disadvantages. The advantages undoubtedly include
the recognition of the opportunities linked to the variety of economic, social, territorial, cultural,
and administrative conditions that connote the country. On one hand, the widespread presence
of local competitive systems throughout the territory that are capable of attracting investments
and activities favours a more balanced and polycentric national development. On the other hand,
the recognition of the existence of different development models allows activities that increase
the specialization of local systems, increasing competitiveness. It was, however, impossible to
identify a single national development strategy on a central level. The variety connoted by the
34 The authors hypothesize another two scenarios. A model of endogenous and spontaneous development, without
interventions decided publicly; a model with a view towards radical environmentalism and sustainability, in consideration
of the peculiar characteristic of the city that make it extremely fragile with regards to environmental issues.
35 In alternative, the literature also indicates the proposal for the identification of a new axis of development that
crosses the northern regions of the country from east to west.
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Italian mosaic requires different interventions according to the scale and context intervened
upon: this therefore requires a burdensome effort by local communities (in terms of men, means,
and resources) in the planning of their own future. With reference to the economy in southern
Italy, for example, notwithstanding positive signs resulting from the spread of local development
processes in various areas of the south, the data confirm the existence of serious difficulties in
starting intense and long-lasting courses of development. These difficulties are due mostly to
serious institutional deficits that mark the south and reflect the existence of inadequate public
institutions incapable of establishing transparent rules of conduct.
From the observation of the Italian experience, we can obtain some indications concerning the
logic with which we can interpret the challenges that the new Europe poses to the territories in
terms of competitiveness and innovation. In the first place, the examination of the Italian situation
introduces a reflection on the links between the facts and the representations, or between the true
functioning of the economic systems and the theoretical elaborations of researchers. The history
of Italian industrialization that we have briefly summarized, clearly demonstrates how changes
in the interpretation of the facts can result in a modification of their representation as well as
changes in intervention policies.
In order to interpret the functioning of the Italian economic system through the mosaic
metaphor we need to recognise and appreciate the existence of different development models.
In the Italian case, this recognition is affirmed through the progressive discovery of the
importance of immaterial assets that determine the competitive edge of businesses and territories.
Competitiveness depends more on organizational and institutional aspects which can then be
improved through interventions that promote communications, cooperation, and the reinforcement
of the network of relations among actors.
Finally, from the Italian experience, the importance of the local scale in development processes
emerged. As can be understood from the words of Borja e Castells 36, through opportune
combinations of technological infrastructure, human resources, and flexible systems management
on a local level, it is possible to establish long-standing and sustainable development.
Beginning with this local scale and the relations that develop within it, it is then possible to
hypothesize some development scenarios for Italian capitalism. From among the potential courses
of development for local systems, three would seem to be most probable:
— cooperation with nearby systems with different vocations. In regional innovations systems,
for example, different local systems are often part of a single innovative chain. In these
cases it is necessary to think of how to improve the relationships between businesses and
the other operators of the innovative process. The contribution that can be made to the
development process by the university operator or by public and private research centres,
etc. is a fundamental one that is expressed in terms that certify the process itself;
— cooperation with distant systems but with common vocations. The recent progress in network
technologies offer excellent potential for the development of communications between local
systems and allow various forms of cooperation37: not only among contiguous systems, but
also among distant systems united by common interests or by their participation in production
or cognitive chains. In both cases, the competitiveness of businesses is guaranteed by a form
of solidarity or, in any case, of trust established thanks to a relationship that we could define
as a “proximity” that it not necessarily spatial;
36 Borja, J. and Castells M., Global and Local. The Management of Cities in the Information Age, Earthscan
London, 1997.
37 Micelli, S. and Di Maria, E. (eds.), Distretti industriali e tecnologie di rete: progettare la convergenza, Franco
Angeli, Milan, 2000.
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— cooperation among various levels and isolation with regard to horizontal relations. The advent
of globalisation, of ICT’s, has not detached businesses from the territory, but has simply
contributed to supplying another operative dimension that adds to, but does not substitute,
the local scale. This must be seen as a mutation in the territorial scale according to which
the local production system is constructed and structured. Special thought should also be
given to the dangers related to an excessive concentration on local dimensions, which leads
to the disregard of the influence of the fundamental elements of higher contexts on local
development processes.
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Introduction
Europe is facing several strategic choices, as Kuklinski’s six methodological reflections included
in this volume clearly show. The choices concern normative options to be followed in all of the
main areas of social life, beginning with demography, economy, technology, science, education, and
ending with culture. It is worth remembering that apart from the difficulty related to making
normative choices as such, the European choice-making is more and more implicated in exigencies
of an emerging system of multi-level governance. A variety of actors, both public and private, of
transnational, supranational, national, regional and local provenience, are invited to be more or
less directly involved in the decision-making processes in Europe, and elsewhere (see Dror 1999).
The phenomenon of multi-level governance constitutes an enormous challenge in terms of
both efficiency and accountability of the European system (see Kohler-Koch 1996). Therefore it is
by no means a univocally beneficial mode of governance, however, by enabling different sets of
actors to participate in the system evolution, it also constitutes an invitation to an increased scope
for the formation and exercise of their subjectivity and thus responsibility for their own growth
and development. This seems to be particularly pertinent to regional and local actors all over
Europe, who have already gained a lot of room for voicing their preferences and needs in the
1980s and 1990s. Although the initial enthusiasm and belief in the possibility to create a “Europe
of Regions” have in the Western Europe gradually faded away, their reflection appears to have
gained a new foothold in some, at least, societies—and regions—of Central and Eastern Europe. 1
European regions, in general, have certainly benefited much from the opportunities offered by
the system of regional policy in the EU (EC 2004). However, at the beginning of the XXI century
it is becoming more and more clear that the system may need a further reformulation, both
in terms of its ideological assumptions and procedural schemata (Kuklinski 2003; G¹sior-Niemiec
2004). This is especially visible when the majority of the new accession regions are taken into
account. Arrested, on the whole, in the center-periphery trap, the new accession regions 2 seem to
1 The Polish region of Wielkopolska (Greater Poland) may be offered as a case in point (see e.g. G¹sior-Niemiec
2003).
2 The term region is used for the sake of convenience in the paper, even though (enlightened) regional elites are
an obvious addressee (or an object) of the statements.
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be more often than not tempted—or forced?—to follow a clientelist path as regards their inclusion
in the EU system of regional policy instead of seeking ways to discover, formulate and follow
their own developmental trajectories.
Lulled by the standard criteria of applying for EU support, which are based on negatively
defined indicators, such as lower than average GDP per capitaor higher than average unem-
ployment etc., regional elites de facto may often opt for a dependent developmental model.
The developmental options they might choose to support by means of structural funds usually
amount to investments in necessary but per se unproductive infrastructures, be it new roads, bus
terminals, sports facilities or material bases for systems of vocational training. Moreover, the fact
that the investments are frequently guided almost exclusively by the logic of calculation (let’s
invest in whatever may be EU-funded), leads to a reinforcement of patchy, temporary and passive
character of regional resources in CEEC.
At the same time, the potentially emancipatory, schemata for multi-level governance (e.g.
a variety of networks and steering committees), enforced by the EU procedures at the regional
level, may be vulnerable to corruption since their role in strategic design and guidance of
developmental processes appears negligible, not to say decorative. Marginalization of the new
regions could be seen as a direct result of the dominant logic of calculation that was mentioned
above. Instead of creating regional projects that are based on region-specific, visionary strategies
of development that could enjoy competitive advantage and possibly trigger changes not only in
the regions concerned but also in the EU system as a whole, elites in those regions follow routine
patterns that were coded—in the idiom of comparative advantage, with a view to obtaining EU
funding—in strategies of regional development, mass produced in Poland in 2000 (see Gorzelak
2001; Grosse 2003; G¹sior-Niemiec 2003; Hausner 2001; Szlachta 2001). Thus, nolens volens they
deprive themselves of the opportunity to participate consciously and actively in the multi-level
mode of European governance. 3
The paper does therefore generally fall in line with the argument (cf. Kuklinski, 2003; Grosse,
2003; G¹sior-Niemiec, 2004) that a thorough reconsideration of the model of regional policy in
the EU is needed. Moreover, an even deeper breakthrough is required in the ideational sphere,
especially on the part of experts, scientists and elites that are involved in shaping regional
trajectories. The paper includes some proposals that might seem rather bold in this respect. The
boldness may be justified by the overall logic of the paper role, which is to prompt a discussion
rather than offer a fundamentalist prescription how to cure the weaknesses of the current model of
EU regional policy and the concurrent deficiencies of strategic thinking about regions. One of the
seemingly more technical tenets includes an idea to separate the issue of investments in hard and
soft infrastructures at the regional level. Relegating the former, in terms of planning and financing,
to the national and European level would, among others, mean that regions (meaning regional
elites by and large) themselves are forced to focus on and demonstrate their capability to create
strategies for long-term, productive and innovative investments in region-specific developmental
paths.
In other words, what would be needed first of all in the context of the new approach to
regional policy in Europe, is again an increase in the scope for regional subjectivity and ...
accountability. The core issue that is inscribed in the approach involves a mental change that is
related to a switch from “lagging behind” to “catching up” and “overtaking” model of thinking
about regions (see Kuklinski 2003). The model of regional policy in Europe must not inculcate in
regional elites a culture of clientelism and learned (calculated!) helplessness that is rooted in the
“philosophy” of lagging behind propped by the demonstration effect of a permanently winning
3 This is further negatively reinforced by the proposed changes in the EU cohesion policy that even further
undermine the status and voice of regional and local actors in the new accession countries (cf. Grosse, Olbrycht 2004).
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non-development, i.e. the advantage of being classified as an Objective 1 region. A turn towards
prospective thinking and regional foresight, including a revalorization and/or creation of regional
resources, seems thus necessary if regions are to develop organically and are to be able to face
the challenges of globalization (ibid.).
“Polish Piedmont” as a (re)formative idea
The second part of the presented paper offers a feedback to an idea of “Polish Piedmont”
which was authored by Antoni Kuklinski in his Memorandum entitled “The Polish Piemonte.
The research priorities” of 13 July, 2004. In the Memorandum, written on the occasion of the
establishment of RECiFER (Research Centre for European Regions) affiliated at the WSB-NLU
in Nowy S¹cz, Kuklinski proposed to set up in the South of Poland a regional laboratory to
test the conditions under which a development of Knowledge-based Society and Knowledge-based
Economy could be triggered in Poland. The idea was to “invent”, monitor and intellectually support
a region where “the KBE and KBS [could be seen] in the holistic context of the transformation
of the economy, society, science, culture and governance” (“The Polish Piemonte...” , p. 1).
In the Memorandum Kuklinski touched thus upon a few of the most salient issues concerning
regional development in Poland in the context of the European Union. First, he pointed to
a need to reorient regional developmental trajectories towards a holistic model hinged on the
creation and interaction of Knowledge-based Society and Knowledge-based Economy. Second, he
assumed the process of reorientation would have to be preceded by a mental and linguistic
turn, which means a shift in the manner regions, regional development and regional policy are
conceptualized and framed in Poland. Third, according to Kuklinski, the process to succeed needed
to combine top-down and bottom-up initiatives. Fourth, he stressed the diagnostic, benchmarking
and prognostic role of regional academic and research institutions in the process. Fifth, and more
fundamentally, he claimed regions and regional trajectories are not to be taken for granted and
seen exclusively in terms of path dependency; they can and may be (re)invented.
While I do not intend to discuss in this paper the issue of the prospects for the development
of Knowledge-based Economy and Knowledge-based Society in Polish regions, nor to delve
deeply into the role of regional academic and research institutions, I would like to dwell on
three other assumptions mentioned above. I am particularly interested in considering the last of
Kuklinski’s theses that verges to a large extent on social constructivism. Not claiming that social
constructivism is the only possible approach to think about regions and regional development,
I will nevertheless argue that routine exclusion of this type of approach by regional planners and
regional elites renders regional policy and the practice of regional development on the one hand
unnecessarily dependent on external factors, on the other—on legacies of path dependency.
The theoretical part will be followed by a brief sociological introduction to the status quo in the
actual addressee of the idea of “Polish Piedmont”, i.e. the assembly of the five Southern regions
in Poland that Kuklinski proposes to view as a single “imagined” community. The introduction
responds, by necessity rather cursorily, to some of the research priorities that were listed in
Kuklinski’s Memorandum. They concerned evaluation and creative thinking in terms of:
— regional and local communities of Polish Piemonte
— the role of social and cultural capital in the development of the Polish Piemonte
— the regional and local governance in Polish Piemonte
— the Polish Piemonte in the framework of the New European Space (Kuklinski 2004).
The paper is concluded with a table that presents basic statistical figures concerning the
regional units that would constitute the Polish Piedmont as imagined by Kuklinski.
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“Polish Piedmont”: A Tradition to Be Invented?
What Kuklinski’s idea amounts to is a challenging offer directed to the five regions stretching
along the Southern, mountainous fringe of Poland from the West (Dolnoœl¹skie Voivodship) to
the East (Podkarpackie Voivodship). The offer concerns a radical shift in the perception and
conceptualization of the regions, which is to be reflected in a new language of opportunities used
to describe them as well as in a new formula of synergetic cohabitation that is to overcome
the current state of zero-sum game rivalry, both within and between the regions vis-à-vis the
European and domestic system. The opportunity may be claimed to be premised on a thorough
reconstruction of weak and/or narrow, local rather than regional, identities there and building
a common, holistic macro-image. Instead of sticking to the patchwork of otherwise fragmented,
diversified and largely peripheral, mountainous borderlands of Poland, Kuklinski proposes an
invention of a new entity—the “Polish Piedmont” as a way to manage the diversity and capitalize
on it. Not promising any automatic transfers of benefits, the idea seems to rely on the “power of
identity” (Castells 2000) and multiple networks that might make the new entity a visible hub on
the map of the New European Space.
For all of its striking novelty in Poland, the idea to invent a certain social entity anew seems
well rooted in philosophical, anthropological and sociological theories of social space, identity and
development. As such it could be considered by regional, and region-oriented elites with a great
interest as an invitation to take an active and forward-looking stance to policies (and politics) of
regional development, especially in so called lagging regions whose trajectories seem to be stuck
at path dependent nodes of deficient economic, social and cultural conditions. In other words, it
may be regarded as an invitation to practical regional foresight 4 whose ultimate aim is to make
regional elites realize that future is flexible and malleable, depending to a great extent on the will
to create and exercise one’s own collective subjectivity.
Seen in this light, Kukliñski’s Memorandum might be thus treated as an invitation to open
up of a new chapter in the history of regional development in Poland by trying to make work
in practice the sophisticated social science discourses that point to the significance of mental
schemata and symbolic images in the recognition and deployment of developmental chances that
the new European and global space appears to hold in store for regions. The idea of the Polish
Piedmont might for instance prompt regional elites to think differently of regional space and to
look differently at their own role in the development of the regional space. What it requires is
however a dedication to the project of re-invention of the regional space ... and regional identity
(meaning in reality an identity of the regional space!). A symbolic re-translation and re-combination
of the differing regional pasts, traditions and developmental options could eventually lead to an
emergence of a completely new, alternative regional trajectory5 and a new “developmental style”,
since as Kukliñski tells us:
“The developmental style is a pattern of thought, motivation and action creating an intellectual
and pragmatic climate in a given country [or region—AGN]. This climate is expressed in an
interaction of political, social, economic and cultural dimensions which answer the question—how
a given country [region—AGN] is overcoming the inertia of failure and creating the momentum
of success” (Kukliñski, 2003: 18; cf. also the concept of regionality as habitus and imago regionis
in G¹sior-Niemiec, 2003).
4 Cf. Practical Guide to Regional Foresight, 2003; The Third Periodic Report of the European Commission, 2004).
5 “Trajectories are self-fulfilling prophesies based on the actors’ decisions and expectations of the future. Like any
institutions they are sustained not by ‘naturalness’ but by the interests that develop in their continuance and the
belief that they will continue” (quoted after Kukliñski, 2003:13)
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For the sake of clarity, a due reservation is to be added at this point, stating that the author of
the essay is aware that apart from the desired transformation of mental and behavioural schemata
the regional actors display, other factors of the regional project’s success—much less symbolic
in nature—need to be named. Namely, attracting necessary external financial and institutional
support for the project as well as mobilizing the endogenous capital(s) are crucial to help institute
the symbolic change and possibly turn it into a set of practices capable of producing regional
growth and development. What needs to be specially stressed is the dialectic relationship between
the two types of factors—tangible and symbolic, which is well captured by Kukliñski’s hypotheses
(Kukliñski, 2003), especially the ones concerning the “catching up vs. lagging behind mentality”,
“mechanistic vs. organic regional policy”.
The usefulness of the social constructivist approach
As already mentioned, social science has a lot to offer in support for the idea of social
inventiveness and its usefulness in overcoming the weight of path dependencies. The core message
hidden in theoretical and empirical analyses of the kind reflects a rather well known, albeit much
disputed thesis concerning the power of ideas to change existing reality, or to create it as if
anew6. Let us consider a few theoretical insights of the kind, which have been inspired by Pierre
Bourdieu’s (1991; 2001), Anssi Paasi’s (1990; 1999; 2002), Eric Hobsbawm’s (1983) and Benedict
Anderson’s (1983) theses and observations. A directly pertinent in the context of regions and
regional communities quotation from Anderson will serve as an apt introduction to the topic,
which reflects a belief in the power of imagination and identity:
“In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps
even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished not by their falsity/genuinness,
but by the style in which they are imagined” (ibid.:5–6, emphasis added)
Following insightful philological analyses of Benveniste, Bourdieu (1991: 220–228) in turn
offers region as an instance of a heretical discourse whose aim is to regere fines, that is to
disrupt and constitute social space anew, while Anssi Paasi in a similar vein forwards a conclusion,
stating that: “[t]erritories and their identities and boundaries are social, political and economic
constructs that contrary to traditional vernacular cultural regions that emerged from the life of
social communities—may be relatively well separated from the every-day lives of ordinary people,
i.e. they are public representations which literally take place in the sphere of these discourses”
(Paasi, 1999:217).
Therefore, while being dynamic and flexible constructs, especially under the new regionalist
paradigm, regions are generally better viewed as spaces of multi-level dependencies, viable
interfaces between different spheres of life, different types of actors and different levels of
policies, which are able to accommodate and reconcile in a non-exclusive manner the divergent
pressures coming from the inside and the outside of the territory.
On the one hand, to be binding (i.e. evoking voice and loyalty, cf. Hirschman, 1970), the
socially constructed regions need to be premised on the act of drawing boundaries (anew) and
sanctioning some differences—marks of identity. However, to be functional in the spaces of flows,
the boundaries and differences need to be constructed as non-exclusive and inviting, promising
some sort of gains to all. Such a redefinition of territorial boundedness requires a substantial
shift in the way territorial identities, loyalties, interests, and linkages are created and justified. In
a deeper sense, the shift is premised on mythopoiesis, that is skilful construction and spread of an
6 Let us not discuss the issue of voluntarism and determinism in this paper.
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adequate mythology of region (G¹sior-Niemiec, 2003) or to use the more established Hobsbawm’s
terms (1983)—on the invention of a (regional) tradition.
In the brilliant book on the subject of invented traditions, Hobsbawm et al. (ibid.: 8ff) argue
for the essential malleability of the modern narratives that encode societal norms and values as
well as defining overall goals reaching which a society/community aspires to (these could be seen
as “developmental trajectories” of a kind). What the authors show is how various “established”,
“time-immemorial” “traditions” might be traced back in time and deconstructed as contingent,
consciously created and/or subconsciously emerging discourses and practices of rather recent
origin which—in particular historical circumstances and owing to particular social actors—became
set and sedimented in social memory. The universal and highly selective nature of the process of
the invention of tradition is the most striking finding of the research. Drawing on numerous case
studies, the authors point to 3 basic areas or spheres in which the invention of tradition might
take place:
— the establishment/authorization of the social cohesion and/or belonging to the given community
— the establishment/legitimization of institutions, statuses, authorities within the given community
— the reproduction/socialization to/commemoration of beliefs, systems of values, patterns of
behaviour obtaining within the given community.
The concept of “invented” nature of traditions points thus directly to the constructive and
transformative power that regional narratives might exert provided they are persuasively
devised, designed, communicated ... and attuned to particular historical conditions circumscribing
the room for malleability in a given society7.
In the context of the idea to “invent” the “Polish Piedmont” it must be stressed again that
inventing region-building traditions requires close co-operation of political, economic, social and
cultural elites in the overlap of their, respectively, top-down and bottom-up spheres of influences,
interests and types of capital they dispose of. The prevalence of heated, ideologically motivated
discourses on the part of potential region-builders would constitute a serious obstacle in the
production of adequate regional mythology. Conversely, it might also reinforce deeply ingrained
unwillingness and/or inability to undertake collective action which through shared efforts, could
help overcome the limitations of the shared “world of limited goods” and contribute to re-routing
of the regional trajectory. Therefore, the myth-making capacities of regional elites and the degree
to which they succeed in overcoming the self-defeating legacies of the distant and near past as
well as the limitations of the fragmented present are of vital importance.
The more different the new identity and the new developmental style from the ones that
used to be familiar to regional communities is proposed, the greater seems to be the role that
such invented traditions and mythologies of the imagined community could play in the shaping of
functionally viable “structures of feeling” (Williams’s phrase), “structures of meaning” (Warren’s
phrase), “habituses” (Bourdieu’s phrase) or “structures of expectations” (Paasi’ phrase) which:
“[...] form a frame that is bound to a specific region. This frame is quite permanent and is
represented in the form of time-space-specific, region-bounded, institutionally embedded schemes
of perception, conception and action, which can comprise real, imagined, and mythical features of
the region” (Paasi, 1990:249; cf. Bourdieu, 2001; G¹sior-Niemiec, 2003).
To be fully legitimized and acted upon they need to be expressed in the language of myth
which enables a symbolic fusion of Knowledge, Truth and Power. The regional myth is created
7 Hobsbawm’s theses reverberate for instance in multiple contemporary analyses that dwell on the creation of so
called “new locality” in Poland (cf. Burszta, 1998; Jaw³owska, 2003). The analyses reveal how local histories, legends,
customs, feasts ... and virtues are (re)produced and invented for purposes ranging from the need for personal belonging
to commercial profit. Cf. also analyses of Bali and Maori territorial identities and developmental trajectories that have
been straightforwardly invented in the XX century (Burszta, 1998; Greenblatt, 1991; Hanson, 1999).
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in order to tell individuals and communities “where the territory has come from and where it
is going to” (Paasi, 2000:10). The regional myth-makers’ task is to reconstruct then or invent
a broken bridge between the past and the future and by structurating the present cognitive and
behavioural schemata to show how a new destiny is to be accomplished. Obviously, the degree to
which the process may succeed is contingent. In the case of regions that dispose of politically
meaningful local governments, the success of the process is premised first of all on the degree of
legitimacy and political will of the elites, second—on the presence of adequate capital resources
(economic, social, cultural), and third, last, but not least—on the feasibility of the proposed vision.
To sum up, Kuklinski’s idea to “invent” a new regional entity in Poland, called the Polish
Piedmont, certainly opens up a new perspective in the debate over regional trajectories in Poland.
The perspective, quite distant from typically technocratic or narrowly political discourses on Polish
regions and their future within the New European Space, has several merits. It points, among
others, to the role that imagination, supported by a thorough knowledge of a given regional
space, creating prospective myths (developmental visions), identities and traditions may play in
overcoming mental stereotypes and adverse discourses that block initiative and innovation.
Successfully invented, a new regional space with a distinct regional identity, specific “style” of
regional management, and an innovative developmental project supported by a new quality in the
area of research and generation of regional knowledge may prove to be key elements in building
regional capacity in the new European regions. They need to be accompanied by a new language
frame (discourse) that will enable a regional subjectivity to emerge both in the interior (regional
space) and the exterior (national and European space). To join the multi-level order of governance
actively, it is not enough to demonstrate statistical tables proving socio-economic backwardness
of the regions or to reproduce standard, routine developmental priorities that are exemplified in
manuals that e.g. accompany training sessions in structural funds.
Instead of concentrating on well rehearsed and universal weaknesses and difficulties typical of
all peripheral regions, perhaps it would indeed be more beneficial to engage in creating holistic,
complex visions of alternative developmental trajectories starting from the idea like Kuklinski’s.
It goes without saying that this is not possible without reaching a certain critical mass of political
will and intellectual innovativeness. Regional academic and research institutions could play an
invaluable role in accumulating and activating such a critical mass.
The idea to invent and promote a new identity for the five regions situated in the Southern
fringe of Poland—”the Polish Piedmont” on the axis Wroc³aw—Rzeszów, and, more broadly,
Berlin—Dresden—Cracow—Kiev, seems in the context quite inspiring. Certainly, an identity like
this, if it could be created and operationalized, would greatly increase the visibility of the regions
vis-à-vis the New European Space, and thus possibly add to their developmental chances. What
is even more important, it might constitute a stimulus and an opportunity to change the regional
trajectories, including a modernizing shift in regional habituses (structures of expectations).
However, the difficulties inherent in the project, especially lacking political will, seem rather
formidable, at least at the moment and in this particular case. Also, the wealth of socio-economic
and cultural “differences” inherent in the five regions poses a serious challenge to the idea of
their common management. On the other hand, sociological insights draw attention to certain
premises to which the idea of the holistic perception, development and promotion of the Southern
regional strip of Poland as the Polish Piedmont8 could be related.
8 It is to be noted that the term “Polish Piedmont” had already been used in the Polish scientific discourse
before Kukliñski’s Memorandum. Among others, a historian, Józef Buszko employed it while discussing the diversity
of socio-cultural relations in the province of Galicia (the Austrian partition) in the XIX century. Indeed, diversity and
its successful management appear to constitute the core message encoded in the term as it is used in the Polish
academic discourse, which lends itself rather easily to the new deployment of the term by Kuklinski.
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A sketch to a profile of the Polish Piedmont communities
All of the five regions concerned are situated literally at the foot of the mountains (pie
di monte), hence the existence of the natural physical boundary is their common experience.
From the point of view of the state frontiers, these are moreover borderlands characterised
by a history of border mobility. Uncertain, undecided territorial, national and ethnic belonging
coincides therefore with labile social identities on the part of a considerable proportion of the
residents. At the same time, on the whole9, these are regions typified by a heightened sense of
Polish national identity, which however is clearly rooted in strong attachment to a given locality,
religion and a considerable social traditionalism.
Moreover, these are the regions (in particular the voivodships of Opolskie, Dolnoœl¹skie,
and Podkarpackie) which have experienced mass migration both in the XIX and XX centuries.
The migrations (both in- and out-) were motivated both by political-administrative and economic
factors. Furthermore, because of their natural beauty, the majority of the regions (most specifically
the voivodship of Ma³opolskie—Podhale and Podkarpackie—Bieszczady) apart from the inflow of
tourists, have been regularly targeted by migrants from metropolitan cities, traditionally, many
artists among them. These have brought with them and/or produced specific external identitarian
discourses and practices that to a greater or lesser degree have influenced the regional spaces.
The migrations have on the one hand reinforced the multi-cultural profile of the regions10,
while on the other have generated many—both positive and negative—processes and social
phenomena. In a sense, they have also almost literally spanned, in social and cultural terms,
the two regions located at the extreme ends of the strip, Dolnoœl¹skie and Podkarpackie, since
in the 1940s and 1950s many residents were forced to move to the former from the latter (cf.
e.g. Akcja “Wis³a”). A direct railway connection linking Wroc³aw (Dolnoœl¹skie) and Przemyœl
(Podkarpackie) constitutes a not necessarily exclusively symbolic link between the two regions. One
more experiential issue derived from the migratory experience, which might be common to some
at least parts of the regions, could be found in the so called syndrome of post-immigrant society
characterised by different than elsewhere in Poland patterns of social organization, integration,
interaction and participation in public life (cf. e.g. Sakson 1998).
Additionally, the repeated experience of economically driven outmigration from the Southern
strip of Poland overseas, especially to the USA and Canada (most particularly from the
voivodships of Podkarpackie and Ma³opolskie) has led to the creation of significant, regionally
flavoured, diasporas abroad and strong linkages with them. Multiple social networks bound the
regions within and withal. Combined with the already mentioned inflows of tourists and artists,
whose impact on the local identities of the local residents is best exemplified by the case of
highlanders (górale podhalañscy), the experience results in specific attitudes to tradition and
identity. The communities exhibit a historically proven capacity to intercept and adapt in a creative
manner ideas, patterns, and models coming from the exterior. Moreover, the capacity enables them
to reinforce and enrich their own territorial identities with the external elements. The flexibility
and mutability of the tradition is reconciled with strong social traditionalism. 11
The feelings of belonging to a local (rather than regional) microcosm are correlated on the
one hand with a high level of participation in multiple local cultural associations, while on the
other hand with a higher than in other areas of Poland level of religious participation. Religious
participation, predominantly related to the Catholic Church, may also be characterised as specific,
9 With a possible, though disputable, exception of Œl¹skie voivodship.
10 Meaning e.g. both, coexistence of the different ethnicites, nationalities and cohabitation of various levels and
types of culture.
11 Cf. G¹sior-Niemiec 2003 on the role of mythical thinking in spatial relations.
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largely qualifying as folk religiosity, with strong involvement and attachment to the Marian
cult. Both forms of participation are related to strong attachment and involvement in cyclical,
publicly reproduced rituals, which may testify to widespread sensitivity to collective symbol-making
activities. To a much lesser degree, the communitarian orientation is related to a common work
ethos. On the other hand, it seems to sustain and conserve traditional division of labour and
gender roles. The features may also be correlated to the significant number, traditional residential
patterns and status of the peasant population within the regions, with a possible exception of
Œl¹sk (Silesia), which is highly urbanized.
Strong and dense social networks constitute thus a model feature of the majority in the
regions of the Polish Southern strip. Apart from the above mentioned examples, the linkages
and social capital associated with them come to the fore in the form of a generally strong
preference and support for local government and a dense network of voluntary associations of
various kinds, including self-help. This is facilitated by residential patterns, which in a majority
of the regions are constituted by a dense network of small and medium size towns which enjoy
well documented historical heritage. Apart from the five regional metropolises (to which actually
only Wroc³aw—Dolnoœl¹skie and Kraków—Ma³opolskie may be included by general European
standards, i.e. number of inhabitants exceeding 500 000), the Southern strip seems to be animated
largely by vibrant and dynamic secondary regional centres, such as Nowy S¹cz, Cieszyn, Bielsko-
Bia³a, Przemyœl. The cities and towns form local nodes which via economic and academic centres
established in them link the regions with global networks. The advantage they offer is a possibility
to preserve and enjoy localness while being networked with global markets. Not infrequently, the
localness constitutes one of the major assets in the brand names associated with the places and
the institutions. 12
The above sketched “general” profile of the supposed Polish Piedmont is by necessity
simplified and cursory. It is also biased towards these features that exemplify the commonality of
experience and therefore might constitute sources of specific forms of cultural and social capital
in the region. Flexibility, adaptability (e.g. modular forms of tradition) and capacity to maintain
social cohesion as if despite objective indicators seem most prominent in this respect. What needs
to be further emphasized is the rather successful cohabitation and coexistence of the various
forms of actual and perceived internal diversity within the area, which incidentally resembles the
historical image of the Italian region of Piedmont. All of them seem to testify to the fact that the
theoretically already well grounded openness of regional narratives to constant reinterpretations
of their images, identities and thus developmental options could be and is practiced by means of
a mixture of spontaneous (bottom-up) and guided (top-down) interventions.
The essential malleability of regional and local traditions might therefore be taken into account
by regional elites should they embark on the task of re-creating or “inventing” regional imagery
and regional identity with a view to the enhancement of strategic developmental choices. However,
a word of caution is also needed in the context. Namely, a sound judgement is necessary not to
confuse visionary strategic planning with opportunist, instrumental social engineering. Lastly, even
though the practice of inventing traditions, identities and images appears to have no limits, it is
to be admitted that socially created spatial structures, such as regions are constituted not only by
ideas but also by material forms, be it “natural” or “artificial”. As such they are also governed
by a certain inertia (cf. Braudel’s concept of longue duree), which may radically counteract the
attempts at large scale reformulation of regional space.
Leaving the issue of spatial inertia aside, it remains to be stated that while at the moment it
would be rather difficult to persuade politically differentiated regional elites in the five Southern
12 Cf. WSB-NLU in Nowy S¹cz or ¯ywiec Brewery in ¯ywiec.
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regions to embrace an idea like Kuklinski’s Polish Piedmont, it nevertheless should not mean
abandoning the theory and practice of regional foresight altogether. The experiences described
in the EC report (Regional Foresight...) seem encouraging enough to further promote exercises
in experimental thinking about regional spaces and their future trajectories. It might be worth
undertaking exercises in regional foresight that, among others, include mental experimenting
with regional images. Such experiments could both reveal already possessed but hidden assets
and resources and trigger imagination that may lead to creative asset-formation. Such mental
exercises are specially recommended in the so called “lagging behind” regions which in reality
stand little chance of “catching up” with the most advanced regional leaders by application of
routine solutions offered by European and domestic regional policy models. These, at present,
may rather be classified as survival procedures and not so much developmental options.
Table 1
The “Polish Piedmont”. Basic statistical figures
Re-
gion/Capital
city
Area in
sq km
Population in
thous
No of
counties
No of cities No of
academic
institutions
in 2002
Support for
European
integration in
2001 in %
Dolnoœl¹skie
(Lower
Silesia)/
Wroc³aw
19 948 2 970,1 26 169 27 56
Ma³opolskie
(Little
Poland)/
Kraków
15 144 3 240,9 19 56 28 59
Opolskie/
Opole
9 412 1 080,5 11 34 5 71
Podkarpackie
(Sub-
Carpathian)/
Rzeszów
17 926 2 131,4 20 45 16 49
Œl¹skie
(Silesia)/
Katowice
12 294 4 830,5 17 70 36 67
Polish
Piedmont
74 724 14 253 93 295 113 52
Poland 312 685 38 632,5 371 884 367 58
Sources: Powiaty w Polsce, GUS, 2003
Nowe województwa. Fakty, opinie, nastroje, PARR, CBOS, 2001
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ANTONI KUKLIÑSKI
SOCIAL CAPITAL
AND THE PERFORMANCE
OF POLISH REGIONS
IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION
Introduction
The membership of Poland in the European Union will create a quite new situation for the
competitive performance of the Polish Regions. In 2004 the 16 Polish Regions will be an integral
element of the dynamic galaxy of the 250 Regions of the European Union.
The development of social capital could be seen as an important trajectory for the qualitative
improvement of the competitive performance of the Polish Regions in the framework of the
European Union. This trajectory has 3 features:
1) it is a long term phenomenon,
2) it is a phenomenon integrating the mechanisms of spontaneous and guided change,
3) it is a phenomenon integrating the economic, social and cultural dimensions of development.
Following these assumption I will organize my paper as a sequence of 6 topics:
I. The region and the architecture of Europe of the XXI century.
II. The region and the architecture of Poland of the XXI century.
III. The dilemma strong versus weak regions and the center-periphery gap.
IV. The development of social capital as a trajectory of transformation of weak into
strong regions.
V. The case of Poland.
VI. Towards a new regional policy in Europe.
VII. The regional problem in Italy and Poland. Experiences and prospects.
I. The region and the architecture of Europe of the XXI century
The dilemma of strong versus weak Europe1 can be seen as one of the most important
choices of the XXI century. There is no doubt however that in the development of strong Europe
1 Compare: A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds) Europe in the perspective of global change. Polish Association for the
Club of Rome, Warsaw 2003.
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the region will be a key element of the European architecture. Strong Europe as a grand actor
of the XXI century will have 4 interrelated features:
1) competitive Europe
2) innovative Europe
3) federal Europe
4) regionalized Europe
In this model the leading function of European regions is to build up the global competitive
capacity of our continent.
II. The region and the architecture of Poland of the XXI century
The dilemma strong versus weak Poland is a dramatic or even tragic dilemma of our country
in the first decade of the XXI century2. Poland is a dual country—with dual society and economy.
The duality of Poland is reflected in the developmental gap separating the strong and weak
regions. In any conditions the region will be an important element of Poland’s architecture of the
XXI century.
III. The dilemma of strong versus weak regions of the center-
periphery gap in Europe and inside some European countries3
Our Conference4 is accepting the distinction of more and less favored regions. We can
formulate a question—Less favored by whom? By nature, by history, by global society and
economy?
The term “less favored region” can be interpreted as a shift of the responsibility for
the development of the regions from the domain of endogenous phenomena—to the domain of
exogenous phenomena of geography and history. In the interpretation of the wealth and poverty
of nations and regions I would like to follow the inspiration of D. Landes5 stressing the prevailing
role of endogenous responsibility.
Therefore—I prefer the distinction of strong and weak regions—implying a better balance of
endogenous and exogenous factors than the distinction of more and less favored regions. In this
perspective Europe is a dynamic galaxy of strong and weak regions.
The center-periphery gap in Europe is expressed in the dominance of strong regions in the
center and of weak regions in the periphery. In this dynamic galaxy we can see 3 patterns:
1) the pattern of continuity—the long duration in the status of many strong and weak regions,
the inertia of the center-periphery gap in Europe and the inertia of the center-periphery gap
in some European countries including Italy and Poland,
2) the pattern of decline—transforming some strong regions into weak regions,
2 Compare: A. Kukliñski, Economic transformation. Experiences and prospects in Poland 1990–2010 and
A. Kukliñski, What will Polish EU Membership Mean for the EU and for Europe at Large (in:) H. Bunz, A.
Kukliñski (eds) Globalization. Experiences and Prospects. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Warsaw 2001.
3 Compare: A. Kukliñski, T.G. Grosse, Education and the challenge of dual societies in Europe. Warsaw—Trieste
2003.
4 Rethinking Regional Development Policies—The role of social capital in promoting competitiveness in Less
Favored Regions. Directorate General—Regional Policy, Universita degli Studi di Lecce—ISUFI—Ostuni, July 2–5
2003.
5 D. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Little Brown and Company. London 1998.
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3) the catching up pattern—transforming some weak regions into strong regions.
In the remaining part of this paper I will concentrate attention on the third catching up
pattern.
IV. The development of social capital as a trajectory
of transformation of weak into strong regions
The catching up pattern—has two interpretations6:
1) a narrow economic interpretation,
2) a broad holistic interpretation in the framework of cultural anthropology—demonstrated
recently by C.J. Dahlman and J.E. Aubert 7.
I am convinced that in this broad framework of the holistic interpretation there is a prominent
place to recognize the social capital as a trajectory of the transformation of weak into strong
regions.
The starting point of my approach are two observations of R. Putnam presented by S. Baron,
J. Field and T. Schuller 8:
Primo—“In that piece, Putnam offers a succinct definition of social capital: ‘by “social
capital” I mean features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to
act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’” (Putnam 1996:56).
Secundo—“But overall, trustworthiness ‘lubricates social life’. It promotes the kinds of
interaction which reinforce norms of generalized reciprocity. This generalized reciprocity is the
touchstone of social capital. It is, Putnam observes, ‘so fundamental to civilized life that all
prominent moral codes contain some equivalent of the Golden Rule’” (Putnam 2000: Ch.1).
The “networks”—“trust”, “generalized reciprocity”, “shared objectives”, “joint effective
activities”—can be recognized as five pillars of the trajectory of transformation of a weak
into strong regions. The goal of transformation must be internalized and shared by four actors of
the scene of the weak regions:
— the business community,
— the academic community,
— the community of NGO,
— the community of public authorities representing the local, regional and national level.
The development of social capital is the main engine transforming the weak into a strong
regions.
Third Italy is the most famous example of a success in this field—The Italian Mezzogiorno—is
the most difficult and complicated case study, where the verdict of failure is emerging very often.
The rich Italian experiences should be seen as an inducement to develop a grand European
research project testing the role of social capital in the transformation of 20–30 well selected
regions of the European periphery especially in Central Europe.
6 A. Kukliñski, Knowledge Based Economy—The Global Mission of the World Bank (in:) A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza,
op.cit.
7 C.J. Dahlman, J.E.Aubert, China and the Knowledge Economy seizing the XXI century. WBI Development
Studies, World Bank 2001.
8 S. Baron, J. Field and T. Schuller (eds) Social Capital—Critical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 2000, p.9
and 11.
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V. The case of Poland
Let me repeat the hypothesis presented in the introduction of this paper—“The development
of social capital could be seen as an important trajectory for the qualitative improvement of the
competitive performance of the Polish Regions in the enlarged European Union”. The concept of
social capital is a source of inspiration to formulate 6 recommendations to be internalized by the
Polish Regions:
One—develop the art of networking both inside the region and in the framework of the European
Union.
Two—promote the climate of trust inside and between the four regional communities—the
business community, the academic community, the community of NGO, the community of
public authorities governmental and self governmental.
Three—reinforce the norms of generalized reciprocity both inside the region and in the framework
of the European Union.
Four—pursue the long term shared objective to transform the region and improve its competitive
performance.
Five—design a long term strategy to achieve this objective.
Six—design a modus operandi to act together more effectively.
These recommendations could be tested in imaginative and innovative empirical studies,
answering the question—to what extent this interpretation of social capital—is already present on
Polish regional scene. The first step on this way was already created by Z. Chojnicki and T. Czy¿9
and T. Zarycki 10. The social capital approach to the improvement of the competitive performance
of the Polish regions should be tested in two different situations, sources of motivation and political
climate.
The first situation is related to the grosso modo passive attitude of some Polish regions
concentrating attention on their status in the European Union as objective one region entitled to
“automatic” support via the mechanism of structural founds. This status may lead to a psychology
of resignation—to be a long term member of the galaxy of weak European regions lagging behind
the strong globally oriented regions.
The second situation is related to the grosso modo active attitude of some Polish regions
recognizing the objective one status as a short transitory phenomenon on the way of transformation
from a weak to a strong region. Those regions are interested not only in the absorption of
structural founds but in the holistic interpretation of all conditions, opportunities and challenges
created by European Union. This holistic interpretation is a conditio sine qua non of the catching
up psychology—using the social capital approach to transform the region to join the galaxy
of strong regions in Europe. This dramatic dilemma of “lagging behind” versus “ catching up
psychology” is not only a dilemma of the Polish regional Scene but also a grand dilemma of
Poland as a dual country divided by the development gap between the catching up avangarde and
lagging behind scansen11.
9 Z. Chojnicki, T. Czy¿, Poland on the road to a knowledge based economy: a regional approach (in:) R. Domañski
(ed.) Recent advances in urban and regional studies. Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw 2002.
10 T. Zarycki, Kapita³ spo³eczny i trzy polskie drogi do nowoczesnoœci—Social capital and three Polish routes into
modern—in print, Warsaw 2003.
11 Compare: A. Kukliñski, footnote 2.
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VI. Towards a new regional policy in Europe
The two decades—1990–2010—are creating an important turning point in the global history
of regional policies 12. It is a transition from socially to globally minded regional policies. This
transition is visible on the national scene of numerous countries inside and outside Europe.
The European Union for understandable historical, political and social reasons is still dominated
by the ideology of socially minded regional policies. This domination is however challenged by the
new situation of the European Union of the XXI century facing a ruthless competitive pressure
of the USA and China.
In this situation the model of globally minded regional policies must be sooner or later
accepted by the European Union. I know very well that this change may be very unpleasant
for Poland—much more inclined to think in the terms of socially minded regional policies both
internally and externally. The new model of regional policy will probably change the modus
operandi of the European Union. The regional policy of the Union will probably drop the approach
of a quasi automatic and universal support for those regions which are lagging behind. Most
probably a new selective and competitive approach will emerge.
In this new framework the European Union will accept the catching up ideology to support
those regions which:
1) present well documented strategies—to transform the weak regions into a strong regions,
2) present well documented strategies—to improve the competitive global performance of dynamic
European regions.
This will be a great turning point in the psychology of regional policies. The core of attention
will be not oriented to those who are lagging behind but to those who have a well documented
self-determination to catch up. This change of psychology means not that the weak regions are just
forgotten. The weak regions are supported very firmly—but not in an universal semi-automatic
framework. In this grand turning point of regional policies—the concept methodology and ideology
of social capital will be very important 13.
VII. The regional problem in Italy and Poland.
Experiences and prospects
The path breaking contribution of Robert Putnam14 and the challenge of Ostuni Conference
are creating an inspiration to design and implement an European research project “The regional
problem in Italy and Poland. Experiences and prospects”.
This will create an opportunity to develop a deep comparative inquiry into the regional
problem in Italy and Poland. In the enlarged European Union—Italy and Poland are two countries
where the regional problem is most pronounced and dramatic. In both cases the role of social
capital in the solution of the regional problem is very important.
I am convinced that both countries and the European Commission would be interest to create
a new network of Italian—Polish Cooperation in this field, seeing both the bright and the dark
dimension of the Italian and Polish Scene.
12 Compare: A. Kukliñski, Towards a new model of regional policy—in this volume.
13 Compare: The volume “Social capital” in the Canadian Journal of Policy Research—Isuma, Spring 2001.
J.O. Baerenholdt, N. Aarsaether, Coping Strategies, Social Capital and Space European Urban and Regional
Studies, 2002(9)2.
14 R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press 1993. The
Polish edition—“Znak”, Kraków 1995.
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Conclusion
This outline is not a finished and comprehensive presentation. It is rather a set of preliminary
and controversial notes which may be a modest input into the international discussion on social
capital and regional policies. I would be most grateful for critical comments and evaluations as
a guidance for my thinking on this subject in the future.
Warsaw-¯oliborz
May 3rd 2003.
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Annex I
ANTONI KUKLIÑSKI
THE REGIONAL PROBLEM IN ITALY AND POLAND
Experiences and prospects
A first tentative outline of an international research project
Introduction
It is interesting to note that in the climate of warm Italian—Polish relations no place was
found for a comprehensive research project as an inquiry into the nature of similarities and
differences linking these two countries in the perspective of history and the future. The suggested
research project is a proposal to open a new trajectory of Italian—Polish cooperation leading the
elimination of this omission.
This tentative outline will be developed around the following topical sequence:
I. The Italian—Polish genus proximum
II. The Italian—Polish differentia specifica
III. Italy and Poland as dual countries
IV. The Italian and Polish internalization of the center periphery gap in Europe
V. Tertia Italia versus Tertia Polonia
VI. Italian versus Polish Mezzogiorno
VII. The inspiration of the path breaking contribution of Robert Putnam
VIII. Vivant sequentes
I. The Italian—Polish genus proximum
The pattern of similarities linking the Italian and Polish experiences is very strong.
Primo—both countries are very deeply embedded into the great foundation of Latin Civilization.
This civilization is a constant factor in the history of both countries. The same can be
anticipated for the future.
Secundo—in the long duration of Italian and Polish development the strong path dependency is
both a blessing and a disadvantage.
Tertio—Italy and Poland are a textbook example of dual countries. This duality is a very persistent
economic, social and political phenomenon.
Quarto—Italy and Poland are now the two most outstanding examples of pronounced and durable
regional problems in Europe.
The list of similarities is much longer. Let me mention only a striking similarity in the
national characters and in the deep pattern of religion and culture. These similarities are
necessary foundation and inducement to design and implement the Italian—Polish research
project.
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II. The Italian—Polish differentia specifica
There is a deep developmental gap—separating Italy and Poland. To what extend the Italian
experiences could be an inspiration for the Polish catching up theory and practice.
Will Poland be strong enough to diminish this gap in the near future developing its capacity
to participate in and draw benefits from European integration.
III. Italy and Poland as dual countries
A comparative reflection on the duality of Italy and Poland is a fascinating test for social
sciences. How to explain the path dependence of these dualities? How to explain the economic
social, political and cultural dimension of these dualities? How to explain the weakness of social,
economic and regional policies facing the persistent nature of these dualities?
The Italian—Polish reflection will be an input not only in the explanation of the experiences
of these two countries but also an inspiration to study the changing scene of dual economies and
societies in Europe.
IV. The Italian and Polish internalization of the center periphery gap in Europe
The European center periphery gap was internalized by the Italian and Polish experiences.
This means that the developmental gap Mezzogiorno versus the rest of Italy and the developmental
gap Eastern Poland versus the rest of Poland have not only national dimension but also European
dimension. A holistic inquiry into the persistent and at the same time changing nature of these
gaps will be a challenging test of our project.
V. Tertia Italia versus Tertia Polonia
The demonstration effect of Tertia Italia in Poland should be very strong and productive
in theoretical and reflection and in pragmatic activity linking the academic, business and social
experiences of Tertia Italia and Tertia Polonia. I am deeply convinced that a trio of Polish regions is
well prepared to start the dialogue “Tertia Italia—Tertia Polonia”. I mean three regions—Greater
Poland (Poznañ), Little Poland (Cracow), Lower Silesia (Wroc³aw).
These three regions have the following features:
1) a strong perception of regional identity
2) a strong academic community
3) a relatively strong and innovative business community
4) a relatively strong civic society
5) a relatively strong regional and local government
VI. Italian versus Polish Mezzogiorno
To my mind Eastern Poland can be correctly described as the Polish Mezzogiorno. Both
regions will be most dramatic examples of the regional problem in Europe of the XXI century.
The challenge is just immense—will the XXI century find a pattern to solve the problem of
the Italian and Polish Mezzogiorno?
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VII. The inspiration of the path breaking contribution of Robert Putnam
This research project will have the challenge and opportunity to use the great and brilliant
body of knowledge especially in the field of social sciences related to the inquiry into the nature
of the experiences and prospects of Italy and Poland.
However for the philosophy and intellectual contribution of the project one contribution is
especially important. This is the contribution of Robert Putnam15 as an inspiration to study both
the Italian and Polish experiences.
VIII. Vivant sequentes16
I am convinced that this research project will open a new chapter in the history of cooperation
of Italian and Polish academic, business and self-governmental communities.
Warsaw, ¯oliborz, June 6th 2003.
15 R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press 1993. The
Polish edition—“Znak”, Kraków 1995.
16 Compare: A. Kukliñski. An inquiry into the development of Social Capital in Poland. Warsaw, June 25th 2003.
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COMMENT ONE
I.
I am in agreement with the intentions and with most of suggestions expressed in the
aforementioned text. This applies in particular to the following points:
(i) a particular relevance of building up social capital in endeavors to solve many contemporary
socio-economic problems in regional development,
(ii) an emphasis placed on the role of “endogenous responsibility”1 in considerations of the way
to overcome differences in performance observed among regions (in particular—in the
context of the role to be performed by social capital in promoting development chances for
weaker regions),
(iii) looking for inspirations and assistance through comparative research and studies of
Italian and Polish experiences (accumulated in the past and expected in the forthcoming
years).
As I understand—the main issue raised by A.Kukliñski is to indicate the need to intensify
research of practical experiences and of unsolved problems in Poland in the problematique
mentioned above (i.e. [i] and [ii]) and it is hoped that this task would be assisted through some
lines of cooperation with Italian scholars.
My comments are meant to express concern for several feasibility issues (obstacles and
chances) in scenarios aimed at greater roles of social capital in regional development. In this
context I am drawing attention to opinions which make a distinction between qualitatively different
kinds of social capital i.e. not only “positive” (with socially desirable effects) but also “negative”
cases, when seemingly similar features of trust and loyalty may be used within undesirable or
potentially harmful networks or hierarchies. In that context—we need more concern for quality
i.e. for replacing “negative” with “positive” features.
II.
Just as a reminder—it is usually assumed that the quality of social capital depends mainly
on the interplay of its causal factors identified as trust and corresponding behavioral norms
1 Kukliñski makes this point (op.cit p.2) in discussing the reasons which make some regions relatively stronger
or weaker and he is referring to the inspiration due to D. Landes. He argues for a shift of attention in regional
approaches to development (with related motivations) from an adjective “favored” (less or more) to “weak” or “strong”,
i.e. it means that instead of an approach aimed at getting (somehow) more favours (as exogenous resources which
would compensate backwardness at home) the main problem will consist of strengthening endogenous potential (which
is also likely to attract more resources from outside, so that both forces, endogenous and exogenous, will work for
development). This does not preclude transfers from outside and both ways are “path dependent” but there is a change
in nature from “compensating for unjust heritage in interregional performance and living standards” into “ overcoming
obstacles and deficiencies in development potential inherited from the past”. The last mentioned focus implies a leading
role of social capital (in mobilizing human wisdom and skills for the sake of development).
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(ethics) which characterize the networks of participating persons kept together by the bonds of
generalized reciprocity (based on trustworthiness) 2.
These factors are reflecting the qualitative status of corresponding informal institutions
(societal “rules of the game” in a behavioral, interpersonal sense) 3. Their desired quality cannot
be decreed i.e. it does not suffice to issue corresponding orders from above like a new law or
like some regulation reflecting a new line of public policy). The extent of really existing social
capital, and its quality, depend primarily on corresponding behavioral features of the people
involved—in particular the moral code they apply. Social capital may flourish and contribute to
the welfare of mankind if the human persons involved are inclined to shape their own actions in
conformance with a moral code which is firmly oriented on honesty, fairness and mutual trust4.
The history of mankind shows that many human persons prefer to follow such behavioral
patterns although these preferences may seem too idealistic or simply queer—especially to such
observers and analysts, who assume that most normal people are bound to follow predominantly
egoistic motives.
In my opinion—one should take into consideration that the preference for and the practice
of applying a moral code of desired high quality can be attained if the persons in question are
firmly resolved to behave in accord with a Christian transcendent ethical base5.
There are other arguments, remaining within the sphere of mundane premises, which keep
assumptions of egoism but they refer to the cases when even an egoistic, less demanding, type of
motivations can incline some persons to honesty6 in interpersonal human relations if the attitudes
of all concerned are shaped and sufficiently governed by the principles of reciprocity7. However,
there are various kinds and roots of reciprocity.
Quite often such relationships are likely to exist among persons who participate in common
endeavors in order to attain certain commonly valued effects (goals), which happens in families
or in various organizations (economic, professional, political, religious).This happens particularly
among the members, who are sufficiently motivated by premises of participation, partnerships,
responsibility for organization‘s success. It is true that these effects of reciprocity are quite
useful for particular organizations (or families) involved . However, there are frequent conflicts
between the interests of organizations, which means that the people loyal to any of them are
confronted with difficult moral issues i.e. to be honest in relations with partners (for the interests
of one‘s own organization) but at the same time—to be double-faced—trying to cheat aliens, the
2 I am referring here to the arguments given in Part IV of Kukliñski‘s text and to the notions recalled there (p.3)
from Putnam‘s studies. Some of my comments are related also to the discussion of this problematique in Tom Schuller,
Stephen Baron and John Field Social Capital: A Review and Critique (chpt 1 in Social Capital Critical Perspectives
edited by the same authors, Oxford University Press, 2000 (I am following here the path indicated by Kukliñski).
3 In other words our problem is tantamount to adequate improvements of institutions (making them more effective
for social development).
4 I have in mind a moral code expressed basically by an “internal voice” of a human conscience i.e. not necessarily
an impact of exogenous norms codified in a formal sense. Essential are such moral standards which exclude insidious
scheming as well as consciously fraudulent and malevolent attitudes in all kinds of social relations (in business, public,
local and other interpersonal matters).The emphasis on a moral code (within informal institutions) does not mean that
codified law and formally binding institutions are underestimated; however—without adequately strong morals it proves
hopeless to attain a workable legal order based on a formal branch of institutions. Norms are written and decreed
but they are neglected in practice.
5 See: Krzysztof Porwit Reflections on Christian Inspirations for Future European Institutional Changes pp 19–40
in Europe in the Perspective of Global Change, eds. Antroni Kukliñski and Bogus³aw Skuza, The Polish Association
for the Club of Rome, Warszawa 2003
6 In that context “being honest” means primarily being “reliable”, “sincere”, “trustworthy”, “having a full sense of
responsibility”.
7 It is assumed then that we are honest [in our bonds of mutual trust with other people] because we are counting
on similarly honest attitudes of them to us (i.e. they “pay back” for our honesty expressed towards them).
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persons in pursuit of alien aims (in order to prevent their success). Moreover, the tasks of solving
such conflicts in motives and in criteria of choice cannot be practically left to individual persons
involved (and to their horizontal networks) but there are inevitable preferences for hierarchical
relationships (of administrative or “patron=client” type).
III.
Altogether—there are reasons to argue that one can hardly expect desirable phenomena
of social capital to evolve if the societal structure consists of multiple sub-sets (organizations),
which are in potential conflict one with another and the nature of reciprocity is not adequately
generalized (not shaped by universally accepted values). These conflicts seem likely as long as
there are no universally honored moral values but each subset is following its own aims and
respectively derived axiological criteria used in defining morals of reciprocity (a narrower one,
specific for each organization) 8.
The societal outcomes in just mentioned cases are diametrically different from those implied
by desired qualities of social capital 9. They represent warfare approaches which draw motives for
common actions from the will to fight against someone or something. This is very distant from
peaceful endeavors to agree on commonly accepted human values, which would eventually allow
to extend the areas covered by mutual trust (with networks based on a generalized reciprocity
and on a firmer ethical base).
The crucial issue is how to promote evolution of the last mentioned type. Only then one can
hope that resulting bonds of mutual trust and cooperation would contribute to a strong version
of democracy and of an efficient economy This generalized type of reciprocity is characteristic
for horizontal bonds of a civic society (which represent a stable type of societal order, where—
according to Putnam‘s diagnosis—one meets the most favorable conditions for extending and for
strengthening the social capital of high quality).
There are observations which exemplify and prove the primordial role of effective institutional
order, as a factor contributing to economic development. This factor has been even found
relatively more effective in comparison with governmental policy and with natural (geographical)
endowments10. Simultaneously—there are reasons to argue that the practice of an institutional
order depends strongly on similar ethical factors (related to human behavior and interrelations)
to those which are known to influence the quality of social capital.
Consequently—it may be useful to consider the question, in what way the abovementioned
qualitative aspects (of “social capital and institutions for development”) are interdependent with
the most frequently met and best known in Europe kinds of socio-economic ideas and political
8 In these opinions I am sharing assessments which question widely prevailing assumptions that the arrangements
of competitive market economy and of a parliamentary democracy are sufficient to ensure holistic harmonization
attributes of a socio-economic order, even if all human persons and their organizations are egoistically inclined and if
they do not follow any common ethics and morals (i.e. without a generalized kind of reciprocity, still more—without
Christian virtues and commandments of evangelic mutual love). I am convinced that acceptance of such assumptions
may lead to detrimental consequences, which was indicated in explicit warnings of Pope John Paul II, that the practice
of democracy will deteriorate towards totalitarian regimes, if the basic human values and respective moral standards
are not honored.
9 The aforementioned review of social capital issues (Schuller, Baron and Field, op.cit. p.31) notes that “...there has
been a significant debate over whether social capital is to be reserved for exclusively positive aspects of social life,
such that there is a direct relationship between high levels of social capital and the quality of life. In Putnam‘s
original formulations this was the case, and this has persisted in implicit form in much subsequent writing. However,
there have been many instances of ‘negative social capital’, where trust levels are high within efficiently functioning
networks which would nevertheless be generally regarded as socially undesirable...”
10 E.g. the leading role of effective institutions as the main factor of economic development (more important than
natural endowments and governmental policies) has been found in international comparative research reported in The
Economist (October 5, 2002) . p.86—Economics focus—Roots of development.
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programs, as well as—with the chances of such ideas to play prominent roles in the future
of Europe. Some features of the latter were discussed lately in a volume “EUROPE in the
Perspective of Global Change “ edited by Antoni Kukliñski and Bogus³aw Skuza (Oficyna
Wydawnicza “Rewasz” * The Polish Association for the Club of Rome. Warsaw 2003. May be the
Italian -Polish cooperation (if it comes into life) will allow to carry the last mentioned line of
research and considerations.
ANNEX:
I am presenting here two sets of excerpts from publications concerned with some issues
which are topically similar to those discussed in this text. The first of these sets (A.) deals with
ethical aspects of institutions and institutional changes, i.e. with the issues relevant for emergence
of positive (desirable) social capital. The second excerpt (B.) presents the ways which allow to
promote innovations (and other measures of disseminating knowledge) by means of social capital
(A.) 112 If any concrete forms of Italian—Polish cooperation enter into the field of social
capital studies then it would be useful to take up and to continue some lines of thoughts presented
in 1994 by Silvana Malle (from the University of Verona), whose reflections on institutional
ethics are topically close and have retained relevance in considerations of actual societal ailments
(in particular—those reflecting deficiency and failures in societal immunological arrangements).
Here are some characteristic excerpts from the final parts of this paper.
One refers to the nature of mafia economy , which is used in contemporary debates
to exemplify “negative social capital” and is usually seen as identical to organized crime , vice
industries etc. The Author cites the definition of mafia economy (taken from Chambers‘ Dictionary)
as expressing “..a spirit of opposition to the law, hence a preference for private and unofficial
rather than legal justice” (p.32). Referring to Italian practice the text goes on to say that
“... The mafia economy is not primarily characterized by crime, but by a behavior in which
...prevarication on the part of political and discretionary power, uncertainty and subordination of
administrative and financial intermediaries to political commands replace contracts enforceable
by law; in short—a behavior characterized by ambiguity as opposed to the certainty of law. ”
Referring to priorities in transformation of our economies in transition the Author advised:
“What needs to be stressed in the shaping of workable capitalist institutions ... is not the criminal
prosecution of long-rooted ill-business and public administration practices, but the need for
a reshaping of institutions and norms up to advanced European standards. These standards are
known by most professionals and are required in business within the international community.”
(p.33)
However—the processes of change are necessarily long and contradictory because the crucial
roles in required institutional evolution will have to be played by the people, their professional
qualifications but also axiological wisdom and moral attributes. Expected difficulties are described
as follows: “There will be contradictions between the demand for modern education, impartial
judiciary, new behavioral codes and the supply of existing teachers, magistrates and leading
senior staff at any level. Newly elected MP-s and new governments are often unprepared to
understand and to apply the rules of the game in advanced capitalist markets and to adjust the
legislation to their requirements” (p.33)
One should add here that still more difficult is the adjustment of judiciary practice and
obtaining adequate socially effective institutions.. This wider emphasis is also expressed by the
11 I am referring here to the paper of Silvana Malle From market to capitalism: the building ofinstitutional ethics
(pp. 22–34) in Experience of Economic Transformation in Central Europe-Lessons for the Future, Conference
papers published by Polish Economic Society and PHARE ACE Programme 1993, , Warszawa April 1994
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Author by a generalized reflection on the nature of a constitutional order: “The respect for
individual rights and liberties belongs to a constitutional order in which each person has a direct
economic interest in the ethical or moral characteristics of the behavior of the other. Like in the
goods market, it is the demand for moral standards of the other party in the game which imposes
individual moral codes. The constitutional order is difficult to attain and may be unattainable
at a given stage by a given society...” (p.34).
(B.) 12 According to Swedish experiences and concepts the attributes of social capital (as
related to more extended and deeper cases of social cohesion) are also relevant for economic
matters approached in a manner compatible with present knowledge—based challenges. Social
capital is seen as the source of crucially important factors, which have essential functions in
contemporary processes of economic growth, especially if they are seen correctly, as a rather
complex whole the substance of which results from competitive selection and depends on knowledge
and manifold competences characterizing diverse actors.
In practice diverse clusters of mutually interdependent actors are conceived as “the competence
blocks”13. Each block (with its activities) is constituted by an interplay of respectively different
kinds of competence i.e. (i) competent and active customers, (ii) innovators who integrate
technologies in new ways, (iii) entrepreneurs who identify profitable innovations, (iv) competent
venture capitalists, who recognize and finance the entrepreneurs, (v) exit markets that facilitate
ownership change, and finally (vi) industrialists who take successful innovations to industrial
scale production. Realization of these interrelations cannot avoid in practice experimental trials
and unavoidable mistakes, which involve a danger of growing costs (depending on frequency
and number of “trial and error” phases). The tasks of minimizing costs can be feasible only in
conditions of loyal cooperation and of mutual trust among all the participants of these processes.
It is easy to imagine diverse scenarios of failure, either because of too low competences (which
in itself means a breach of promise) or because some participants are consciously engaged in
mischievous schemes and wish to win at the cost of others.
12 I am referring here to the work of Gunnar Eliasson Knowledge and Social Capital in Economic Growth
(presented at a conference in Warsaw-Konstancin in June 2001) and his other publications concerned with his theory of
Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE). Conference materials were available in a (mimeographed) volume entitled
The Development of Knowledge-Based Economy in Europe, edited by Antoni Kukliñski, Warsaw August 2001.
13 The structure of a competence block is taken from G.Eliasson‘s text , op.cit. p.88. The original source for that
presentation is G.Eliasson, A.Eliasson 1996 The Biotechnological Competence Block Revue d‘Economie Industrielle 78–4
Trimestre.
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COMMENT TWO
It would be difficult not to agree with most of the Antoni Kukliñski propositions regarding the
importance of the social capital as a crucial dimension of the development of the Polish regions.
Social capital is recognized more and more widely as a useful notion allowing to describe the key
factors conditioning the social and economic development at any level of territorial organization. It
is especially interesting to use this notion as a tool of comparative analysis of regional development
especially today, in the period when regions become much more independent agents in the global
scene.
Professor Kukliñski’s call for a comparative analysis of the Polish regions from the point
of view of their social capital assets and the Polish-Italian comparative study seems timely and
valuable. I would suggest in particular relating such a study with the core-periphery structure
of Europe. As its seems, the main difference between the Italian and Polish situations could be
described in the following way: while the Italian developed North is part of the old European
core zone, the Polish regions can be only divided between those belonging to the higher and lower
level of European periphery.
At the same time Polish case seems to be relatively more complex and in effect possibly more
interesting as the pattern of centre-periphery does not seem to be so clear-cut as the Italian
North-South differentiation. I would of course agree with Professor Kukliñski that the Polish
Mezzogiorno is to be found in the Eastern part of the country, more precisely in the former
Russian sector of the 19 century partition of Poland (particularly in its Eastern part, East of
Vistula river). In the same time, one could agree that the “Tertia Polonia” as it was proposed
by Antoni Kukliñski to call the more developed part of Poland, could be identified with the
regions of Lower Silesia, Greater Poland and Little Poland. In this case however, we should be
conscious of the considerable differences between these three regions which today form separate
administrative entities. Thus, the most fascinating question in the given context as I would argue,
could be linked with the nature of comparative advantages of each of the three above mentioned
Polish regions. While their superiority over the former Russian partition zone, the Eastern Poland
is unquestionable, the question which of them will prove to be the most competitive actor on the
European and Polish regional scene does not seem to be so easy to answer. This could be one
of the potential starting points for the research project suggested by Professor Kukliñski. This
question would have not only descriptive character but also considerable theoretical relevance.
This is because to answer it one would need a deeper inquiry into the nature of social capital that
is characteristic each of the three regions. In the later stage we could ask the question which
of the types of social capital will appear most useful in the contemporary economic and political
environment. We should not forget that the notion of social capital is a very capacious one and if
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defined in specific way can even include contradictory elements1. Thus for example, social capital
can imply in the same trust in formal institutions or in informal social networks, it may pertain to
state structures or rather private institutions, it may be seen as a product of activity of churches
and religious communities or rather secular civic society institutions as associations and clubs.
This list of dilemmas related to the questions of sources and agents creating the networks of
social capital could be continued almost endlessly. One could point out that these questions have
both empirical and theoretical character. In the theoretical aspect, such issues seems particularly
relevant as coherent identification of fundamental models of social capital ideal networks and their
political implications. Taking into account the fact that the sphere of the social capital is highly
charged in political and ideological sense, awarness of this dimension of the debate on social
capital seems necessary. In a more practical dimension a question to which extent different forms
of social capital are mutually exclusive could me mentioned among several others. In any case,
I would strongly argue that given the vagueness of the term of ‘social capital’, already in the first
stage of the project the researches should decide which particular definition would be the main
point of reference for future discussions and empirical studies.
This can be exemplified on the Polish example. The three regions mentioned by Professor
Kukliñski as Polish leaders are undoubtedly characterized by quite different types of social capital
which lay at the foundations of their present strength. More interestingly, the communities of
these regions could be seen as products of three quite different historical trajectories, or as some
would even argue, different civilizational heritages. The regions of Greater and Little Poland while
historically always belonging to Poland, during the crucial period of the 19 century, the time of
creation of modern nations states with their institutional and cultural innovations, belonged to
different states: while the Greater Poland was part of the Prussian State, the Little Poland was
part of the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicja. Than, the Lower Silesia has been populated
with the current Polish inhabitants only after the Second World War and can be to the large
extent considered as a social product of the Polish Peoples Republic (although the greatest single
share of the settlers come from the Austro-Hungarian Galicja).
In effect, until today we have regions in which social capital networks have quite different
origin, nature and carriers. Most clear contrast seems to appear between the Lower Silesia
and the Little Poland. On one hand we have a highly secularized region with relatively active
network of institutions of civil society as NGOs2. On the other hand we have a region of
highest religious activity and strongest role of the Catholic Church in social and political life
in Poland. It is here were traditional values, family relations and informal structures play most
important role in the organization of social life in the country3. One could risk a thesis that the
three above mentioned regions represent three different versions of the Polish national identity,
three versions of Polishness. Which of them will prove most successful in the context of the
challenges of European integration and globalization and why seem to be a fascinating empirical
and theoretical questions. Here one can not exclude the necessity of a multidimensional approach
to the problem. Successes of particular regions can appear to be partial—they may concern only
1 See for example my article in Polish: T.Zarycki (2004) Kapita³ spo³eczny a trzy polskie drogi do nowoczesnoœci.
Kultura i Spo³eczeñstwo, rok XLVIII, nr 2, pp.46–65.
2 A very interesting question concerning the region of Lower Silesia could be asked about the origins of its
obvious advantage in the dimension of social capita over the other former German regions of Pomerania or former
Eastern Prussia (the Warmiñsko-Mazurskie voivodship). While all of them have experiences the exchange of population
after 1944, for some reasons the post-war Lower Silesia emerge as one of the most promising regions of the modern
Poland. Taking into account the relative similarity of the starting conditions the question of the roots of the Lower
Silesian success seems particularly relevant in both theoretical and empirical dimension.
3 See for a detailed case study in Polish my book on region as context of political behaviour: T.Zarycki (2002)
Region jako kontekst zachowañ politycznych. Wydawnictwo Naukowe “Scholar”, Warszawa.
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particular dimensions of the inter-regional competition. Thus for example, one of the regions can
appear more successful in the purely economic point of view, another can become a leader in
the production and attraction of the cultural capital. In this context one can also not forget the
role of other types of capital as factors of regional development, in particular the cultural capital.
Taking into account of these premises can make the project proposed by Professor Kukliñski
a major breakthrough not only in the understanding of the dynamics of the Polish regions in
the transformation period but also lie the foundations for a wider and deeper study of regional
development in European Union.
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COMMENT THREE
The main research area of my part of the project is the organizational system of regional
policy in Poland. This is a new system which was introduced during administrative reform in
Poland in 1998–1999. This system includes institutional framework of central, regional and local
administrations, as well as partnership between central government, self-government, private
enterprises and non governmental organizations. This system also includes cooperation with
European institutions responsible for regional policy (cohesion and structural policy). This is the
cross-national system of governance linking private and public actors in new, innovative ways.
The main ideas of the administrative reform in Poland was to improve quality of public
administration and initiate collaboration between public administration and private sector. The
system of regional policy in Poland supports modernization and development in regional and local
level, provides new methods of local and regional planning, changes administrative culture and
adjust Polish administration for European system of regional and structural policy.
I would like to focus on new instruments of regional policy in Poland, especially European
ones: pre-accession funds and structural funds. It is important to examine how do such instruments
in administrative practice operate. How do they interact with old modes, culture and administrative
practice? How do cooperate various level of public administration, especially central and voivodship
governmental administration with regional and local self-government etc. But my research is
going to be particularly sensitive to new developments happening outside the frame of existing
structures.
We would like also to assess “soft” as well as “hard” policy instruments. That means legal
procedures, institutional competences, financial, planning and implementation sub-systems but also
administrative and political culture, new management modes and practices etc. It is interesting
to compare traditional methods of working (especially linking to the communist period) with new
stile of public administration functioning. What are the origins of this new methods (European
integration, globalization or systemic transformation), and in which way could this experience be
strengthened?
The main areas of my interest will focus on tree basic questions:
1. Is there any relation between effectiveness of regional planning and regional development
and decentralization of public administrative structure as well as civil participation?
I would like to investigate the main institutional factors of regional policy improvement. What
kind of impact have the emergence of new forms of economic cooperation among diverse types of
private and public actors? What sort of challenges and dangers brings such collaboration?
2. The second question is focusing on possible impact of new governing modes and
management rules of the structural funds in Poland on the changes in political and
administrative culture.
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Is there any positive impact on limitation of political clientelism, corruption or old socialistic
rules of public administration behavior? My hypothesis is that such influence is very imperfect and
at beginning we would have post-socialistic cultural norms and political style in new institutional
and procedural framework.
3. The third question is concerning with economic adequacy of EU cohesion policy
instruments for solving the regional problems in Poland.
Is European institutional framework for cohesion policy an instrument of real development?
Or maybe there is only political will to spend as much as possible European money?
During my research I want to examine 4 main political science factors:
1) The first of these is the distribution of preferences and interest among the main actors of
regional policy system.
2) Second, the behavior and autonomy of those actors depends crucially on the institutional
decision rules governing the delegation of powers and procedures of regional policy. So,
I would like to base on theoretical foundation of institutionalism in political science and
economic sociology.
3) Third factor is the distribution of information and financial resources, as an instrument of
power and influence in regional policy.
4) Fourth, I want to investigate new forms of social inclusion as an example of the hidden
principal—agent relation. My hypothesis is that the main actors could influence non-
governmental organizations and administrative agents as representatives of their interest.
Those organizations could bypass these actors and support their interests. So, I find the
standards of principal-agent theoretical model as most suitable for this level of research.
I would like to investigate Polish central governmental structures, self-local government
administrations, regional agencies, NGO-s and private enterprises. I would base on interviews,
research on documentation.
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COMMENT FOUR
Antoni Kuklinski’s tentative outline of an international research projects draws our attention
to a potentially very promising comparative research area that focuses on persistent regional
disequilibria in Italy and Poland. The outline lists several features that may be treated as
a starting point for further considering the idea of the comparative research agenda. The list
includes factors as diverse as the impact of Catholicism, the weight of path dependency, persistence
of a “lagging behind” instead of “catching up” thinking, ideational and institutional weaknesses of
regional policy etc. in both of the countries. Lastly, the issue of social capital is brought to our
attention while investigating the problems of regional development.
Both the durable marginalization and non-development of the Italian Mezzogiorno and the
overcoming of the duality of the Italian regional economy with the discovery of Terza Italia
are offered as cases to be studied in great detail in Poland where, according to Kuklinski, we
are witnessing similar phenomena. Moreover, both of the countries deserve special attention in
this respect with a view to future developments in the European space. The amount of common
European money allocated to bridging the regional gaps in both countries constitutes not the least
of the reasons for the attention.
Before I point to some further reasons to consider seriously such a research agenda, let
me add one or two more remarks following the assumptions of Kuklinski’s outline. First, one
could point to other important commonalities between Italy and Poland, namely the relative
recency, weakness and instability of both statehoods, the diversity of cultural and economic
influences from different European countries on the different regions within the two countries,
excessively expanded (and far from Weberian standards) public administration, delayed and partial
decentralization of the state, faulty institutionalization of regional (development) policy, prevalence
of localism (localismo) over regionalism in most of the regions concerned, concentration of bonding
instead of bridging and/or linking types of social capital among the local communities, frequent
overlapping between politics and economy at all levels of the state organization, strong support for
rightist/populist political parties, still well entrenched closed and exclusive in nature, traditional
family and gender patterns etc.
Second, one may venture other sets of similarities concerning the organization of local/regional
economies (cf. Trigilia 1992; Anielli 2001; Donolo 2001). Agriculture and rural areas still belong
to dominant traits of the lagging regions’ landscapes. Informal economies generally seem to
constitute considerable shares in both countries, especially in their lagging regions. European
regional policy might be further attributed with a reinforcement of dependent development in
some regions in both countries. Finally, prolonged migratory experiences, make the poorer parts
of the countries both economically and socio-culturally quite similar. Likewise, the patterns of
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investment and consumption in the lagging regions, when researched, would also, in my view,
reveal striking similarities between the lagging regions of Poland and Italy.
Kuklinski’s outline identifies the following Polish counterparts for the Italian regions: the
Polish East as an equivalent to Mezzogiorno and the group of 3 central-Western regions (Little
Poland, Lower Silesia, Greater Poland) as an equivalent to Terza Italia. The juxtaposition needs
to be marked with some more comments. Indeed, the area of the so called Polish Eastern Wall
could be considered, roughly, as a Polish equivalent to Mezzogiorno. Although, Zarycki in his
comment rightly points to the different historical paths (partitions) of the regions constituting
that part of Poland, generally, Podlaskie, Lubelskie and Podkarpackie all persistently show both
objective (infrastructural gap, poor socio-economic indicators, claimant attitudes) and subjective
(traditionalism, lacking regional identity, inferiority complex) features of Poland B (cf. also Gorzelak
2003, 2003a).
Internal differentiation of patterns of political, economic and cultural participation between
the regions, or rather sub-regions within the 3 regions makes the comparison with the Italian
Mezzogiorno all the more pertinent in light of the most recent research (cf. G¹sior-Niemiec,
2003). Moreover, the general prevalence there of folk Catholicism and rural traditionalism coupled
with closed social networks and so called bad social capital (cf. amoral familism, Banfield 1967,
Tarkowski 1991) as well as an aversion to institutional and social change would also seem to
support the relevance of the juxtaposition. Lastly, the experience, at least partially comparable, of
intense external investment made at some points in the history of the regions (via COP in Poland
and via Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in Italy) might make the comparison worthwhile.
The other part of juxtaposition raises some reservations, though. As I do not want to
repeat Zarycki’s remarks in this respect, I will only venture a suggestion to limit the search
for a comparative research agenda to a few localities where traces of clustered local production
systems, quite similar to those of Terza Italia, might be identified in Poland. Clusters of
traditional, craftsmanship SMEs in and around Kalwaria Zebrzydowska in Little Poland or
Swarzêdz in Greater Poland could perhaps be pointed to as promising in this respect. Newly
established or reinvigorated clusters of innovative high-tech SMEs related to aviation industry
in/around Bielsko-Bia³a (Silesia) and Krosno/Rzeszów (Podkarpackie) could be also indicated in the
context.
In my view, the comparative research agenda on Italy-Poland proposed by Kuklinski appears
promising for several reasons:
• first, it offers an invitation to investigate center-region relations in states that are weak but
inclined to centralization;
• second, it opens up the issue of the relationships between localism and regionalism;
• third, it evokes the problem of social capital formation and transformation as a factor in
regional development;
• fourth, it points to the need to evaluate change (or lack thereof) brought about by the EU
regional interventions;
• fifth, it invites an inquiry into a more general issue of the possibility of bridging developmental
gaps, durability or fragmentation of the core and the periphery patterns in Europe, planned
and guided from above vs. spontaneous nature of developmental processes;
• sixth, and more importantly, it encourages asking a question whether a mental change,
a shift from “lagging behind” to “catching up” thinking is a necessary prerequisite for such
a developmental take-off in regions;
• last but not least, it justifies paying attention to the role that discourses and images may play
in reinforcing/changing regional trajectories (cf. G¹sior-Niemiec 2003a).
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FRANCESCA SILVIA ROTA
COMMENT FIVE
In his research proposal Prof. Kuklinski points out the pillars of the trajectory of transformation
of weak into strong regions: networks, trust, generalized reciprocity, shared objectives. These
pillars—that are constitutive elements of what is called ‘social capital’ (see also Coleman 19881)—
are recognized as key elements of the success of regional development strategies.
In the Italian case, the experience of ‘Third Italy’ is pointed out as an example of the success
in this field: the rich economies of the Italian North-Est-Center (NEC) regions are represented
as the result of an industrial modus operandi based on a network of small and mid-sized firms
and the production (via the diffusion of trust, reciprocity and long term relationships) of norms
that are often referred to as institutions 2, Cambridge University press. . The Italian Mezzogiorno
(that comprehends the southern part of the country and the Islands) is instead described as
a failure of the political efforts to improve the local economic and social development. An image of
the Italian territory divided in two macro areas thus emerges: strong and developed Italy against
weak and stagnant one.
But as we will argue in our contribution to the volume “Europe—the strategic choices”, the
Italian geography is far more complex than that emerging from the literature. Italian territory
is more likely to be a mosaic, in which the local dimensions, with their cultural, historical and
institutional differences, affect the development paths deeply.
The recognition of this gap between representation and facts leads us to an approach which
takes into account the local geographical dimension and complexity. A in-deep analysis of the
current relationships between individuals, firms, organizations at the local/regional scale is thus
seen as the starting point of any policy initiative at every scale. In this way we would be able
to discover how, among the regions forming the ‘Third Italy’, differences are strong and rooted
into public government and firm organization as well as we could find out that not the whole
Mezzogiorno is a depressed territory.
We might also discover (this a hypothesis to be still verified) that Poland as well is
characterized by a territorial conformation that goes beyond the center-periphery model to get
closer towards to the mosaic one.
Then, as for Prof. Kuklinski’s proposal for an international research project on the common
regional problems in Italy and Poland, we believe that a possible outcome of the Polish-Italian
1 Coleman, J.C. (1988) “Social capital in the creation of human capital”, American Journal of Sociology 94:
S95–S120
2 We refer to the definition of institutions provided by, among others: Hodgson, G. (2001) How economics forgot
history: the problem of historical specificity in social science, Routledge or Schotter, A. (1981) The economic theory of
social institutions
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cooperation could be the mutual discovery of the theoretical passage from a dualistic to a pluralistic
representation of the national economic system. The research project may lead to the re-discovery
of facts about Polish and Italian industrial geography and a re-definition of their representations.
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REGIONAL DYNAMICS1
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
In the border land of part III and IV of our volume it is necessary to mention four
contributions which may be useful in our cognitive and pragmatic effort:
— primo—the contribution of J. H. Dunning2 outlining the new regional reality emerging in the
processes of globalization,
— secundo—the contribution of D. Konstadakopulos 3 presenting a rich and innovative comparative
reflection related to the regional scene of Europe and South-East Asia,
— tertio—the contribution of T. Tas¸an-Kok4 analyzing the institutional and spatial change
emerging from the experiences of Budapest, Istambul and Warsaw,
— quarto—the contribution of C. G. Pickvance5 introducing interesting methodological reflections
expanding our knowledge in the field of comparative analysis.
To my mind these four contributions may provide some inspirations for the design and
implementation of different research projects outlined in the Twin Volumes.
1 Compare: W. Œwitalski, Regional dynamics and regional dynamism (in:) A. Kukliñski et alia (eds) regional
dynamics of socio-economic change, Finnpublishers, Tampere 1979.
2 J. H. Dunning, Regions, globalization and the knowledge-based economy, Oxford University Press, 2000.
3 D. Konstadakopulos, Learning for innovation in the global knowledge economy. A European and South-East
Asian perspective, Intelect, Bristol 2004.
4 T. Tas¸an-Kok, Budapest, Istambul and Warsaw. Institutional and spatial change, Eburon Academic Publishers,
Delft 2004.
5 C. G. Pickvance, Four varietes of comparative analysis, Journal of Housing and Built Environment,
16.01.2001—quotet after T. Tas¸an-Kok, op.cit.
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ANTONI KUKLIÑSKI
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE FUTURE
—THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
OF CORPORATIONS AND REGIONS
A proposal to establish in the framework of RECiFER
An international research publications
and conference programme Corpo Regio Programme
Introduction
There are four most important actors of the global scene of the XXI century:
— the transnational corporations (T.N.C.)
— the regions
— the states—countries
— the international organizations
In the CRP we will concentrate attention on the strategic partnership of corporations and
regions. This is a challenging problem which could be a great inspiration for theoretical reflection
and pragmatic action. In this paper will present some opening remarks related to the following
topics:
I The TNC as an inspiration for regions
II The regions as an inspiration for TNC
III CRP as an inspiration for meta-disciplinary approaches in managerial and regional
studies
IV The management of the future
V The four perspectives
VI The three dimensions
VII RECiFER and the institutional pattern CRP
VIII The first stages of CRP organized by RECiFER
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I. TNC as an inspiration for regions
Following the observations of S. Boisier1 we can say that in the framework of Old Regionalism
the region was seen as a quasi state—in the framework of New Regionalism the region should be
seen as a quasi corporation. In this context the TNC is a model for the reconstruction of regional
governance leading to the reduction of relations based on political power and increasing relations
based on management.
This means that the first item of CRP is the corporational reconstruction of regional
governance.
II. The region as an inspiration for TNC
It is well known that the current reconstruction of corporate governance is changing the
relations between the classical stiff approaches of functional universalism to elastic approaches
allocating an important place to spatial units in the management of the corporation.
The spatial units are getting a growing autonomy in the decision making mechanism
(decentralization). This autonomy is pushing the TNC into a growing recognition of the genius
loci represented by the individual identities and assets of different regions.
This means that the second item of CRP can be defined as the role of the regional
genius loci in the global success of TNC.
This line of thinking is presented in the relevant paper of J. Lambooy2.
III. CRP—as an inspiration for meta-disciplinary approaches in
managerial and regional sciences
The managerial and regional sciences are two different domains of academic reflection
and pragmatic activities. The CRP will supply a rich field of cooperation and inspiration for
meta-disciplinary approaches emerging in this two domains facing the challenge of the strategic
partnership of corporations and regions.
This means that the third item of CRP are the meta-disciplinary approaches developed by
managerial and regional sciences in the inquiry of the strategic partnership of corporations
and regions.
IV. The management of the future
This is a most challenging formulation both in theoretical and pragmatic reflection. In
the framework of CRP we should try to face this unique intellectual challenge. This is the
fourth item of the CRP Programme.
1 Compare: S. Boisier, The elusive goal of regional development. Between the black box and political agenda—Essays
Series, Document no 95/30 Santiago de Chile 1997, ILPES
quoted in: A. Kukliñski, Studia Regionalne i Lokalne, Np. 4/2003, Warsaw.
2 Compare: J. Lambooy, Globalization—Regional context and governance. A relational perspective (in:) H. Bünz, A.
Kukliñski (eds) Globalization—Experiences and prospects, F. Ebert Stiftung, Warsaw 2001
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V. The four perspectives3
In the paper four perspectives were introduced:
1) the regional governance in the perspective of TNC
2) the corporate governance in regional perspective
3) the perspectives related to the mutual interaction of managerial and regional sciences
4) the perspectives involved in comprehensive approaches to the management of the future
VI. The three dimensions
The network of reflection related to CRP could be developed as a field of interaction of three
dimensions:
1) the theory of the region and the corporation, the theory of the management of the future,
2) the empirical studies related to the experiences of strategic partnership of 25 regions and 25
corporations,
3) the pragmatic studies outlining the corporate reconstruction of the regions and regional
reconstruction of the corporations.
VII. RECiFER and the institutional pattern
RECiFER will be the institutional focus of the CRP. However in a relatively short time we
should try to develop this institutional pattern via the expanding association ofat least 10 academic
institutions, 25 corporations and 25 regions.
3 Compare: OECD—Governance in the 21st century, Future Studies, Paris 2001.
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VIII. The first stage of CRP organized by RECiFER
The first stage is related to the preparation of a pathbreaking volume to be published in in
September 2005 and a pathbreaking conference in Spring 2006. This will be the third volume of
the Eurofutures Publication Series.
Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to open an E-mail Discussion Forum which in a relatively short
time will be an efficient intellectual and pragmatic vehicle leading to the creation and development
of CRP. Yours brainstorming contributions are most cordially invited. Two types of contributions
could be envisaged:
— primo—incremental contributions presenting a deeply critical evaluation of the paper accepting
however the basic scheme of thinking proposed in this paper,
— secundo—structural contributions proposing an alternative vision of CRP based on different
empirical, methodological, and pragmatic assumptions.
Now the judgment is yours Ladies and Gentlemen. I hope however that this judgment will
support the general idea of CRP as a valid international research, publication, and conference
programme—designed and implemented in global and European scale.
Nowy S¹cz—W.S.B.—NLU—RECiFER
August 18th 2004.
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COMMENT ONE
I have been surprised by Prof. Kuklinskiïs proposal on strategic partnership of corporations
and regions. My surprise arises because I thought the original concepts I introduced in the
literature a couple of decades ago, had disappeared in the turbulent waters of new ideas.
Let me make clear that when I wrote the original paper, almost twenty years ago, I used
a couple of metaphors to talk about decentralization on one hand and regional management on
the other.
In relation to decentralization my attention was concentrated in countries with unitarian
political systems (which are the overwhelming cases in Latinamerica) and I wondered how
much political decentralization could be given to regions under these conditions, in other words,
how much of the “nature” of the State could be transferred to regions without hampering the
Nation-State. I recalled that Harold Laski had provided us with a neat definition of the nature
of the State saying that the State was a voluntary institution created by men having three
characteristics: a) a territorial delimitation; b) a compulsory membership and; c) the legitimate
monopoly of the use of power. Then I wondered how much of these characteristics could be
transferred to regions created by a political decision, either by the Executive or by the Parliament
or both.
The conclusion was that territorial delimitation could be transferred without serious problems
and I had in front of me the case of Chile, a country whose Political Constitution declares
that the country is a unitarian republic whose territory is divided into thirteen neat regions; no
problem so far. The compulsory membership (citizenship) could not be transferred to regions if
we are talking about natural persons, but then, what happens with moral or juridical persons,
for instance, firms? I let the answer open to empirical analysis, since from the theoretical point
of view is a feasible operation; just pass a law imposing firms to have HQ in the same regions
where its main activities are developing and think about the fiscal consequences in favor of the
region. The monopoly exerted by the State with respect of the use of power cannot be transferred
to sub national “governments” if we talk about physical power (armed forced) but Laski referred
obviously to the imposition power of the law and certainly there are many examples of regions
which have Regional Councils with normative and legislative powers on competences transferred
to them.
So I concluded that it is perfectible feasible to transfer—if not all—at least some of the
essential features of the national State to regions even in Unitarian political systems and since
I wanted to stress my conviction that regional development is—above all—a problem of political
nature, I coined the term “region as a quasi State” to create a powerful expression.
Later on, I returned to the concept and I introduced considerations about the structure of
domination/dependency which articulates—in my opinion—all the territorial component parts of
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any country and I argued about the need, for all regions (with the exception of the one located
in the top of the pyramid), of creating political power from its own society with the purpose of
changing the regional position in the domination/dependency structure to facilitate a faster growth
and, if possible, to facilitate the passing from growth to development. Once again, “region as
a quasi-State” was a manner of describing that the region had accumulate enough political power
so as to fight for a better position in the national structure. The analysis grew a lot in complexity.
In relation to regional management I coined the expression “region as a quasi firm” to call
the attention to the fact that in practice we were seeing an increasing use of private corporations
management tools in regional or local management. I refer—of course—to strategic planning in
first place and I said that any region with a capacity of long run thinking should answer four
pairs of questions, as any private corporation does: a) what should be produced and where to
sell; b) what investment projects should be studied and what type of financial resources should
be looked for; c) what type of human resources are at our disposal and how can we employ them
and d) what type of corporate image should be built and how the marketing of the region as such
should be done. Remember, I am talking of the years of the “reinvention of government” (Gabler
and Osborne).
It is easily understood how far from traditional views I was.
I received in the last days two reactions to Prof. Kuklinskiïs proposal. One from Prof. Anna
G. Niemiec, extremely good in my opinion; I really enjoyed reading it and I feel that I should
reintroduce this topic in the various courses I give on regional development. Prof. Niemiec
discovered new insights to couple corporations and regions. Another comment by Prof. Roman
Galar is more skeptical to some extent, although he finds the idea of a strategic partnership of
corporations and regions is a powerful idea. I am not sure wether I was well understood, since
I never proposed a reduction of relations based on political power, quite the contrary. During the
last years I have written a couple of times on social capital and its relation—a fundamental one—to
regional development and even, for regional growth. But I do share some of the observations by
Prof. Galar.
Now, what happens with these two concepts in the context of the XXI Century? Well, as it is
clear looking at the EU (which is not my habitat), regions are more important from the political
point of view, as far as the national State is being transformed and therefore, the image of a region
as “a quasi State” is quite appropriate to the current time. And, if we take for granted globalization
and the neo liberal model of political economy as dominating forces in the foreseeable future,
I have no doubts that territorial governance will require more use of administrative tools which
come from the world of corporations, for instance, concerning competitiveness, decentralization,
horizontal networks and so on.
Finally, I suggested Prof. Kuklinski to add a fifth actor in the global scene of the XXI
Century: CIVIL SOCIETY. Both in Europe (and I am thinking of the former countries under
the soviet regime) and in Latinamerica there is a truly explosion of civil society. Many people are
accepting that from now on, the main social actor with the main responsibility of conducting the
process of social modernization is no longer “a lonely ranger” (the State, the working class, the
Church, the oligarchy, the military, etc.) but it is now a collective actor, “all of us”, that is, the
civil society, certainly, in association with the State.
Social life in the next future will circulate among the Palace, the Temple, the Agora, the
Atheneum, and the Market. Public sector will be an actor, for sure, but probably not the most
important.
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COMMENT TWO
Adaptive feedbacks between regions
and corporations
Kukliñski’s memorandum The Management of the Future—the Strategic Partnership of
Corporations and Regions proposes a research program that would probe into the area of existing
and possible interactions between regional governance and corporate management.
This is certainly a topic worthy of considerations in times when more and more real power
is devolved to both establishments. The following comments are my reactions to some ideas
presented in this Memorandum.
I am not sure that parallelism between regions and international corporations is as fundamental
as suggested by Kuklinski. Let us notice few basic differences;
• Corporations might go bankrupt and disappear, their assets being absorbed by the more able
competitors. The Schumpeter constructive destruction effect might even benefit economy as
the whole. Unfortunately, the bankrupt region remains—a sore place full of broken lives and
wasted opportunities. There are a lot of such places.
• Corporations might hire and fire its workforce at wish, pruning it according to developments.
Regions generally have to do with their native population as it is. They can lure some but
cannot oust anybody; they can’t even regulate migration, which is a competence of states.
• Corporations might generally move where they wish, looking for the best business opportu-
nities. Regions are put where they are, bound by geography and demography and political
fortunes of their states.
While skeptical about the concept of Corpo-Regio convergence, I find the idea of the Strategic
Partnership of Corporations and Regions quite convincing. With all the talks about quicksilver
dynamics of multinational corporations, which tend to go without sentiments after the best business
opportunities, their headquarters tend to be well rooted in their regions. Understanding the reason
for this somewhat surprising loyalty might be illuminating for the regions with ambition to host
a big corporation itself not just its outsourcing outlet.
The Boisier’s postulate of reduction of relations based on political power and increasing
relations based on management implies that the problem is in its nature technical and seems
to miss a point of regional viability and competitiveness, which are based on the elusive social
capital. Lambooy’s genius loci seems in this respect more inspiring.
I am not a great enthusiast of the future management, especially in its most alluring form of
putting all imaginable resources into rosy scenarios. I would rather opt for the future alertness.
As it seems, history consequently points this way. Such approach enables fast adaptations and
enhances innovative awareness. It seems that corporations have learned to understand this aspect
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much better than the regions. Regions are too often playgrounds for inexperienced but ambitious
politicians who try to make careers by making irresponsible promises. A dose of corporate
accountability would do a lot of good for regional politics.
From the other side, corporations get used to treat people as any other resource, what is
a shortsighted policy. The resulting degradation of human capital inside corporation structures is
responsible for a number of ills that are harassing their efficiency—from exuberant management
fees to innovative sterility1. Well doing regions, which base their success on transferring human
capital into social capital, might be a source of meaningful inspirations for the corporate
management.
The postulate of interdisciplinary approach to the problem can be only applauded. Corporations
and regions seem to exploit different parts of the developmental know-how. Blending them should
increase adaptive capacities of both. In this context my doubts concerning their convergence might
be constructive with regard to the aims of Corpo-Regio project. Strategic partnership to be viable
must be based on complementary rather than competitive interactions.
1 Galar, R, Knowledge Economy and Evolutionary Traps, (in:) Kukliñski A, W.M. Or³owski (eds), The knowledge
based economy, The global challenges of the 21st century, Rewasz, Warsaw 2000
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COMMENT THREE
I shall take up the invitation by Professor Kuklinski to join in the Discussion Forum dedicated
to the Corpo Regio Programme (C.R.P.) which he proposes in the Memorandum I of August
18th, 2004, entitled “The Management of the Future—The Strategic Partnership of Corporations
and Regions”. My point of view will be that of a sociologist interested in the theory of regions
and regional development. My remarks concern what I call residues of traditional—mythical
thinking about regions. Notably, they are intended as a discussion prompt rather than a set of
fundamentalist propositions. In addition, I make a small mental experiment and think of some
essential features of a region in “corporational” terms.
The idea to link intellectually—and functionally—regions and corporations or to liken regions
to firms seems still rather challenging. It still needs to be encouraged despite the fact that
it has already appeared in a few contributions1, out of which Boisier’s essay appears as truly
path-breaking. More than a moderate response to the idea so far might mean that it runs counter
several deeply rooted biases. These biases could be blocking a possibility to transmit positive
experiences between entities that are perceived as belonging to different types of order. In my
view, these biases are to a large extent embedded in traditional-mythical thinking about regions.
However, the perception of firms/corporations and regions as totally alien in terms of their
statuses, functions and goals cannot be maintained any longer if a closer look is cast on their
performances and qualities. This requires that some of the biases following from traditional,
divisive (disciplinary) thinking based on binary oppositions between, say, economy and culture,
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, market and society etc. need to be revised. Below I have put six,
admittedly overstated, stereotypes that could be negatively affecting inovative thinking on regions
and regional development and the possibility to graft some of the corporate experiences on to
them.
The reluctance to think about regions as about a kind of firms/corporations and thus to
radically reform our thinking about their status/function/goal is frequently justified in the following
manner:
1) firms and corporations are subjects, while regions are objects in the global games
2) firms and corporations are businesses (associations) while regions are not (they are well,
communities)
3) firms and corporations are all about money while regions are mostly about people
4) firms and corporations must develop while regions may and/or must endure
5) firms and corporations are human creations while regions either just are or result from
cultural-political-administrative processes
1 See for instance Boisier 1997 quoted in Kuklinski 2004; Cooke, Morgan 1998; Gasior-Niemiec 2003.
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6) firms and corporations are managed while regions are administered or ruled.
I shall try to deconstruct the biases briefly:
Ad 1) “Firms and corporations are subjects, while regions are objects in the global
games”. Firms, corporations and regions may be both subjects and objects of the globalizing
process, depending on their having a strategy and a mission. Both need to be flexible, however,
as it is rather obvious that a strategy of opening up and coming out in the global world offers
at present greatest opportunities to become an actor, that is a subject of the processes. This, in
turn, requires that a mission, a goal to be reached should be defined clearly. Both, a strategy and
a goal, to be operative, need to be rooted, or at least anchored, in a sort of identity or, in other
words a brand name 2 that is recognized globally.
Ad 2) “Firms and corporations are businesses (associations) while regions are not (they
are, well, communities)”. Firms, corporations and regions are both associations and communities,
or rather a mixture thereof. First of all, they function due to certain stocks of capital. The capital
may take different forms3, ultimately, however, all of them need to be convertible to economic
capital. Moreover, running both firms, corporations and regions incurs costs. The point is to
minimize the costs and thus to increase efficiency of the entities. Nevertheless, to be operative
all of them need to be bound by some kind of normative framework out of which trust, voice
and loyalty as opposed to exit 4 could result as their members’ (employees’, clients’, voters’ etc.)
dominant strategies towards the entity. While this again, brings us back to the issue of identity
and community, both regional and corporate, it is to be remembered that contemporary regions,
like firms and corporations, are mostly imagined communities. 5
Ad 3) “Firms and corporations are all about money while regions are mostly about
people”. As pointed above, neither firms and corporations or regions are able to function without
stocks of capital, including economic capital. Similarly, neither can disregard people. Both firms,
corporations and regions may only be successful owing to people they attract, inspire, use and ...
shape. Human capital is thought to constitute a major factor in the developmental chances of any
collectivity. Money and people are related in many ways. It is worth bearing in mind that the
richer the firm or the region the more it may and will invest in its people. And conversely, poor
regions like unsuccessful firms are instrumental in degrading people and destabilizing inter-human
relationships.
Ad 4) “Firms and corporations must develop while regions may and/or must endure”.
In the contemporary world whatever/whoever does not develop, cannot endure. Firms and
corporations that do not develop, go bankrupt and disappear. Regions that do not develop, become
deserted by people (out-migration etc.), marginalized (lose autonomy, become overly dependent on
the state etc.), and degraded (lost transportation links etc.). The persistence of “lagging behind”
attitude among many regional actors6 obscures the growing improbability of continuing the
outdated model where regional stagnation is “fed” by automatic redistribution of means from some
central budget. The responsibility for development rests with whoever manages a firm/corporation.
I do not see why such a responsibility could not be more emphasized and institutionally demanded
from whoever heads a region.
Ad 5) “Firms and corporations are human creations while regions either just are or
result from cultural-political-administrative processes”. This puts us, as a matter of fact, at the
very heart of traditional-mythical thinking about regions, which makes it difficult to conceive their
existence in terms of purposeful process and change. Therefore, it is much more fruitful to perceive
2 Cf. Gasior-Niemiec 2003 on imago regionis.
3 Cf. Bourdieu 2001.
4 Cf. Hirschman, 1970.
5 Cf. Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1983.
6 Cf. Kuklinski 2003.
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 311 (310)
The Management of the Future—The Strategic Partnership...—Comment Three 311
both firms, corporations and regions as social constructs. 7 Leadership is thus a prerequisite for
the establishment, institutionalization and development of both. Change is related to purposeful,
endogenous action then and not only results from exogenous shocks, if at all. Passivity and
“lagging behind” attitudes are no longer fully justified by anonymous forces of history that might,
indeed, be inimical to certain regions. Such an approach does not, by any means, neglect the
importance of myth-making in the creation and development of regional entities. The myth-making
process needs to be forward-looking however, as is most often the case with successful firms and
corporations. 8
Ad 6) “Firms and corporations are managed while regions are administered or ruled”.
This point, unfortunately, more often than not seems to be true. Regions often fall prey to politics
that frequently exceeds their boundaries. Their administration is intertwined with electoral cycles.
The qualities of whoever heads them are not always known or checked in advance. Moreover,
regional space is populated by a multiplicity of actors whose interests, competences and relations
with the region are variegated. All this undoubtedly makes regional government a difficult task.
One of the solutions is offered by a progression from government to governance that has
a lot in common with corporate experience of management. Strategic thinking, decentralization,
strengthening horizontal and/or multi-level linkages and intensive (external and internal) marketing
belong to its instruments. Regions cannot escape politics altogether, however they could certainly
fare better if it were complemented with strong orientation toward management of the future of
a given regional space.
Finally, let’s make a small mental experiment and think for a while through the metaphor of
a region as a quasi-firm. 9 Such an entity needs to be both internally and externally oriented.
Ideally, the «firm» is a global player. It implements a strategic vision that is in general approved
by its shareholders. Since it is sensitive to competitive pressures, its management, apart from the
strategic action, must also take into account and deal with short-term fluctuations on the market.
Hence, market and competitiveness are the two major concerns in the external orientation of the
«firm». On the other hand, the «firm» implements the strategic vision, owing to concrete human
resources that are within the «firm» bound by a certain culture and style of work. Their essence
is caught and coded in a consciously formulated and promulgated “mission” of the «firm» and in
its “image”.
In short, the «firm» devises and implements in parallel two types of policy: external, which is
ruled by the principle of profit maximization and dominated by the idea of competitive advantage
and internal, which is ruled by the principle of trust maximization and dominated by the ideas of
building voice and loyalty (or in other words, participation and creativity). Striking the balance
between the two types of policy enables the «firm» to succeed. What is particularly important is
the fact that the metaphor of region as a firm allows for a reconciliation between two, seemingly,
mutually exclusive understandings and approaches to regions: this of a technocratic business
association and that of an affective community.
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COMMENT FOUR
Regions and Corporations:
the importance of technological transfer
Kukliñski’s memorandum on ‘The Management of the Future: The Strategic Partnership of
Corporations and Regions’ is both interesting and challenging. I make the following observations,
based upon my own recent work on regional agglomerations, technological advancement and firms’
behaviour. In doing so, I am taking into account the fact that technological innovation manifests
itself in different ways in the various regions, depending on the region’s industrial structure, as
well as the prevailing socio-political and cultural conditions.
Firstly, there is little doubt that policy-making has shifted away from national administrators,
up to the supranational level and down to the sub-national (regional or local) level 1.
I agree with other commentators on this memorandum, such as Roman Galar, that the
parallelism between regions and TNCs postulated by Kukliñski is weaker than he suggests. In
my view, substantive differences exist between regions and corporations, but nonetheless some
common elements are indeed apparent:
• The disposition of many European regions towards collaboration rather than competition, in
supporting technological advancement, assisting firm networking and fostering the development
of social capital.
• The propensity of TNCs to cluster in regional agglomerations, forming technological al-
liances with indigenous firms and generating opportunities for innovation through technology
spillovers, information sharing and exchange of knowledge.
• The clustering initiatives of many regions, targeting particular industries and sectors, and
developing an industrial policy to fill the gap created by the free market and by the fact that
supranational entities have limited industrial policy, or none at all.
• The regionalisation strategy of TNCs, which tend to agglomerate their production in a few
selected localities rather than disperse their value-added chain activities in a wider geographical
area.
Without effective transfer of technology from TNCs, some regions might not be able to climb
the technological ladder. TNCs locate within a region not only because of the presence of direct
factors of production (good road infrastructure, availability of skilled staff, etc.) but also because
of indirect factors (entrepreneurial and innovative culture, an attractive local environment and
1 Eser, T. and Konstadakopulos, D., (2000), ‘Power Shifts in the European Union? The Case of Spatial Planning’,
European Planning Studies, 8(6), pp. 783–798.
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amenities, etc.). These indirect factors are not properly addressed by the traditional locational
models found in regional science2.
There are many cases where a region has been successful in forming a technological alliance
between TNCs and some of the local firms, making it an attractive location for R&D facilities.
This confirms Kukliñski’s point of view that strategic partnerships of corporations and regions are
worth exploring3.
In an increasingly integrating world, knowledge is becoming the driving force behind the
economic growth of regions and states. The emergence of this ‘new economy’ depends on how
well economic actors, and particularly firms, exploit new scientific and technological knowledge in
the form of new product or process innovations, and make use of their intangible assets, such
as skills and creativity. Knowledge management is undoubtedly an important constituent of the
management of the future, but generally corporations are more efficient in this respect than are
the regions. For some time now, these corporations have been creating knowledge management
programmes and appointing executives to manage their intellectual capital and R&D efforts
in a globalised environment. It is only very recently, however, that the concept of knowledge
management has started to feature in strategies for economic development adopted by the regions
in Europe and elsewhere in the world4.
I strongly agree with Sergio Boiser’s extension of Kukliñski’s model of four perspectives, to
include a fifth: civic society. The extensive literature on innovative milieux and Italian industrial
districts has shown the importance of this dimension. Increasingly, economists, geographers
and sociologists are focussing on cultural attributes of society, such as the disposition towards
cooperation based on trust, wider participation, creativity and entrepreneurship in the context of
an enlightened civic society. Furthermore, the social embeddedness of corporations within their
respective regions, as well as localised forms of knowledge, are becoming important issues for
discussion amongst economic geographers and regional analysts and merit inclusion within this
fifth perspective. (For an excellent review of the literature on embeddedness, see Schnell and
Sofer (2003) 5.)
Kukliñski’s proposal for an interdisciplinary study on fostering a strategic partnership between
TNCs and regions could be useful, especially to those peripheral regions that view TNCs as one
of the most important agents in regional development.
2 Konstadakopulos, D., (2004), ‘The Success Factors of Small Towns in England and Wales’, paper presented at
the Transatlantic Science Association, University of Dundee, July 12–14.
3 Konstadakopulos, D., (2004), Learning for Innovation in the Global Knowledge Economy: A European and South
East Asian Perspective’, Bristol (UK) and Portland, OR, (US): Intellect, 154 pages.
4 Konstadakopulos, D., Revilla Diez, J., Kockel, U. and Mildhan, B., (2001), ‘Knowledge Companies in Britain
and Germany: A Common Response to the Challenges of the Emerging Knowledge-Based Economy?’, London:
Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society.
5 Schnell, I. and Sofer, M., (2003), ‘Embedding Entrepreneurship in Social Structure: Israeli-Arab Entrepreneurship’,
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27(2), pp. 300–318.
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LOCATION POLAND
The experience of the Transnational Corporations (TNCs)
A research, conference
and publication program-outline up-date
In the quest for the position within modern world of politics and economics Poland and
entire Region of CEE widely opened its doors to Transnational Corporations (TNCs) at the
beginning of the transition process in the 90’s. Last decade brought to the Region numerous
foreign investments deeply influencing not only local economy but also leaving their very strong
footprint on the local social, cultural and moral behaviors.
The role of TNCs are no longer hidden behind their brands and logos, TNCs are subject
of public attention and debate on the role that their play in the national economy. Also their
interacting with politics and public administration are the issues of interest. However most of
the studies undertaken in that respect concentrate on evaluating start-up research, strategies
and patterns of entering those markets. Few deal with protection of local interest and values in
interacting with TNCs.
It is proven that investments made by TNCs have on average positive result for local market,
however under specific conditions entry of TNC might cause danger to local society and local
economy. 1 That danger comes with number of characteristics owned by TNCs and introduced to
local society and market which in most cases is not aware of those and does not have ability
to deal with them. The size, financial strength, cross-border experience, legal and administrative
support, determination and many other characteristics of TNCs make them extremely capable in
achieving their objectives which could differ from those of local policy makers.
May 1st 2004 marked new era of Europe with long expected accession of 10 new countries
to United Europe. Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Baltic States, Czechia more than ever
will be subject of TNCs penetration. New markets, new opportunities, new challenges that is
the never-ending mean of TNCs development and quest for better return, bigger market share,
higher earnings and dividends on the most competitive global market place.
Polish Association for The Club of Rome has come to the conclusion that a new angle of
that process must be explored. The angle of economic and social advancement that TNCs and
their presence in the local economy bring to Poland. The new initiative aims to answer several
important questions that need to be addressed. Why Poland? How decisions were made? Which
1 Maciej Smêtowski “Przedsiêbiorstwo zagraniczne w otoczeniu lokalnym” Studia Regionalne i Lokalne Europejski
Instytut Rozwoju Regionalnego i Lokalnego UW; Sekcja Polska Regional Studies Association
Vol.no 4 ( 4) 2000 ISSN 1509–4995; pages 87–103
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elements had most important role on the choosing location and time of investment? Did local
administration help TNCs entry? Did legal and tax environments support investment decisions?
But at the same time more important issues must be dealt with;
a. how efficient are TNCs in Poland and Central and Eastern Europe?
b. is local public administration prepared to deal with and interact with TNCs and their technical,
legal and tax requirements?
c. what role international organizations like World Bank, OECD, IMF play in bridging between
transition economies of Central Europe and TNCs?
d. what are the global versus local interests and links in the economy?
e. do we have models and instruments to measure TNCs role in the local and global economy?
Polish Association for the Club of Rome foresees the need to establishing open and strong
links with TNCs as highly required partners in realization of core goals that The Club of Rome
was set for from its beginning:
“ A group of world citizens, sharing a common concern for the future of humanity and
acting as catalyst to stimulate public debate, to sponsor investigations and analysis of the
“problematique” and to bring those to the attention of decision-makers” (Uwe Möller” The Club
of Rome at The Millenium Threshold”, Globalization. Experience and Prospects. 2001)
Polish Association for The Club of Rome makes efforts of launching its new initiative as three
stage program containing following elements;
1. Research and analytical phase—commissioning of TNC’s operating in Poland under general
headline “ The location in Poland—The experience of Corporation X”, based on agreed and
approve methodology, selection process and Authors formation seminar.
2. Conference and publication phase—provides that enough research material will be obtained
an academic conference analyzing the results of those reports should be organized driving
towards synthetic evaluation of the performance of TNCs in Poland. Also a political debate
should take place to answer some of the questions on the role of TNCs in the local
economy. Governmental and parliamentary views on TNCs but also on the public authorities
and administration dialogue with TNCs must be collected and recorded. Going further an
international conference involving IMF, OECD, World Bank, UN, Club of Rome could be
organized with objective of evaluating the role of TNCs in transformation of CEE and beyond.
3. Execution phase—based on the research results and public debate outcome it should an
effort to create a complex education program for the public authorities and administration to
facilitate relations and interacting of TNCs with local environment to better understanding
and cooperation in solving most important economic, social and cultural issues. If scientific
research is to help local societies that phase becomes the most important part of the entire
program.
Polish Association for The Club of Rome is in the process of setting up necessary links to
the selected number of TNCs which are present in Poland and marketing our initiative to their
decision makers seeking their intellectual support and financial assistance in program realization.
Unfortunately program success depends on its intellectual quality and managerial performance,
but also on the ability to overcome its financial barriers. Polish Association for The Club of
Rome estimates that Program will require between 200 to 250 thousands EURO. But even more
importantly it depends on the ability to break through the barrier of TNCs reluctance to open
doors for such studies. Experience shows that extensive study program meets several objections
form TNCs local management.
Status of project:
• Initial discussions with potential partners ( TNCs) show their interest to that initiative which
does not translates at any point directly into program participation and its financial support.
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• Realization of the Program will require lengthy negotiations!!!!
• There is some interest of local business organization and associations of foreign investors to
support our efforts but again that interest ends in the preliminary discussions.
• Realization of the program in phase 1 must be viewed within the 12 months i.e. till the end of
2005. Phase 2 and 3 do will be feasible only upon collection of sufficient number of individual
company (TNCs) reports and their academic elaboration.
Given the unsuccessful results of the efforts made in year 2004 Polish Association for the Club
of Rome seeks new approach to that initiative. More dialogue with TNC’s operating in Poland
and other potential supporting parties is scheduled in the beginning of the year 2005.
Polish Association for The Club of Rome should be very much obliged for the intellectual and
institutional support that The Club of Rome may provide to the realization of that new initiative.
The Club of Rome focuses its activity on the processes of globalization. The role of TNCs in
those processes can not be overstated. TNCs mean globalization and therefore The Club of Rome
must have its very close working relations with TNCs. Those relations will carry out forward the
mission and vision of The Club of Rome.
The initiative of Polish Association for The Club of Rome sets grounds for establishing contact
and initiating dialogue of The Club of Rome and TNCs. This may be read as controversial and
create an open debate within the Members of The Club of Rome, but we shall not be afraid of
being controversial, The Club of Rome should have its courage to drive into controversial issues
and discussions.
While spending time on debate concerning Europe in the perspective of global change The
Club of Rome shall not forget the role that TNCs play and will continue to play in that process.
Warsaw, January 8th, 2005
References:
Editor Anna ¯orska “Transnational Corporations in Poland” Warsaw 2003
Boles³aw Domañski “Kapita³ zagraniczny w przemyœle Polski”( translation “Foreign capital in industry of
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Studia Regionalne i Lokalne vol.no 4 ( 4 ) 2000—Europejski Instytut Rozwoju Regionalnego i Lokalnego
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COMMENT ONE
There is no doubt that transnational corporations TNCs are the key player in contemporary
global economy. They have also made a strong impact on the postsocialist transformation of
Polish economy, contributing to its growth and enhanced competitiveness. Poland has attracted the
largest amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) among the postsocialist countries since 1990,
though some smaller states were more successful in terms of FDI per capita. TNC activity have
created new strong links between Poland and global economy. The important point is that
foreign companies stimulate general modernization and progress in organization and management
occurring among their domestic competitors and suppliers too. And last but not least, TNCs have
constituted a powerful force lobbying for Poland’s swift integration within the European Union.
The initiative of a new programme focused on transnational corporations (TNCs) put forward
by Bogus³aw Skuza deserves wholehearted support. Our understanding of the role of TNCs in the
postsocialist economy of Poland is far from satisfactory (see B³uszkowski and Garlicki 1996; Durka
1999; Domañski 2001, 2003; Zorska 2003). This is especially important at the time of Poland’s
accession to the European Union.
What I perceive as strength of the programme is its focus on the relationships between the
functioning of TNCs and various local actors and interests. I would like to comment briefly on
some of the issues (from a. to e.) suggested by Bogus³aw Skuza.
The question of the efficiency of TNCs in Poland and Central and Eastern Europe is
connected with the role of a Polish subsidiaries within the entire corporation and hence in relations
between the former, the mother company and its affiliates in other countries. This reflects the
character of activity carried out in Poland, e.g. high/low-value added, specialised/standardised,
final product/component, type of customers, the extent of intra-firm supplies and exports/imports.
The position of Polish affiliates can be entrenched or gradually upgraded, for example by the
augmentation of production competences and/or acquiring marketing, design and R&D functions.
This can be viewed from the perspective of value chains.
The relationships between global and local interests can be approached in terms of local
embeddedness of TNCs. There is contradictory argument about the embeddedness of foreign
investors in Central and Eastern Europe. The salient component of this embeddedness are
networks of suppliers of various components and services. All these linkages bring about local
and regional multiplier effects. There are also local income multiplier effects generated through
employment. In addition, the local integration takes the form of company support for various
institutions and events, and the involvement in infrastructural investment. All these provisions
make the firm “a local citizen”, together with tax payments, respect for the environmental
regulations and good labour relations. Lastly, there are relations with the local government and
other institutions and a broader influence on local firms and community by means of personnel
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mobility, social contacts and imitation behaviour. The embeddedness of TNCs can be seen as
a prerequisite of their positive impact on the capacity for sustained national and regional economic
development (Phelps 2000; Domañski 2004a, 2004b).
Finally, it seems interesting to explore how TNCs change Polish labour (Gradev 2001).
Successful national economic policy requires knowledge of how the quality of labour and labour
force attitudes have been transformed. The qualitative influence of foreign-owned enterprises on
local an regional labour markets may differ, for example in metropolitan and non-metropolitan
areas.
I am sure that better understanding of TNCs activity in Poland will bring policy-relevant
effects.
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COMMENT TWO
Transnational groups transfer their knowledge and organization style through the countries
they operate. They interact with local social, economic and legal environments on various
dimensions. I fully support the idea of researching those dimensions, proposed by Mr Skuza
and believe that ABB, being first transnational group operating in Poland, will give important
contribution into proposed program.
Local presence of Transnational Corporations (TNC) has to be seen from Globalization and
Knowledge Era point of view. The world has already entered the knowledge based economy
epoch. Information and knowledge capital are as important as production infrastructure and
financial capital. Globalization, growing global civil society and technological innovations are the
most important factors forcing companies to shift the fundamentals of business conduction. The
speed, at which a corporation can learn and employ new knowledge, is a decisive factor in the
competition. Presently, most of leading firms are, or are trying to be organized around information.
What do the mentioned above realities mean for a transnational company like ABB?
Briefly, they mean that the information and knowledge have to be managed in an efficient
way, both internally and externally applied in the product offer. On one hand global customers are
served with products at a uniform level of quality, on another hand local standards, habits and
conditions will always require localized products.
Internal Knowledge Management
Global companies have to realize cultural and organization change in countries they operate.
Knowledge and information existing at all levels has to be utilizing in possibly most effective way.
Efficient internal knowledge management is a must. Studies show that 20–30% of average
company’s resources are wasted due to recovery of the wheel. Presently there are no secrets in
the market. The internet, among other things, proves that companies compete transparently, in
pricing, specifications, etc. Now the whole organization has to be customer focused, consequently
knowledge management and fast responds to present and future client expectation are the main
focus. Managing and utilization of individual and collective knowledge for this purpose is all about
running a company.
The program called Step Change was designed to lead ABB there. The main goal of the
program is cost saving but cultural and organization change are critical dimensions. The way of
information and knowledge sharing, their transfer and distribution have to be optimal across the
whole organization. The company structure should be simple and clear in order to be able to
profit from customer centric approach.
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Product Knowledge Management
Knowledge being a part of the offered product system is another story. ABB is a power
and automation technology group with substantial production facilities. Its core business is power
transmission, distribution technologies and automation for industry. One can say—old economy
example, but ABB already knows that a proper balance between knowledge, production and
financial capitals has to be sustained. The ABB offer consists of product system solution. Most
of the products have their own intelligence, own means of related information and knowledge
resources handling. For nearly a decade, ABB has been engaged in a sweeping program of
technological and cultural change geared to optimizing the way in which its broad offer works
together: products from every ABB business are being re-engineered into compatible, “information
enabled” building blocks. This concept is called Industrial IT, and is being developed to help
customers navigate and manage thousands of plant devices as easily as browsing the files on
a desktop PC.
First pilot, Industrial IT enabled production line has been applied in Poland. Polish ABB
company in £ódŸ, has been chosen to show the advantages of the new approach. This company
is a focused factory—the only ABB European unit for production of medium-sized distribution
transformers. The £ódŸ model is scheduled to be copied at other ABB distribution transformer
factories around the globe.
R&D and international network of researchers
Global Corporations have a pioneer role in Central & Eastern Europe Transformations.
Europe has progressed its integration process during last decade fairly due to early 90’ and
subsequent joint ventures and investments. In some cases it was not just technology transfer and
investment in low cost labor. ABB Corporate Research in Kraków has been operating since 1997.
That was in line with conviction that for long-term presence at this part of the world investment
in knowledge-based economy is needed.
What is essential for a company for creation of industrial R&D unit in a country?
Firstly lets define Industrial R&D. USA is ahead of Europe in new technologies but
implantation of existing technologies is a field of equal chances. The aim of Industrial Research
and Development activities is to initiate those implementations.
And now coming back to the question, in short for effective R&D once needs:
skilled people, communication, laboratory infrastructure as well as support from a high
education centers. Outsourcing of a research works requiring expensive laboratory works at local
institutions is a cost effecting solution. But costs are not the only critical factor, more important
is obviously quality of work and the result delivery time.
As it has been found in Polish ABB case all those aspects could be found in Central and
Eastern Europe countries. In majority of cases laboratories are well equipped and under utilized.
Young skilled scientists there are efficient and swift in their work, as they well know that more
effort is required from them to become an equal partner at global organizations.
Young generations do realize that EU enlargement is their chance of a lifetime, and they
are probably more determined than their western colleagues who could be already accustomed to
prosperity of stable economies. This should give some “fresh blood” to new Europe so needed in
global competitions.
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Sustainability and innovations—social and environmental dimen-
sions
Ability to find new solutions for old problems, to apply solutions for changing conditions and
to offer new systems is an R&D organization task. Also, there is no sustainability (understood as
balance between economy, environmental protection and social responsibility) without R&D.
Most of TNCs support the concept. One of the reasons could be Dow Jones Sustainability
Index where ABB is toped ranked as in most countries it has a leading position in Environmental
Management System implementation and development of Environmental Product Declarations
according to ISO 14000 series. Implementation of Social Policy complement ABB’s Sustainability
Program.
Conclusions
The knowledge-based economy requires cultural and organizational change from compa-
nies. Integrated solution based on common communication platform, assuring comprehensive
information handling, can provide competitive edge itself.
Transnational groups acting globally, transfer their knowledge and organization style through
the countries they operate, are setting international standards and values including environmental
protection as well as social responsibilities. They also profit, not only in traditional economic sense,
they acquire a new knowledge that comes from doing and teaching others.
References:
Yury Boshyk, “New World: New Challenges”, International Consortium Program, 26 August, 2002
“Welcome to the world of Industrial IT”, ABB brochure, 2002
Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds), “Europe in the perspective of global change”. Warsaw 2003—p. 207–209, Piotr
Ciechanowski “Sustainable development of Europe”
Boles³aw Domañski, “Kapita³ Zagraniczny w przemyœle Polski”, Jagiellonian University 2001.
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 323 (323)
Part Part Five
TheWeimarTriangle—Illusion versus
Reality
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 325 (324)
ANTONI KUKLIÑSKI
THE WEIMAR TRIANGLE—THE HISTORICAL
ILLUSION OF THE XX CENTURY
VS. THE STRATEGIC REALITY
OF THE XXI CENTURY*
“If the supreme goal of the international
policy of our state is the achievement of full
membership in the EU, then we should do every-
thing to stress our links with Western Europe,
contrary to the wall of separation built by the
communistic dictatorship. The Weimar Triangle
should be transformed into a important instru-
ment of our political return to Western Europe
designed in such a way that it will serve our in-
terests but also appear as useful and promising
to our partners.”
Jerzy £ukaszewski, Warsaw 2000
I. The historical illusions of the XX century
The political scene of the XX century has created the Weimar Triangle as an instrument of
cordial and comprehensive cooperation of Germany, France and Poland. It was assumed that the
historical experience and the geopolitical location will be an inducement for the Three Countries
to create a New Entente Cordiale of integrated activities and policies designing and implementing
the vision of strong and united Europe.
The bitter experience has demonstrated that this was to a large extent an historical illusion.
Especially bitter are the experiences of the first years of the XXI century when the network of the
Triangle was very weak and very often destroyed by highly divergent activities and approaches.
* This paper is a follow up of the contribution of A. Kukliñski—“Europe, Germany, Poland—Three Dilemmas and
Two Scenarios”, Warsaw November 4th 2003. This contribution will be quoted as “Three Dilemmas”.This paper was
presented at the International Conference—M¹dralin 18th–19th June 2004—“Poland and Germany in the enlarged
European Union”. The conference was organized by Prof. Witold Ma³achowski as the Leader of the Project. Some
elements of this paper are published in the volume: W. Ma³achowski (ed.) Poland—Germany and the enlargement of
the European Union, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2004.
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A comprehensive evaluation of the relative share of the three countries in the creation of this
miserable political landscape is outside the scope of this short paper. For the sake of clarity
and sincerity let me add only that unfortunately the negative input of Poland was highly visible
although it would be wrong to shift into the Polish field the total burden of negative responsibility.
II. The strategic reality of the XXI century
The bitter experiences of the past should not eliminate the firm value judgment that the
Entente Cordiale of the Weimar Triangle should be transformed into a strategic reality of the
XXI century.
The Triangle should transform itself into a political, economic, social, academic and cultural
community—creating jointly an integrated network dedicated to the Bright Future of the three
countries and Europe in toto. In the new stage of the development of the European Union the
discussions related to the Triangle are especially important.
III. The integrated network of the New Entente Cordiale
In this short paper I will not try to outline a comprehensive vision of the New Entente
Cordiale as a Strategic Reality of the XXI century Europe. I will try to outline only some
elements of a Grand research Programme which would be able to create a vision of convergences
and divergences linking the experiences and prospects of the three countries. The potential to
create a network of learning processes able to improve the performance of the three countries is
really very great.
The Grand Programme will be designed and implemented by a consortium of nine Institutions:
three German, three French and three Polish. The Benchmarking approach could be used in
a very efficient way in this grand Programme (see Annex One).
IV. France–Germany–Poland
—The fields of convergences and divergences
As far I know the Polish Social Sciences—it is impossible to find contributions analyzing
an integrated field of comprehensive reflection incorporating jointly the French–German and the
Polish Scene. We have some Polish–German and French–Polish Research Projects but the analysis
of the Triangle in toto is totally missing. The social science community related to German–Polish
studies is practically self-contained and isolated from the Francophonic community involved in
comparative studies—Poland–France.
We should try to create bridges of cooperation linking the two social science communities in
Poland. In the next stage of our Programme we can envisage a grand scheme of cooperation of
French, German and Polish Academic Community involved in a deep and comprehensive analyses
of the integration of French, German and Polish analytical scene.
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V. The convergences and divergences inside the Weimar Triangle—
The five testing fields
In the first stage of our programme I would like to propose to test five fields related to the
performance of the Weimar Triangle:
1) The demographic drama
2) The challenge of the reconstruction of the Welfare State
3) The challenge of the Knowledge—based economy (K.B.E.)
4) The new dynamics of the regional scene
5) The approaches to the construction of a Strong European Union
VI. The demographic drama
The demographic scene of France, Germany and Poland will be dominated by the same trend:
The drastical change in the balances of the young and old generation is creating the demand for
a new set of demographic policies. It is an open question when France, Germany and Poland will
recognize the urgent political, social and cultural necessity to promote pronatalistic policies.
Anyway, the joint French–German—Polish reflection on the demographic future of Europe is
a challenging topic.
VII. The challenge of the reconstruction of the Welfare State
In this field the convergence is highly visible. The integrated learning process should be
promoted both in political and academic dimension. The classical welfare state of the XX century
will not survive. However the idea of the welfare state cannot be totally eliminated in Europe.
So we have an open challenging question in France, Germany and in Poland—How to design an
efficient welfare state of the XXI century?
VIII. The challenge of the Knowledge-Based Economy
Also in this field the convergence can be observed. Unfortunately this convergence is in the
sphere of declarations of the fidelity to the Lisbon Agenda. In real terms, Poland is lagging
behind Germany and France in all efforts to create a strong KBE. The German and French
demonstration effect should be studied very carefully in Poland.
We have to see however the weakness of the German and French performance in the
Euro-creativity Index. See Annex One in this paper.
IX. The new dynamics of regional scene
Germany and France have opened a new chapter in this rich field of cooperation. This is the
cooperation of the French Regions and the German Lander. The Polish Regions are well prepared
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to join the Regional Community of the Weimar Triangle. A big push on this scene will create
excellent results.
X. The approaches to the construction of the strong European
Union
The final and the most important testing field is the presence or absence of a joint approach
to the construction of a strong EU. This is a great historical decision for Poland to join the
German and French efforts in the construction of strong EU or to play a game which probably is
leading to the reality of weak EU and weak Europe in toto.
XI. Four dilemmas—two scenarios
The performance of the Weimar Triangle can be expressed also as a set of Four Dilemmas
and Two Scenarios.
The four dilemmas are:
— strong versus weak France
— strong versus weak Germany
— strong versus weak Poland
— strong versus weak European Union
In the matrix notation the panorama of these four dilemmas can be seen in the following way:
This panorama of the different situations expressing the relative power and weakness inside
and outside the Weimar Triangle we will reduce to two paralellistic scenarios 1:
Scenario A (optimistic)—Strong France–Strong Germany–Strong Poland–Strong EU
1 Compare for example: K. Bennhold, France headed for stagnation, IHT, October 20th 2004.
C. Dougherty, Sluggish growth projected for Germany, IHT, op.cit.
Charlemagne The Lisbon Lament, The Economist, November 6th–12th 2004
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Scenario B (pessimistic)—Weak France–Weak Germany–Weak Poland–Weak EU
Naturally we can consider an alternative set of non paralellistic scenarios. I am convinced
however that the paralellistic scenarios have a bigger cognitive and pragmatic power related to
a very clear choice of the optimistic versus pessimistic interpretation of the Weimar Triangle.
Conclusion
The whole system of the Weimar Triangle should be very deeply interested and motivated
in the transformation of this Triangle into the Strategic reality of the XXI century. Naturally
this transformation is a complicated political process developed by the respective political
communities.Nevertheless the academic community of the three countries can create a modest but
valid contribution in this field. I hope that this paper is a right step in this direction.
M. Laudler. Man who wrote book on German’s reforms. Hartz becomes lighting rod in debate, I.H.T., November
26th 2004.
M. Marody, J. Wilkin (eds) On Course? Poland on the eve of EU accession. EU Monitory, Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, Kraków 2004. Compare German labour—The day the factories stopped, Economist, October 23, 2004.
The come-back Chancellor, Economist, February 5, 2005.
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Annex One
The Benchmarking of the performance
of France, Germany and Poland
Benchmarking is a special type of comparative analysis, trying to discover the best practices
and the ways to transplant successfully these best practices from community A to community B
(the catching up community).
In this context we would like to outline only the basic comparative data (table I) and a most
interesting table—The Euro-Creativity Index—reproduced from the pioneer contribution of R.
Florida and J. Tinagli—“Europe in the Creative Age”, February 2004, Carnegie Mellon Software
Industry Center (table II).
Table I
Selected general economic indicators and selected indicators of knowledge-based economy
for France, Germany and Poland, at the beginning of XXI century
Indicator France Germany Poland
Total area (thous. km2) 552 357 313
Population, (thous.),) 2001 59037 82260 38644
Gross Domestic Product (mln euro), 2001, current prices 1463700 2071200 204300
Average annual GDP growth rate (%), 1998–2002 2,60 1,50 3,00
Imports, total, (mln euro), 2001 366910 549940 56035
Exports, total, (mln euro), 2001 361080 638160 40195
Foreign direct investment (% GDP), 1990–2000 average 2,90 5,60 3,90
Total expenditure for R&D, (% GNP), 2000 2,15 2,48 0,70
Researchers in R&D, 2002 160424 259214 55174
Researchers in R&D, (per 1 mln inhabitants), 2002 2737 3155 1482
High-Tech exports, (as % of manufacturing exports), 2001 23 18 3
Investment in telecom, (as % of GDP), 2000 1,01 0,37 0,88
Computers, (per 1.000 inhabitants), 2002 347 435 85
Internet users, (per 10.000 inhabitants), 2002 3138 4237 984
Source: Poland—The European Union. Central Statistical Orfice. Warsaw2003. 2004 Knowledge Assessment Methodology.
http://www1.worldbank.org/gdln/kam.htm.
Table prepared by dr W. Burzyñski
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Table II
The Euro-Creativity Index
TALENT INDEX TECHNOLOGY INDEX TOLERANCE INDEX
Euro-Creativity High
Creative Human Scientific Self-
Index Innov. Tech R&D Attitudes Values
Class Capital Talent Express
Index Innov. Index Index Index
Rank Score Index Index Index Index
Index
1. Sweden 0.81 8 7 2 2 3 1 2 1 1
2. USA 0.73 1 1 3 1 1 3 n.a. 13 4
3. Finland 0.72 4 6 1 4 2 2 3 5 10
4. Netherlands 0.67 3 2 10 6 4 8 5 4 2
5. Denmark 0.58 9 15 4 5 5 6 7 3 3
6.Germany 0.57 11 4 7 3 6 4 12 2 9
7.Belgium 0.53 2 8 6 7 9 7 13 8 8
8. UK* 0.52 5 3 8 9 6 9 8 9 6
9. France 0.46 n.a. 11 5 10 8 5 11 7 11
10. Austria 0.42 12 14 11 8 10 0 9 10 5
11. Ireland 0.37 6 10 9 11 12 1 5 15 7
12. Spain 0.37 10 4 12 13 13 3 1 12 14
13. Italy 0.34 13 12 13 12 11 2 4 11 12
14. Greece 0.31 7 9 15 14 14 5 14 6 13
15. Portugal 0.19 14 13 14 15 15 4 9 14 15
Note: The number in column 3–11 indicate the relative position of the specific country with respect to the dimension
reported in the column header (i.e. number 1 on the Human capital Column indicates that the country ranks first on
human capital dimension). In bold, tied results.
*The scores on the Values Index and Self Expression Index refer to Britain (excluding Northern Ireland), for all other
indexes scores refer to United Kingdom (Britain and Northern Ireland)
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THE WEIMAR TRIANGLE
An International Research
and Publication Programme*
Towards a New Paradigm
We should find a new paradigm for Weimar studies trying to outline new research questions,
and new answers outside the domain of conventional wisdom and political correctness.
The way leading to the new paradigm is a different trajectory of trial and error. We should have
the wisdom, courage, and imagination to face this challenge. To start this brainstorming discussion
let me present for your most critical and comprehensive evaluation three notes:
I. The global significance of the experiences of the Weimar Triangle
II. The spectre of the bankruptcy of Europe as a global power—The challenge for the
Weimar Triangle
III. The Weimar Triangle and the reinvention of the West
IV. The Weimar Triangle after all
I. The global significance of the experiences
of the Weimar Triangle
In the International Herald Tribune we find an optimistic and inspiring comment1
“Germany and Poland a reason to celebrate”. Let us present two quotations from this
contribution:
“Relations between states are seldom as moving as those between people, governed in general
by dry formulations rather than the unpredictable fluctuations of the heart. But there is something
in the postwar reconciliation of Germany and Poland, the most improbable of diplomatic triumphs,
that stirs the spirit as much as any human drama.
If, after the Nazi transformation of Poland into the epicenter of its program for the annihilation
of European Jewry, after Auschwitz and Majdanek, after the German slaughter of millions of
Christian Poles and millions of Polish Jews, after the ghettos and the executions, after the
* This paper is a follow up of my contributions published in the volume: W. Ma³achowski (ed.) Poland–Germany
and the enlargement of the European Union, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2004
1 R. Cohen, Germany and Poland. A reason to celebrate, I.H.T., August 7th–8th 2004. Roger Cohen can be reached
at: rocohen@nytimes.com
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crushing of the Warsaw Uprising and the street-by-street destruction of Warsaw—if, after all this
and more, Germany and Poland have within three generations come to a point where civility
governs their close relations, that is reason for celebration.”
“If Poles and Germans can reconcile, so, too, can the most bitter of foes, even Israelis and
Palestinians. The method? Define your borders in the knowledge that they become less relevant
as trade and people-to-people contacts expand. Create a regional political and economic framework
that binds and is supportive, Set aside differences over property in the overriding, interests of
peace and let the courts decide individual claims. Above all, accept that agonizing history cannot
be undone, but it can be overcome by looking, together, to the future.”
These quotations are an inducement to see the experiences of the Weimar Triangle in a global
perspective. In the complicated and tragic landscape of the XX century the French–German
reconciliation and the Polish–German reconciliation are optimistic experiences which could be an
inspiration for other conflict regions around the world.
In our new research project the global significances of the reconciliation experiences inside the
Weimar Triangle should be seen as an important element of our studies. To my mind this would
be a totally new approach into the nature of the global success of the Weimar Triangle as a field
of two important dramatic historical reconciliations—the French–German and the German–Polish
reconciliation.
Maybe Mr. Roger Cohen would accept our invitation to join our Weimar Programme?
II. The spectre of bankruptcy of Europe as a global power.
The challenge for the Weimar Triangle
This note will be formulated in a dramatic language trying to say that the bankruptcy
of Europe as a global power of the XXI century should be seen as the crucial real problem
in our studies.
The International Herald Tribune2 has published a contribution outlining the new economic
order Anno Domini 2050. In table 1 we are presenting the most important features of the global
landscape of 20503.
Naturally this information should not be taken too dramatically. The presented projection is
probably the extrapolation of the present structure of the rates of growth which hinc et nunc are
very unfavorable for Europe. This situation may be changed in the next decades assuming that,
Europe will again be a strong and dynamic continent.
Nevertheless responsible and outstanding personalities of the European Union 4 have
formulated the following dramatic question:
“Are we going to accept that the EU will be eventually overtaken by India and China?”. This
is most probably the most important problem of the XXI century for Europe in toto and for the
Weimar Triangle.
Will this Triangle transform itself into a leading engine of European development or will this
Triangle transform itself into a symbol of weak stagnant and paralyzed Europe. The answer to this
dramatic question we will not find in the theory and practice dominated by political correctness
and conventional wisdom in the framework of short term opportunistic approaches.
2 The new alliances—A shifting geography of trade—Developing countries economic clout grows—The new economic
order 2050, I.H.T., July 10th–11th 2004.
3 Please compare the Global Landscapes Anno Domini 2000 and Anno Domini 2050.
4 M.Harney, L.J. Brinkhorst, H. Grethen, P.Hewitt, The consecutive Presidents EU Competitiveness Council. We
can still make the EU Competitive. I.H.T., July 3th–4th 2004.
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Table 1
The global landscape 2050
GDP in trillions* USD GDP per capita
United States 35.1 83.7
Japan 6.7 66.8
Britain xx 59.1
France xx 51.6
Russia 5.8 49.6
Germany xx 48.9
Italy xx 41.0
South Africa 1.2 39.5
China 44.4 31.3
Brazil 6.0 26.6
India 27.8 17.3
Europe **17.5 xx
* — billions in European convention
** — projection corrected by Antoni Kukliñski
xx — data not available in the article
A really new paradigm of European Development 5 should be discovered maybe via coherent
innovative and dynamic activities in the framework of the Weimar Triangle. Will we find the
knowledge, the imagination, and political will to design and implement this grand mission of the
XXI century?
Naturally this opinion is not expressing the only one possible point of view. Europe can
represent a different approach—saying: “We are not in a race with the U.S.”. 6 This is however
a false hope. In real terms the economic weakness will create sooner or later the social and
political weakness of a continent reduced to the status of a New Global Periphery.
There is no hope for “Dolce Vita” in this periphery.
III. The Weimar Triangle and the reinvention of the West
A brilliant Frenchman7 has published in the US8, in Germany9, and in Poland10 a challenging
paper arguing that the grand vision of the West as a field of strategic cooperation of the US and
Europe must be invented again to provide a new future for the Atlantic Community.
5 Compare: Third European Report on Science and Technology Indicators. European Commission, Brussels 2003.
In this Report we find a very mild idea of the new paradigm of European Development. This mild formulation is fully
kept inside the limits of political correctness and conventional wisdom. We need however a new paradigm which is at
the same time a radical turning point in the development of Europe.
Compare: A. Kukliñski, The Future of Europe. Prospective reflection. Four basic concepts. Long durations, turning
points, trade offs, strategic choices. July 2004.
6 K. Bennhold, Continent guards its right to leisure: “We are not in a race with the US”., I.H.T. July 19th 2004.
7 D. Moisi, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris.
8 Foreign Affairs, December 2003.
9 International Politik, December 2003.
10 D. Moisi, Wymyœliæ na nowo Zachód, Przegl¹d Polityczny, No 65/2004.
Compare also: Diplomacy à la française, Economist—October 25, 2004; J Vinocur, A bold Bush—2 Gesture towards
Europeaan Allies, IHT, October 26, 2004.
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This reinvention of the West is not only the strategic choice of the Atlantic Community—it
is also a great strategic choice in the framework of global development which is just impossible
without the solidarity of the US and Europe.
The special charm of the paper of D. Moisi is the application of the French strategic thinking
to the analysis of the past, the present, and the future of the Atlantic Community.
The mindset of D. Moisi is extremely interesting also from the point of view of the Weimar
Triangle which can perform an important role in the reinvention of the West of the XXI century.
We should try to invite Professor Moisi to join our Weimar Programme.
IV. The Weimar Triangle—after all
Our political and academic experiences has fully confirmed the view, that the Weimar
Triangle should be selected as an object of an effective programme of European studies for
the years 2005–2008. The pragmatic weakness of the Weimar Triangle co-operation does not
alter the fact that the Triangle should be seen as a source of valuable traditions creating
social and political capital which should be used and developed in the first decade of the
XXI century.
The proposed programme of German–French–Polish studies should incorporate a broad field
of social sciences and especially economic, sociological, political, geographic and historical sciences.
This is only a preliminary proposal seen as a beginning of creative discussion. In this
discussion the following methodological assumptions can be accepted:
1. The Weimar Triangle is an important element of the European and global scene. It is
a potential instrument of the creation of strong Europe as an important actor of the global
scene11.
2. In the proposed programme the important functions are not only the external relations of the
three countries but also the comparative analyses of their respective internal scenes—political,
social, economic, scientific and cultural.
3. The programme should overcome the limitations imposed by the conventional wisdom and
political correctness. The programme should not hesitate to discover and analyze the weakness
of the French, German and Polish scene. The programme should generate the trajectory to
eliminate these weaknesses.
4. The main institutional and scientific axes in the creation and implementation of this new
programme can be established in the framework of the Polish Association for the Club of
Rome and the WSB–NLU–RECiFER Nowy S¹cz.
Let the smile of good fortune bless the activity of the new programme both in cognitive and
pragmatic perspective.
Warszawa–Nowy S¹cz
October 3th 2004.
11 Compare: Kac Olaf Lang, Abschied von der Romantik Das Weimar Dreieck in der erweiterten Union
Piotr Sztompka, Die integration wird Kein Neues Trama werden
Thorben Albrecht, Die Zukunff des sozialen Europas
Rafa³ Trzaskowski, Ungenutztez Potential Uber the polnish französischen Beziehungen, Dialog Deutch–Polonishes
Magazin, Nr 66/67 2004.
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THE “WEIMAR TRIANGLE”
AND ITS MULTINATIONAL ROLE
IN CONFLICT-MANAGEMENT
AND RECONCILIATION
An economical approach
1. Introduction
When I met Prof. Kukliñski on the Trilateral Conference on the Future of Energy in the
Enlarged Europe: Perspectives for R&D Co-operation 7–8 October in Warsaw, where I took place
as Secretary General of the Committee to promote the French/German/Polish cooperation called
“Weimar Triangle”, Prof. Kukliñski inspired me with an interesting and idiosyncratic idea, namely
the question: whether it will be possible to talk about the “Weimar Triangle”—which, in the last
decades, has stabled and intensified the political, cultural and scientifically contacts between the
former war enemies Poland, France and Germany—as a role-model of reconciliation. In other
words: Will it be possible to exploit the experience Poland, France and Germany have made in
the last century for other conflicts especially for the durable long conflict between Israel and
Palestine?
As Professor Kukliñski friendly invited me to take part in this conference, suggesting to
refer over the “Weimar Triangle” and its impact on the Polish, Germany and French relationship
I at first felt honoured having the opportunity to talk to such an outstanding audience on the
occasion of this conference. Than I quickly got aware, that this invitation will or must be even
more than an honourable offer to join a conference. In my very critical eyes it will not do to
provide you with some “political” statements concerning the “Weimar Triangle” and its purpose.
Contrary this theme builds a scientific challenge to elaborate and present some very new general
ideas concerning peacemaking and reconciliation of international regimes.
The fundamental scientific problem I faced was, how it will be possible to compare the
historical situation in Europe especially between Poland, France and Germany in the last century
with the present Israeli–Palestinensian conflict of our days.
I decided to exploit an economical approach from which I do hope this scientific approach
will not only enable us to objectify conditions and methods of reconciliation but also to generalize
them so that results or conclusions can be transferred to every other political quarrel especially
to the conflict between Israel and Palestine.
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According to this aim I organized my speech around the following four main parts:
1. I start my presentation with some essentials about the “Weimar Triangle”
a. In this part I would like to address the historical situation in Europe from the early
beginning of the last century up to now.
b. This leads me to the key issue as well as to the political and cultural benefits of the
“Weimar Triangle”.
2. Then I will move on to a succinct outline of my methodological approach for answering the
question if the success of “Weimar Triangle” can be transferred to other conflicts.
3. I will sum up by emphasizing some parallels between Polish, French and German appeasement
and the situation in the “Near East”.
4. At the end I will conclude by outlining the results of my efforts and maybe by taking
questions from the floor.
Even if the spirit of the “Weimar Triangle” has become weak in the last years, and even the
“Weimar Triangle” has to be renewed two years after Poland has become member of the EU,
this presentation will outline the durable signification of the “Weimar Triangle” in its international
context as a role-model of reconciliation. May this signification of the “Weimar Triangle” contribute
also to the promotion, regeneration and modernisation of “Weimar Triangle”.
As my methodical approach is a very pioneering one, it will be a great privilege for me
to present my ideas to public firstly on this conference, and I do hope—even if you will not
agree with all of my ideas—this “première” will open up a new field of scientific interdisciplinary
research.
2. The historical framework of the relations between Poland,
France and Germany
I would like to start my presentation—without any further ago—by asking you all to picture
the historical situation of the last century:
After the First World War which affected mainly France and Germany and which led to 13.5
million death and after the disastrous Nazi-Regime which slaughtered millions of Polish citizens,
after ghettos and executions of polish hostages and citizens, after the brutal crushing of the
Warsaw Uprising, after the street-by-street destruction of Warsaw in 1944, Poland, France and
Germany quickly regained civilized and closed relations. In an extreme short period of 50 years
after the Second World War the Germans have maintained reconciliation.
The question which now arises is, how such an outstanding reconciliation has been possible.
Or in other words, can we discern the framework or the conditions enabling this stupendous
process of reunion, appeasement and better understanding.
I will try to look at the historical situation a little bit closer:
The process of reconciliation can be subdivided into two separate courses of historical
development: The French–German relations and The Polish–German partnership
2.1. The French–German relations
The reconciliation between France and Germany took place in the middle of the last century.
First steps of the normalisation of mutual relations were not political ones but especially done
by undertaking juridical bargaining. The first main instrument which focused on normalisation of
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political relation between France and Germany was the ECSC-Treaty (or the Paris-Treaty) 1 from
1951. The ECSC-Treaty established the “European Coal and Steal Community”. It has had—
especially in its early stage of existing—also a military purpose: It was the aim of the ECSC-Treaty
to bring under control the production of war materials (for instance steal and coal) and to prevent
especially Germany from rearmament2
This intention was accomplished by signing the EURATOM-Treaty in the year 19583.
The military aspect of these treaties soon became obsolete in the relationship of the European
partners France and Germany. In 1958 the six European Member-States signed the European
Economic Community-Treaty (EEC-Treaty) 4 which did not arrange military affairs but which
synchronized economical activities. This treaty led finally to the creation of the “European Union5“
and the new EC-Treaty as amended on 26. 2. 2001 by the Conference of Nice6 in our days7.
2.2. The enveloping of Polish–German partnership
Establishing juridical frameworks between Poland and Germany like the French and German
ones, have not been possible in the epoch of the “Iron Curtain”, when the so-called “Cold-War”
divided Europe into two separate parts of incoherent political ideologies.
Never the less the German–Polish relationship started changing modestly by signing the
so-called “Warschauer Vertrag” (“Treaty of Warsaw”8) in 1970:
Art. 1 of this contract stabled the sovereignty of Poland and Germany by fixing frontiers
and borderlines9. Apart from these mainly International-Law-orientated rules of Art. 1, Art. 3
section 1of the “Treaty of Warsaw” already has given birth to the Polish–German cooperation.
This cooperation covers lots of diverse fields of every-day-live (e.g.: economics, scientist, arts,
culture) and promoted the process of approach of these two nations.
1 Treaty from 18. 4. 1951 who established the “European Coal and Steal Community” (Official Journal C 340 v.
10. 11. 1997, p 1 ff.
2 Introduction to Treaty from 18. 4. 1951 who established the “European Coal and Steal Community” (Official
Journal C 340 v. 10. 11. 1997, p 1 ff.):
• considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that
threaten it,
• convinced that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can make to civilization is indispensable
to the maintenance of peaceful relations,
• recognizing that Europe can be built only through practical achievements which will first of all create real
solidarity, and through the establishment of common bases for economic development,
• anxious to help, by expanding their basic production, to raise the standard of living and further the works of
peace,
• resolved to substitute for age old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an
economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody
conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared,
• ...
3 Treaty from 25. 3. 1957 establishing the European Atomic Energy Community “EURATOM” (Official Journal C
340 v. 10. 11. 1997, p 1 ff.
4 Treaty from 25. 3. 1957 establishing the European Economic Community (Official Journal C 340 v. 10. 11. 1997,
p 1 ff.)
5 Treaty from 7. 2. 1992 on “European Union” (Official Journal C 340 v. 10. 11. 1997, p 1 ff.) consolidated text:
Official Journal C 325 of 24 December 2002
6 Treaty of Nice, Official Journal C 80 of 10 March 2001
7 Treaty from 25. 3. 1957 establishing the European Community, consolidated version (Official Journal C 325 of 24
December 2002)
8 Vertrag v. 7. 12. 1970 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen
der Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen (Warschauer Vertrag).
9 see as well the German–Polish Treaty from 14. 11. 1990 to confirm the existing frontiers between Poland
and Germany Vertrag v. 14. 11. 1990 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen über die
Bestätigung der zwischen ihnen bestehenden Grenzen.
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In order to fill up Art. 3 with life a couple of treaties have followed.
Here are to mention mainly:
• Vertrag vom 14. November 1990 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik
Polen über die Bestätigung der zwischen ihnen bestehenden Grenze (Grenzbestätigungsvertrag,
pdf, 8 kb);
• Vertrag vom 17. Juni 1991 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen
über gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (Nachbarschaftsvertrag, pdf,
8 kb);
• Abkommen vom 17. Juni 1991 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik
Polen über das Deutsch–Polnische Jugendwerk (pdf, 30 kb);
• Abkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Polen über die
Zusammenarbeit beim grenzüberschreitenden Umwelt- und Katastrophenschutz (April 1997,
pdf, 43 kb);
• Abkommen vom 14. Juli 1997 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik
Polen über kulturelle Zusammenarbeit (Kulturabkommen, pdf, 350 kb)
Than—on 16. of December 1991—Poland became an associated partner of the EC.
In 1991 as well the three ministers of foreign affairs Krysztof Skubiczewski (Poland), Roland
Dumas (France), and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Germany) met in Weimar to found the “Weimar
Triangle” in order to promote trilateral cooperations between Poland, France and Germany.
The “Weimar Triangle” based on the ideal:
1. that it must be possible to define and to design common basic interests of Poland, France and
Germany,
2. to develop a mutual interlocutory culture and to develop the mutual dialogue,
3. with the mean to consort different jumping-off positions of the three nations and
4. to ensure a better mutual understanding of the three partners of the “Weimar Triangle”
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These items were set out in the intention not to minimize or to reduce the importance and
leading role of these nations in the process of establishing a Single European Market and to form
the European Union, with its 25 member-states10.
Designed to be only a forum for unofficial political contacts, the “Weimar Triangle” quickly
became more important.
2.3. The “Weimar Triangle” in the context of the European Union
In the political context of the European Union the “Weimar Triangle” may take the position
of an engine to promote the future development of partnership between France, Poland and
Germany. Even thought Poland obtained the status of full-membership in 2004 the process of
integration and especially the process of harmonisation of national law has not stopped in our
day. On the contrary the new situation of the enlarged “European Union” demands various and
qualified arrangement of reconciliation and understanding.
As it will be proved in the next chapters the “Weimar Triangle” can be identified as a qualified
regime to monitor and to supervise this process.
The “Weimar Triangle” will also be capable to become an “enhanced cooperation” in the terms
of the European-Law. This means that the European Law will allow member-states to cooperate
much closer than other European member-states do11. In this case Poland, France and Germany
built the locomotive of the closer development of the European Community.
10 see also: Kühnhardt, Ménhudier, Reiter: Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung Bonn:
http://www.zei.de/download/zei dp/dp c72kuenhardt.pdf
11 see: Art. 11, 11a Treaty from 25. 3. 1957 establishing the European Economic Community (Official Journal C
340 v. 10. 11. 1997, p 1 ff.) in the consolidated version (Official Journal C 325 of 24 December 2002)
Article 11
1. Member States which intend to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves in one of the areas referred
to in this Treaty shall address a request to the Commission, which may submit a proposal to the Council to that
effect. In the event of the Commission not submitting a proposal, it shall inform the Member States concerned of the
reasons for not doing so.
2. Authorisation to establish enhanced cooperation as referred to in paragraph 1 shall be granted, in compliance
with Articles 43 to 45 of the Treaty on European Union, by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. When enhanced cooperation relates to an area
covered by the procedure referred to in Article 251 of this Treaty, the assent of the European Parliament shall be
required. A member of the Council may request that the matter be referred to the European Council. After that
matter has been raised before the European Council, the Council may act in accordance with the first subparagraph
of this paragraph.
3. The acts and decisions necessary for the implementation of enhanced cooperation activities shall be subject to
all the relevant provisions of this Treaty, save as otherwise provided in this Article and in Articles 43 to 45 of the
Treaty on European Union.
Article 11a
Any Member State which wishes to participate in enhanced cooperation established in accordance with Article
11 shall notify its intention to the Council and to the Commission, which shall give an opinion to the Council within
three months of the date of receipt of that notification. Within four months of the date of receipt of that notification,
the Commission shall take a decision on it, and on such specific arrangements as it may deem necessary.
also: Art. 17 Abs. 4 EU-Treaty Art 29, 30 and 31 EU-Treaty and Art. 40, 43 ff. EU-Treaty (EU-Treaty v. 7. 2.
1992 in the version from 2. 10. 1997)
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2.4. The present task of the “Weimar Triangle”
Developing from an international forum of consultations to a reliable instrument of trustworthy
collaboration of all domains of every-day-life the “Weimar Triangle” guarantees and promotes
innumerable activities of trilateral interactions12.
Formal or informal personal communication and information-exchange take place not only
on an intergovernmental sector but also between officials and functionaries. Communication has
enlarged to citizens, enterprises, universities, local regions and communities.
The main activities of the “Weimar Triangle” nowadays are:
• High-levelled meetings of the ministers of foreign affaires,
• Round-Table-Discussions,
• Conferences (e.g.: interdisciplinary German–French–Polish European Forum “Initiative—
Inspiration—Innovation (27.–30. 6. 2002); Weimar Triangle: Innovation policy and business
setup (19–22. 11. 2003), und Trilateral Conference on the Future of Energy in the Enlarged
Europe: Perspectives for R&D Co-operation 7–8 October 2004 Warsaw)
• scientific Colloquials,
• Partnerships of regions and towns13,
• Youth-, Student- and Artist- exchange-programmes.
The success of the “Weimar Triangle” on the fields of unification and reconciliation of nations
is enormous. This proves its manifest and evident role on the fields of unification and reconciliation
of nations.
Outlook
This above related success entails itself the following questions:
• Could the “Weimar Triangle” be regarded as a role-model of a successful return to civility
and to reconciliation?
• May—as the Herald Tribune14 proposed—the “Weimar Triangle” contribute to resolve also
the Israeli and Palestinensian conflict?
To launch such a statement it will be consequent to ask whether the German/ French/ Polish
circumstances can be compared with the actual status of Israeli and Palestinensian confrontation.
The answers of all mentioned questions depend on the “ideology” or on the “aim” purpose of
the “Weimar Triangle”.
• The “Weimar Triangle” defines its aims in supplementing the consultations on governmental
and non-governmental levels and in creating a more civil atmosphere in all parts of political,
social, cultural and scientifical life.
• The “Weimar Triangle” brings people together from different nations, regions, professions and
thinkings.
• Its main tasks—in the last years—were to support the transfer of knowledge in conferences,
teaching and colaborations in the legal and economical framework of the European Union.
• By this the “Weimar Triangle” denies the importance of former borders and replaces them
with extending people-to people contact.
• It gives huge priority to trade and to transfer of services and knowledge in the framework
of the European Union.
12 You will find a short list on the Internet-side of the Committee to promote the French / German / Polish
cooperation (Weimar Triangle)
13 Liste der bestehenden Städtepartnerschaften auf der Website der deutschen Botschaft in Warschau (pdf, 28 kb)
14 R. Cohen, Germany and Poland. A reason to celebrate, I.H.T., August 7th–8th 2004. Roger Cohen can be reached
at: rocohen@nytimes.com
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• Inside the European Single Market the “Weimar Triangle” also creates an economical, binding
system of reliable support and trustworthy cooperations between France, Germany and Poland.
3. The neccissity of the “The New Institutional Economics” as
a methodological approach
These mainly political orientated declarations do not only attribute to political non binding
“statements of intentions”. They based also on juridical and economical evidence. More than ever
juridical and economical facts may answer the question whether the French–German and the
Polish–German reconciliations can be transferred to solve the conflict between Israel and Palestine.
If it will be possible to generalize French/German/Polish reconciliation, an abstract but general
valuable practice will be found and evinced. This demand may satisfy an objective scientific
approach. In order to put my research on an objective general valuable base I will apply an
economic orientated approach, namely the theory of “The New Institutional Economics”, hoping
to discern, analyse and describe the conditions of reconciliation.
2.6. The “The New Institutional Economics”
It was R. Coase who—in 1937—has proved the reducing or minimizing effect of “Institutions”
on transactions-costs and—due to this—the welfare-use of “Institutions” for social, economical and
political systems15:
R. Coase asked in his article “The nature of the firm”16 for reasons why combines, companies
or groups of enterprises exist on the market.
Coase justifies the existence of combines, companies or groups of enterprises by their
advantage to reduce transaction-costs:
15 The Nature of the Firm, in: Economica, Bd. 4, 1937, p. 386 ff.; also: Coase: Lectures, 2: The Nature of the
Firm: Meaning, in: Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 4 (1988), S. 14 ff.; see also: Veblen: The Engeneers
and the Price System; The Engeneers of Busainess Enterprise; vor allem Commons, Commons j.R.: Institutional
Economics. p. 55 ff.; Commons j.R.: Legal Foundation of Capitalism
16 Coase: The Nature of the Firm, in: Economica, Bd. 4, 1937, S. 386 ff.; also: Coase: Lectures, 2: The Nature of
the Firm: Meaning, in: Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 4 (1988), p. 14 ff.;
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A market-situation where only a lot of small individual suppliers and demanders are operating
will be characterized by a tremendous amount of detrimental transactions-cost (especially costs
for search, information and bargaining).
E.g.: Every individual demander has to find out costly where he will find the needed product, the suitable
quality the reliability of the supplier. He will also have to explore what the conditions of the delivery are and at
what time he will be able to dispose over the good. By this he will have to bargain for conditions and the time of
delivery.
On the other hand every individual supplier must check out expensively what kind of product or service is
needed on the market. What quality must his products or services correspond to etc.
All these investigations will entail a lot of costs especially information-, search- and bargaining-costs.
These so-called “transaction-cost” are unsolicited in economical systems, because of their
detrimental impact to welfare. Search-, information- and bargaining activities will neither raise the
quality of the product nor improve the quality of its distribution. Their expenditures furthermore
bind financial capacities of enterprises and prevent investments in research and development.
So whenever an economical system is willing to stable and improve welfare it has to allow its
participants17 to avoid or at least to minimize transaction-costs.
“Institutions” will be able to minimize transaction-cost. And combines, companies are such
suitable institutes:
Due to its hierarchical structure of a combine or of a group of enterprises, the “parent company” will order
the exactly needed quantity in the appropriate quality in the required time from its subsidiary. Expenditures and
costs for searching the right quality or a reliable provider will become in the same way obsolete as bargaining-costs.
The supplier will cancel all his previous costs for market-research.
At least the economisation of expenditures of harmful transaction-costs justifies the existence
of a combine18/ 19.
17 see: Sohmen: Allokationstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik, München 1994, p. 26 ff.; also: Dahlman: The Problem of
Externality, in: Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (1979) p. 141 ff., 161
18 By the way (the system) the existents of) combines, finds its natural limit: In the case the costs of administration
of a combine will even higher then the gain of economized search-, information- or bargaining-costs Participants of an
economic system will not tend to grow up combines.
19 The existents of combines will finds its natural limit: In the case the costs of administration of a combine will
even higher then the gain of economized search-, information-or bargaining-costs Participants of an economic system
will not tend to grow up combines.
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 345 (345)
The “Weimar Triangle” and its multinational role in conflict-management 345
2.7. The transfer of Coase’s economical approach
• North applied this economical approach on the description and explanation of historical
processes20/ 21.
• In 1986 Keohane expanded the term of “Institutions” 22. Keohane made sure that such
“Institutions” can not only be economical institutions (like markets, prices or enterprises)
or Law-Institutes (like contracts, juridical sanctions and regulations23), but also political
institutions like the “State”, “Democracy” as well as “International organisations”24.
Up to this the interest of economists and lawyers has evaluated and underlined the value
of international organisations, regimes, conglomerations, co-operations of nations as the “Weimar
Triangle“ can be regarded as.
3. Some conclusions
The benefits of “Weimar Triangle“ are—in the eyes of this economical/institutional approach—
now easy to proof: They mainly consist in ensuring a binding system of mutual valuable,
compulsory and mandatory system of norms, which is to spare transaction-costs.
3.1. The framework of norms as an “Institute”
of reconciliation and peacemaking
A situation without any law and without any rules between individuals as well as between
nations will be disastrous for all of its participants. Each state (as it has been proofed by history)
will push its egoistic interest through if necessary by using physical force. This fight of everyone
against everyone will cause endless and useless transaction-costs:
E.g.: Not only the damages of war can be subsumed under this context. The aggressor himself is constrained
to build and support an army to conquer the others states; while the attacked and every other state will have to
invest a certain amount of transaction-cost (so-called “protecting-costs”) to defeat its goods and interests.
It is obvious that both sorts of transaction-costs will be injurious: They do not improve welfare
and prosperity of the involved states. So an “anarchistic” situation will be a costly one for each
of its participants. This consequence make comprehensible, why states (and not only so-called
“civilized ones”) tend to organize their foreign relations by establishing regulations.
20 North/Thomas: The Rise of the Western World, A Economic History, 3. ed., London 1979; North: Institutions,
Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 1990; North: Structure and Change in Economic History,
New York, 1981
21 see: Krimphove: Rechtstheoretische Aspekte der neuen Ökonomischen Theorie des Rechts, in: Rechtstheorie Band
32, 2001, p. 497 ff., 522 ff.
22 Keohane: After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the Political Economy, Princton 1984
23 see also: Schotter: The Evolution of rules, in: Langlois (Hrsg.), Economic as a process, Cambridge 1986, p. 117–133;
Richter: Institutionen ökonomisch analysiert, Tübingen 1994, p. 2; Erlei/Leschke/Sauerland, Neue Institutionenökonomik,
Stuttgart 1999, p. 23; Richter/Furubotn: Neue Institutionenökonomik, 3. ed., Tübingen, 2003, p. 7 f.; Krimphove: An
Economic Analysis of the Law of Good-Faith Purchase in European Property Law, in: Gdanskie Strudia Prawnicze
(Festschrift für Prof. Dr. hab. Kazimir Krukzalak), p. 228–236; Gdanskie Strudia Prawnicze; Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
Gdanskiego, Tom V; Danzig (1999)
24 Keohane: After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the Political Economy, Princton 1984, p. 85 ff.
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We have distinguished this positive effect of juridical settlements in the early beginning of the French–German
reconciliation. France and Germany set out an international instrument by signing the “ECSC-Treaty”25. This treaty
which—in 1951—originally was signed to control military supplies and armaments industry power later became the
fundament of a real partnership between France and Germany.
Regulations in general will have further transactions-cost-reducing effects: By the existence
of Law every nation can trust on law-adequate behaviour of every other nation. So each state
will have the opportunity to spare its expenditures of information concerning prospected attacks
of foreign states.
The setting-out of abstract but decisive rules for resolving any conflictions situation will
therefore have he positive effect, that the behaviour of parties and nations became computable.
Existing law will by this abolish information-costs of all partners. Former adversaries or even foes
became partners.
In this context the juridical framework of the EEC and later of the EU found its justification
and importance.
Compared with the Palestinian–Israeli situation we have to consider a lack of such qualified juridical settlements.
Israel and Palestine dispose simply over political initiatives to conclude peace settlements. Their obligation—like Art.
1 of the “Treaty of Warsaw26“ said—is to respect frontiers and sovereignty. These settlements have to be enlarged
for the purpose to become to a base of cooperation and collaboration.
Maybe the first step of this reconciliation is made—as we could make it out in Art. 1 of the “Treaty of
Warsaw”27 or in the former “ECSC–Treaty”—in order to restrain the parties from military activity. But these mutual
settlements have also—in an official-juridical order—to give place to the possibility of a growing up partnership and
mutual cooperation.
Art. 3 section 1of the treaty of Warsaw as well as the EEC Treaty can therefore be taken as a pattern.
3.2. Necessity of enforcement of norms and mandatory norm-systems
Peacemaking institutions can not simply consists in formal juridical systems of norms. No
party will obey to any rules if there are no sanctions guarantying the prosecution of norms. So
norms, which are not mandatory or compulsory, are null and void28 even if they are given in
written form.
A legal system without any mandatory or binding character of its norms will be similar to any
other “anarchistic” system. It will not economize transaction-cost 29. For this reason enforcement
is essential and indispensable for the reduction of transaction-costs and therefore for a successful
working welfare30.
25 Treaty from 18. 4. 1951 who established the “European Coal and Steal Community” (Official Journal C 340 v.
10. 11. 1997, p 1 ff.)
26 Vertrag v. 7. 12. 1970 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen
der Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen (Warschauer Vertrag).
27 Vertrag v. 7. 12. 1970 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen
der Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen (Warschauer Vertrag).
28 Wiggins: The Economics of the Firm and Contracts: A Selective Survey, in: Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics, 147 (1991), p. 603 ff. 633 ff.; Krimphove: Spieltheoretische Aspekte des Rechts—Ein Beitrag zur
Analyse und Gestaltung von Recht mit Hilfe objektiver quanitfizierbaren Methodik—in: Rechtstheorie Band 35, 2004,
Heft 1, S. 19 ff., 31 ff.
29 see above chapter 3.1
30 Richter/Furubotn: Neue Institutionenökonomik, 3. Aufl., Tübingen, 2003, p. 526
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The enforcement of norms and legal systems can be granted also by the “Institution” of Law
with the means of “Moral 31“, “Ethic Systems” and “Religion32“ or by other Instruments33.
3.2.1. Enforcement of norms by the “European Law”
The European Union itself did not dispose over efficient assets to enforce law34, especially
international law position.
Also the above mentioned Peace contracts and agreements between Israel and Palestine do not dispose over
any effective working asset to ensure the enforcement of its norms.]
3.2.2. Enforcement of norms by “Moral” or “Ethic and religious Systems”
The non-binding or non-mandatory or binding character of “moral” norm will be the reason
for its failure. Especially in war-time, when the social control could not take place, and when
people keep away from sticking to a common system of moral, ethical norms will flop.
The idea to benefit from religious systems to enforce norms will not work in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.
The parties belong to different religions and even take this difference for a reason to justify their hostile attacks.
The requested enforcement of rules might therefore be ensured by other instruments.
3.2.3. Political assertion- and enforcement-instruments
A quantity of mainly political instruments or sanctions can be stated to guaranty the
enforcement of law between nations35:
• “confiscation of foreign publicity owned—or private property“,
• “break off mutual relations”,
• “establishing an hegemonic predominance”.
All of them are discussed and executed in history.
Especially Israel—as a hegemony in the “Near East”—and strongly supported by the United States of America
makes large use of its predominance.
After the “Second World War” France and Poland restrained from using the above mentioned instruments. On
the contrary France tried to bind and to get Germany involved in the process of generating a supra-national subject
of International Law as the EEC or the EU.
Under the aspect of the “The New Institutional Economics” the most suitable, efficient and
qualified “Institute” of enforcement will be “Integration” or “Unification” to a durable international
regime as it is promoted by the “Weimar Triangle“36.
31 Boulding, Beyond Economy—Essay on Society, Religion and Ethics (1968), S. 177 ff.; Becker: A Theorie of
Marri- age; Part 1 J. Pol; Econ. (1973), S. 813 ff.; Schultz, An Economic Model of Family Planning and Fertility, J.
Pol. Econ. 77 (1969), S. 153 ff.
32 Schmidtchen/Mayer: Ökonomische Analyse des Religion, in: Ramb/Tietzel (Hersg.) Ökonomische Verhaltenstheorie,
S. 311 ff.; to the role of the roman catholic church in Europe, see: K. Porwiz: Reflections on Christian Inspiration for
the Future European Institutional Changes, in Kukliñski/Skuza: Europe in the Perspective of Global Change (Polish
Association for the Club of Rome) Warzaw 2003, p. 19 ff.; F. Kinsky: Christian View onb Europe and Globalisation, in:
ukliñski/Skuza: Europe in the Perspective of Global Change (Polish Association for the Club of Rome) Warzaw 2003, p.
15 ff.
33 see chapter 4.2.3
34 Krimphove: Das Neue europäische Schadenersatzrecht, Österreichische Juristenzeitschrift (ÖJZ), 1999 Heft 9, p.
321 ff.
35 Richter/Furubotn: Neue Institutionenökonomik, 3. Aufl., Tübingen, 2003, p. 527 ff.
36 see above chapter 2.4
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A method of integration—after Kromann—is every social and political arrangement which
stimulates parties to search after common items37. This is exactly the purpose of the Weimar
Triangle.
1. A Union of states or regimes will organize mutual relations between member-states and
therefore decreases, uncertainty and unsafeness among its member-nations, with the positive
effect of a reduction of information-costs.
2. The reputation of belonging to the international organisation will make member-states
respecting international law systems even if the international regime does not disposes over
executing power to assert existing law. Membership of nations in a multinational (operating)
regime will consequently lessen the range of expected behaviour of the members and therefore
lower uncertainty and the expenditures of unsolicited information-costs.
3. Also information becomes more widely between the members of a regime. Keohane shows,
that intergovernmental ongoing communication among working-level officials is more con-
tributing to exchange information than traditional official and formal relationships between
bureaucratises38. Regimes as the “Weimar Triangle“ could therefore find its role in suppressing
information-asymmetry and therefore entailed information-costs.
4. This aspect may also release bargaining amongst the participants and diminish bargaining-
costs. Why regimes are able to link special issues and actors as well as to facilitate informal
contacts between officials they will not only give incentives and enable beneficial agreements
among their members but also create transgovernmental networks. Communication—as O.
Williamson substantiated39—inclines to increase cooperation among the members of a group.
5 International organisations will have the advantage, that their repeal and (new-)creation will
cause extremely height expenditures. Member-States will not abolish them—even if they will
work under circumstances which are not as sufficient as in the beginning of their existence. By
this international organisations and regimes will—even under economical difficult conditions—
continue their work of balancing different interest, of informing and integrating states and
their citizens. They build a stable and continuous factor and through this they guarantee the
enforcement of common legal standards.
All these aspects will diminish unsolicited and harmful transaction-cost and so promote
economical and social welfare40.
4. Summary and Final results
Before I conclude I would briefly like to go over the main points of my presentation:
• My task was to verify whether the “Weimar Triangle“ can be a role-model to resolve conflicts
and to establish reconciliation.
• We at first looked at the historical situation and the position of the “Weimar Triangle”.
• Then I sketched succinctly the method of “The New Institutional Economics”. I have had to
deal with this method to obtain an objective base which allows the transfer of the results
we have made out to any other conflict, and to define objective conditions of reconciliation of
nations.
• At the end of my presentation I would like to summarize and to outline the main results:
37 Kromann: Contract Law and the State of Nature, in: Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 1985 (1), p.
5 ff., 21
38 Keohane After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the Political Economy, Princton 1984 p. 97
39 Williamson 1965, p. 584
40 see above: 3
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1. Reconciliation is traced by law and settlements.
2. Nevertheless rules are not sufficient if they simply will restrain parties from military
operations.
3. They also have to provide a reliable base of future cooperations with led into collaboration.
4. This cooperation has to cover all fields of daily life and sin all hierarchies of society.
5. Rules are not apposite in the promotion of reconciliation. They are null and void if they
are not binding and mandatory.
6. International regimes—like the “Weimar Triangle”—grant the enforcement of norms.
7. They will have the additionally aspect
— to enable partners to interact on every area of life and
— to lessen unwelcome transaction-costs
8. and by this to promote welfare.
This brings out my final essential statements:
• Reconciliation is not only the absence of quarrels. Reconciliation means furthermore a durable
process of mutual interaction on all fields of life.
• As I proved this reconciliation must be accompanied by international regimes, as the “Weimar
Triangle” can be regarded as.
• Each process of reconciliation needs also a constant scientific attendance and monitoring.
• This scientifically research may lay on the fields of an interdisciplinary exchange of mainly
economical, juridical and sociological research. In my opinion especially a comparison of
national constitutions is needed in order to examine whether constitutional law enable citizens
and enterprises to promote the process of “weimarisation”; will mean the process of durable
reconciliation guided by an international regime as the “Weimar Triangle”.
• The “Weimar Triangle” is in my eyes assigned to guaranty scientifically promotion and
development.
In my briefly speech I could have only adumbrated some essentials of scientific juridical-
economical research on the field of the Weimar Triangle. Scientific researches and investigations
in this domain have to be undertaken and pushed.
Personally I do hope my brief ideas concerning the “Weimar Triangle” will encourage and
persuade you to join the research of my chair.
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CURRENT STATE
OF WEIMAR TRIANGLE COOPERATION
1. Origins of the Weimar Triangle
The Weimar Triangle formula was launched on 28 August 1991 at a meeting in Weimar of
the foreign ministers of Poland, France and Germany attended by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Roland
Dumas and Hans-Dietrich Genscher.
Germany, the initiator of the meeting, was actuated by a desire to create a special medium
for dialogue which could help it to banish historic fears about the kind of policy that might be
pursued by a reunited Germany towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and to
embark on reconciliation with Poland based on the experiences of a similar process begun thirty
years earlier with France.
France, anxious to forestall any marginalization of its position in Central and Eastern Europe,
wanted to keep pace with Germany in its foreign policy towards this region... For its part
Warsaw saw the nascent Weimar Triangle primarily as an instrument for furthering Poland’s
integration with West-European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation structures and thereby contributing
to achievement of its foreign policy priorities. Participation in this trilateral initiative made Poland
the only country in the region to become a part of the constellation of states that were the driving
force of the process of unification of the continent, which enabled it to occupy a position on the
international stage corresponding to its potential.
Since the first meeting of the Polish, French and German ministers of foreign affairs we have
witnessed the birth of the new and original form of co-operation among these countries. The
Weimar Triangle plays a key role in building European Unity. It serves as an example of the
tripartite alliance among neighbours , who have managed to overcome prejudices and terrible
burden of history.
2. Assessment of the cooperation record
A stocktaking of the achievements of the Weimar Triangle over the years 1991 to 2004
would show that the scope of three-way consultations has been extended to include defence and
finance departments, joint deliberations by parliamentary committees and meetings of regions. In
1998 political dialogue was raised to the level of heads of state and government, beginning with
a Polish initiative establishing consultative meetings of the Presidents of Poland and France and
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the Federal Chancellor of Germany. Beyond the political plane, areas of cooperation which have
aroused a particularly good response are youth, military matters, local government, the academic
world, the media, and multilateral diplomacy in the OSCE forum. Such positive effects undoubtedly
validate the Triangle’s raison d’˜tre.
Despite developing diverse forms of cooperation, the Weimar Triangle has now become
a political structure in search of a new identity. As a result of the dramatic changes in the
international situation in the 1990s and the attainment by Poland of full membership status in
NATO and the EU the old formula of Weimar Triangle contacts is reaching the end of its
usefulness. Since continuation of special cooperation with countries of such standing as France and
Germany is one of the basic elements of Poland’s raisin d’état its diplomacy now faces the task
of devising new long-term forms and planes of trilateral interactions which factor in our shared
Union membership and can prove to have a stronger appeal than hitherto for French and German
partners.
The last Weimar Triangle summit, held in Wroc³aw on 9 May 2004, was a good start to the
process of developing a new Union-based formula for special relations between France, Germany
and Poland. All three participants stressed that in building cooperation within the enlarged Union
it was essential to take due account of the viewpoints of its new members and define jointly the
areas in which there common goals and tasks. The most recent contacts at the highest level have
shown that good will and a wish to go on working together are present on all sides of the Triangle
and that Poland treats its European commitments with the utmost seriousness and is prepared
to play its part in building a Europe that is cohesive not only internally but also vis-à-vis the
outside world without trying to define the Common Foreign and Security Policy in opposition to
the transatlantic link.
3. Prospects of Weimar Cooperation
Since the original goal of the Weimar Triangle—integration of Poland into Euro-Atlantic
cooperation structures—has been achieved in full redefinition of its remit is required. A Union
of 25 nations needs a powerful engine to drive Community activities and of the new members
Poland with its geopolitical situation, importance to European security and economic capacities,
Poland seems a natural partner for France and Germany. Collaboration by these three countries
to advance European integration could enhance the process with a new dimension and lend it
additional impetus.
The Weimar Triangle continues to be a convenient forum for discussing the final shape of the
European Union, the limits to integration and fundamental issues of European security, including
in particular the question of developing a common policy towards the EU’s eastern neighbours.
A point to be analyzed in these discussion is the possibility of closer dialogue with Ukraine and the
rationale and implementation of Union policy towards Russia and Belarus. Recent developments
in the Iraq conflict have demonstrated the necessity of searching reflection about harmonization
of security policy in the transatlantic and European cooperation framework and building up
European defence capabilities.
The attractiveness of the Weimar Triangle formula stems from the possibilities it offers of
moving beyond the consultations sphere and undertaking joint political action thought to be of
special importancw for trilateral cooperation. At the Wroc³aw summit the following areas were
singled out as ones of particular mutual interest:
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• Preparation of national command structures for EU-led military missions, development
of operational capabilities under the European Capabilities Action Plan, the ESDP and
coordination of military technology cooperation;
• consultations between internal affairs departments on civil security issues and orientation of
cooperation toward predictable threats, including terrorism and its consequences;
• inclusion of Polish experts and representatives of the farming community in the work on the
future shape of EU agricultural policy and establishment of a trilateral forum or agricultural
policy;
• organization of a “Weimar labour forum” in the form of consultations between labour ministry
employment policy experts;
• an initiative to transform Viadrina European University into a Foundation University whose
founders under a German plan would be the governments of Poland, France and Germany;
• construction of a European science and research space based on cooperation between
departments responsible for science and information technology;
• commencement of talks with the Polish-German and Franco-Polish Chambers of Commerce on
promotion of trilateral cooperation, e.g. infrastructure projects, construction of highways and
border crossings on the EU’s eastern frontiers, environmental protection, cooperation in third
countries markets;
• cooperation between the Polish finance ministry with institutions in France and Germany
responsible for providing government guarantees and sureties;
• organization of projects involving Poland’s eastern neighbours, especially in the field of
politico-military, youth and cultural cooperation.
4. Possibilities of dynamizing the Weimar Triangle
Definition of the objectives of trilateral cooperation should be accompanied by incremental
expansion of the number of institutions and persons involved in pursuing these goals both in
the political dialogue dimension and specific manifestations of social life. An important role could
be played by professional contacts between parliamentary committees, ministries and central and
regional agencies. Parallel to these, we should promote social cooperation, in both the forms
already in place (three-way exchanges of youth, contacts between local authorities, towns and
communes) and ones only recently established (employers’ associations, academic and professional
institutions).
If the Weimar Triangle is to become something more than just a short-lived product of
political dialogue between its constituent states popular awareness and acceptance of its existence
and agenda are essential. Its activities must become more intensive and visible, both in official
life and in the perception of the French, Germans and Poles. This aim can be furthered through
implementation of a number of important initiatives.
1. Political declaration
An objective as important and long-range as special cooperation between France, Germany
and Poland requires a special symbolism. It would therefore be worth considering the case for an
appropriate declaration by the heads of the three states stressing the significance of this fact and
transcending the limits of a routine press release.
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2. Secretariat
We should work toward implementing the idea of setting up a centre for coordination of
knowledge about specific examples of trilateral cooperation between governments and societies,
assistance in establishing new contacts and monitoring of projects in progress.
3. Foundation
Weimar Triangle dialogue has frequently given rise to proposals for joint projects of
significance to its development and intensity, such as an international affairs studies centre,
full participation by Poland in the Arte television channel, cooperation between universities, or
high-speed Paris–Berlin–Warsaw transport links. Implementation of these would be made possible
by establishment of a foundation independent of ad hoc budget subsidies.
4. Mr/Ms Weimar
In today’s media world the success or failure of any undertaking depends to a large degree on
presentation. A boost to popular acceptance of Triangle cooperation would be its personification by
prominent public figures who command respect on a supraregional scale. A Mr or Ms Weimar—a
national representative of cooperation between the three states—seems to be an institution
essential to its further successful functioning.
Warsaw, November 2004.
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A review paper
The main goal of the research project 1 “Poland–Germany and the Enlargement of the
European Union” (No 2H02 C 048 24, carried out 29.04.2003–28.11.2004) was to show the impact
of the EU’ Eastern Enlargement on the economies of Poland and Germany and their economic
relations.
In the last years, each of the research team members has shown in his publications in
a convincing way his qualifications needed for the professional achievement of the research goal. It
is unquestionable that ones of the most recognised experts have worked on the scope of German
economy studies in the research team. Many of the authors are not only academic teachers or
academics in research institutes but they also deal with economy in practice, holding responsible
positions in state institutions or business corporations, including the Chancellery of the President
of Poland, ministries of government and the Embassy of Poland in Germany.
Particular research subjects have been specified in such a way so they could form a cohesive
and logical structure of the main research enterprise: “Poland–Germany and the Enlargement of
the European Union”. Each of the research subjects has a theoretical as well as empirical part. It
should be emphasised that the members of research team met systematically giving the coverage
of certain phases of their research work, which were subjects to critical analysis.
As it was previously assumed, in the course of research project there were held two
Polish–German conferences. The first of them on “The outcomes of the UE Eastern Enlargement
for Polish–German economic relations” was held on 14–15 November 2003. The other, entitled
“Poland–Germany Enlargement of the European Union”, was held on 18–19 June 2004. There
were over 150 participants all together from almost 30 research centres and institutions from
Poland and Germany. Poland was represented by academics from six universities, higher education
schools and research institutes.
The research conducted covered micro- and macroeconomic issues. The domineering focus
was economic analysis, however if needed the research took also into account political aspects.
The research as well as their conclusions have not only theoretical meaning but are also vital
1 A research project sponsored by the State Committee for Scientific Research of the Republic of Poland. The
results of this project were published in a comprehensive set of two volumes (800 pages): W. Malachowski (ed.)
Polska–Niemcy — a rozszerzenie Unii Europejskiej, Warsaw School of Economics, The Publishing Office Warszawa
2004.
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for business practice (which has been highlighted by the political and economic decision makers
participating in both conferences).
Germany still will play a vital role in the process of European integration, so will Poland
sustain its crucial position in the group of the 10 new EU member states. Germany will be still
the most important strategic economic partner for Poland, and Poland for Germany will be one of
the most substantial states among the Central and Eastern European states.
The outcomes of the research are presented in a two-volume publication, whose editorial
reviewer was prof. dr hab. Leon Olszewski from the Law, Administration and Economy Faculty of
the Wroclaw University. The reviewer has stated:
“Broad scope of the research and the participation of the most recognised Polish and
German experts made it possible to prepare a certain synthesis of a substantial epistemic
value and high applicability. The publications touch upon often controversial but essential
aspects of participation of Poland and Germany (two states which have functioned till recently
in two separate socio-economic systems) in European integration processes, which requires
a multidimensional approach. One of the main advantages of the research is that the authors
give the analysis of the chosen problems on the background of political, social and economic
conditions of the European economy, including both the European Union member states and
the countries outside of this integration community. Moreover, despite the participation of many
authors and broad scopes of analysis coherent research conclusions have been presented making
it possible to specify and enrich the further stage of European integration analysis in the current
decade.”
The research encompassed the following research tasks:
1. Poland–Germany: perspectives for the 21st century
The mentioned subject was presented in three aspects:
1.1. as a diagnostic and perspective analysis of Polish-Germans relations;
1.2. as an analysis of perspective role of Germany in United Europe in 21st century;
1.3. as an analysis of perspective role of Poland in United Europe in 21st century.
Ad. 1.1. The diagnostic and perspective analysis of two decades (1990–2010) in Polish and
German transformation:
• Outcome of Polish and German transformation,
• Results of historical process of transformation (1990–2010),
• Comparison of the effectiveness of transformation’s processes in Poland and in Germany,
• Relations between the transformation’s and development’s processes or the disappearing of
dual economy and dual society.
Ad. 1.2. The diagnostic and perspective analysis of accretion and disappearing of the historical
development gap between Poland and Germany.
The question: to which extend and in which areas the experiences of the last decade of the
21st century have influenced the increase or decrease in the development gap between Poland and
Germany, has been answered. Also an analysis of decrease in the development gap in the 1st half
of 21st century was carried out.
The subject of Polish-German relations was presented against the background of the European
center and outskirts.
Ad. 1.3. The diagnostic and perspective analysis of Polish and German cooperation in the
European concept of the 21st century. The convergence and divergence were analyzed in four
domains:
• Vision of a federal Europe’s;
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• EU’s agricultural policy
• Knowledge based economy;
• Migrations and EU’s borders security.
2. The German concepts of European integration
The subject was presented in the following aspects:
• Historical conditions of German doctrine and integration policy;
• Mainstreams of the German concepts of European integration in the 2nd half of the 20th
century;
• European policy of German governments;
• Place of Germany in the European and the EU’s economy,
• European reflection and policy in Germany at the beginning of the 21st century;
• Implications of the implementation of different European integration concepts for Poland.
3. The role of Germany in the European integration process during the EU’s
Eastern Enlargement
The policy of German government and policies of the political parties on the EU and its
enlargement were presented in addition to an analysis of the German economic development
against the background of other EU member countries, including Poland, between 1990 and 2004.
Traditionally, Germany was one of those countries, which supported European integration most
deliberately, no matter if Christian- or Socialdemocrats were in power. Also other parliamentary
parties gave their endorsement to European integration. The German society more than other ones
backed European integration and supported the idea of strengthening the European institutions.
The opinion that Germany is the main power and lifeblood of the European integration is fully
justified.
Taking into account the main economic factors describing the economic position of a country
(e.g. gross national product (GNP), international trade etc.), Germany played a key role in the
EU. After the re-unification of Germany, its role even increased.
In the 90s Germany also became Poland’s most significant economic partner. The best example
for this is the fact that after adding up the amounts of turnover with the next five Poland’s
economic partners, they would be smaller than the amount of Polish export to Germany and Polish
import from this country.
These conditions influenced the German perspective of the negotiations on the full-fledged
membership of Poland in the EU.
4. The time and space in the integration process
Germany remained Poland’s key economic partner even after our accession to the EU. Due
to the convergence theory and imitation models, Poland will be bridging the gap to other EU
member states. It will result mainly due to the cooperation with German economy. The author
tried to answer the following questions:
• When it would be possible?
• Does it encompass the whole economy or only some areas?
• Which areas of the economy will be affected?
• To which extend will it influence the economic expansion to the East?
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5. The European conditions of Polish-German relations
In the elaboration were described:
• Germany’s standpoint on the EU enlargement
• Perspectives for political and security cooperation between Poland and Germany the EU
Eastward enlargement.
6. The development of external economic ties of the Eastern Lands of Germany
on the eve of the 21st century
The author has presented:
• The development of the economic situation of the Eastern Lands of Germany between
1990–2002;
• Evolution of the international trade of the Eastern Lands of Germany between 1990–2002
with a special focus on development of trade with Western Lands and the EU countries,
including Poland;
• Development of the external exchange of productive factors between 1990–2002, with special
attention to the development of trade with Western Lands and the EU countries, including
Poland;
• Hitherto coherence between the formation of the Eastern Lands’ general situation and the
formation of their economic ties;
• Perspectives for the development of the external ties of the Eastern Lands of Germany;
• Hitherto and anticipated implications of the development of the Eastern Lands’ external
economic ties with Poland.
7. The changes in the social market economy’s system in Germany
The analysis of the social market economy’s evolution in Germany has been done with a special
attention to the flexibility of the labour market, the restrictions of the social benefits and changes
in the financing of poorest Lands.
The influence of the EU’s integration on the direct investments’ flows and on the technical
knowledge exemplified by bilateral connections between Poland and Germany.
The goal of the research was to assess whether and to which extend the accession of
Poland to the EU will influence the international investment’s and scientifical connections of
Poland, with special attention to Polish-German relations. So the analysis covered the results of
the integration process for international flows of two productive factors: capital and technology
(technical knowledge). The analysis was conducted in theoretical as well as in empirical sphere.
The economic integration is to be associated not only with the liberalization of goods and
services flows, but also with elimination of barriers that slow down free flows of production factors
within the group of countries. The free flow of capital is one out of four key rules, on which the
European Community is based, so the EU enlargement means that this rule covers also Poland.
The following questions were to be answered:
• Does the incorporation into the common market will increase or maybe decrease the
attractiveness of Poland’s localization for foreign investors, especially German investments?
• What will be the influence of integration on Polish entrepreneurs’ direct investments?
• Will the integration result in the increase of Polish investments in the EU?
In the context of Polish accession to the EU, the inflow and outflow of capital (including
changes in attractiveness of different trades) including the final effect on the development of
Polish economy were analyzed.
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The flow of the second analyzed factor (technical knowledge) is regulated—also in the terms
of integration—on slight different conditions than the transfer of capital. It results from the fact
that technology can not be generally seen as an available factor of production, because it unites
both the features of public and private goods. The technological knowledge as a private good can
be converted into market strength, when it is materialized in products and processes and when it
is not available for competitors. This feature of technology brings it closer to the physical capital,
because knowledge, as the time goes, gives less and less advantages. It happens due to the fact
that knowledge is widespread among competitors. On the other hand technology can be seen as
a public good and the part of technological achievements is a commonly available knowledge (e.g.
some results of the research and development activities which are financed by the states’ budgets).
8. Directions and opportunities for development of economic co-operation be-
tween Poland and Germany in agriculture after Polish accession to the EU
in the years 2004–2006
Presently Germany is a main economic partner of Poland. The share of Germany in total Polish
exports amounts to 37%, while in imports to 25%. The share of agricultural and foodstuff products
in Polish-German trade is significant. Exports of agro-food products to Germany constitutes ca.
20% of the whole Polish exports (what, in turn, makes 40% of the whole Polish exports of
these articles to the EU). As regards imports from Germany, the share of agro-food products is
estimated at between 14,3%–16,4%. It is worth emphasizing that although Polish trade balance
showed in general deficit, balance of trade with agricultural and foodstuff products in the years
1997–2000 was positive. As regards agro-food articles the so far trade co-operation with Germany
was favorable for Poland.
Polish integration with the European Union provides opportunities for further development of
collaboration in agriculture between Poland and Germany. This chance is additionally strengthened
by the close neighborhood and cultural ties between the two countries. From this standpoint it
seems sensible to conduct research on directions and opportunities of further co-operation between
Poland and Germany within common market created by the EU.
The aim of this research task was to determine directions of economic co-operation development
between Poland and Germany in agriculture. There was particular stress laid on the production
potential of agricultural sectors in both countries, taking into account basic production factors such
as: land, work, capital and natural conditions. Based on that the level of agricultural production
(both vegetable and animal one) and directions of its development in the common market were
presented in the paper. The analysis included hitherto and future collaboration with regard to
vegetable production (exchange of vegetable specimens), animal breeding but, first of all, to
agro-food trade. There was also examined the competitiveness level of chosen agricultural products
(grains, white beetroots, vegetables) as well as of milk, beef, pork and poultry livestock. The
analysis covered selected types of farms according to production specialization and scale. At this
place various levels of direct payments for candidate countries within Common Agriculture Policy
were taken into consideration, as well as their influence on farmers’ earnings and, indirectly, their
competitiveness.
9. Germany’s Foreign Trade and the EU Eastern Enlargement
The accession of Poland to the European Union and the EU Eastern Enlargement are
surely a milestone for the enhancement and development of political, economic, social and cultural
ties in Europe. New chances and challenges for the newcomers have arisen, brought afloat
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by the application of the common market rules. On the other hand, the exports-oriented EU
economy has gained new markets where EU trade rules apply, with millions of customers, which
opens new horizons for further export expansion. The geographical closeness of Germany and it’s
familiarity with local markets are additional factors (which played a substantial role also before
the Enlargement) making the above mentioned scenario more probable.
The main goal of the research was to analyze the current EU’s foreign trade structure in the
relations with new EU member states, focusing on potential changes in this regard.
The aims in detail were:
• Role of foreign trade in the region
• Comparison of the international trade position of Germany with the position of the new
member states;
• Specification of Germany’s specialization in bilateral trade with these countries;
• Outlining perspectives for Germany’s foreign trade after the Enlargement
• Competitiveness analysis of the Polish and German economies after the Enlargement.
10. Research and development activity of transnational corporations. German
experiences—implications for Poland
In the highly-developed economies scientific and research activity remains mainly in compe-
tencies of private enterprises. In Poland, however, the chief role in this respect is still attributed
to the state sector. Since Polish enterprises are still not sufficiently capitalized and they often
lack awareness of necessity of long-term investment in research and development sphere, and, on
the other hand, Polish central budget is very restricted, the general level of R+D expenses and
therefore innovativeness of Polish economy remain limited.
Economic development demands at the same time remarkable expenditures on scientific
research and development works being a potential source of innovations. Therefore, opportunities
for Poland resulting from internationalization of R+D activity in transnational corporations were
researched in the paper. In other words there was answered a question to what extent external
private financing of research in Poland may be intensified.
The aim of this paper was to analyze determinants of R+D activity location, to carry out
empirical analysis of guidelines resulting from the theory based on the example of German
economy and finally to refer conclusions to the current Polish situation.
The analysis includes international, and in particular European dimension of R+D activity. In
order to evaluate determinants of R+D activity location, European policy towards transnational
corporations, as well as policy supporting research and development were discussed in details. In
the empirical part concerning Germany, particular attention was paid to intensification of scientific
and research collaboration between EU member countries.
11. Assistance policy as an instrument supporting integration processes in
Central and Eastern Europe
The paper has the following structure:
1. Assistance policy as one of the factors supporting economic transformation.
2. Obligations of Poland as a member of OECD to implement assistance programs.
3. Polish-German-Ukrainian co-operation within German governmental program TRANSFORM.
The concept of assistance programs for Eastern block countries was born yet before 1989,
but only conditions created with the collapse of communism made it possible to absorb aid means
and develop support programs for these countries.
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In order to stimulate economic and socio-political development the program TRANSFORM
was created in Germany. It covered the most advanced in economic transformation countries
such as: Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Russia,
Belarus and Ukraine.
Germany concentrates its collaboration programs in this geographic area on key issues for
reforming economies:
• Development of democracy;
• Adjustment and preparation of economy to free-market conditions and competition.
Similar targets were settled by the European Union while determining development strategy
of Eastern enlargement and accession of new members. There were launched PHARE and TACSIS
programs targeted at preparation of candidate countries for accession and incorporation in the
EU structures. Huge financial grants, counseling and collaboration of administration institutions
let relatively quickly prepare particular countries for integration.
Among the most significant bodies giving and monitoring international assistance there is
a Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the OECD structure. Members of this organization
are obliged to provide assistance policy for the sake of the poorer countries.
Polish accession to OECD in 1996 meant that also our country accepted this obligation.
Presently, Poland has an observer status in the Development Assistance Committee and it free
willingly incurs fees financing regional programs in Eastern Europe and Baltic States.
The presented in the paper case describing mutual experiences exchange in the field of
economic transformation between Poland, Germany and Ukraine cast light on the potential of the
assistance policy and its significance for beneficiaries.
12. Cross-border co-operation of German Lands in the perspective of the EU
Eastern enlargement
The research presents experiences of German Lands in cross-border co-operation which
might be useful for Polish voivodeships and provinces. The first part of the paper focuses on
description of legal conditions concerning Federation’s and Lands’ competencies in foreign policy
and co-operation between regions. The issues of growing influence of German Lands on EU
regional policy and the necessity of a broader representation of German territory units in the
EU forum were touched upon as next. The short presentation of cross-border co-operation in
the most significant Euroregions situated on the Western, Northern and Southern frontiers of
Germany may serve as a pattern for this type of collaboration on the Polish and German
border. The second part of the paper includes a comparison analysis of two German Lands
(Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) as regards their cross-border co-operation in the
Baltic See area. The author specifically describes partnership nets with the regions of the
Baltic See neighboring countries, giving many examples of collaboration co-financed from the
EU programs. Experiences in utilization of the means from the structural funds and examples
of realization of EU initiatives within regional policy framework provide a good incentive for
further development of cross-border co-operation between Polish and German regions. The next
part of the paper deals with description of the most remarkable cross-border undertakings
between Poland and Germany (such as establishing Euroregions, PHARE BCB, INTERREG
III pre-accession programs, TWG economic co-operation, environment protection, cultural and
academic collaboration). It also enumerates chief barriers in the further development of this
co-operation. In the final part the author attempts to draw conclusions for the bordering regions
from the present cross-border co-operation as well as he proposes to take advantage of positive
experiences of German Lands utilizing means within common structural and regional policies.
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13. Accession negotiation process of Poland with European Union—sensitive
issues from the German point of view
German position in the European Union is strong in both economic and political aspects.
This fact for Poland has particular significance because of geographic neighborhood, common
history and economic relations. Although Eastern EU enlargement belonged to main priorities in
German foreign policy and it was supported by all considerable political parties, elaboration of the
common EU standpoint in some negotiation areas was in practice difficult because of real German
interests. This situation referred in particular to such areas as: free employees flow, freedom of
rendering services, free capital flow (especially with regard to purchase of land and real estate
by foreigners), agriculture, regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments, as well as
administration of justice and domestic affairs.
The aim of research was to identify German political and economic interests during the
process of EU enlargement by Poland, description and analysis of German standpoint as
concerns particular negotiation problems and comparison of German position with the Community
standpoint. As a starting point of the paper political and economic relationships between Poland
and Germany were analyzed and the role of Germany as one of significant pillars of EU stressed.
In reference to each of the negotiation areas the author discussed Polish standpoint, German
standpoint (official argumentation of the Federal Government, in some cases also opinions of
particular Lands, opposition, various political and economic circles), as well as the EU standpoint
including in some cases the role of European Commission. The analysis covered the content of
the negotiation process and its results.
In the report’s conclusion it should be once again emphasized that there is a strong necessity
to continue the research. The research areas mentioned above concerned co-operation of Poland
and Germany in further intensification of economic integration process as well as common
responsibility for transformation processes in the countries to the east from Poland. Further
broadened research should be made into processes of structural changes of German and Polish
economies, especially as regards social market economy model.
The approved title of the research will be: “Poland—Germany and Eastern economic policy.
Challenges and responsibility”.
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ANTONI KUKLIÑSKI
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
IN SECULAR PERSPECTIVE
The experiences and prospects
of the years 1950–2050
Global catastrophe versus global renaissance
Memorandum I*
“Can we do better as we enter the twenty-first
century? The apocrypha of Yogi Berra warns us
not to make predictions, particularly about the
future. Yet we have no choice. We walk around
with pictures of the future in our heads as
a necessary condition of planning our actions.”
Joseph S. Nye Jr
Introduction
The global success of the “Limits to growth” should be seen not only as a substantive success
of a new innovative approach in the interpretation of the global future1. This success should
be seen also as an ability to shake up the global public opinion by the formulation of a set of
dramatic conclusions and value judgments questioning the conventional wisdom about the global
future.
The turning point created by the publication “Limits to growth” incorporates two elements:
1) the substantive innovation
2) the dramaturgy of presentation and discussions
In the experiences of the Club of Rome of the last decades we can find a deficit both in
substantive innovation and in the dramaturgy of presentation. The lessons of success and failure
should be analyzed hinc et nunc.
* The opinions and value judgments presented in this paper are related to the personal responsibility of the
author and may be not shared by all Members of the Polish Association for the Club of Rome.
Discussion paper prepared for and presented at the 2004 Annual Conference of the Club of Rome, Helsinki October
10th 2004—paper presented also at the Workshop of the Club of Rome in Warsaw—see Anna G¹sior-Niemiec in this
volume.
1 Compare: D. Meadows, Limits to growth—The 30 year update, Helsinki Conference, op.cit.
Compare also: Globalisation, I.S.S.J. no 160, June 1999, UNESCO, Paris.
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There is an urgent necessity to create a second dramatic turning point in the history of
the Club of Rome. We should find a grand thematic field incorporating the substantive innovation
and the dramatic presentation.
To my mind the topic—“Global development in secular perspective—Experiences and
prospects of the years 1950–2050” has the potential to create the second turning point. If the
Club of Rome would be able to sponsor a set of studies which will formulate twelve theses related
to the evaluation of the global experiences of the years 1950–2000 to the optimistic and pessimistic
scenarios for the years 2000–2050—then the global public opinion would have a controversial and
imaginative background for the discussion of the experiences and prospects of human development
of the years 1950–2050.
These twelve theses should be build around comprehensive empirical and prospective evidence
developed in the framework of bold and strong value judgments shaking up the global public
opinion.
The ability to promote a global intellectual and moral shake up will create a second turning
point in the history of the Club of Rome and will put the Club in the center of global attention.
* * *
Naturally the selection of twelve theses is definitely a subjective choice developed in the
framework of my academic and empirical experiences. This enumeration is only an invitation to
a brainstorming discussion of the crucial strategic choice of the XXI century—“Global catastrophe
versus global renaissance”.
I. Sustainable versus unsustainable development—illusion versus reality
II. Demographic growth, demographic transformation, and the dramatic demographic
decline of Europe
III. Globalization—a blessing or disaster
VI. Science and technology—efficiency or deficiency of breakthrough innovations
V. The clashing civilizations—a nightmare or reality
VI. The splitting globe—global wealth versus global poverty
VII. The growth and collapse of Soviet Union—the mismanaged transition from real
socialism to real capitalism
VIII. The global terrorism and the global criminal economy as a tragic challenge for the
world order
XI. The paradox of the American power
X. The glory and the misery of the European Union
XI. The emergence of Imperial China as the leading power of the XXI century
XII. The emergence of competitive India as an important actor of the global scene
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I. Sustainable versus unsustainable development—illusion versus reality2
We have to answer the question—to what extent the development of the years 1950–2000
was sustainable or unsustainable. We need a set of comprehensive historical studies which will
formulate a well documented optimistic or pessimistic answer to this question. My intuitive answer
will be inclined to formulate a pessimistic hypothesis saying that in the final evaluation the
development of the second half of the XX century was rather unsustainable.
Much more difficult in methodological and pragmatic terms will be the answer related to the
prospective question—what will prevail in the first half of the XXI century—the sustainable or
the unsustainable development?
II. Demographic growth, demographic transformation, and the dramatic demo-
graphic decline of Europe
The hundred years of demographic development 1950–2050 are and will be a witness of
great quantitative and structural transformation of the global demographic scene. It is easy to
imagine the very great differences in the comparative analysis of three “photographs” of the
global demographic scene 1950–2000–2050. These great demographic transformations will have
direct and indirect economic, social, political and cultural consequences. In the analysis of the
changing global demographic scene we should notice the dramatic demographic decline of Europe,
which in some European countries could reach the dimension of a national tragedy.
III. Globalization—a blessing or a disaster?
It is the highest time to initiate a set of contributions which sine ira et studio will answer the
question to what extent globalization is a blessing and to what extent a disaster. The arguments
of proglobalistic and antyglobalistic approaches should be analyzed in a climate of academic
objectivity if such an objectivity can exist in the framework of social sciences dominated by
different value judgments3.
IV. Science and technology—the affluency or deficiency of breakthrough inno-
vations
Prima facie the century 1950–2050 is a period of great affluence in the field of breakthrough
innovations in a scale unprecedented in the historical experiences. This thesis is questioned by R.
Galar4 suggesting that in the second half of the XX century there was a deficiency of breakthrough
innovations in comparison with the experiences of the second half of the XIX century.
2 compare: A. Kukliñski, Sustainable development as the major challenge for the XXI century (in:) REUPUS
volume one.
Compare also: T. Schauer, F.J. Rademacher, The challenge of the digital divide—promoting a global society
dialogue, Universitat Verlag Ulm, 2001.
T. Schauer, The sustainable information society—vision and risks, Saskia Global Society Dialogue, Universitat
Verlag Ulm Gmbh, 2003.
T. Schauer, F.J. Rademacher, Equality and diversity in the information age, Global Society Dialogue, Universitat
Verlag Ulm, 2000.
T. Schauer, Lifestyles, Future Technologies and Sustainable Development, Protext Verlag Bonn, 2000.
Compare: Special Report—United Nations—Fighting for survival, The Economist, November 20th 2004.
3 Compare: A. Kukliñski, W. Or³owski (eds) The knowledge based economy, Warsaw 2000, p. 300.
4 Compare: A. Kukliñski, W. Or³owski (eds) op.cit, p. 32–62.
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The thesis of R. Galar is an inducement for a deep and comprehensive inquiry into the S and
T development of the years 1950–2050. Maybe our performance in this period is not so brilliant
as presented in the framework of conventional wisdom.
V. The clash of civilizations—a nightmare or a reality
In 1996 S.P. Huntington5 has published his controversial and path breaking book. After eight
years we see the power of the arguments of S.P. Huntington in a new perspective. The policies
of the present American administration are creating new arguments to make this clash stronger
and more difficult to reconcile in the future. In a pessimistic scenario this may led to global
catastrophe. Let us quote the poetic warning of N.D. Kristof 6:
“Shakespeare is warning us against rash actions on the basis of flawed intelligence. Hamlet
is sometimes seen as an indictment of indecision, but his “to be or not to be” soliloquy is
a careful examination of the pros and cons of immediate action—a measured approach that
Bush might have emulated before the Iraq war.
Instead, Bush emulates Coriolanus, a well-meaning Roman general and aristocrat whose war
against barbarians leads to an early victory but who then proves so inflexible and intemperate
that tragedy befalls him and his people.
Unless Bush learns to see nuance and act less rashly, he will be the Coriolanus of our age:
A strong and decisive leader, imbued with great talent and initially celebrated for his leadership
in a crisis, who ultimately fails himself and his nation because of his rigidity, superficiality and
arrogance.” (e-mail: Nicholas@nytimes.com)
VI. The splitting globe—global wealth versus global poverty
Never in human history the difference between the rich and the poor was so great as now. If
you add up the wealth of the world’s poorest two billion people it matches the cumulative wealth
of the richest 200. This is the experience of the XX century and the dramatic challenge for the
XXI century.
In this context we would like to quote the dramatic warning of J.E. Garten7:
“Of the earth’s 6 billion people, 5 billion live on less than 2$ a day. Three billion are under
age 25. Over the past decade, no improvement has occurred in the poverty levels for the 50
poorest nations, where health-care delivery systems are collapsing. This is a catastrophe with
implications, including an even more heightened terrorist threat, for us all.”
* * *
“Could we expect such far-reaching responses from our Presidential candidates? I’m skeptical.
But even with bold answers, the highly partisan and short-term nature of our government policies
still needs to be overcome. Moreover, our politicians would have to unite behind the longer-term
5 S.P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations, Simon and Schuster, 1996.
Compare also: J. Reston Jr, Warriors of God—Richard the Lionheart and Saladin in the Third Crusade, Faber
and Faber, 2001.
Compare also: A. Besancon, Islam I reszta œwiata—Islam and the rest of the world, Tygodnik idée—Europa,
November 10th 2004.
6 N.D. Kristof, Shakespeare’s lessons for the president, I.H.T., September 7th , 2004.
Compare also: G. Evans, K. Sadjadpour, Iraq chaos has only emboldened Iran US policy backfires, I.H.T., October
13th 2004.
7 J.E. Garten, Thorny questions for Next President, Business Week—European Edition, September 6th , 2004.
(e-mail: jeffrey.garten@yale.edu)
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national interest as they did right after World War II. That could never happen without
a farsighted and truly courageous President to lead them. Right now, I’m worried that neither
Bush nor Kerry is up to that challenge.”
VII. The growth and collapse of Soviet Union—the mismanaged transition
from real socialism to real capitalism
M. Castells 8 has presented a well designed analysis of the processes which have generated
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately the low level of strategic 9 thinking of the great
liberal democracies opened the way for a mismanaged transition from real socialism to real
capitalism. We must have the wisdom, imagination and courage to analyse this great historical
mismanagement10.
VIII. The global terrorism and global criminal economy as a tragic challenge
for the world order11
The global future of humanity is challenged by the terrible efficiency of global terrorism
and the skillful management of global criminal economy. We need a quite new perception of this
problem. The conventional theoretical and pragmatic wisdom is too weak to answer this challenge.
Maybe in the framework of our programme we will be able to present some innovative thinking
in this field.
IX. The paradox of American power
We have three brilliant and charming books analyzing the paradox of American power12. In
a very convincing way the Authors present a framework of thinking which should determine the
performance of the American superpower in the XXI century. The essence of this framework is
related to the strategic partnership USA—Europe.
Unfortunately this framework is quite alien to the mind of the present American administration.
Will the paradox of American power change itself into a global tragedy?
X. The glory and misery of the European Union
The glory of the European Union is well presented by M. Castells 13. The crisis of Europe and
the European Union is outlined by A. Kukliñski 14. A strong European Union is an indispensable
anchor of the global system. This point of view should be developed in our programme.
8 M. Castells, End of Millennium—The Information Age, Vol III, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 2000, p. 5–61.
9 Compare: Looking back from 2992—A World History, Chapter 13—The disasters 21st century, “The Economist”,
December 26th 1992—January 8th 1993.
10 Compare: A. Kukliñski, The hypothesis of the mismanaged transformation (in:) A. Kukliñski (ed.) Baltic Europe
in the perspective of global change, Warsaw 1995, p.446.
11 compare: M. Castells, op.cit. , p. 169.
Compare also: Th.L. Friedman, Fight the war on terror at the pump. The Bush-Cheney emerging policy should
be called—No Mullah Left Behind, October 8th 2004.
12 Compare: J.P. Nye, The paradox of American Power—Why the World’s only superpower can’t go it alone, Oxford
University Press, 2002.
D.P. Calleo, Rethinking Europe’s Future, A Century Foundation Book , Princeton 2001
T.G. Asch, Free world, America, Europe and the surprising Future of the West, Random House, 2004.
Compare also: R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power—America and Europe in the New World Order, Random House,
2002.
13 M. Castells, op.cit., p.338.
14 A. Kukliñski, Strong or weak Europe—The global environment of the XXI century (in:) REUPUS volume one
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XI. The emergence of Imperial China as a leading power of the XXI century
The present mismanagement of the American power is opening the way for China to assume
the role of the leading power of the XXI century15. The warning of T.G. Asch16 should be quoted
in this context:
“The most important American elections in history are approaching—a really global elections
in which the world has nothing to say. The next four consecutive years of Bush will strengthen
millions of Muslims in the futile anti-western phobia will strengthen the European despise for
America, and lead the U.S. to a budget catastrophe. Another four such years and during the
Olimpic Games in Pekin—the divided world would listen to the dictate of the growing Chinese
power.”
XII. The emergence of competitive India as an important actor of the global
scene
India will be one of the four great global powers of the XXI century17. The American
economy and the European economy will face the India competition in many fields.
Conclusion
In the conclusion we should indicate a pattern of an integrated analysis of optimistic and
pessimistic scenarios which will emerge in the framework of the proposed programme of the Club
of Rome. 18
In this pattern the crucial dilemma or the crucial strategic choice can be developed around
the formulation—“Global catastrophe or global renaissance—the perspectives of the XXI century”.
This is a great historical challenge for the Club of Rome to face this dilemma in a climate of
affluence in the field of wisdom, imagination, and courage.
Warszawa–Nowy S¹cz
March 10th 2005.
compare also: G. Bowley, A grim report on future grabs Europe attention, I.H.T., November 12th , 2004.
15 A. Kukliñski, op.cit.
compare: China—Geburteiner Weltmacht, Der Spiegel, No 42, October 11th 2004;
compare also: The tiger in front. A survey of India and China, The Economist, March 5th 2005.
16 T.G. Asch, The global election—Wybory œwiatowe, Gazeta Wyborcza, September 4th–5th , 2004.
compare also: J. Vinocur, Barroso’s Thermostat set cool for Bush, IHT, January 22, 2005.
17 A. Kukliñski, op.cit.
compare also: J.E. Garten, Thorny questions for the Next President—How important is the rise of China and
India to the well being of U.S. citizens, Business Week—European Edition, September 3rd–6th 2004.
Compare also: Special Report Asia Future The Great Oil Hunt—China needs energy more than ever. It quest to
secure enough oil and gas to keep its economy humming will change the world, BussinessWeek, November 15th 2004
Compare also: China’s growth spreads inland, The Economist, November 20–26th 2004.
18 An inspiration for this Programme can be seen in the interesty Report of the National Intelligence Council’s
2020 Project—Mapping the Global Future, NIC Washington DC, December 2004.
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GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
IN SECULAR PERSPECTIVE
The experiences and prospects
of the years 1950–2050
Global catastrophe versus global renaissance
Memorandum II
This is a follow up of Memorandum I which most probably is finding a positive reception in
the intellectual and institutional environment of the Club of Rome. The positive reception is an
inducement to prepare Memorandum II as a set of five reflections stimulating the discussion on
“global development in secular perspective”.
Reflection one—The global “election” of the President of the USA
In the IHT1we find the following information— “Global poll shows Kerry widely preferred to
Bush”. This is the summary of this information:
1 T. Crampton, It’s a Kerry romp (if world voted), IHT, September 9th 2004.
Compare comments presenting the evaluation of the electoral victory of George W. Bush:
a) International Herald Tribune, H.E. Kissinger, Now, back to defining a new world order, November 6th–7th 2004.
H.D.S. Greenway, Think reality, not ideology. An agenda for Bush II:
“Congratulations, Mr. President. Now that you never have to face an electorate again, I would hope that your
second term might be based a bit more on reality than ideology. One of your senior advisers told the writer Ron
Suskind that his kind were “what we call the reality-based community,” people who “ believe that solutions emerge
from your judicious study of discernible reality.” That, according to your adviser, was old hat. “We’re an empire
now,” he said, “and when we act, we create our own reality. We’re history’s actors, and you, all of you, will be left
to just study what we do.” There can be no doubt that you are one of histoy’s actors, but the first act has not gone
so well. Your advisers, especially your messianic ideologues, have gotten you and the country into a awful mess in
Iraq.”— underlined by A. Kukliñski—November 6th–7th 2004.
Living with the second Bush Term—How the world saw America’s election, November 9th 2004.
L.Nofziger, Bush’s trouble ahead—Mandate—what mandate, November 9th 2004.
D.S. Hamilton, J.S.Quinlan, Europe—We can’t afford that transatlantic squabble, November 5th 2004.
For Bush and America deciding what comes next, November 5th 2004.
M. Dowd, The Torture Guy, November 12th 2004.
b) The Economist:
The incompetent or incoherent? October 30th–November5th 2004.
Now, unite us, November 6th–November 12th
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“Paris: If the world could cast a vote in the United States presidential election, John Kerry
would beat George W. Bush by a landslide, according to a poll released on Wednesday that is
described as the largest sample of global opinion on the race.
‘It is absolutely clear that John Kerry would win handily if the people of the world could
vote’, said Steve Kull, director of The Attitudes of the University of Maryland, a co-sponsor of
the survey. ‘It is rather striking that just one in five people surveyed around the world support
the re-election of President Bush.’ The poll of 34,330 people older than 15 from all regions of the
world found that the majority or plurality of people from 32 countries prefer Kerry to Bush.”
The world has nothing to say in this election. Nevertheless—this is a document that the
victory of Bush will create a great divergence separating the global and the American public
opinion. This would be a great challenge for the American global leadership. In the begining of
2005 some new elements have emerged for the evaluation of the American Presidency2
Reflection two—Templates of terrorism—The pattern is global,
but the causes are local
This is the title of a commentary of W. Pfaff 3 where we find the following observations:
“Terrorism and the measures adopted against it acquire reciprocal momentum that is all
but impossible to stop once a certain threshold has been crossed. That threshold was crossed in
Russia last week, with potentially enormous consequences for civil liberties in that country, for
civil peace in the Caucasus and possibly for the existing peaceful relationship between Russia
and America.
This is why issues of nationalism, irredentism and religion—the usual motives for
terrorist outrages—are so desperately dangerous. Ignored or misinterpreted, assigned to spurious
international causes, they can do immense damage. They have to be dealt with in their natural
dimensions.”
* * *
“The affairs retain their national causes, and the only hope of solution remains national.
But once the terrorist action-reaction auction begins, it is almost impossible to stop. Russia has
already invaded Chchnya twice to ‘end terrorism’, but terrorism simply got worse. Ariel Sharon’s
entire career has consisted in failed attempts to solve Israel’s problem of national existence by
brute destruction of what he considers its enemies. The United States invaded Afghanistan and
overturned the Taliban government, but the terrorists took to the hills and the country is in
political and social pieces. And now there is Iraq.”
Charlemagne Chirac—lite—The competition for the right foreign policy vision for the European Union, November
20th 2004.
c) BussinessWeek:
The next four years, November 15th 2004.
2 Compare: Traumathic Partnership. A concrete strategy for mending fences, I.H.T., February 17, 2005;
R. Bernstein, Is it possible that Bush wasn’t entirely wrong?, I.H.T., February 18, 2005;
S. Sharm El Seikn, Peace in our Time, Economist, February 12, 2005;
R. Cohen, Iraq’s in intricate theater of dawning democracy, I.H.T., February 12–13, 2005;
Bush financial folly, I.H.T., February 15, 2005;
D. Altman, US debt Watch out the domino effect, I.H.T., February 12–13, 2005.
3 W. Pfaff, Templates of terrorism. The pattern is global but the causes are local, IHT, September 9th , 2004.
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* * *
This is a strong and controversial message. We need a comprehensive diagnosis of the roots
of terrorism in all scales. We need also new approaches to answer the tragic question—how to
solve the mortal danger of global terrorism. In the present political, ideological, and pragmatic
framework it is impossible to solve this problem4.
This means not that this problem cannot be solved in a new framework. Maybe the Club of
Rome could design such a new framework.
Reflection three—The security economy
There is no doubt that in the intellectual perspective—the OECD is the most brilliant
international organization. This innovative, intellectual leadership was once more demonstrated by
the publication of a path breaking volume5—“The security economy”. In the foreword we find the
following information6:
“The security industry is a large and expanding area of economic activity. Spurred on by
the perception of rising crime, the threat of terrorist attacks and increasingly free movements
of goods, capital, and people, there has been a swell in government, corporate and consumers’
budgets for security goods and services in recent years. This development promises to have
far-reaching economic and societal implications over the longer term. The challenge for policy
makers is how to meet the apparent need for greater security without unduly impeding economic
efficiency and citizens’ rights in liberal societies.”
* * *
“The meeting consisted of four sessions. The first reviewed the social, economic, and
institutional drivers behind the rising demand for security and sketched out the trends and
developments likely to determine its future scale and direction. The second session looked at
the supply side, outlining the state of the art in several key technologies in identification,
authentication and surveillance and exploring their likely development over the next ten years or
so. The third examined the longer-term economic implications of the emerging security economy.
It addressed key trade-offs in the coming years between greater security on the one hand and
economic efficiency on the other, and explored the roles that governments and the private sector
might play in helping to resolve these trade-offs. The fourth and final session considered the
mid—to long-term implications for society of the growing use of security, technologies. More
specifically, it was about the future of the ‘surveillance society’ and what can be done to guide
the development and utilization of identification and monitoring technologies along avenues that
society regards, on balance, as generally most beneficial.”
4 compare three open-minded contributions in IHT, September 11th–12th 2004,
V. Erofegen, September 11th and Beslan—a battle for civilization. Russia must now decide.
J. Marias, Spain gets back to normal. There is no such thing as war on terrorism.
B. Herbert, Bush has no idea to end his quagmire. The insurgency in Iraq will never end as long the U.S. is
an occupying country.
Editorial: The private and public knowledge of September 11th . A justified and dangerous fury in Russia
Compare also: A. Kukliñski, Globalization in the XXI century. In quest of a new paradigm (in:) A. Kukliñski, B.
Skuza (eds) Europe in the perspective of global change, Warsaw, 2003.
5 OECD, The security economy, Paris 2004. Compare inter alia: Chapter 7, Assesing the Economic Trade-offs of
the security economy.
6 OECD, op.cit, p. 3 and 4.
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The brilliant publication of OECD is an important input into the discussion related to thesis
eight of Memorandum One.
Reflection four—The demonstration effect of the contributions
of Angus Maddison
Angus Maddison in the framework of OECD has developed a magnificent school of macroe-
conomic and macro-historical analyses which is introducing a new paradigm of well documented
quantitative global history7. The contribution of A. Maddison are a direct input into the intellectual
and empirical construction of our Programme.
Maybe the Club of Rome would be able to invite Angus Maddison to participate in
our programme—“Global development in secular perspective”. His methodological and empirical
competence would be a great asset for our programme.
Reflection five—Global development in secular perspective
The institutional considerations
I am convinced that this Programme will find strong support of three leading institutional
organizations:
— OECD
— the World Bank
— the European Union
We will get this support under one fundamental consideration. We must have the knowledge,
the imagination, courage, and the will to establish a strong theoretical, methodological, empirical,
and pragmatic framework of the programme. Having this strong framework we will get the
support of the Three Grand International Organizations and most probably of other institutions
including the Great American and British Universities (J.S. Nye, S.P. Huntington, J.E. Garten, M.
Castells, D.P. Calleo, T.G. Asch) and journalists (W. Pfaff, N.D. Kristof).
Naturally—this is not a comprehensive list of personalities 8 which might be interested in the
participation in our programme. This full list will emerge from a comprehensive discussion related
to the design and organization of a consortium of 25 European and American Institutions which
would accept the intellectual and pragmatic responsibility for the design and implementation of
the grand path breaking programme:
“Global catastrophe versus global renaissance”
Warszawa—Nowy S¹cz
February 20th 2005.
7 A. Maddison, The world economy—A millennial perspective, OECD, Paris 2001
A. Maddison, The world economy, Historical statistics, OECD, Paris 2003.
8 compare part V in the volume: A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds) Europe in the perspective of global change, The
Polish Association for the Club of Rome, Warsaw 2003
compare also: The volume—H. Bünz, A. Kukliñski (eds) Globalization—Experiences and prospects, Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, Warsaw 2001.
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EUROPE AND THE GOAL
OF SUSTAINED DEVELOPMENT
The subject put before this panel can be understood as a question: should long-term global
development be expected to bring about global catastrophe or rather to lead towards global
renaissance? My answer is by no means pessimistic. I believe that we—the mankind—still have
a chance to override the imminent dangers and steer towards a safe and well managed world.
But it would be unwise to disregard these dangers which in fact do provide a serious warning
that we may well be on a road to catastrophe.
These dangers implied in prospective world development were presented for the first time
in 1972 in a logical model by Dennis Meadows in his “Limits to Growth” published as the first
report to the Club of Rome1. Let me recall that the model showed, on a high level of aggregation,
the links and feedbacks between the population explosion, increasing demand for food, industrial
growth, depletion of natural resources and environmental pollution. It led to the identification of
clearly negative tendencies and to the conclusion that their further continuation would lead to
a general downfall and stagnation. As a follow up, the main focus of interest for the Club became
an endeavour to provide answers on how to revert this course of events and determine the lines
of action conducive to a general betterment of the fate of humanity.
The widely accepted general answer to this challenge acquired the shape of the concept
of sustained development. It has received much international attention with the main emphasis
being laid on defence against ecological destruction caused by industrial expansion. This found
expression in the international action programme called Agenda 21 adopted in 1992 by the UN
Conference in Rio de Janeiro.
The real problem was, of course, that of implementation. In spite of all the commendable
desires not much was achieved in later years to stop the processes of destruction. The second
book published by the Meadows team 20 years after the first one2 showed that none of the
previously identified negative tendencies was weakened. Only the rate of population increase was
somewhat reduced, but not enough to reduce seriously the annual increments in absolute terms.
Thus the overall situation grew distinctly worse than it was 20 years earlier. The bundle of
negative tendencies taken together constitute now what can be termed a global trend towards
self-destruction.
The concept of sustainable development became accordingly still more important. But it
also had to evolve. During the last decade it became clear that ecological destruction is not the
1 Meadows, D.H. & others: Limits to Growth, 1972
2 Meadows, D. & D., Randers, J.: Beyond the Limits—Global Collapse or a Sustainable Future. Earthcan, London
1992
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only danger facing mankind. Increasingly important dangers were recognized in the social area:
mass unemployment, poverty, marginalization of large social layers and atrophy of social cohesion.
The increasing relevance of these phenomena can be seen in the rapidly growing income disparities
both between rich and poor countries and in internal income distribution of individual countries,
including those representing highest levels of development. This results in growing antagonisms
and conflicts between social groups, nations, religions and civilizations, with their most acute
expression in the form of global terrorism. Over the last decade social problems have become
a major international concern. They were the subject of the 2002 UN Conference in Johannesburg,
where a programme for combating world poverty was formulated. Thus, the present understanding
of the concept of sustained development encompasses measures against ecological destruction and
those against poverty. In this shape it presently has the status of a widely accepted set of priority
objectives.
In the European context this line of thinking found a certain expression in the Lisbon
Strategy of March 2000 which formulated objectives for the development of Europe. While
setting the ambitious goal of making the European Union “the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world”, the Strategy document underlines the need for securing
sustainable economic growth as well as more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.
But, as said before, the problem is that of implementation. According to a recent report
presented to the European Commission early in November 2004 (known as the Kok Report) the
performance picture of the Lisbon Strategy is highly disappointing. The Report attributes this
mostly to the lack of political will. It will be interesting to try decipher what this really means.
On the one hand, it means that national governments of the Union countries were reluctant
in adopting policy measures to secure the necessary level of investment in R&D (at three per
cent of GDP) and the proposed employment rate of 70 per cent. On the other hand, however, it
also means that the Lisbon strategy, in spite of the quoted reference to sustainable growth, is
in fact based on policy ideas which do not have much in common with the concept of sustained
development.
The main difference is in the understanding of the role of the market system. The broad
version of the concept of sustained development implies a recognition of the fact that free market,
although needed as a basic instrument of efficiency, when left to itself becomes the creator of the
negative tendencies referred to above. It needs therefore support and corrective measures from
deliberate policies at the national and international level.
By contrast, the Lisbon Agenda is fully focused on the idea of industrial growth based on
almost exclusive regulation of the economy through market and competition. What seems to
provide a basis for macroeconomic policies are such ideas as reforms for competitiveness and
innovation, reductions of company tax levels, and greater flexibility of labour markets. It is worth
noticing that the Growth and Stability Pact which is a cornerstone of economic policies of the
European Union and sets clear targets for the acceptable rate of inflation and level of public debt,
pays no attention whatsoever to the issue of unemployment which is not even mentioned in the
document.
This approach very clearly belongs to the neoliberal school of economic thought devoted to
supply-side policies which proved to be totally ineffective in dealing with unemployment problems
in Europe3.
In defence of the Lisbon line one should quote the ideas which are in opposition to the notion
of future threats. These are the neoliberal ideas linked to the belief in self-regulatory abilities
of the free market. According to this line of thought, free market competition sets in motion
3 See, e.g., a study of the German experience by Laski, K.: Three ways to unemployment, in Sadowski, Z. and
Szeworski, A. (eds.): Kalecki’s Economics Today, Routledge 2004.
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automatic reaction to the negative tendencies by streamlining entrepreneurial innovational activity
towards solutions which provide all the necessary adjustment. Thus every aspect of the mentioned
self-destructive tendency finds response from the self-regulatory action of market competition.
This leads to an optimistic assessment of the prospects for future development, such as painted
in the writings of Herman Kahn4.
Thus we are faced with two fully opposed approaches in the assessment of world development
prospects. One of them stresses the importance of the tendency towards self-destruction. The
other is based on a belief in the mechanism of self-regulation. The author is inclined to draw
the conclusion that both tendencies deserve recognition. The real issue is not a controversy of
opinions, but an objective contradiction between these two tendencies with resulting question
which of them can prove stronger in the longer run. This brings us back to the subject of this
panel.
Is it right to believe that the self-regulatory mechanism of the market, despite all the negative
phenomena, is able to secure stable and safe development, particularly if due account is taken of
the impact of the newly emerging knowledge-based economy with its continuity of innovation? Or
are there more reasons to recognize the predominance of the self-destructing tendency and admit
the necessity of deliberate policy effort to combat the ecological and social challenges and attain
the goals of sustained development?
There can be no doubt about the existence of the self-regulatory tendency and its role
in infusing necessary adjustments into the patterns of resource allocation. However, a closer
look at its working shows that these adjustments usually take much time and are made with
considerable delays. There is a number of reasons. First, their introduction needs incurring
investment costs which involve risk. Firms which are interested do not make prompt decisions
before scrutinizing the projects. They do not act on the ground of interests of mankind, but
their standpoint is always their own interest. Secondly, the implementation of relevant projects
may require specialized know-how which may not be readily available. Thirdly, major adjustments
often require participation of governments which implies the need to attract the attention and
understanding of politicians to obtain their support.
This means that the needed reallocation of resources is introduced with considerable delays.
But there are no delays in the working of the tendency of self-destruction. It would follow that
autoregulation is more effective in slowly growing economies, while it tends to fail keeping pace
with rapid growth rates.
We live in a period of very rapid changes: in technology; in the economic system; and
in patterns of human behaviour. This suggests that the autoregulatory tendency suffers from
considerable delays, while the tendency of self-destruction consistently gains strength owing to
the accumulation of negative phenomena.
There is no way to determine for certain the future course of events. We cannot be sure
which of the two tendencies will ultimately prove stronger. But in this situation it seems safer
and more rational to assume that, to avoid the well recognized imminent dangers, the world
economy needs support from deliberate international action. Free market is not able to revert the
tendency leading to self-destruction which results from the way it works. In the modern economy
ways and means have to be found to combine the working of a free market (needed to enhance
entrepreneurship, innovation and progress of science) with rational steering (needed to promote
the desired patterns of development). This brings us back to the concept of sustained development
which helps to define these desired patterns.
4 See Kahn, Herman: The Year 2000—A Framework for Speculation on the Next 33 Years, 1967; and Kahn H.,
Martel L. & Bron W.: The Next 200 Years—A Scenario for America and the World, 1985.
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The challenge is to find a method of implementation. Some ten years ago it became widely
believed that a serious boost to the autoregulatory tendency would come from globalization. With
its emphasis on general liberalization of trade and capital flows globalization was expected to
enhance growth and raise levels of living in less developed countries, thus bringing relief to world
social tensions.
But globalization failed to bring these expected results. On the contrary, it worked towards
making the contradictions more acute. Liberalization of trade and capital movements, instead
of narrowing the gap between rich and poor nations, brought about increasing disparity, as
a large number of countries tends to lag more and more behind those highly developed. Policy
recommendations based on the idea of liberalization not only do not help in stimulating growth
and development in less developed countries, but make these countries to enter into uneven
competition with much stronger partners.
Thus there is no built-in mechanism which would contribute to the implementation of sustained
development. Perhaps something should be said in favour of deliberate regulatory activities. It
can hardly be denied that a certain progress in overcoming some ecological troubles is being
achieved in recent years. But even in this area, on a global scale, the picture is far from
satisfactory. The level of environmental pollution is still growing due to industrial refuse, air and
water pollution, global warming, deforestation and wasteful exploitation of soils resulting from
utter poverty of millions of people.
Experience shows that in spite of efforts made at the international level it proves extremely
difficult to arrive at agreed upon action programmes. A sad example is provided by the fate of the
Kyoto Protocol—an important measure against global warming. It committed signatories to reduce
gradually over 20 years their output of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases by about 5%.
However, the main pollutant—the USA—refused to sign the Protocol. A recent UN climate change
conference5 took up the planning of longer-term action beyond 2012 when the Protocol expires,
on the assumption that further emission reductions are unavoidable to avoid continued global
warming which—apart of climatic disturbances—represents a serious threat because of rising sea
levels. But, again, it only showed great difficulty in arriving at any agreement except continuation
of talks.
What is still worse, nothing whatsoever is done (although much is being said) with regard to
the other danger area, namely that of the social threat. There seems to be no clear idea of the
nature of possible solutions. This is not surprising in view of the complexity of problems which
begin with demography and lead to vast areas of destitution and hunger, while world continues to
develop quickly in the direction of increasing disparities and polarization. It is clear that the war
against terrorism does not provide any solution, as it hits the symptoms rather than the causes.
Thus ultimately we have before us a contest between the process of gathering threats to
future development, and the progress resulting from the achievements of human mind. Which of
the two is going to gain advantage? This remains to be seen. What, however, is already visible,
is that there is no organizing power capable of making materialize the concept of sustained
development. This concept remains nothing more than a desideratum. It is helpful in orientating
the thinking, but has little significance in orientating action.
There is so far no political will to work out a joint action programme at the fully international
level. The United Nations Organization is clearly incapable of inducing its members to arrive at
any such agreement. The present-day world seems to be overpowered by the hegemony of USA,
but this probably has its limits. A tendency towards a polycentric formula in which the European
Union has a substantial role to play is easily decipherable.
5 Buenos Aires, December 2004
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But the present forms of globalization are often interpreted and criticized as serving
predominantly the interests of USA. Whether this is true or not, such criticism is the cornerstone
on which the increasingly powerful anti-globalist movement emerged. It recently adopted a new
name of alter-globalism which rightly underlines the idea of seeking new solutions for a rational
trend rather than fighting against it. This movement will probably exert an increasing influence
on policy programmes. What, however, is ultimately needed but still beyond reach, is to call into
being by common agreement an international political body fully committed to the implementation
of the model of sustainable development for the world.
For the European Union this should indicate a basic reorientation of its economic policies.
Their present neoliberal bias can hardly be combined with the requirements of a strategy for
sustained development which is badly needed for the world and for Europe as a part of it. The
objective of economic growth cannot nowadays be well served without being combined with care
for social cohesion and the natural environment. This so far does not find adequate expression
neither in the programmes nor in the proposed constitution of the Union. The Lisbon strategy, if it
were to be adequately fitted into such broader context, should be orientated towards encompassing
a serious treatment of both pertinent social issues, as well as ecological concerns.
But It is clear that neither the world trend towards self-destruction nor the limitations of
the market mechanism in its self-regulatory capacities are not yet adequately understood by the
decision-makers.
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REMARKS ON THE PUBLIC SECTOR
IN THE FACE OF GLOBALIZATION
The following considerations have been inspired both by the Antoni Kuklinski paper The
Future of Europe—The Global Future—The Club of Rome presented at this workshop as well
as by the unforgettable Report by the Coucil of the Club of Rome The First Global Revolution
(1991). Since the time of the latter publication we are witnessing many dramatic changes shedding
new light on the world scene.
In the recent several decades the neo—liberal orthodoxy (or rather theology) has been
propagating an idea that in the globalization era and as a result of globalization processes, the
state—national state—is becoming antiquated, is in the eclipse. It is also argued that ordinary
citizens, and the more so—businesses are less and less identifying themselves with the particular
nation and particular state. Although the mentioned propagators do not clearly formulate the
eventual conclusions concerning the possible state of affairs in the world economy and community,
such a conclusion seems to be quite apparent. Since it is no world government and will not appear
in the imaginable future and a kind of governance by the international organizations is by far not
sufficient, only one way is realistically foreseeable—namely the private corporate governance. It
would have been, however, unimaginable how in such conditions the civil society can develop let
alone exist.
This kind of a doctrine, scrapped off from theological traits, should be confronted with reality.
And this reality speaks clearly about something totally different. Within this context I would like
to discuss briefly the problem of interrelationships between public and private sectors, but more
in the international than national perspective. This choice of perspective is determined by the
facts that simultaneously the nation states persist to exists and are becoming more and more
internationalized. Such kind of development is rather commonly taken as a result of globalization
and also as one of the forces stimulating globalization.
I would like to mention a couple of problems in order to emphasize that we are facing today
some challenges which can be met and/or are being met by the inter—statal endeavours.
The first challenge—a preservation of world peace—will be left beyond this discussion, despite
of its utmost importance. I have in mind the socio-economic challenges. The following seem to me
worth discussing at this juncture...
First problem—demographic in its world and domestic dimension. Although the demographic
pressure in the world still exists with all its dire consequences, although the universal demographic
transition seems to be approaching, another factor has emerged and is calling for new and
unprecedented solutions. It is ageing of population, thence changes in all population structures.
This factor will unavoidably bring about the new challenges for distribution and redistribution
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systems, together with pension systems etc. Thence, these challenges, in the first place, would
be met within nation states; it is well known that private systems are not able to cope with
it. That is again—the responsibility of state. But this problem now, and the more so in the
future is becoming more and more internationalized and will necessarily call for inter-statal coping
with as well as finding solutions. In both cases the role and importance of the public sector is
growing, nationally and internationally. Needless to say and believe as well that the European
Union is better prepared to meet this challenge than everyone else in the world. It should
also be reminded, that migrations belong to the general demographic problematique, and again,
unavoidably, some kind of inter-statal steering of the migration streams should be—rather sooner
than later— organized and materialized.
Next point—technological and the problem of energy in particular. It is well known that
present civilization cannot develop nor exist without an ample supply of energy. The demand for
energy is constantly growing despite of very successful progress in the energy-saving devices,
which can only hamper the rate of demand growth. On the other hand exploration, processing
and use of energy is one of the main factors contributing to the natural environment destruction.
Thence the intertwining of technological and ecological factors is apparently menacing existence
and development of contemporary civilization. Just therefore the vigorous efforts aiming at finding
solutions are under way, both in the area of research and industrial materialization.
A huge inter-statal project has already started in order to construct first very large power.
station and the whole series of the same should be followed. To reach for a new, cheaper and
fully renewal medium, namely the thermo-nuclear synthesis. It is almost sure that in the coming
decades we will face a revolution in the production, supply and use of energy, in all probability
quite friendly to the natural environment. This is and will remain an inter-statal endeavour,
where private companies will act as implementators of investment process and—may be—also
managers of the energy producing plants after their completion That means, that also in this
crucial technological and economic field a new kind of public—private co-operation, nationally and
internationally, will emerge.
Next point—the exploration and gradual conquest of outer space. Here the inter-statal
endeavours reign supreme and nothing else seems to be imaginable.
Coming to conclusions one may say that neither the national state is disappearing, nor,
the more so, the European Union is also driving to the form of federal state (may be in the
distant future), nor the international community can get rid of the statal governance, of the statal
regulatory activities as well as statal responsibility for social affairs and the civilization survival.
All possible developments are imaginable: national states, inter-statal integration schemes, new
federations of states. All in all, something like international public sector is emerging together with
progressing globalization. But what is more important—all that may bring hope that globalization
will eventually achieve the human face.
One more problem cannot be omitted in this context—the contesting of globalization, leaving
aside the anti-globalists. Different is the story of alter-globalists—a widespread movement—which
should be carefully watched at least from one important viewpoint. The question is whether in
this movement some new seeds of the international civil society is contained and may bring about
quite new shapes of the future civilization.
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GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
IN A SECULAR PERSPECTIVE:
GLOBAL CATASTROPHE versus
GLOBAL RENAISSANCE
First of all one should respond to the philosophical yet at the same time practical dilemma:
quo vadis, the globalising planet? Towards self-annihilation—or renewal? The response should
not be limited to the guess-work nor an attempt to predict what may eventually happen. The
response should focus on how to avert an evidently destructive scenario and to ensure socially
and ecologically sustainable development on a global scale, i.e. for all. Obviously, not identical for
everyone (country, company, citizen) but without excessive—and dangerous—gaps we witness now
as globalisation progresses.
Why globalisation has been picked up at the seminar devoted chiefly to the future of
Europe in the first place? The Old Continent’s future is intricately linked with that of the
“remainder” of the Earth. Long term prosperity of Europe (and other highly developed regions)
is unsustainable at long term without decent existence of those less privileged. Not only because
poor countries represent an important (though not indispensable) market for our products and
source of raw materials. Also because the development gap aggravated by the digital one threatens
our well-being by means of unwanted migrations, domestic unrest necessitating our intervention
and (conflict and post-conflict) assistance, pollution, expansion of trade in narcotics and humans,
crime and—recently—the outburst of—now international and well-organised—terrorism. Today
and tomorrow, containment of all these ills happens just impossible. Even prevention proves to
be costly and inefficient. Our frontiers cannot be sealed. Our societies and economies protected.
Conclusion: some sort of solidarity for our own sake is indispensable and timely. We cannot let
globalisation to transform itself into an unguided missile.
What may be done in this juncture by the Club of Rome? Its predictions, including those
unconfirmed by the course of events, are of value as they constitute an advance warning for
politicians to alter policies. The essential role for the Club nowadays should be, as OECD put
it in 2000 in the title of its annual ministerial session, to contribute to the effort of SHAPING
GLOBALISATION. Assuming the latter to be a quasi-independent yet man-made phenomenon,
born out of interaction of activities by governments, companies especially TNCs, and individuals,
as well as IGOs and NGOs, interaction not designed to bring into being any grand plan or
a consciously conceived blueprint to save the humanity or make it happy, or happier,—one can
ask: at the present stage, can globalisation at all yield itself to any influence or is it a totally
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spontaneous force beyond of any control? Are we condemned just to stare at what it brings—evil
or good? Not trying to predict its evolution since all the same we are powerless and helpless?
What made globalisation and its constant expansion possible were tools which can be—and
are—used for any purpose one can think of. International trade in goods and services—in parallel
to the organized crime. Researchers and terrorists alike use internet and mobile telephones.
TV reaches people virtually everywhere, for educational, entertainment and other valid purposes,
and international terrorists use it to impress people with their wrong-doings and mass murder.
Globalisation has either brought or at least exposed profound inequalities among and within
societies. Demonstration effect was never so evident—and felt—to and by so many. Also, anti- and
(recently) alter-globalists’ protests were never so numerous and so visible. Once omni-powerful,
nation-states (governments) start to loose (in accordance with Tofflers’ forecasts1) more and more
power to enemies or competitors like TNCs, NGOs, mafias, even threatening individuals like
internet hackers. Globalisation appears as an easy prey, or a scapegoat. Though nobody can
offer anything instead... Even though some—as anti-globalists disguised as alter-globalists pretend
they can (this is not to put in doubt their valuable intellectual effort to pinpoint weaknesses of
globalisation).
As I wrote in the volume entitled “Globalisation: Experiences and Prospects” published in
20012 and then in another “Law, Institutions and Politics in the Process of Globalisation” of 20033,
rule-makers and the civil society is capable, through a concerted effort, to alter the course of
global processes. International negotiations, mainly at the platform of IGOs, serve as a key tool
to implement the task. The goal is to “civilise” the globalisation, to render a human face to the
otherwise faceless phenomenon. To manage it. To enhance and—in the first place—to channel to
the poor the benefits that can be derived from globalisation, and reduce unwanted side-effects
(or abuses). Without trying to deprive it of essential and basically positive ingredient: a rising
competition and its different dimensions like, for instance, outsourcing.
Lord Dahrendorf is of the opinion that active approach to globalisation is a must since
contemporary democracy has found itself under pressure, and the first factor of this pressure
is globalisation: important decisions bearing on our lives have been transferred from the local
to global space. Kofi Annan continues: “More than ever, a robust international legal order,
together with the principles and practices of multilateralism, is needed to define the ground
rules of an emerging global civilization... this implies that decision-making structures through
which governance is exercised internationally must reflect the broad realities of our times”4. It is
precisely globalisation—our common baby born after mid-XX century—which is a motive force of
these activities. The point is we should take responsibility for the kid. For our own good—and
safety.
Whereas regulatory activity has been lately in full swing, many think we already encounter
an over-regulation. This may be true here and there, yet a number of completely new areas call
for rules and many old ones call for revision of the obsolete rules governing them. Real weakness
though consists not that much in the rule-making but in the implementation of the existing hard or
soft law—and its monitoring. Who and how should implement the rules in force, how to help—or
1 TOFFLER, Alvin and Heidi. “Czy przetrwaj¹ pañstwa narodowe? Kraj okrojony” (Will nation-states survive?
A shrinking country). POLITYKA weekly, February 12, 2000.
2 WORONIECKI, Jan. “The Visions of Globalization”, in: Globalization. Experiences and Prospects, ed. A.Kukliñski.
Warsaw, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Rewasz Publ. House, 2001; pp. 15–22.
3 WORONIECKI, Jan. “Negocjacje wielostronne—podstawowe Ÿród³o prawa miêdzynarodowego w dobie globalizacji”
(Multilateral negotiations—,basic source of international law at the era of globalisation), in: Prawo, instytucje i polityka
w procesach globalizacji (Law, Institutions and politics in the process of globalisation), ed. E.Hali¿ak, R.KuŸniar. Warsaw,
Scholar Publ. House, 2003; pp. 201–222.
4 “We, the Peoples. The Report by the S–G to the UNGA. NY, p. 15.
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make—others to do it remains the key issue. Since the response to challenges confronting us,
and—the more so—ahead of us has been inadequate and asymmetrical. Dieter Krimphove’s thesis
relating to the crisis or decline of law and intergovernmental dialogue is at hand, nevertheless
we need them; what is necessary is to reform and improve the institutions. Their elimination and
creating new from scratch does not seem a valid proposition.
* * *
This brings me to the thesis contained in Prof. A. Kukliñskis’ memorandum I: “There is an
urgent necessity to create a second dramatic turning point in the history of the Club of Rome”.
I wholeheartedly agree—except for the rationale for the conclusion. The reason as I see it is not so
much publicity for nowadays less visible and almost sinking organization in need of a grand theme
for another astounding report. It is—first and foremost—the humanity which seems to be at the
turning point, and the Club of Rome should take up the challenge to offer its vision not merely
of what may happen under various scenarios assumed but—much more importantly—indicate
a course of international action to be taken, set of institutions to be created or rejuvenated,
changes within societies which must accompany intergovernmental and inter-NGOs—initiatives.
Twelve issues identified by Professor5 and probably many others confirm that the time is ripe
for another major study by the Club to show the threats and related challenges for all actors on
the international scene. 15 years after the end of the Cold War a danger of another split of the
world (owing to North-South development and digital gaps, clash of civilizations) is looming. Suffice
to read Joseph Stiglitz’s book on globalisation6, or the recent report of the World Commission
on the Social Dimension of Globalisation “A Fair Globalisation: Creating opportunities for all” 7.
Are we doomed to fail? The response can be found in a realistic study by Jagdish Bhagwati in
defense of globalisation8, Martin Wolf ’s reasoning why globalisation works9, or Francis Fukuyama’s
“State-building: Governance and Order in the 21st Century”10, all published in 2004. All these
eminent authors in essence come to a similar conclusion: obstacles to a global economic and social
progress have been the failures not so much of the market (whose invisible hand may at times be
insufficient or inadequate) but of politics and policies. Of poor and short-sighted governance.
Even if we are not heading in fact towards an imminent catastrophe or self-destruction
(wouldn’t stagnation be enough?), a list of current threats, many of which were not there or at
least did not have the magnitude they have acquired by now, should make us shiver. Therefore
it seems timely to revive the intellectual future-oriented dialogue where the Club used to be so
strong. The dialogue should bring about a research programme as suggested by Professor Antoni
Kukliñski and the conclusions could serve for a new Club report or (as Klaus Wittman suggests)
a manifesto—or both.
5 I would though respectfully disagree with putting globalisation as just one of them. It is an all-embracing
phenomenon influencing and influenced by others hence should not be considered as on of many factors but—rather—as
a kind of chapeau for them.
6 TIGLITZ, Joseph E. Globalizacja (Globalization). Warszawa, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, 2004.
7 A Fair Globalization. Creating opportunities for all. (Geneva), World Commission on the Social Dimension of
Globalization, 2004.
8 BHAGWATI, Jagdish. In Defense of Globalization. New York, Oxford University Press, 2004.
9 WOLF, Martin. Why Globalization Works. New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 2004.
10 FUKUYAMA, Francis. State-Building. Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca, NY, Cornell
University Press, 2004.
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THE FUTURE OF EUROPE—THE GLOBAL
FUTURE—THE CLUB OF ROME
Two International Workshops in Warsaw
Introduction
Ever since its establishment the Polish Association for The Club of Rome, which was founded
and registered in Warsaw in 1987, considered strategic thinking in European and global terms to
be its predominant objective. Led by its eminent presidents, like Professors Adam Schaff, Józef
Pajestka, Zdzis³aw Sadowski and Antoni Kukliñski, the Association has been one of the most active
voluntary organizations whose mission is to increase awareness of global problems and European
issues among Polish intellectuals, scientists, policy-makers and businessmen. Owing to its linkages
with The Club of Rome as well as co-operation with similar associations established in other
countries—the German Association for the Club of Rome in particular—the Polish Association has
managed to put on the public agenda some of the most important issues viewed from the global
and European perspective.
Apart from introducing the public in Poland to some of The Club of Rome’s path-breaking
reports, the Association has been involved in several related research projects of its own, seminal
workshops, seminars and public debates. It has published several volumes of research reports,
critical essays and monographs dedicated to social, economic, cultural, political problems of the
world.
Under the current executive board, apart from reinvigoration in the fields of publishing,
organization of international and national conferences and annual workshops co-organized by the
German and the Polish Associations for The Club of Rome, all of which are closely related to the
global mission of the Club of Rome, the Association has also successfully embraced the task of
expanding its activities to promote the Knowledge-based Society in affinity and co-operation with
other global actors, such as the World Bank, the European Union and OECD.
The timing of the two workshops was extremely advantageous from the point of view of the
promotion of an effective partnership of the Polish Association and the WSB-NLU Nowy Sacz.
The WSB-NLU was preparing at that time under the editorship of A Kuklinski, K. Pawlowski two
volumes in the framework of a New Publication Series—The RECiFER Eurofuture Publication
Series—vol one “Europe—the global challenges” and vol two “Europe—the strategic choices”.
Both volumes are dedicated to the European Parliament and will be published in Nowy Sacz
in February 2005. The Workshops were able to absorb as inputs some of the contributions
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prepared for the Twin Volumes. In turn the Twin Volumes have absorbed some contributions to
the Workshops improved by the discussions of this meeting. The following review paper prepared
by dr Anna Gasior-Niemiec is trying to present the intellectual mechanism of this interaction.
Workshop 1. “The Future of Europe—Strategic Choices
for XXI century”
On 19th of November 2004 a workshop dedicated to “The Future of Europe—Strategic Choices
for XXI century” was held in Warsaw under the auspices of the Polish Association for The Club of
Rome and the European Support Centre of The Club of Rome. Within the premises of the Polish
Economic Society at Nowy Œwiat 49, there gathered Polish and German scientists, academicians,
politicians and journalists of all walks of life to discuss the challenges and opportunities related
to the future of Europe. The meeting was also to initiate a closer co-operation between the
European Support Centre for The Club of Rome in Vienna headed by its new director, Dr. Thomas
Schauer and the Polish Association for The Club of Rome in Warsaw. Building a common research
programme focused on the challenges and strategic choices for Europe was envisaged as one of
the aspects of the co-operation. The workshop included an introduction to the European Support
Centre by Dr Schauer, a panel on the future of Europe chaired by Professor Józef Ni¿nik and
a general discussion following the presentations.
Professor Kuklinski opened the session and invited Dr. Schauer to present the new principles
of work and an outline of the programme of the European Support Centre for The Club of
Rome. Dr. Schauer introduced the audience to the new conception of the Centre’s mission and
activities. The ESC is a co-ordination point for the European National Associations. The members
of the National Associations make a major knowledge capital available to the CoR, and it needs
to be tapped. The ESC serves as a central node of a network of the NAs and helps the CoR to
gain advantage from synergies between the different National Associations. Tools include events,
projects and studies. The ESC provides among others a News Service on activities in the National
Associations. This Service is available on http://esc.clubofrome.org.
Professor Ni¿nik started the panel on the future of Europe reminiscing about the very
beginnings of the Polish-German co-operation under the auspices of the respective national
associations for The Club of Rome. He claimed an analogy could and should be made between the
challenges and strategic choices discussed in the 1980s and 2000s. The analogy would primarily
point to the pressing need to employ courage and imagination while debating the challenges
and strategic choices. He reminded the audience that back then, in the 1980s, members of the
associations initiated a discussion on the future of Europe in a—what then seemed—completely
utopian mood. Strategic options such as the European Union’s enlargement to the East were
discussed for instance by the participants of the Polish-German workshops. As it turned out, the
utopian ideas suddenly and quite unexpectedly—especially for more “realistic” thinkers—came
true and became sedimented as facts of life and history.
In other words, hard facts, existing data and rational calculations might not necessarily
always be the best predictors of future developments. Political courage and imagination as well as
seemingly utopian ideas and concepts authored by academicians and intellectuals have proven to
be indispensable in forecasting and making strategic choices so far. On the other hand, one has to
realize the limitations inscribed in the very concept of “strategic choices”. According to Professor
Ni¿nik, currently it would be na¨⁄ve for instance to equate strategic choices with free choices, as
almost all of the choices that can be made nowadays are conditioned by several factors. The real
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issue is to recognize the conditioning factors, both in their positive and negative weight on the
choices we may need or want to made.
Many areas of strategic choices may be named while thinking of the future of Europe:
economy, security, culture etc. Among them, one should also focus on strategic choices that could
lead to a “construction of a social space” in Europe. In brief, one of the most pressing challenges
for Europe is to resolve the problem of the growing uncertainty and frustration on the part of
the public, which is related to the fact that elite-driven solutions as they have been practiced for
decades may no longer suffice to drive the process of European integration further on. Novel
institutional solutions are urgently needed to make the European public more involved in the
process. Paradoxical blockages might be overcome then like the one that we seem to be witnessing
in Poland where the public opinion appears to be more in favour of the European Constitution
than any of the political parties is. Professor Ni¿nik proposed the panelists and discussants reflect
upon these and many other challenges and choices that Europe is facing now. Some of the most
prominent and most problematic areas were already strongly emphasized in Professor Kuklinski’s
paper on “Strategic Choices” (this volume).
The first panelist, Professor Juliusz Kotyñski took Kukliñski’s paper1 as his starting point to
delve deeper into a few conceptual dilemmas inherent in the term “strategic choices” seen mainly
from the point of view of international relations. He reflected upon certain general restrictions on
the scope of choices that are available to different categories of political actors. The restrictions
are related, among others to their political power, style of decision-making, type of legitimacy,
degree of risk and uncertainty, the number of steps and variables involved in the process etc.
The panelist stressed that making strategic choices in and for Europe today is hindered by
a number of factors, such as complex decision-making procedures, deep and multiple political,
institutional and social cleavages, and the high level of uncertainty concerning the future. Moreover,
it is not all that clear who and how may and should make strategic choices in and for Europe.
What seems to be clear is that Europe needs bold solutions and innovative ideas. These however
must be complemented with greater transparency and public deliberation. A stronger push towards
a federalist model of governance should for instance be made but preceded by public debates,
which would render the choice transparent and democratic.
The second panelist, Professor Roman Galar, presented his views on broadly understood
developmental perspectives in the frame of which “strategic choices” for Europe should be seen.
He advocated caution while using dichotomized models of available developmental options. The
models suggest, according to him, that an optimal solution may be obtained by going to any of the
extremes. In reality, systems develop best by achieving a balance, establishing a certain harmony.
Referring to the strategic dichotomies included in Kukliñski’s paper, Professor Galar stressed they
should be reformulated into a question of how much of either of the extremes we wanted rather
than which one we opted for.
Another point to be noted while discussing strategic choices is in his view to resort more to
military conceptual models in which strategies are hierarchically placed among other conceptual
fields, preceded by aims and followed by tactical and operational levels. The level of aims was
essential to scrutinize before moving to the level of strategies, then tactics etc. Aims for their
part are always rooted in values. Therefore before entering the debate over strategic choices
for Europe, one would be well advised to look into European dominant values. Values might be
treated as probably the most important predictive variable while considering future options and
choices.
1 Kukliñski A. 2004. “Europe—the strategic choices. Six methodological reflections”, [in:] The Future of Europe.
The Global Future. The club of Rome, The Polish Association for The Club of Rome: Warsaw.
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Dr Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse concentrated on the institutional level that frames the field of
strategic choices for Europe. European institutions, he claimed, are key both to the effectiveness
of European public policies and to the emergence of common European identity. Therefore, first of
all it is the design of European institutions that should be looked into while pondering dilemmas,
challenges and choices in Europe. He argued that the main dilemmas involved in the design of
European institutions were the following:
— an adequate arrangement including federal vs. national (sub-national) institutions
— a type of leadership (technocratic vs. political)
— a type of legitimacy (elitist vs. democratic)
— a system of interest representation (territorial vs. sectoral)
— a framework for strategic and crisis management (efficiency vs. legitimacy and social control)
— a style of policy management (coercive vs. elastic).
The next panelist, Professor Mieczys³aw Kabaj pointed out human resources as a field within
which strategic choices must be made in Europe. He focused on problems such as educational
failures (e.g. growing number of school drop-outs), ageing societies, low mobility of Europeans, and
potentially disturbing unbalanced distribution of income within European societies (e.g. according
to him the bottom decile of the population has had steadily decreasing level of income in most of
the European countries). These are the challenges that must be further analyzed, discussed and
solved.
The last panelist, Dr Thomas Schauer argued that challenges and choices might be deliberately
deferred, hidden, masked and/or altered behind certain concepts, notions and terms. He discussed
the ambivalent and/or mystified events and processes—and/or, conversely, lacunas in stead
thereof—that have been disguised and disarmed by means of concepts such as the “unification
of Germany”, the “accession states”, a “European identity”, “European values” etc. Discourse on
Europe needs careful examination to disclose the real challenges and choices involved.
In the discussion that followed, a member of the European Parliament, Dr Jan Olbrycht,
argued that in fact strategic thinking was going on within the EU institutions. A tension was
growing between the community institutions and national governments in relation to the future
shape of the European polity. Moreover, challenges coming from the outside of the EU, such as
reports on European governance and European finalite coming from Turkish experts, seemed to
inspire those inside the EU to think more critically and openly about a new Europe. Openness
and competitiveness with traditional values far in the background might be one of the options
for the future EU instead of opting for an over-regulated, homogenizing super-state whose spirit
belongs to the XIX century.
Other discussants focused on investigating the issues of European values as well as attributes
of the EU as a political power. These were seen as essential factors that needed to be clarified
before further questions concerning strategic choices were asked and answered. The research
programme on European challenges and choices proposed by Antoni Kukliñski should therefore
include also probing the fields of European values and attributes of power in its framework.
The programme is to be established under the auspices of the Wy¿sza Szko³a Biznesu-National
Louis University in Nowy S¹cz, the Polish Association for The Club of Rome in Warsaw with
co-operation of the European Support Centre for The Club of Rome in Vienna.
Workshop 2: “The Global Future—The Club of Rome”
On 20th and 21st November 2004, within the premises of the Polish Economic Society,
a workshop of the German and Polish Associations for the Club of Rome was convened. Around 30
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Polish, German and French diplomats, policy-makers, politicians, scientists, and experts attended
to present and discuss views on global challenges, options for the future and, both acknowledged
and overlooked or ignored, current potentials. As stated by the President of the Polish Association
for The Club of Rome, Professor Antoni Kukliñski, the workshop was to reinforce and extend the
decades-long co-operation between the two national Associations as well as to lead to outlining
a framework for three research programmes focused, respectively, on global, European and
regional issues. The workshop was organized in three panel discussions2:
1) “Europe—the global challenges”, which was chaired by Mr Uwe Moeller (Secretary General
of The Club of Rome); General Dr Klaus Wittman (Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr),
Professor Thomas Bruha (Europa-Kolleg-Hamburg), Dr Thomas Schauer (The European
Support Centre for the Club of Rome) and Mr Kolja Raube (University of Hamburg) took
the roles of the panel speakers;
2) “The Weimar Triangle—an Illusion or Reality”, which was chaired by Mr Antoni Kukliñski;
Dr jur. Dieter Krimphove, Mr Philippe Brunnel, Mr Bruno Duthois, Mr Stefan Bredohl, Mr
Aleksander Korybut-Woroniecki, Dr Wojciech Burzyñski took the roles of the panel speakers;
3) “Global Development in a Secular Perspective. Global Catastrophe versus Global Renais-
sance”, which was chaired by Mr Thomas Schauer (the European Support Centre for The
Club of Rome in Vienna); Mr Uwe Moeller (Secretary General of The Club of Rome, Professor
Antoni Kukliñski (the Polish Association for The Club of Rome), Professor Zdzis³aw Sadowski
(Polish Economic Society), Professor Jan Woroniecki (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic
of Poland), Professor Aleksander £ukaszewicz (Warsaw University), Professor Józef Ni¿nik
(Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences) and Professor Roman
Galar (Technical University of Wroc³aw, Institute of Engineering Cybernetics) the roles of the
panel speakers.
Session 1: “Europe—the global challenges”
Chairman Uwe Moeller started the first panel by introducing a few global issues that could
be seen as starting points for further presentation and discussion. The idea of globalization as
a win-win vs. zero-sum game, the idea of sustainable survival vs. sustainable development as
a critical choice, the recurring issue of the limits to growth, which was broached decades ago
by Dennis Meadows all seem to acquire ever more urgency (especially alongside the dynamic
growth of China and India) and similarly—the never resolved problem of energy, and the equally
persistent, political instability in the Middle East being of crucial importance to Europe due to its
high and ever increasing dependency on oil and gas supplies from this region. These and many
others appear as global challenges that need to be widely discussed and, if possible, met with
adequate solutions to which Europe has to contribute substantially.
The first speaker, General Dr Klaus Wittman, spoke on the Euro-Atlantic partnership as
exemplified by NATO, both as a challenge and as a solution to some of the challenges in
the European and global perspective. The partnership, reformulated after the collapse of the
Soviet system, has expanded, experienced external and internal tensions but still has managed
to reassert itself as a strategic actor in the field of global security. Moreover, NATO, in the
General’s view, should be seen as a most appropriate platform for the urgently needed strategic
dialogue between the EU and the USA in order for both sides to articulate openly issues of
security, their idiosyncratic interests, and to find a satisfying and working compromise thereof.
Furthermore, NATO and its activities after 1990 provide ample evidence that some new strategic
thinking is generally needed to cope with asymmetrical threats, preventive or pre-emptive actions,
2 Improved versions of the papers delivered by the panelists are included in this volume.
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ever more blurred issues of internal and external security, inefficiency of inter-blocking instead of
interlocking international security institutions as well as to debate an uneasy opposition between
legal and legitimate actions.
Dr Thomas Schauer spoke on the challenges inherent in the Lisbon agenda as the strategy
for Europe. He pointed out to the conceptual and methodological inadequacy of the concept of
sustainable growth as it was inscribed in the Lisbon document. Furthermore, using a parable
of the Pandora Box, he emphasized the ambivalent nature of technological progress: blessed for
making people’s lives seemingly easier, more comfortable, less costly and more free, in fact it
may lead to increased direct and indirect consumption of natural resources, production of waste,
congestion, pollution and other ills.
Professor Thomas Bruha wondered in his presentation whether the Constitutional Treaty
could be seen as a qualitative change in the process of European integration. Critically analyzing
several articles of the Constitution he argued that in many respects, the Constitution represented
a step backwards rather than forwards in the development of the European polity. The voice of
national governments has in fact been strengthened by some of the “last minute” amendments
introduced in a not very transparent manner to the body of the Constitutional Treaty. Addenda
in the form of protocols and annexes document fragmentation of the normative and regulative
authority of the Constitution. Promotion of the external identity of the EU ceases to be the task
of the CFSP under the Constitutional Treaty. Many other traces of “slowing down” the process
of integration could be pointed to. In sum, as Professor Bruha claimed, the Constitutional Treaty
might be seen as “new clothes for the old king”.
Mr Kolja Raube in his presentation on “Efficiency, democracy and the prospects of a two-
track Europe in CFSP/ESDP” argued for a reconciliation between “input legitimacy” and “output
legitimacy” in the framework of the EU. The challenge is to perceive differences between
member-states not as an obstacle but as a pool for efficient policy-making. The issue of
“expectations-capability gap” also appears to be extremely disturbing in the case of CSFP. Further
challenges derive from the principles of unanimity and enhanced co-operation although these—if
supplemented with socialization-effect—need not necessarily lead to solutions based on the lowest
common denominator. Wondering whether the EU could emerge as a normative power rather than
a military one, Mr Raube also hypothesized that engaging politicians and publics in wider debates
concerning CSFP could actually influence and strengthen the formation of a European identity.
The discussion following the presentations focused mainly on the challenges derived from the
ill-balanced relationship between the EU and the US, the rise of China to the rank of global
powers and a change of the world order that might be envisaged in the context. Some discussants,
General Dr Wittman and Professor Woroniecki among them, pointed out that the global order was
hopefully becoming closer to multipolarity with China entering the order as a competitor perhaps
but the one that is aware of global interdependencies and possibly open to co-operation with the
EU and the USA. The recent conference in Beijing dedicated to “NATO and the world security”
might be treated as a sign of the process. As General Dr Wittman observed 5 years before if
such a conference were held in Beijing at all, it would be dedicated to «NATO as a threat to the
world security». Therefore, global interdependencies produced, according to the discussants, both
challenges and unexpected opportunities.
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Session 2: “The Weimar Triangle—an Illusion or Reality”
The second panel session was devoted to the history and future of the Weimar Triangle as
a strategic regional structure in Europe. 3 The French-German-Polish partnership was analyzed
thoroughly by Dr. jur. Dieter Krimphove. Taking the multi-faceted history of the French-German
and German-Polish and then trilateral relations, Dr. jur. Dieter Krimphove proposed, following
Roger Cohen of the Herald Tribune, that the Weimar Triangle be treated as a role-model of
reconciliatory politics that could perhaps be transferred to help cope with other conflictual fields,
such as for instance the conflict between Israel and Palestine.
The transferability of the model is premised on the assumption that it acts as a framework
of norms which “institute” and “legalize” the process of reconciliation and peace-making. The
institutionalization of a normative and legal model means lower transaction costs for any conflict
resolution process, including diminished costs of military actions and their consequences, lower
costs of intelligence, etc. However, the working of the model needs to be supplemented by rules
of its enforcement; integration within an international regimes like the Weimar Triangle seems,
according to Krimphove, the most effective way thereof as it induces the interested parties to
define common interests. Moreover, participation in such a regime produces a common institutional
culture that affects strategies on both sides.
Mister Aleksander Korybut-Woroniecki presented a view that Poland’s accession to the
EU had provided further stimulus for the development of the French-German-Polish co-operation
by including Poland in mapping out a common vision of the CSFP/ESDP, joint reflections on
agricultural and regional policies as well as closer co-operation under the common justice and home
affairs framework. However, apart from the political and policy level co-operation, the Weimar
Triangle to become a sustainable structure should invest in growing involvement of the public:
promotion of cultural exchange, professional and local government programmes, more visibility
in the media, establishing a foundation to implement the project of gaining popular acceptance.
Apart from the institutional expansion, some symbolic steps need to be undertaken, such as
adopting a common political declaration by the heads of the states on the one hand, while—on
the other—offering to the public a Weimar Triangle ambassador of a kind: a figure of Mr or Mrs
Weimar.
Focusing on some details, he said that “In the final communiqué of the Weimar Triangle
summit (Wroc³aw, 9 May 2003) the French and Polish Presidents and the German Chancellor
reaffirmed on behalf of their countries a firm commitment to continuing their special cooperation.
What is more, Poland’s entry into European Union structures created, they believed, an exceptional
opportunity for making it a forum for dialogue and political inspiration going beyond the existing
framework of cooperation. If France and Germany’s simultaneously declared wish to include
Poland in their ongoing debate on the future of Europe and to reinforce three-way dialogue is to
become a fact it must be translated into concrete action. Such action should be characterized by
clearly defined objectives, diversity of forms and popular acceptance.
[In terms of ] political objectives, one of the notable results of the Wroc³aw summit was an
invitation to Poland to map out a common political vision of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy. Poland has a vital interest in participation
in trilateral consultations of foreign and defence ministers aimed at framing a uniform European
position in this field. In particular, given our geographical situation and experience of history
we wish to contribute in concert with France and Germany to development of the EU’s eastern
3 Cf. Kukliñski A. 2004. “ The Weimar Triangle. An international Research and Publication Programme. Towards
a New Paradigm” and idem, “The Weimar Triangle—The historical illusion of the XX century vs. The strategic reality
of the XXI century” [in:] The Future of Europe. The Global Future. The club of Rome, The Polish Association for
The Club of Rome: Warsaw.
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dimension. Another important element of expanded cooperation will be participation in joint
reflection on the evolution of agricultural policy, structural economic and social change, and
transport and energy policy in the form of regular working meetings at decision-maker and expert
level. Also of growing significance in both the European and the Weimar Triangle dimension will
be closer cooperation under the common justice and home affairs policy, especially in the area of
combating terrorism and organized cross-border crime.
[In terms of] Forms of action, definition of the objectives of trilateral cooperation should
be accompanied by incremental expansion of the number of institutions and persons involved
in pursuing these goals both in the political dialogue dimension and specific manifestations of
social life. An important role could be played by professional contacts between parliamentary
committees, ministries and central and regional agencies. Parallel to these, we should promote
social cooperation, in both the forms already in place (three-way exchanges of youth, contacts
between local authorities, towns and communes) and ones only recently established (employers’
associations, academic and professional institutions).”
While Mr Duthois in his short presentation outlined a corporative perspective on the French-
German-Polish relations within the Weimar Triangle, Mr Brunel elaborated on the prospects of
the French-German-Polish co-operation in more general terms. He said that “Since its relatively
recent reactivation, the Weimar Triangle is a very efficient instrument to prevent or to solve
potential or effective conflicts or misunderstandings. But that instrument should also be oriented
to a positive goal: what kind of initiatives, projects or special visions of Europe Poland, France
and Germany want to promote? Are these three countries able to draw compromises which could
prepare a consensus at the European level? In theory spontaneous positions or interests of Poland,
Germany and France are different in the majority of cases: rich v/ poor countries; countries with
a strong social-democrat background v/ country which dreams more about the American way of
life; countries with a strong industrial basis v/ country where agriculture still plays a significant
role. If these three countries succeed in elaborating a compromise, it could have a driving force
towards the other member-states. The political dialogue between France and Poland resumed at
a very high level and very quickly since the beginning of September. But the public opinion in
France has still in mind the last two years where the opposition between the two countries was
especially tough. So beyond the dialogue between Poland, Germany and France within the Weimar
dialogue exists the need of specific bilateral contacts in order to improve the image and the
knowledge of Poland in France and vice versa.”
The next speaker, Mr Stefan Bredohl wondered if the Weimar Triangle should be seen as
a reality or a utopia. On the one hand, it constituted an instrument to contain conflict and crisis in
Europe. On the other, it lacked horizontal, everyday programmes that could integrate populations.
Moreover, Poland’s views on the Iraq as well as her ambitions to become an intermediary between
the EU and the US were, according to the speaker, rather ill-founded and constituted an obstacle
to furthering co-operation within the Weimar Triangle.
Dr Wojciech Burzyñski proposed an alternative outlook on the Weimar Triangle. He suggested
turning from non-measurable to measurable issues and items. The benchmarking system developed
to measure and compare Knowledge Economy Indices in different countries could be applied
to the assessment and comparison of KBE potentials in the three partners within the Weimar
Triangle. The KE Index is composed of 4 basic components: general economic regime; education,
information & communication infrastructure, and innovation.
Professor Antoni Kukliñski drew attention to the dormant intellectual, scientific and institu-
tional potential of the Weimar Triangleusing it as a tool for mutual information and consultation
of three important EU partners more likely to promote EU decision-making. As yet no Weimar
research programme has been proposed, which seems a curiosity in view of the importance
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attached to the trilateral partnership. Mindsets of the Polish, German and French scientific
communities appear to be diverging or at least not cohesive, according to the speaker. In the
meantime, a few challenging issues are awaiting a joint scientific approach. The bankruptcy of the
welfare state and its consequences, the prospects and impacts of the knowledge-based economy
and knowledge-based society, co-operation between Polish, German and French regions all require
a scientific inquiry. It seems clear for instance that more intense co-operation within the Triangle
could be enhanced if stronger governance structures where in place in the European Union. The
EU governance constitutes a challenge in itself, as the EU member-states may have to be forced
to state their choices more openly. Likewise Poland has to assert its choice to opt for the EU that
is not only an economic fact but also a political and social entity. Only strong Europe can help
overcome the peripheral position of Poland in Kukliñski’s opinion.
In the following discussion, a variety of topics were introduced. Mr Moeller advocated
a win-win approach to the problematic of the Weimar Triangle. Mr Galar was skeptical about the
enhanced co-operation within the Weimar Triangle; he pointed out that other areas of co-operation
were perhaps more attractive and open for Poland in this respect, namely Great Britain and
Scandinavia. Professor Klaus Ziemer expressed his disappointment at the involvement of France
in the Weimar Triangle activities. Similarly, he saw a need for Poland to state her strategic
choices more clearly. Referring to Kukliñski’s presentation he wondered whether indeed strong
Europe was the Polish choice. Mr Brunnel raised the subject of negative national stereotypes that
are still in place among the nations of the Weimar Triangle. Poles appear to the French people
as ultra-Catholic, reactionary anti-Semites, which does not help to enhance mutual co-operation.
While other discussants continued to debate the controversy, Professor Kukliñski saw it as an
excellent starting point for initiating a scientific research programme focused on the diversity
within the Weimar Triangle 4 and its function of a laboratory for reconciliation. The idea to start
building a social science research community dedicated to the investigations was fully supported
by Mr Krimphove and other speakers.
Session 3: “Global Development in a Secular Perspective. Global Catastrophe
versus Global Renaissance”
The third panel session dedicated to the topic of “Global Development in a Secular Perspective.
Global Catastrophe versus Global Renaissance”, chaired by Mr Schauer, took as its starting point
the Helsinki paper by Antoni Kukliñski 5. The Chairman initiated the panel with a thought-
provoking anecdote reporting an encounter between Alexander the Great and Diogenes. He
continued with an argument that the world consisting of a variety of local cultures was more and
more being replaced by a world encompassed by horizontal cultures built on homogenizing order
and information technology. The question for him was whether the two types of culture could still
coexist in the XXI century and the ones to come or the horizontal culture would dominate and
then eradicate the local cultures completely. Another question that he posed concerned the very
possibility of forging a European identity and a European culture in the period more and more
overwhelmed by global, horizontal culture.
4 Cf. Kukliñski A. 2004. “The Weimar Triangle. An International Research and Publication Programme. Towards
a New Paradigm” [in:] The Future of Europe. The Global Future. The club of Rome, The Polish Association for The
Club of Rome: Warsaw.
5 Kukliñski A. 2004. “Global development in secular perspective. The experiences and prospects of the years
1950–2050. Global catastrophe versus global renaissance. Memorandum I” and idem, “Global development in secular
perspective. The experiences and prospects of the years 1950–2050. Global catastrophe versus global renaissance.
Memorandum II” [in:] The Future of Europe. The Global future. The Club of Rome. The Polish Association for The
Club of Rome: Warsaw.
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Mr Moeller acknowledging that indeed the period we live in might exhibit all of the traces of
a global village went on to introduce the issue of the paper presented by Antoni Kukliñski at the
2004 Annual Conference of The Club of Rome in Helsinki. Kukliñski argues in it that The Club of
Rome urgently needs to produce a new stimulus to global development. Therefore it must embark
on a path-breaking intellectual and scientific venture that could reverberate in the world as “The
Limits to Growth” did decades ago. The research programme “Global Development in a Secular
Perspective. Global Catastrophe versus Global Renaissance” outlined by himself by means of 12
theses promises to produce another turning point for The Club of Rome and its global mission.
Reporting the general approval of Kukliñski’s idea by The Club of Rome, Mr Moeller proposed
the structure of the research programme, the mechanism of its execution and the final deliverable
be further discussed. There is no doubt a “plus-minus 50” research programme focused on global
developmental trends and options is needed. The Club of Rome is dedicated to sending a message
to the world that is evocative and based on substantial research that covers the span of the next 50
years. Insightful research, intellectual imagination and political courage are welcome to delve into
the future and develop different scenarios outlining possible and probable global developments. To
this end Kukliñski’s theses are best dealt with when thoughtfully clustered and streamlined into
a kind of work packages that might be executed and delivered by carefully selected researchers
and experts. The intellectual and organizational potential of The Club of Rome could be deployed
to this end.
The following panel presentations and remarks of the discussants concentrated mainly on the
philosophy and form of the proposed enterprise. It was generally agreed that while this kind of
research might be expected to bring voluminous partial reports, the final report to be effective
should be relatively concise (a maximum of 300 pages). Its message could even be more effective
if it were formulated as a manifesto, some of the discussants, like Józef Ni¿nik, argued. Professor
Kukliñski accepted the suggestion and agreed that a less voluminous outcome may possibly have
a stronger political impact when presented to decision-makers.
Claiming that humanity was not so much on the verge of a global catastrophe as on the
road to it, Professor Zdzis³aw Sadowski pointed to some of the global tendencies and trends
that are relevant in the context of the proposed programme. Building on Meadows’s reports, he
emphasized that surprisingly little impact was achieved so far by the attempts to avert global
catastrophes, especially in the political and social sphere. While a political power fully committed
to the implementation of the model of sustainable development for the world is still lacking,
one should not overlook the potential dynamics of the budding anti-globalist or alter-globalist
movement in this respect. Global issues may not, however, be left to the free play of chance and
the care of the market forces in Professor Sadowski’s view.
Professor Jan Woroniecki continued in a similar vein, stressing the need to answer the
question “Quo vadis the globalizing club?” In view of poor effectiveness and high costs involved in
traditional strategies designed to avert global threats like drug-trafficking, terrorism, fuel crises,
he advocated an approach based on global solidarity. As the future of Europe is linked with global
future, strategic thinking in Europe must acknowledge the needs and interests of those who
remain outside the European club. Protection and preventive actions aimed to guard the world of
the affluent are not sustainable solutions in the long term. There is a pressing need to “shape
globalization”, although, admittedly, no blueprint is ready at hand.
Professor Aleksander £ukaszewicz added a few new points to the discussion wondering
whether globalization was indeed beyond our control. To admit this would mean to give up
strategic thinking and expose human powerlessness. Both the rising global civil society and the
expanded realm of a global public sector point to the fact that in reality humans do try to meet
the challenges. This however, in his view, can only be effectively implemented by means of statal
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and interstatal governance and further expansion of a global public sector. The rising global civil
society and market are not likely to take the lead in responsibility for the globe. The Club of
Rome should nonetheless dedicate some thought to the challenge posed by alter-globalists. The
new political economy of globalization promises new insights in this respect.
In the following discussion there were voices that argued for increased diversity and pluralism
as the underlying principles of the world order. Professor Galar, while pointing to the fact that
one should look up to the future as a space of choices rather than a road to somewhere, advocated
at the same time a renaissance of a neo-medieval order in Europe. Middle Ages provided, in his
opinion, a truly successful paradigm for managing diversity and heterogeneity, including increased
spectrum of fields for an individual to succeed. He said that “ «The Limits to Growth» was
a mind opener on an unprecedented scale. Unfortunately, many believe it to be a failure. They
point out that the dire consequences predicted in this report were somehow avoided, so let’s be
optimists. They abstract from the fact that fulfillment of the rapport’s most basic assumption, i.e.
of convergent development, was hold back for decades. It becomes valid only now, with the grand
entry of China and India as global producers and consumers.
What is still more annoying, we might be entering the period of doom predicted by the
Limits to growth just in time when some fundamental cultural trends of our era show symptoms
of approaching to their limits as well. This happens with procedural democracy, synergy of free
market and free trade, formal education etc. All this deserves the kind of serious attention that
Prof. Kuklinski is calling for. The single factor that might be the most exasperating is that the
innovative drive of our civilization is stalling. This effect might be overlooked in the avalanche
of incremental improvements and clever combinations of the already existing solutions, which are
highly advertised everyday. Yet, if one compares the influx of breakthrough concepts with the soon
proven life changing capacity between the late 19th century and the late 20th century, the crisis
is evident. 6 The causes of such slowdown might be explained in a number of ways, e.g. as the
results of the intentional model of development. 7 Whatever the reasons, if this innovative-adaptive
impasse continues, the challenges posed by the limits to growth look still more formidable. It
is hard to say what might shake the complacent public opinion of the early 21st century; still the
effort proposed by Prof. Kuklinski is worth trying”.
Professor Ni¿nik stressed that one should be aware of the conditionality that nowadays
underlies the space of choices. On the other hand, he claimed that the global challenges could be
usefully reformulated into a set of questions concerning the human nature rather than political
options. If the world today were compared to the Hobbesian state of nature—and indeed such
a comparison could be according to Ni¿nik made—the real issue was the ability of humans to
forge a new global social contract. To consider this dilemma, more attention should be dedicated
to scientific work on human consciousness. Social science and humanistic approach should take
precedence over technocratic knowledge while thinking about global challenges and choices that
need to be made. This kind of “soft” insight could, in Ni¿nik’s view, produce some breakthrough
that could also serve to update the global mission of The Club of Rome.
In Ni¿nik’s own words “[t]here is an urgent need for a turning point in the mission of the
Club of Rome. Its activity could concentrate on quite different aspects in human relation’s to the
world. There is a need for a global agency that would exploit existing knowledge, social and
humanistic knowledge, to overcome social, religious and cultural roots of antagonisms between
the peoples world-wide. This may become the new mission of the Club of Rome, since the original
6 R. J. Gordon , Does the “New Economy” Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past? Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 4, no 14, 2000.
7 R. Galar, Knowledge Economy and Evolutionary Traps, (in:) Kukliñski A, W.M. Or³owski (eds), The knowledge
based economy, The global challenges of the 21st century, Rewasz, Warsaw 2000
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mission, stressing economic and environmental sustainability, has been taken over by a number of
other international agencies, and relevant expertise has become almost a common knowledge. But,
it is quite clear now that any possible success in this area needs first transformation of human
consciousness which appears to be a dramatic barrier. This could become a new challenge for the
Club of Rome and the European Union could become our “laboratory” to develop some measures
that could be later applied globally.”
Other discussants stressed the linkages between the issues of human nature, values, institutions
and modes of governance. General Dr Wittman brought forth the issue of values and differences
that were traditionally contained within borders. He wondered on the nature of governance,
institutions and identity in the period when borders cease to mark the lines between “us” and
“barbarians”. Professor Bruha was especially animated by the vision of the neo-Hobbesian order
seemingly replacing or at least undermining the Kantian order based on law. Mr Raube pointed
out there already were new, successful modes of global governance in operation; FIFA was one of
the best examples of such new governance regimes.
Antoni Kukliñski ended the workshop with a few Treppengedanken. He claimed that the
mission of The Club of Rome was definitely not finished yet in the face of the many global
challenges. However, a turning point or a shake-up was needed to reassert the Club’s role and
weight in the global dimension. The Warsaw workshop proved that a serious reflection leading
towards three research programmes was urgently needed in view of a wide-spread deficit of
innovative thinking, imaginary forecasting and bold decision-making.
a) The global research programme should be structured around the Helsinki paper following
Uwe Moeller suggestions concerning clustering and streamlining of the theses and selecting
manpower for its delivery. The Secretariat of The Club of Rome, the German Association
for The Club of Rome and the Polish Association for The Club of Rome will be the major
institutions involved in further construction and implementation of the programme
b) The European research programme should be organized around strategic choices, including
the issues of European identity, institutions and governance. Wy¿sza Szko³a Biznesu-National
Loius University in Nowy S¹cz and the Polish Association for the Club of Rome in co-operation
of the European Support Centre for The Club of Rome in Vienna will be the main institutions
involved in further construction and implementation of the programme.
c) The Weimar Triangle research programme should be preceded by establishing a Weimar
Triangle Social Science Community. The Polish Association for The Club of Rome and the
University of Paderborn will be the first institutions involved in further construction and
implementation of the programme.
Further work on the construction of the three research programmes should draw on general
methodological reflection that concerns the issue of building frameworks for scientific inquiry
as such. The methodological outline by Antoni Kukliñski and comments by Tomasz Zarycki and
Katarzyna ¯ukrowska, included in this volume, may be taken as an apt introduction and an
invitation for further discussion in this respect.
While networking between participants of the workshop should be encouraged and kept
alive, Professor Kukliñski promised that some of the contributions to the workshop—apart from
becoming part of the network resources—would also appear in the present 2 volumes dedicated
to global challenges and strategic choices in Europe and elsewhere. Chairman Uwe Moeller, in
his final statement, apart from the words of gratitude directed at the participants and organizers
of the Warsaw workshop, and Antoni Kukliñski in particular, stressed that further discussion and
work on the research programmes could be resumed as part of the proceedings of the next
workshop in Hamburg in 2005.
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EUROPE—THE STRATEGIC CHOICES
SEVEN METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
First Reflection
Introduction
This is a title of the volume which will be published in February 2005. The volume is a follow
up of five volumes2 published in Poland in the years 1998–2004. These five volumes were prepared
by an eminent group of 100 authors representing competent and elegant domain of the European
Academic Community. So the new volume is not emerging in crudo radice. This volume is a link in
an interesting intellectual history—having its past—present and the future. The new volume has
the honor to include a set of contributions presented both by the “old” and “new” Authors.
The philosophy of the new volume
The formulation “the strategic choices” is assuming that the developmental processes in
Europe of the XXI century will have a double nature:
— primo—the nature of a spontaneous process driven by the global market forces,
— secundo—the nature of a guided process driven by the decisions of the grand actors of the
global and European scene.
Four groups of a grand actors should be mentioned in this context:
1 Maybe the term “strategic choice” should be replaced by “critical choice” as defined by Y. Dror:
“A choice making a real difference for the future in objective sense or assumed to do so subjectively. The
appropriate metaphor as used in the classical Confucian writings is one of painfully facing crossroads leading into
different futures, however uncertain.” Y. Dror, The capacity to govern, Frank Cass, London 1999, p.XIV.
compare also the contribution of M. György in this volume.
2 a) A. Kukliñski, K. Paw³owska (eds) Innovations—Education—Regional Development, Nowy S¹cz 1998, WSB–NLU
b) A. Kukliñski, W. Or³owski (eds) The knowledge based economy—The global challenges of the XXI century.
Warsaw 2000, State Committee for Scientific Research of the Republic of Poland.
c) A. Kukliñski (ed) The knowledge based economy—The European challenges of the XXI century, Warsaw 2000,
The Stete Committee for Scientific Research of the Republic of Poland.
d) H. Bunz, A. Kukliñski (eds) Globalization—experiences and prospects. Warsaw 2001, Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung—Warsaw Office.
e) A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds) Europe in the perspective of global change, Warsaw 2003, The Polish Association
for the Club of Rome.
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1) the grand international organizations and especially the European Union, the OECD and the
World Bank
2) the grand transnational corporations
3) the governments of big, medium and small countries
4) the self-governments of autonomous or semi-autonomous regions which will assume a growing
role on the European and global scene.
To my mind—the developmental process in Europe of the XXI century will be leseferic and
dirigistic at the same time. We have to find the optimal composition of leseferism and dirigisme
for the development of Europe of the XXI century.
This point of view may be seen as controversial but a controversy of this type will increase
the intellectual and pragmatic charm of the new volume.
Seven fields of strategic choices
The future of Europe should be seen in long term perspective. We can outline different
approaches and value judgment related to this perspective. In this short paper I would like to
propose to consider seven fields of strategic choices (this list has a preliminary character).
The first field is demography. Europe is a dying continent. There is a fundamental strategic
choice to promote or not to promote active pronatalistic policies in Europe. The choice is not only
substantive—it is also ideological. Anyway we have to face this choice.
The second field is economy. The strategic choice can be formulated in a clear dichotomy.
Should the Lisbon Agenda be taken seriously or this Agenda should be regarded only as a nice
set of good intensions. The knowledge based economy is a dramatic challenge for Europe.
The third field is science and technology seen as an important source of the power
of European civilization. The strategic choice is to promote organic policies which will create
conditions for the emerging of a new renaissance in Europe.
The fourth field is education 3. There are two strategic choices in this field:
— primo—democratic versus elitist education,
— secundo—national versus European education.
Both choices are controversial in the framework of conventional wisdom and political
correctness.
The fifth field is culture. In this case the strategic choice is also very clear—the elitist
culture versus mass culture.
The sixth choice is governance. It is a choice of federal versus non federal Europe.
The seventh choice is related to the developmental gap of the European mega space.
This is the choice center versus periphery.
Conclusion
Naturally the tentative list of seven strategic choices 4 is just an opening suggestion and the
beginning of the creative discussion developed inside the team of the potential Authors of the new
volume.
Naturally each Author will express his own substantive approaches and personal value
judgments. The pluralistic philosophy is the fundamental assumption of the volume. The
3 Compare: K. Paw³owski, Education—the key to the Future of Europe—in this volume.
4 The seven strategic choices can be symbolically expressed in the fundamental dilemma—“Strong versus weak
Europe“
compare: Europe in the perspective of global change, op.cit, p. 511.
Compare also: A. Kukliñski, Strong or Weak Europe (in:) REUPUS Volume One.
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volume will not try to outline an integrated set of strategic choices for Europe of the XXI century.
The new volume will try only to supply a contribution to creative discussion of this fascinating
problem.
Let me express the hope that the new volume will be a source of innovative substantive
approaches and bold value judgments.
Audaces fortuna iuvat!
Second Reflection
The multiple ego of knowledge based economy in Europe
Introduction
The development of KBE in Europe will have a double nature:
— primo—the nature of a spontaneous process driven by the global market forces
— secundo—the nature of a guided process driven by the grand actors of the global and
European scene
This dichotomy could be expressed also as a co-existence of leseferic and dirigistic
approaches to the development of KBE in Europe. Four groups of grand actors should be
mentioned in this context:
— The European Union
— The transnational corporations
— The national governments
— The self-governments of autonomous or semi-autonomous regions
This is to my mind the multiple ego of KBE in Europe. Three methodological assumptions in
the studies of this “multiple ego” are proposed:
1) the methodology of institutional and behavioral studies analyzing the modus operandi of the
grand actors,
2) the methodology of benchmarking studies outlining the emergence of best practices and the
diffusion of these best practice in Europe,
3) the methodology of deeply critical evaluations transgressing the limits of political correctness
and conventional wisdom,
In this intellectual climate I would like to propose to establish and develop a grand research
project:
“The multiple ego of KBE in Europe”
The starting point of this project is an inquiry into the nature of KBE presented in the
path-breaking volume published by the European Commission5. This inquiry will be inter alia
performed by an interdisciplinary team of four Polish authors 6 concluded in November 2004.
“The multiple ego” project
Let me present a few introducing remarks answering the questions—how to analyze the
modus operandi of the grand actors.
5 European Commission, Third European Report on Sciences and Technology Indicators—2003, Towards
a knowledge—based economy, Brussels 2003.
6 W. Burzyñski, R. Galar, K. Porwit, W. Œwitalski—compare the papers of these Authors in this volume.
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The European Union
The Lisbon Agenda and other activities of the European Union are an important contribution
to the development of KBE in Europe.
I think however that the contribution of the Union is too slow and too small to change the
KBE into a new paradigm of European development.
To use the old W. Rostow terminology the Union has not yet created the universal take off
conditions for the development of KBE in Europe. The proposed “Multiple Ego” project should
find a comprehensive and balanced judgment related to the performance of the European Union
in the field of KBE.
The transnational corporations
The emergence and development of KBE in Europe is to a large extent related to the
approaches and decisions of the grand transnational corporations. We need a comprehensive
historical and prospective reflection in this field. A historical study should answer the question—
how the TNC have created their contributions to the development of KBE in Europe—let us say
in the last decades of the XX century?
A much more challenging prospective study should try to answer the question—how the TNC
might contribute to the development of KBE in Europe in the perspective of 2020–2030?
This is a particularly difficult topic—since the TNC are global by definition. So Europe for
TNC is only a fraction of the global megaspace. This means not however that we should not try
to develop a well organized knowledge concerning this fraction.
The national governments
It is well known that the performance of national governments in Europe in the field of
KBE is deeply differentiated phenomenon. We should be not afraid to apply the benchmarking
methodology in the analysis of the performance of the 25 governments of the European Union in
the field of KBE.
This benchmarking approach should be developed also by monographic studies designed
in the spirit of the institutional school 7 of thinking. These monographic studies will answer
the question—why some national governments are so brilliant 8 and why some other national
governments are so weak in intellectual and pragmatic dimensions.
The regional self-government
The dynamic and innovative region is an important actor of the global and European scene.
In this context we should see the growing role of regional self-governments in the promotion of
KBE.
In the framework of the proposed project a set of 100 European regions could be defined and
selected. This set could be changed into a sui generis laboratory of social sciences in the field of
the development of KBE in the reality of European regions.
7 compare: World Development Report 2002—Building Institution for Markets, The World Bank, Oxford University
Press 2001.
Governance in the 21st Century—Future Studies OECD, Paris 2001
Y. Dror, The capacity to govern—A Report to the Club of Rome, Frank Cass, London 1999.
8 Compare: M. Castells and P. Himanen, The information society and the welfare state—The Finnish model, Oxford
University Press 2002.
Compare also the paper of J. Routti—in this Volume.
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Conclusions
This reflection is a modest application of the assumptions of the institutional methodology
to the development of the KBE in Europe. Seeing very clearly the theoretical and pragmatic
weakness of this reflection. I would like to express the hope that this reflection will be recognized
as a successful beginning of the discussions related to the grand research project—“The multiple
ego of knowledge based economy”.
Third reflection
Towards a dichotomic model of strategic choices9
I would like to present for critical evaluation a preliminary idea of dichotomic model which
may be useful in our thinking concerning the Future of Europe. This model is concentrating
attention on a set of dilemmas or dichotomic choices which drive our thinking into clearly
formulated substantive fields and value judgments.
This type of thinking has a great brainstorming potential even in this case when this thinking
is regarded as intellectually and pragmatically simplistic.
In this spirit I am presenting for your critical evaluation 16 dichotomic strategic choices
related to the future of Europe:
I. Spiritual versus material values in the future of Europe
II. Open Europe versus fortress Europe
III. National versus European systems of education
IV. Knowledge based economy versus knowledge based society
V. Lisbon Europe versus agrarian Europe
VI. Anglo-Saxon capitalism versus Rhine capitalism
VII. Leseferic versus dirigistic Europe
VIII. Social market economy versus global market economy in Europe
IX. Full employment versus unemployment in Europe
X. Introvertic versus extravertic Europe
XI. Growth versus cohesion in Europe
XII. Sustainable versus non sustainable Europe
XIII. Federal versus non federal Europe
XIV. Core versus periphery in Europe
XV. The European civilization—monistic versus pluralistic approaches
XVI. The global versus European scene
Presenting these 16 dichotomic choices I am not trying to say that this is a perfect and
final list. Each dichotomy can be reformulated—the list of dichotomies can be extended—some
dichotomies can be eliminated as examples of false formulations.
I think however that the dichotomic model is an useful inspiration in the processes of our
thinking about the future of Europe.
* * *
9 L.E. Harrison, S.P. Huntington, (eds) Culture Matters. How Values Shape Human Progress, Basic Books—Pereus
Books 2000—The Polish Edition—Warsaw 2003, “Zysk i Spó³ka”.
T.G. Asch, Free World. America, Europe and the surprising future of the West, Random House, N.Y. 2004.
K. Paw³owski, Rediscovering higher education in Europe—Studies on Higher Education UNESCO—CEPES,
Wy¿sza Szko³a Biznesu—National Louis University, Bukareszt 2004.
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This reflection is the beginning of a new dimension of our volume. I understand that we have
a long way to go towards a dichotomic model of strategic choice. I would be most grateful for
comprehensive, critical comments supporting or rejecting the concept of the dichotomic model.
The methodological discussion of this type could be interesting and useful.
Fourth Reflection
The Future of Europe
Four basic concepts
The prospective reflection related to the future of Europe can be developed in the framework
of four basic concepts:
a) long durations
b) turning points
c) trade offs
d) strategic choices
Long durations and turning points are analytical concepts applied in the inquiry of objective
developmental processes generated by the spontaneous movement of political, economic and social
forces.
The first concept is stressing the long term continuities in the development of the economy,
society and culture.
The second concept is concentrating our attention on the mechanisms of deep relatively
rapid structural change and the emergence of a new trajectory. Turning points in this approach
are a fundamental change in the constitution and modus operandi of the engine of growth and
development.
Trade offs and strategic choices are macro managerial concepts applied in the framework of
decision making theory and practice. Trade offs are emerging in situations where the decision
is still kept inside the limits of political correctness and conventional wisdom. Such trade offs
are discussed in the excellent paper10—“Possible Trade Offs”. Let us mention only two examples
presented in this paper:
“Trade off between growth and stability. Trade off between employment and productivity.”
The strategic choice is a much stronger decision very often outside the limits of political
correctness and conventional wisdom. I am convinced that hinc and nunc—there is a grand
historical demand for bold strategic choices related to the fundamental dilemmas—strong versus
weak Europe or stagnating versus dynamic Europe11.
Discussing the history of strategic choice let us mention three fields:
1) the military field
2) the economic field
3) the political field
In the military field the best reference is still the opus of Karl von Clausewitz—On War—
where inter alia we find a brilliant analysis of strategic choices in the framework of Napoleonic
experiences. Maybe in this context we should mention the valuable opus of Robert Mac Namara12
as an honest account of the wrong strategic choices related to the Vietnam War.
10 Possible Trade Offs involved in the Lisbon Strategy, Brussels May 26th 2004. Secretariat of the High Level
Group on the Lisbon Strategy.
11 Compare: A. Kukliñski, Strong or Weak Europe (in:) REUPUS Volume One.
12 R.S. Mac Namara, In Retrospect. The Tragedy and Lesson of Vietnam, New York, The Times Books, 1995.
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In the economic field the most important are the experiences of the Transnational Corporations
discussed inter alia by J.E. Garten13. In the political field the opus of Y. Dror14 is deserving
a special attention.
* * *
This short reflection is only an invitation to discuss the four basic concepts in the framework
of Prospective Reflection on the Future of Europe. To stimulate this discussion let us analyze the
following matrix of interaction:
Table 1
Four Basic Concepts. The Matrix of Interaction
Long Turning Trade Strategic
duration points offs choices
Long
durations X
Turning
points X
Trade
offs X
Strategic
choices X
The boundary separating the analytical inquiry and the decision making sphere
In the reflection related to the content of Table 1 the main question is the artificial character
separating the analytical inquiry and the decision making sphere. For example a thesis can be
formulated that the turning points are created not only by the spontaneous movements but also by
decisions selecting right or wrong strategic choices. Next questions of this type can be formulated
and discussed in our volume.
The Seven Methodological Reflections are only the first step in the long way towards
a comprehensive methodology of strategic choice.
Fifth reflection
The case of Poland
The volume—“Europe—the strategic choices”—should be seen as an opening of a whole set
of reflections and publications related to diagnostic and prospective studies trying to outline the
13 J.E. Garten, The Politics of Fortune. A new agenda for business leaders. Harvard Business School Press, Bristol
2002.
14 Y. Dror, The Capacity to Govern, Frank Cass Publishers, London 2001.
Compare also: A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds) Europe in the perspective of global change, Warsaw 2003, p.444.
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 408 (407)
408 Antoni Kukliñski
Table 2
The horizons of strategic choice
Temporal
Spatial
short medium long secular
global
continental
national
regional
methodology of strategic choice—in global, continental, national, and regional scale. Those four
spatial horizons could be related to four temporal horizons—the short—medium—long and secular
horizon.
There is a genus proximmum linking the strategic choice in all spatial and temporal horizons.
But there is also a differentia specifica for each horizon in space and time. This interaction of
spatial and temporal horizons will be an object of my next papers. In this reflection I would like
to concentrate attention to the case of Poland15 testing the medium and long term horizon.
In this reflection we will concentrate attention on the following topics:
— The field of strategic choice
— The ego of strategic choice
— The first strategic choice—a dynamic versus stagnant society
— The second strategic choice—equality versus efficiency
— The third strategic choice—the past versus future
— The fourth strategic choice—the coal based versus knowledge based economy
— The fifth strategic choice—strong versus weak Europe
The field of strategic choices for Poland
In a medium scale country like Poland two approaches can be developed
— primo—a voluntaristic approach saying that our political will is creating a vast field of
strategic choices which can be designed and implemented with little attention to the global
and European context.
— secundo—a fatalistic approach saying that the almighty power of globalization and integration
is totally eliminating or vastly reducing the freedom of our strategic choice.
We should try to find the middle golden stream between the Scylla of voluntaristic and
charybdis of fatalistic approaches. We have a considerable freedom of strategic choice but we
must develop the capacity to use this freedom properly in the changing global and European
environment.
In a medium size country like Poland we must devote a lot of attention to the expanding or
shrinking field of our strategic choices of the XXI century.
15 Compare my earlier contributions in the volume: H. Bunz, A. Kukliñski (eds) Globalization—Experiences and
prospects, F. Ebert Stiftung, Warsaw 2001, pages 435 and 459, and in the volume: A. Kukliñski, B. Skuza (eds) Europe
in the perspective of global change, The Polish Association for the Club of Rome, Warsaw 2003, p.125 and 211.
Compare also: K. Paw³owski, Spo³eczeñstwo wiedzy—Szansa dla Polski, Znak, Kraków, 2004.
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The ego of strategic choice
The Polish political elite is the most important ego of our strategic choice. The political elite is
a representation of the democratic society of the given country. The elite has a certain autonomy
in the representation of the society at large.
This autonomy can be used by the elite in a prodevelopmental and antidevelopmental spirit.
The elite can enlarge the point of view of the societal avangarde and to diminish the point of view
of the societal arriergarde or the other way around.
In the first situation the elite is acting in a prodevelopmental spirit 16 in the second the elite
is acting in an antidevelopmental spirit. Unfortunately the Polish political elite hinc et nunc is
representing the antidevelopmental spirit. The art of long-term strategic thinking is almost totally
absent in this elite. The mind of this elite is grosso modo dominated by short term electoral
considerations contaminated by wide spread populistic approaches.
This malaise is not a particular Polish phenomenon. It can be observed in many other
countries including Germany and France. But this malaise is more dangerous in a weak and poor
country than in a strong and rich country.
The first strategic choice—a dynamic versus stagnant society
Only a dynamic Polish economy and society can shift Poland from the European periphery to
the European core. So the first strategic choice for Poland of the XXI century is to promote the
development of a dynamic society and economy.
The second strategic choice—equality versus efficiency
The efficiency is a fundamental strategic choice of a dynamic society and economy. It means
not that the equality principle should be totally eliminated from the scope of our attention. I fully
agree with A.M. Okun17 that we should put some “humanity into efficiency”.
The third strategic choice—the past versus future
This strategic choice could be expressed also as a strategic choice—old versus young
generation. This choice is expressed in the proportions of resources allocated for the benefit of
the old generation and the resources allocated for the education18 of the young generation. The
dramatic conflict in this field is mentioned by L.C. Thurow19.
The fourth strategic choice—the coal based versus knowledge based economy
The coal based economy of the past versus the knowledge based economy of the future is the
fourth strategic choice for Poland of the XXI century. This choice is well documented by volumes
published in the years 2001 and 200320.
16 Compare: M. Castells, P. Himanen, The Information Society and the Welfare State. The Finnish Model, Oxford
University Press 2002.
17 A.M. Okun, Equality and efficiency The Big Tradeoff, Washington D.C. 1975., p. 120.
18 K. Paw³owski, Rediscovering higher education in Europe—UNESCO—WSB NLU, Bucharest 2004.
19 L.C. Thurow, The Future of capitalism, N. Y. 1996, p.104–105.
20 A. Kukliñski (ed.) Gospodarka oparta na wiedzy. Wyzwanie dla Polski XXI wieku, KBN, Warszawa, 2001.
A. Kukliñski (ed.) GOW—Perspektywy Banku Œwiatowego, Warszawa 2003.
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The fifth strategic choice—strong versus weak Europe21
A dynamic Poland shifting its place from the periphery to the core of Europe can be created
only in the framework of strong European Union. So the strong Union should be an important
strategic choice for Poland.
Conclusion
This is not a comprehensive case study of Poland. This is only an attempt to present
a preliminary template for our thinking related to strategic choices of Poland in the XXI century.
The critical analysis of this template will answer the question to what extent my thinking will be
useful in the study of the experiences of several European countries.
We need a whole set of studies and reflections to develop a comprehensive methodology as an
instrument in the studies of strategic choices22 seen in different spatial and temporal horizons.
We are just in the beginning of this fascinating intellectual trajectory.
Sixth reflection
Creating the future—Three trajectories
Triple motto:
“The future is always the product of a dy-
namic combination of necessity, contingency,
chance and choice.”
Yehezkel Dror23
“Thus, the first aim of prospective thought
is to illuminate the choices of the present by the
light of possible futures.”
Michel Godet24
Projecting current events forward is always
wrong. Such projections miss the turning points
in human events.”
Lester C. Thurow25
The human being as an ego endowed with rationality, imagination, and will can accept two
attitudes in relation to the future:
— primo—the future is an unavoidable fate which can not be changed by the will and action of
the individual and the society,
21 A. Kukliñski, Strong versus weak Europe (in:) REUPUS Volume One.
22 Compare: Scientific uncertainty in decision making (in:) S.O. Hansson, Uncertainties in the knowledge society,
I.S.S.J., March 2002, No. 171, UNESCO.
Compare also: Cover story—Tech’s Future with affluent markets maturing. Tech’s next billion customers will be
Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, Thai. In reaching them the identity will be deeply transformed, by S. Hamm, Business
Week—European Edition, September 27th 2004.
Compare also: France’s Industrial Power Trip by John Rossant and Taiwan: Falling into China’s Embrace by
Brian Bremner, BusinessWeek, November 29th 2004.
23 Y. Dror, The capacity to govern. A Report to the Club of Rome, Frank Cars, London, 2001, p.40.
24 M. Godet, From anticipation to action—A handbook of strategic perspective, UNESCO—Paris, 1993.
25 L.C. Thurow, The Future of capitalism, N.Y., 1995, p. 3.
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— secundo—the future can be created at least in some domains—in the global, European,
national, and regional scale.
In this reflection we accept the assumption that education of the main instrument creating
the future in optimistic scenario creating the future happiness and well being. We would like to
present three trajectories creating the future:
The general trajectory
— education—talent—innovation—values and institutions — trust—happiness and well being
The social trajectory
— education—learning society—knowledge society—competitive society—dynamic society—
happiness and well being
The economic trajectory
— education—learning economy—knowledge economy—competitive economy—dynamic economy
—happieness and well being
The enclosed table is an attempt to design a map of concepts and trajectories which
could create a framework for intellectual and pragmatic reflection26 related to the fundamental
question—“is it possible to create the future?”. If the answer is affirmative then we open a new
perspective in our discussions related to the methodology of strategic choice.
This is also a new way in the interpretation of the rich and challenging context of the
volume—“Europe—the strategic choices of the XXI century”—which will be published in Nowy
S¹cz and dedicated to the European Parliament.
Warszawa –Nowy S¹cz
September 30th 2004.
Seventh reflection
The multiple ego of strategic choice in Europe
Towards a synthetic approach
Europe can be seen as a vast continental field of strategic choices. These choices have
different motivations, different scale, and different horizons in time and space. Table 1 is
suggesting a dichotomic vision. De facto we should see a complicated continuity from the
motivation—pro publico bono—to the motivation of individual utility—from small to big scale,
from short to long term horizon, and from local to global perspective.
The millions of strategic choices emerging every day in the reality of Europe27 are ex
necessite rei a demonstration of diversity of motivations, scales, and horizons in the time and
26 compare: K. Paw³owski and J.M. Rousseau—in this Volume.
27 Very interesting examples of strategic choices having deep historical roots in long duration are presented by the
recent decisions of the Russian Government:
primo—Russia to abolish Soviet holiday: “Russia’s upper house of parliament on Monday passed legislation—
abolishing several state holidays, including anniversary of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, and extending the New Year
Holiday”. “The bill replaces the Nov. 7 commemoration with a new state holiday, National Unity Day, to be celebrated
on Nov. 4. The new holiday will mark the end of Polish intervention in Russia in 1612.”
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Table 1
The dimensions and fields of strategic choices
The dimensions The fields of interaction
Motivation pro publico bono individual utility
Scale small big
Horizon in time short long
Horizon in space local global
space. In this diversity we must find however a minimum threshold of cohesion without this
cohesion the construction of united and integrated Europe will be only an utopian dream
and not a reality of the XXI century.
secundo—Russia and China hold maneuvers: “Russia and China will hold joint military maneuvers on Chinese
territory next year involving their air forces and navies, Russia’s defense minister said on Monday. Sergei Ivanov,
speaking at a cabinet session chaired by President Vladimir Putin, said that the exercise would involve submarines and
possibly strategic bombers, the Interfax and ITAR-Tass new agencies reported.” “Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent
military analyst who long has followed Russian-Chinese military cooperation, said the announced exercise was clearly
intended to show Moscow’s irritation with the West. ‘It’s symbolic gesture aimed at the United States, intended to
show that Russia has other allies,’ Felgenhauer said.”
Both information in I.H.T., December 28th 2004.
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In the charming book of Z. Brzeziñski 28 we find an interesting reflection related to
multiculturalism and the strategic cohesion of the American Society. This reflection could be
an inducement for us to consider the challenging problem of multiculturalism and the strategic
cohesion of the European Society.
The comparative evaluation29 of the European and American Societies facing the dramatic
global problems of the XXI century is a challenging task for social sciences both in cognitive and
pragmatic perspective30.
Warszawa–Nowy S¹cz
Christmas 2004–New Year 2005.
28 Z. Brzeziñski, The Choice. Global Domination or Global Leadership. Basic Books 2003—Polish edition—Znak,
Kraków, 2004.
29 We are fully aware that “omnis comparatio claudicat”.
30 Compare the Post Scriptum in this Volume and A. Kukliñski, Four megaspaces (in:) REUPUS Volume One.
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COMMENT ONE
AN ADAPTIVE VIEWPOINT
ON THE STRATEGIC CHOICES OF EUROPE
It is always a pleasure and stimulation to assist another one of the Kukliñski’s string of
initiatives directed to make people think seriously about the future. The idea of the volume
Europe—the Strategic Choices of the XXI century seems especially challenging as it attempts to
make a probe into the future more than one generation distant. This future is already formed
by today’s more or less opportunistic decisions, but few bother to ponder what their far away
and synergic consequences might be. What follows is my contribution to the discussion on these
choices. My comments follow generally the outline of Kukliñski’s paper1.
First, let us note that if we are going to consider “strategic choices” the aim of the invoked
strategy should be revealed. Otherwise, the Dror’s suggestion to replace “strategic choice” by
“critical choice” seems to be a good idea. In my opinion, in the assumed half century perspective,
there is no aim worth pursuing except other than providing that Europe will remain a viable
cultural entity (based on diversity) and a global player still very much in control of its own destiny.
In this perspective winning one or the other race—even as prominent as the Lisbon Strategy—is
of secondary importance.
The assumption that: the developmental processes in Europe of the XXI century will have
a double nature: primo—the nature of a spontaneous process driven by the global market forces,
secundo—the nature of a guided process driven by the decisions of the grand actors of the
global and European scene might not be too hopeful. First, the global market forces are not as
spontaneous as one would like to believe and manipulative ploys seem to acquire a decisive role
(e.g. irrational advertising). Also decisions of the grand actors are becoming quite haphazard (e.g.
the Nice process, unfortunate in face of its sudden reversal). Secondly, there are growing tensions,
rooted mostly in demography and global trade) that are dissolving the present social contract in
Europe and changing boundary conditions of European policy. It would be reasonable to add the
tertio factor, namely: the mounting of not institutionalized pressures on establishment.
Consequently, the list of grand actors should be expanded to include at least media, NGOs and
the emerging terrorist-counterterrorist complex. The first two already strongly limit the spectrum
of practically available choices2. The third one is still treated as a temporary problem which
might be solved without modifying the status quo. Assuming this might involve more optimism
than advisable.
1 A. Kukliñski, —Europe—the strategic choices of the XXI century, Seven methodological reflections, in this volume
2 Insider’s observation: the first preoccupation of a city clerk is to escape attention of the media.
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The assumption that developmental process in Europe of the XXI century will be laissez-
faireism and dirigisme at the same time should be accepted with some reservations; as well as
the supposition that some well tuned compromise between them will emerge. At present, Europe,
which seems to be trapped by the overly complex regulations, is neither open for free enterprise
nor subject to efficient governance. It is easy to notice that the trends toward Europe, which is
rather paternalistic and opportunistic, are strong and perhaps growing.
The seven fields of strategic choices presented seem well chosen.
1. What regards demography, the problem might be not so much with the lack of family support
policies as with the dominant model of life 3. The idea that the aim of life is personal happiness
and fulfillment is so simple and attractive that it should be implemented long before our times.
It didn’t happen and now, we might guess the answer—the societies dominated by such idea
are not sustainable in the simplest sense of biological reproduction. Most probably, the next,
not very numerous generation of Europeans is going to face the impossible burden of carrying
for the masses of the richly entitled old and the wave of migration unprecedented since the
fall of the Roman Empire. This might be a challenge for the democracy in Europe. It is not
at all sure that the senile European societies will find enough energy and determination to go
for the necessary reforms in a sensible way.
2. As far as the economy is concerned it looks like only a miracle can save the Lisbon Agenda
from fiasco. Still the knowledge based economy remains the only way to retain the affluent
consumption in the poor but rapidly industrializing world. Without creative and innovative
edge Europe will be pushed to compete with China and India in the costs of production and
services, with the obvious consequences for the accustomed standards of living.
3. In the field of science and technology the problem is in reviving the traditional European
innovative drive, which is stalling in recent decades. This situation seems to result mostly
from overregulation based on na¨⁄ve models of progress4. It is necessary to discard “objective
indicators” of S&T efforts, which are so easily corrupted, and concentrate on creation of
innovative environment. The “new renaissance”, which we would like to expect, has to be
based on understanding of irreducible role of human personality in creative processes.
4. The choices in education might not be as straightforward as “democratic” versus “elitist”.
Primo, both of them are needed. The mass education is necessary to improve individual’s
job elasticity, its quality of life potential and to enhance creation of social capital, The
“elitist education”—in a sense of being strongly competitive—is needed to provide society
with a relatively limited number of extremely well prepared specialists and managers. Both
streams of education should be provided by somewhat separate channels. Attempts to blend
them undertaken in recent decades have brought frustration5 to employers and employees and
deconstruction of authorities. Secundo, the choice between national versus European education
looks like trap, as it involves the deadly winner—looser dilemma. Education in Europe should
be based on recognition of the range of loyalties, which everyone owes first to its family, then
neighborhood, commune, region, country, Europe and finally to the humanity.
5. In the field of culture, stressing importance of one other dimension might be important—the
choice between participating and watching. The new, excellent telecommunication and media
technologies supply the continuous omnipresence of top performers. This resulted in practical
demise of unprofessional participation in culture—drawing, playing, singing, etc. As artistic
3 Galar, R., Conflicting visions: Colas Breugnon versus Baron de Coubertin, in: Kukliñski A., Skuza B. (eds.):
Europe in the perspective of global change, Polish Association for the Club of Rome, Rewasz, Warszawa 2003
4 Galar, R., Knowledge Economy and Evolutionary Traps, in: Kukliñski A, W.M. Or³owski (eds), The knowledge
based economy, The global challenges of the 21st century, Rewasz, Warsaw 2000
5 What’s it worth? The Economist, Jan 15th 2004
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occupations correlate well with creativity, this might have a serious debilitating influence on
cultural and social dynamism.
6. In the domain of governance the choice between federal versus non federal Europe is
very important, assuming the European experiment survives. The present obsession of
partner states with economic and eminence issues of secondary importance, coupled with the
growing indifference of peoples suggest that in future much more dramatic choices might be
confronted. Remembering that previous attempts to form the European concerto ended in
wars and revolutions, it is most important that this aspect is not neglected.
7. The choice, presented as the center-periphery issue, has a destructive potential mentioned
above. It seems hardly possible to resolve this problem in the purely economical framework.
The stable solution should be based on some multi-polar system of diversified regional
attractions and values. In face of present tendencies focused on convergence such system
is hardly imaginable. Still, it should be beneficial for the EU as a whole, enhancing its capital
of diversity and the resulting adaptive abilities.
Generally, in the space of choices proposed, one moves between uniform and diverse, individual
and social, controlled and adaptive. It is obvious that the YES or NOT options are ridiculous and
a proper equilibrium is needed. It seems that the pendulum of implemented policies has gone
too far toward uniform, individual and controlled, what hampers both solidarity and creativity of
Europeans.
The second part of Kukliñski’s paper is a research proposal entitled The Multiple Ego of
KBE in Europe. Of the three methodological approaches projected, the first one, concerning
analyses of modus operandi of the grand actors seems evident. I am somewhat skeptical with
regard to the value of results of benchmarking studies outlining the emergence of best practices
and their diffusion. Such benchmarks have an unfortunate propensity to degenerate, once definite
payoffs are arranged to reward the good scores. I expect most from the third methodology,
i.e. deeply critical evaluations transgressing the limits of political correctness and conventional
wisdom. If the early warnings on new developments are to be found, this is the method to look
for them. These symptoms are usually subliminal, up to the moment when they suddenly escalate
to become obvious and signal the imminent dangers (demographic breakdown, global warming,
recent paroxysm of terrorism etc.) or opportunities (cell phones).
Kukliñski’s observation that the contribution of the Union is too slow and too small to change
the KBE into a new paradigm of European development seems accurate. The reason might be
that the cultural and adaptive paradigm of KBE clashes with the procedural and deterministic
paradigm of the Union itself. This might be one of the most interesting problems to analyze 6.
Another very interesting topic is introduced by the question: how the TNC have created their
contributions to the development of KBE in Europe. The answer is not going to be straightforward.
While transnational corporations are just great in propagating their brand technologies they are
prone at the same time to treat the possible technological breakthroughs as disruptive phenomena
that threaten their position. Also the extent and consequences of territorial loyalty of TNC
headquarters deserves some consideration.
Taking all together, the magnitude, scope and courage of the proposed research is truly
breathtaking. One might wonder if this will help in making it happen.
The third part of the Kukliñski’s paper goes toward a dichotomist model of strategic choices.
Sixteen choices are presented with intention to release the brainstorming potential of participants.
The list seems quite comprehensive. Perhaps the opposition: “Europe of fun Versus Europe of
duty” should be considered as well.
6 Galar, R., Knowledge Economy as an Antagonist, in: Kukliñski A, W.M. Or³owski (eds), The knowledge based
economy, The global challenges of the 21st century, Rewasz, Warsaw 2000
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Some of the enumerated dichotomies I have already commented. I find opposition knowledge
based economy versus knowledge based society quite intriguing. I have reservations against
treating agrarian Europe as an antonym to the Lisbon Europe—I understand this as a pointer to
the topic of the proper allocation of European budget. I would rather talk about “full employment
versus unregulated employment”, and not “unemployment”.
I agree that the dichotomist model is a useful inspiration in the processes of thinking. It
let us feel that the problem is multidimensional and cannot be solved by dealing solely with
isolated issues. Yet it must be remembered that the optimal, or even good enough solution usually
involve harmony rather then dominance of some aspects and inferiority of the others.
The fourth and final reflection is concerned with methodology of the proposed research. The
conceptual framework is to be based on (a) long durations, (b) turning points, (c) tradeoffs (d)
strategic choices. It seems logical that we should consider long duration processes, try do detect
turning points, evaluate tradeoffs and then discuss strategic choices. But is it plausible?
Trends dissolve with a distance in time. We know the turning points of the past, we might
search for their feeble symptoms in the present, but in this respect the more distant future is
impenetrable. We might calculate the obvious tradeoffs but the complex and delayed ones (like
global warming in times of industrialization) are out of reach. All strategic choices have to be
done under great, sometimes fundamental uncertainness. To venture into such marshy and foggy
future some certainties are necessary. The task becomes easier if we know that there are some
fundamental values, which people tend to protect whatever might happen. This seems to be the
only tendency that provides a long term regulatory feedback, which might limits consequences of
unavoidable errors, thus making future more regular and predictable. I feel strongly that the list
of basic concepts should include fundamental values as the point (e).
Conclusion: An essential research was proposed and we should be looking forward to an
interesting volume.
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The following comment—presenting some sharply formulated points—aims at inspiring a more
animated discussion over some at least of the theses presented by Professor Kuklinski in the
paper “Europe—the strategic choices of the XXI century. Seven methodological reflections”. In
the short paper Professor Kuklinski has outlined seven fields of strategic choices that Europe
faces at the beginning of the 21st century. Although he has rightly pointed out that the processes
to which the choices refer will have a double nature: “primo—the nature of a spontaneous process
driven by the global market forces [and] secundo—the nature of a guided process driven by the
decisions of the grand actors of the global and European scene”, it needs to be emphasized that
some of the processes appear much more susceptible to guidance and design than others. In
other words, strategic choices as a challenge to be faced might be easier conceived, debated and
executed in reference to some of the fields identified by Kuklinski than in reference to the others.
The field of governance may, in my view, be certainly included in the first type of the fields
facing a challenge. The task of governing Europe can hardly be left to spontaneously developing
forces and tendencies. It requires serious, carefully carried out analyses, informed debates and,
finally, enlightened decisions. Moreover, and in congruence with Kuklinski’s thesis, the decisions—to
be of a strategic value—may exceed “the limits of political correctness and conventional wisdom”.
For a start, this means that certain notions, concepts and models, which so far have been for the
most part excluded from the public discourse on Europe or else occluded by convoluted definitions
and reservations made by politicians and academicians alike, need to be brought forward and
examined publicly. “Federalism” seems to be one of such notions, concepts and models at the same
time that urgently merit a reasoned come-back to the debates on governance in Europe.
In the context, it is quite interesting that there have in fact been only very few occasions on
which federalism as a choice for the political organization of Europe was actually brought under
a public discussion by politicians. Joschka Fisher’s expose of 2000 is one of the most recent and
most vivid examples thereof. Instead, and as a rule, politicians and academicians in their majority
seem much more often tacitly to assume and/or confidently declare that federalism is not and
cannot be offered to the public as a political option for Europe at all. The anti-federalist discourse
merits a much more extensive analysis than it is possible to carry out within the short comment.
In general however, one is tempted to wonder whether indeed there is something in the concept
(and the model) of federalism that would immediately abhor the popular imagination of Europeans
or perhaps, rather, there are some hidden, vested interests at stake that make most politicians
avoid and/or paint the notion black in front of the European public.
In fact, both suppositions included in the question might turn out to be well-founded if the
anti-federalist claims are given a closer look. Federalism, especially when presented to the public
as an ideology to legitimize building a horrendous supranational Leviathan, may raise fears of
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losing not only one’s liberty and political voice but also one’s cultural identity—both collective and
individual. Hundreds of both genuine and made up stories ridiculing the European Commission’s
attempts at introducing all kinds of norms and standards into a variety of aspects of life hint
that there looms over the people a fear of a utopian perfect order and undistorted homogeneity
that federalism adopted as a political formula seemingly would inevitably institute. Similarly, the
current labyrinthine bureaucratic procedures associated by Europeans—be it farmers, scientists
or merchandisers etc.—with the Brussels-type decision-making and policy process could also serve
as a most effective deterrent in this case. The perception of an imminent disempowerment is still
aggravated by a certain common strategem employed by the governments of the member-states
which frequently have used “Brussels” as an excuse whenever a difficult step needed to be
introduced in internal affairs.
On the other hand, if considered from the vantage point of the current ruling elites in the
many European states, federalism—especially when associated with a transfer or at least giving
up a share of power—cannot but must be feared as well. Presumably, only few of the currently
leading political figures would stand a chance of “promotion” to the federal level of government.
Conversely, they would have to face a potential danger of the federal echelons to step in and
intervene at the “lower” levels of political authority whenever the interests of the polity and
its citizens should require such a step. Moreover, the political class at the national level would
be expected to get more engaged in politics and policy-making that are guided by a culture of
consensus-seeking and cost-sharing more than by a logic of confrontation and one-sided calculation.
Lastly, instead of an easy play on affective elements of national identity, the political elites to
gain legitimacy would perhaps be more forced to comply to a greater extent with cognitive needs
and to satisfy behavioural standards accepted by the populations concerned. No wonder thus that
a move towards a federal Europe may not quite appeal to the current political class.
Reduced to the above reported fears and demands, the concept of federalism is however far
from being fully explored and explicated. Therefore, it is necessary in my view to open up and
extend an informed public discussion over federalism as a political formula for the united Europe.
One possible point of departure for such an informed debate could be found in a fresh reading of
the Federalist Papers registering the birth of the American federal model. Not assuming that the
American model is the solution for the problems of European governance, it might be extremely
useful to consider the vital arguments and counter-arguments that were offered at the point in
history when the—undoubtedly well functioning—federal system covering an extensive territory,
numerous and diversified populations was being designed.
Discussed in the Federalist Papers issues such as the trade-offs between inclusiveness and
efficiency, division of competences, vertical and horizontal checks and balances, representation of
interests, popular participation in the execution of political power and, last but not least the
issue of popular sovereignty, considered anew would perhaps draw our attention to a few aspects
of federalism that might make it much less abhorrent to the political and especially popular
imagination of Europeans than it is deemed at present. Seen from this point of view, a federal
Europe could and should, in my view, be explicitly presented to the public as a potential political
project for the united Europe. Only by presenting and debating a clear-cut model political formulas
in a reasoned way and supplementing them with the currently operating practical reflections
thereof 1, may the public be expected to form an opinion on what form of political organization
in Europe—and why—deserves a strong support. Introducing mixed and half-hearted political
measures without a former public debate by means of complex and convoluted constitutional tricks
1 The principle of subsidiarity, and more generally, the operation of the system of multi-level governance within the
framework of EU regional policy might be offered to the public openly as a sort of an introduction to the operation
of the federal model of governance.
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is only bound to aggravate the problem of the democratic deficit in the EU. It might also mean
that the strategic choices necessary to make hinc et nunc, as Kuklinski tells us, will be infinitely
postponed to the detriment of the development of Europe as a fully fledged polity.
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COMMENT THREE
This note is focussed on two topics, of conceptual and methodological nature, among those
identified by prof. Józef Ni¿nik1.
They are related to the concept and nature of strategic choices and consequent decisions
on their implementation, and to the question who could be eligible and capable of making and
executing effectively such decisions on behalf of the European Union.
Prof. Ni¿nik is seemingly right, questioning the concept of “choice” understood as an equivalent
of a “free choice”. In my view, however, such interpretation of this term does not appear to be
accurate or necessary, both in the European and a more general context.
Obviously, in contemporary international relations no country (or government) is able to make
quite freely and independently rational choices without paying a due attention to internal and
external conditions and circumstances, and to potential impact and feedbacks of “autonomous”
decisions, notwithstanding asymmetries characterising political and economic interdependence of
states and regional groupings within the global system.
Thus apparently the “degree of freedom” of choices made by a global superpower is likely
to be higher than that of a smaller country or a regional power, but also restrained by various
factors. Yet in some areas, of crucial importance, the freedom of choice of superpowers might be
de facto more limited than that of smaller countries, due to their global political responsibilities
and widespread implications of the strategic choices.
Nevertheless, a critical and risky choice—if deemed necessary—could be made and enforced
by a strong power, despite unfavourable circumstances and unclear chances of achievement of
underlying strategic objectives, while a timely choice of a similar kind would be difficult to make,
or even out of reach, for many other international actors, including multinational institutions, with
their complicated multipart decision-making system.
Hence the relative freedom of choices depends also on their scope and on the shape of the
decision-making mechanism, including its democratic or rather autocratic character.
The latter factor occurs to be correlated with that who is responsible for making the critical
choices.
Alternatively, “strategic choices” could be interpreted as fundamental decisions, taken in
crucial historical moments (“fateful moments”, in Giddens’ terms2), in stochastic conditions,
1 J.Ni¿nik, Europe—the strategic choices. A few words of introduction to the panel.
Compare the paper of Anna G¹sior-Niemiec : Two Workshops of the Club of Rome in Warsaw—in this volume.
2 “Fateful moments are those when individuals are called on to take decisions that are particularly consequential
for a person’s destiny. There are, of course, fateful moments in the history of collectivities as well as in the lives of
individuals. They are phases at which things are wrenched out of joint, where a given state of affairs is suddenly
altered by a few key events. ... Fateful moments, or rather that category of possibilities which an individual defines
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within a multidimensional space of feasible options, limited inter alia by the dynamic international
environment. Such decisions are supposed to influence in a desired way (rather than to determine),
future long-term developments of states or groups of states, and their citizens, in some key areas.
Strategic decisions—even when based on adequate information, stemming from high-quality
analyses and good knowledge of historical experience, present conditions and forecasts—are
inherently associated with risk. The risk might be due to uncertainties linked to stochastic factors
involved, including highly unpredictable actions of other quasi-independent world players. Risk is
an intrinsic part of any decision, or a choice among available options, characterised by different à
priori probabilities of their successful implementation and associated with various expected values
of their outcomes (the scores of “success”).
Higher potential “prize” is likely to be connected with a larger risk. Such risky choice is rather
preferred by risk-prone leaders—absolute rulers, or strong centralised governments entrusted
with a clear popular mandate. A weak power tends, on the other hand, to be associated with risk
aversion in its decisions. Prudence however might also be the feature of a wise power.
Such types of decisions, problematic and risky, may be looked upon as “strategic choices”3, or
“critical choices”, in terms of Yehezkel Dror4.
Another conceptual problem relates to dichotomised nature of strategic choices, assumed
by A.Kukliñski 5. This purposefully “simplistic” approach, using clear-cut alternatives, has its
intellectual advantages. It concerns specific, breakthrough decisions, of great importance, taken at
some historical thresholds or crossroads in life of states, nations and the international community.
Making such a choice, perhaps a wrong one, means often entering the way of no return (e.g.
starting a war, accepting or rejecting a project of some bilateral or multilateral agreement, etc.).
A special case of “critical choices”—possibly not a rare one—may consist in embarking on no
action in face of a critical challenge (consciously, or by passivity or impotence). In this case the
risks resulting from negligence or undecidedness, and losses due to missed unique opportunities,
might be much higher than those associated with making a risky decision and undertaking some
resolute, timely action. One can, however, consider that only purposeful, explicit decisions (also of
the type: “Do nothing!”) should be classified into the category of “choices”.
Dichotomised, clear-cut approach to evaluation of strategic choices (that could be regarded
as a part of a broader class of strategic, dynamic decisions) appears not the only one option.
A lot depends on formulation of “strategic choices” and on the role of particular decisions
at a given historical moment. Complex, multi-stage decisions can often be disaggregated into
specific bi-variate choices, shaping a tree of objectives and consecutive, supplementary targets.
The second- and third- round choices (decisions) would be then selected successively, pending upon
outcomes of earlier actions, depending also on the behaviour of other actors and evolution of the
international environment.
For example, a general strategic decision (critical choice) on a further enlargement of the EU
could be, in principle, positive. That choice could be however translated into an affirmative answer
as fateful, stand in a particular relation to risk. Fateful decisions are usually almost by definition difficult to take
because of the mixture of the problematic and the consequential that characterises them”, A.Giddens, Modernity and
Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, Polity Press, Cambridge 1991, pp. 112–114.
3 Cf. A.Kukliñski, Europe—the strategic choices. Six methodological reflections, in the collection of papers submitted
to this workshop: The Polish Association for the Club of Rome, The Future of Europe. The Global Future. The Club of
Rome, A Workshop of the German and Polish Associations for the Club of Rome, Warsaw, November 19th–21st 2004.
4 Y.Dror, The Capacity to Govern, Frank Cass, London 1999, p. XIV, as quoted by A.Kukliñski, op.cit. See also
J.Kotyñski, Global risks and the European integration, in: Europe—the global challenges and the strategic choices,
Edited by A. Kukliñski and K. Paw³owski, RECiFER Eurofutures Publication Series REUPUS, WSB–NLU, Nowy
S¹cz 2004, Vol. I.
5 A.Kukliñski, Towards a dichotomic model of strategic choices, in the collection of papers, op.cit.
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to the accession pleas of some countries, and vague or negative answers to other applicants, at
least for the time being.
One can perhaps argue that only a clear dichotomised answer (“yes” or “no” now) can
be interpreted as a “critical choice”. But what then about “strategic choices”, which—from the
definition—should be based upon some underlying long-term (strategic) vision, encompassing also
possible trajectories (main guidelines), time-tables and dynamic scenarios, to be implemented
consecutively and conditionally, pending inter alia upon future actions of other players on the
global chessboard. Moreover, “pure” political models and extreme solutions, though desirable, are
rarely directly applicable to the complex community of national, historical states of Europe. This
may regard also the critical choices on a future shape of the European Union, types of its
governance (“federal vs. non federal” model), possible new enlargements, etc.
It appears that a number of strategic political decisions (choices), though urgent and necessary,
cannot be made effectively today at the European level, not only because of the uncertainties
involved, but also due to a complicated decision-making process within the Union and numerous
cleavages among politicians and the public opinion, separating not only, and not so much, the
member states, but going rather across individual countries, political factions and institutions.
Those frictions may concern not only a designation of governance methods at the European level,
but primarily and more importantly possible formulation of common political, economic and social
objectives.
This brings us to the second principal issue, namely who does and who should make such
strategic decisions (choices) at the national and European level.
Obviously, there is not—and hopefully there never will be—any single Machiavelli’s Prince or
a modern Emperor to lead and to rule Europe, apparently on behalf of all, but actually in the
interest of a single nation, ideology, political party, social group, etc.
After tragic experience of past centuries, and in view of emerging challenges, the peoples and
nations of Europe need unity and do wish stricter but democratic co-operation, although they are
generally cautious in ceding more power to unknown and mal-defined supranational bodies. They
are also suspicious when observing attempts aimed at creation of restricted coalitions or informal
groups of countries aspiring to a leading position within the evolving Union. In such circumstances,
nationalistic and cynical politicians, seeking a wider national electorate and personal gains, might
sometimes misuse the fears and disorientation of the public.
In this context the evocation of prof. Kukliñski for overcoming three barriers: those of
conventional wisdom, political correctness and intellectual self-satisfaction should be perhaps
reconsidered. We all probably agree with the assertion of prof. Niznik that “Everything seems
to provide evidence that Europe urgently needs bold decisions that would be adequate to
unprecedented economic, social and political experiment of European integration and would
successfully confront both internal and global challenges.” 6
Bold and brilliant intelectual ideas should be however accompanied by enhanced transparency
and credibility of the new concepts of international governance, by greater efforts aimed at
explanation of their sense and purpose to the wide European public, and by a democratic practice
of their implementation. In this respect, the comments made by Dr Anna G¹sior-Niemiec should
be fully endorsed7.
In my opinion we should also agree that what has been oficially accepted in the EU, after
painful and complex negotiations, should be as soon as possible put into practice. European
6 J.Ni¿nik, op.cit.
7 A.G¹sior-Niemiec, A Comment on Antoni Kuklinski’s paper “Europe—the strategic choices of the XXI century.
Six methodological reflections”.
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integration is a long-time venture, advanced gradually, by joining vision with pragmatism, during
a strenuous stop-and-go process.
To make this process more effective in face of common urgent challenges, more federalistic
solutions are rather necessary, with the subsidiarity principle still playing its crucial role. To
be practicable and sustainable, potential reforms should be well prepared and widely debated,
in a transparent and democratic way, without attempts of imposing some individual positions on
other partners.
Although there is an apparent contradiction between the requirements of efficiency and
solidarity at the national level as well as at the European one, a synergy between pursuing the
execution of both objectives appears also very important, not only in the economic and social area,
but also in the political field.
Establishing a technically efficient governance mechanism appears an essential but insufficient
condition for reaching political cohesion and enhanced international acting power of the Union.
Traditional political and economic objectives, interests and ambitions of leading European powers
should not automatically outweigh different views and priorities of other member states. Paternalism
and arrogance should not appear in the intra-European debate, and the faits accomplis should
not replace the mood of dialog and conciliation in reaching a common approach to major global
or regional problems and vis-à-vis external partners.
This seems to be a proper way to increased confidence and compatibility in European
policy-making and in shaping up the common external policy of the Union.
In such conditions the all-European debate on the important issue of international and regional
governance could gain ground and to embark hopefully on some politically feasible and viable
solutions, needed by the countries of the enlarging Union.
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A reply to “Europe—the strategic choices”
by Antoni Kukliñski
The following remarks start from a pragmatic point of view. They do not take into account
the possibility that visions may cause dramatic changes in development and lead to “light at the
end of the tunnel”. The pragmatic point of view means an evaluation of the strategic options with
respect to the degrees of freedom for decisions which are remaining presently.
The first field of strategic choices in the paper by Antoni Kuklinski is demography. Of course
the principal possibilities exists that women older than 30 may still get three children. But this
is not probable. The decision to reduce the population in Europe drastically has been made
in parallel by the national governments some decades ago when they decided not to support
families adequately, but to get re-elected for giving potentials for “Selbstverwirklichung” to their
population. Children would have disturbed the consumerist lifestyle. Now we may still decide
whether to cut pensions drastically or to take up millions of immigrants.
The second field is the economy. Here, the strategic option is in fact related to the Lisbon
agenda—will we really follow only the growth- and competitiveness oriented path or will we be
able to establish efficient policies for sustainable development?
The third field is science and technology. Here, important ethical discussions are ahead. The
stem cells scientific community is promising never ending life and easy substitution of organs and
we have to decide whether we want to believe in these promises or whether we will stick to the
traditional definition of human life.
In the fourth field, the educational one, there will be even more choices. Do we subordinate
education to the needs of economy, do we breed perfectly working managers and engineers in our
institutions or do we want to educate self-conscious citizens?
In the fifth field, the cultural one, there is little choice. Culture has proven to be a field
with an own dynamical development. In the past, trials to maintain traditional cultures frequently
failed and the younger generation has always chosen what they preferred.
In the sixth field, Europe will be probably a federal and not a centralistic entity. This implies
also that the relation between the centre and the periphery will be complex. The centre will not
be a unique place but there will be several different centres of excellence and different peripheries
with different problems.
And of course, there are more choices on the agenda. For example the choice/development
of a European identity which is still in its beginning, the choice of the degree of social security
which Europe will be ready to pay for, the choice of new member states which will depend on the
fragility or stability of the present Union and of course the choice of political priorities which will
hopefully go beyond the Lisbon Strategy and include adequate environmental and social standards
as the key factors for sustainable development.
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Professor Antoni Kukliñski presented “reflections”, which—in fact—look like a programme for
a many years long activity of a centre for strategic studies. I would like to comment on two issues,
both quite general although their generality are of different level. The first is the very concept of
strategic choice, and the second is present at the background of all prof. Kukliñski’s reflections,
and that is the problem of public-elite gap. In conclusion, I will argue that the language of
strategic choices—apart from its substance—should become part of a public discourse.
The concept of “strategic choices” inevitably gets us back to the issue of determinism versus
indeterminism. Although in political studies this dichotomy is rarely recalled it is hardly possible
to point out a better area to illustrate the case of determinism than politics and international
relations. Here is why.
Because of specific political context only certain choices are possible, some are unavoidable
while others are clearly the most rational. Also, ( this it is quite a trivial observation), certain
choices are definitely setting down future options. In reality this trivial truth only very rarely
affects political decisions which in most cases are dependent on a number of factors which have
little to do with the long term rationality and more with the existing interests games. But this is
only one aspect of determinism in politics. Many events determining our future do not depend
just on a simple wish or decision. For example, there is a number of publications devoted to
speculations around the possible course of the world’s affairs in case of a different outcome of
famous battles. What would happen if the battle of Marathon would had been lost by the Greeks?
What would happen if the battle of Warsaw in 1920 would had been won by the red army? There
is no doubt that in both cases the whole world history would be different. Battles and their results
may not look like a choice, but in every case we can—at least—enumerate the whole sequence
of choices that ended in a particular military confrontation. From this point of view decisions of
commanders in chief belong to the different dimension of the problem.
There are, however, radical differences between singular events—even if they are of a scale
of the above mentioned battles—and political or macro-economic choices that have to be made
by a policy making body of a major political system like the European Union. Although in both
cases the effects may determine the future possibilities in many areas of life, policy making—at
least at first glance—indeed involves a choices since it is always directed by specific political ,
economic or social objectives and usually seem to enjoy substantial degree of freedom (limited, of
course, by specific political context). If these objectives refer to fundamental options of the future
development we can correctly call such choices “strategic”. In case of a battle everything depends
on its outcome, which not always reflect strategic talent of the commander in chief or morale and
skills of the fighters. In case of strategic choice in policy making, a proper agency seem to make
decisions which are free and rational. Are they? Are they especially in case of the EU? How
far European Union is free to make decisions that seem most instrumental for desirable future
effects? Of course, one can be a determinist and maintain that there is no such a possibility like
a completely free decision.
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The problem is that in case of the EU we cannot even formulate such question because
of quite a different reason: there is no accountable, effective system of decision making in
the European Union. Such system would require—first of all—a working concept of European
interests. In reality, everything what determines European future, what in fact demands a strategic
choices, is an object of intergovernmental negotiations in which the concept of European interests
rarely appears, most often replaced by tacitly assumed national interests of the participants of
negotiations. Therefore, one can be afraid that strategic choices of the EU are far from the best
possible. But, if the whole experiment with European integration is to be treated seriously, can
any member state win while the EU is loosing? Is it possible to define national interest of any
country in opposition to the European interest? These are again wrong questions. We all know
that national interests of a particular state are formulated not in opposition to the European
interest (at least not in full awareness) but in opposition to the assumed national interests of other
states. In fact such situation demonstrate important deficiency of European integration. Why it
is so? It is so because the concept of European interest is absent both in political discourse of
European integration and in the minds of Europeans who quite rarely feel and experience their
European identity.
One can hope that with the time European identity will get stronger in all European nations,
and also the concept of European interest will become the common category in Europe. The
problem is that we cannot wait for this moment while future chances for the adequate position of
Europe in the world are at stake and demand decisions right now. Decisions clearly of a strategic
significance. Can Europe effectively decide about its own future? Is European Union able to make
its strategic choices Antoni Kukliñski is talking about? My view is that unless European Union
becomes a federation, national rivalries will prevail over European interests and, in effect, all
nations will be loosing.
And here we are getting to the second issue. I believe that in order to move on with the
crucial problem of the form of political system of the EU we have to solve another problem first:
the problem of widening gap between elites and the public in the EU.
Until now the process of European integration was elite driven. With majority of European
population being quite passive or indifferent, elites, very slowly, were moving the whole project
ahead. Looking back it is clear that all what has been done so far brought Europe closer to
the federal form of governance. At the same time such option, the federal option, is almost fully
removed from the public discourse and today there is no politician who would dare to recall Jean
Monnet’s idea of United States of Europe. In fact very modest step toward this direction, that has
been made in the Constitutional Treaty, may be rejected in some of the countries.
Here is the problem. Can we afford to continue building European Union mainly by the
elites? Shouldn’t we start working on a policy which would get the public directly involved in
the process of European integration? The whole discussion about the democracy deficit might be
missing the point? We probably have as much democracy as it is needed or even more. Besides,
we cannot insist on intergovernmentalism and at the same time demand more democracy, which
can be much easier envisioned within federal polity. What is lacking—first of all—is adequate
level of political knowledge of the public. And here I see the most important implementation of
the approach of Antoni Kukliñski. Shouldn’t we try to reach the public with the knowledge about
all challenges that European nations have to face in order to survive? This kind of knowledge is
probably the only chance to change public view on the nature of European integration and on the
best ways to cope with the challenges. This is why prof. Kukliñski’s approach in the language of
strategic choices should become a basic educational practice and essential element of the public
discourse on Europe.
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KRZYSZTOF PORWIT
“THE MULTIPLE EGO” OF
EUROPEAN KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY
AND EUROPE’S STRATEGIC CHOICES
FOR THE 21st CENTURY
(Comments to Professor Kukliñski‘s notes
dated June 13th 2004)*
Both notes1 have in common a diagnostic assessment (or diagnostically based assumption)
that European development involves processes which (in their nature) are—and will be—in part
spontaneous (being driven by the global market forces) and—in another part—will have the nature
of guided processes—driven by the decisions made by organizations (or public institutional bodies)
called “ the grand actors of the global and European scene” (such as European Union, OECD,
the World Bank, IMF, as well as the transnational corporations or the national governments and
regional self-governents). I am ready to accept these and other methodical assumptions (proposed
in note A) but I think that some additional features deserve more attention, because otherwise
we shall be vulnerable to “sins of ommission” in our considerations.:
(1) The background for discussion (in the note A) is asymmetrically concerned with the
viewpoint “from above” i.e. of decision centers, supposed to guide development processes , which
are otherwise spontaneous and also influenced by “the global market forces” 2.
* My comments have been written thanks to the request and encouragement of Professor Krzysztof Paw³owski,
the Rector of Wy¿sza Szko³a Biznesu-National Louis University in Nowy S¹cz, Poland
1 I am refering to “The Multiple ego of knowledge-based economy in Europe. A discusson paper” and to
“Europe—the strategic choices of the XXI Century. An editorial note for discussion and evaluation” . The first of
these notes refers to the issues tackled by the European Commission in the volume “Third European Report on
Science and Technology Indicators—2003. Towards a knowledge-based economy” Brussels 2003 as well as in some
other related studies. A deeper inquiry is suggested, the main points of which will refer to forces likely to enhance
KBE promotion and to overcome potential obstacles. The second note announces intentions to publish a volume which
will hopefully gather opinions on several strategic choices which will have to be made in the future developmental
processes (seven fields for such choices are mentioned in the note). I understand the notes as initial suggestions of
topics for future research and my comments are offered in that context. The notes will be called: A and B respectively.
My comments are addressed directly to note A and indirectly to several fragments of note B.
2 Professor Kukliñski says that processes of development in Europe will be simultenousely “leseferic and dirigistic”
(which probably means that various kinds of processes may coexist). I would add a reservation that consciously devised
guidance differs from “dirigisme”. The latter does not approve spontaneity, which exists but as an opposing force. The
concepts of coexistence or complementarity do not seem so controversial if applied to somewhat softer notions, i.e.
respectively to market self-regulation and to subsidiary functions of public bodies, with a crucial qualitative condition
that both are based on sufficiently strong institutional foundations (including the ethos of public benefit and service)..
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It would not be enough to assume that the main and decisive causal factors for development
processes in Europe can be found in the roles of “grand actors” . They are essential but
within a context of their interrelations with spontaneous movements and changes ( “ups and
downs”) , which are primarily resulting from micro-activities observed in the sphere of economic
and societal life. One can argue that such endogenous micro-aspects (considered from a holistic
macro-perspective) deserve more attention3,—mainly as “grass roots” factors , which may enhance
good chances or may create obstacles. Their relevance is particularly great at present—in view
of extraordinary extent and speed of changes ( which lead to abnormal profileration of variety
in many fields of societal and economic matters). There are many problematic features of
micro-economic and micro-societal activities , in particular when they are observed and considered
from the angle of their interrelations with more general and wider (holistic) concepts used in our
consideration of Europe‘s development, at present and in the future. The role of global impacts
seems particularly relevant in this context. They create problems in micro-sphere, reactions to
problems lead to various spontaneous transformations in that sphere and in turn—to changes
in challenges and constraints which must be faced by the grand actors as critical choices (or
dilemmas) in their tasks of guidance.
(2) It seems that we can try to touch only a few chosen aspects in a rather complex
problematique of the mutual relations between the notions of “spontaneity” (in processes supposed
to be driven by market forces) and of “guidance” , sometimes “control” (which are the tasks
expected from the grand actors).
The adjective spontaneous applied to contemporary practice of market processes has a peculiar
and relatively limited sense because respective activities, although directly not dependent on any
exogenous instruction, are nevertheless supposed to take place within certain constraining bounds,
which are predetermined by formally binding law and by other generally accepted informal rules.
A large part of these constraining obligations (in other words—expressions of an institutional
order) have their origin in certain societal arrangements and their experiences, which are usually
somehow influenced by the public bodies (called “grand actors” in note A), and the same was
true in a recent and a more distant history. At the same time it seems crucially important to
remember that the nature and characteristics of each “grand actor” has been somehow conditioned
by feedback interrelations between their own activities and the outcomes of spontaneous processes
and “bottom up” pressures in the areas of economic and other societal matters. It would be
wrong to opt for concentration of power in the hands of central public bodies 4 and also—it would
be naive to expect that a sheer act of their will would suffice to allow “the grand actors” to
shape the future of Europe, especially if the prospects for just mentioned “bottom up” outcomes
and pressures would not be aimed in similar directions. Unfortunately it also happens (as in
contemporary Europe) that there are two parallel and interdependent ailments.
3 I have in mind here the features studied by such fields of literature as these concerned with transaction
costs, with asymmetry of information, with various morally doubtful practices in business and in public sector. One
way or another they indicate an extending range of pathologies or weaknesses in contemporary spontaneous market
regulation (They are market failures—but in a wider sense, not covered by a traditional scope of that notion). Their
occurance leads to increasing demands for public action (of governmental or local bodies) but demands are too large,
in comparison with feasible potential of supply. This happens also in the area of R&D and innovations (problems of
that kind were discussed in Society—The endless frontier. A European vision of research and innovation policies for
the 21 th century by Paraskevas CARACOSTAS and Ugur MULDUR, European Commision, Luxembourg, 1998)
4 One should remember in that context a well known “priniciple of subsidiarity” , which is declared as binding in
European public matters—but the extent of its implementation is too small. “The Economist” (June 12th 2004) in its
leader on the European elections (entitled “Apathy contest”) presents suggestions on feasible ways to counteract the
symptoms prevailing in Europe and called “democratic deficit”. Suggestions refer to the rules of subsidiarity,“which
provide for powers to be exercised at the lowest sensible level of government” (p.16) and they postulate that this
criterion should be more emphasized in considerations of legislative proposals made by the European Commission.
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On the one hand—“the grand actors” (especiall in public matters) are frequently willing
to gather in their hands too many functions, responsibilities and attributes of power. On the
other hand—there are widespread symptoms of neglect and failure on the part of persons, who
could have been active at micro-level in shaping, supporting and improving societally desirable
institutional order.
These deplorable cases of neglect or failure are destructive in two senses i.e. being harmful to
engagement in local and regional civic duties as well as to contributions in “bottom up” processes
(which are meant to assist endeavours to improve institutional order in respectively larger areas,
up to national or “Union wide” extent).
(3) I am sharing opinions that the chances of setting in motion and promoting adequate
sanative processes (i.e. essays to counteract pathologies and deviations in spontaneity and guidance
interrelations) are depending primarily on the chances of adequate transformations in personal
patterns of behaviour. The roots of such chances can be looked for and also hopefully found in the
sphere of personal minds and souls of human beings. Ultimate causal factors for these changes
are predominantly within respective ranges of responsibility that each person has for her/his
behaviour (being grown-up and normally sane, i.e. acting according to one‘s own free will, reason
and conscience).
Important are in that context the personal features related equally to merits and criteria
of reason and knowledge, which are acquired through education, training and experience as
well as those related to deeper motives of existential wisdom, faith and loyalty concerned with
fundamental values, linked to a superior sense of human dignity and finding expression in a strong
concern for judgements of personal conscience5. A justified concern for these issues is motivated
not so much by potential diversity among individual behaviours but by various qualitative aspects
of interdepence between personal behaviour and the practice of societal relations.(or even—with
global issues of mankind). We can trace here the roots and main characteristics of micro-relations
(in a basic, closer sense of families and other micro clusters), and also of respectively wider
relations in areas, where the human values (conceived in consciences as multiple personal sources)
are somehow expressed by the notions of common (public) good (benefit) and by respective criteria
of evaluation for activities and decisions undertaken for public purposes (i.e. neither private nor
individual).. The nature of such criteria seems most understandable and transparent if they are
clearly built upon a common will to accept superior position of human dignity (of every person) as
well as to acknowledge parallel importance of human rights and human obligations within a truly
democratic societal order. In short—I think that the phenomena marked at present with the names
“Knowledge-based economy” and “ Knowledge-based society” will not be sufficiently successful
and beneficial unless they gradually develop and undergo transformation into “Knowledge, Ethics,
Wisdom—based ...economy and society”
This line of thought excludes any assumption that the desired changes would be imposed by
exogenous pressures and sanctions, within any kind of an ideological project (similar to those of
historically experienced totalitarian regimes, or being a somehow camouflaged its new mutation).
However, one cannot forget other arguments, which maintain that aforementioned chances for
improvement are in fact and will be heavily hampered because the voices raised in their favour
are consciousely neglected and excluded from a scientific and public discource by a majority of
institutional features, as well as by the unwritten rules of political correctness, which are visible
in many existing democratic societies (and in their economic systems). This is due perhaps to the
emphasis on tolerance, which is usually understood and promoted in a peculiar sense. It is supposed
5 These foundations of personal behaviour are (approximately) expressed in the professional literature by the
notions of human capital and social capital respectively. Both of them include certain specific evaluations of personal
behaviour considered from the viewpoint of a wider benefit (i.e. not individually of each person concerned).
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to give priority and privileged treatment for such concepts of behaviour, which are somehow
original in deviations from any earlier accepted normal standards. In some cases this brings
valuable innovations, elsewhere, however, that attitude leads at present to discrimination of those,
who are arguing against some aspects of modernism (because of their dangerous implication for
the fate of mankind). It seems that we are facing a kind of adverse selection of quasi-innovations
in societal matters, which go together with many valuable technological innovations. This may
contribute to extending of deplorable societal ailments (e.g. destruction of family life, regres in
pre-school conditions for children, contempt for honesty and fairness in business or in public and
human relations etc). Preference seems to go for behavioral patterns which are just opposite to
the postulates aimed at curing the societal ailments. This is not so strange, because preferred are
in contemporary practice such behavioral patterns which seem relatively easier, promising prompt
satisfaction or offering higher immediate benefits (without concern for secondary or delayed
losses).
Such happenings may be understandable but, nevetheless, they seem detrimental for the
future of mankind, thus they are far from being expressions of wisdom.
I am fully aware that these reflections are just a tentative and rough outline of problems
for discussion on prospective conditions which would hopefully decrease extent and frequency of
failures and of mischievious activities in societal matters. They are trying to follow the lead of
thoughts and suggestions published in the volume Europe in the Perspective of Global Change,
edited by Antoni Kukliñski and Bogus³aw Skuza, The Polish Association for the Club of Rome,
Warsaw 20036.
(4) The future of mutual relation between “the grand actors” and European spontaneous
development forces, and of their institutional order, will be also shaped by the main problems of
to-day, in particular by the impacts and challenges caused by simultenousely occuring processes of
(i) European Union‘s enlargement, (ii) proclaimed endeavours to promote (soon) Union‘s economy
to a leading competitive position in the global area7, (iii) the essays to achieve (simultaneously) the
goals of Lisbon Strategy, and to implement its respective tasks, in the fields of KBE development
and rising productivity as well as of attaining more societal coherence (with reduced unemployment
, with better jobs and with less symptoms of social exclusion).
In my opinion—there are reasons to argue against one aspect within a concept of “a new
strategic goal 8” (adopted at the Lisbon European Council of March 2000). I have in mind the
declaration of political will to transform the European Union by 2010 into “the most competitive
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world ...”. In other words—this means also that
European Union‘s economy was confronted with a goal which compels to strive for leadership at
the global arena, which was supplemented with indications that that leading position will be taken
from the USA.
My reflections and arguments are not meant to imply any objections against endeavours to
increase dynamics of development and of competitiveness in the economies, which are forming the
Union. However, I think that it is not advisable to apply a total (aggregate) formula in expressing
6 My contribution there was explicitly concerned with the role of Christianity and respective inspirations for
European institutional order. However, there are also numerous cases of similarly directed arguments, where similar
suggestions for institutional improvements follow from arguments of mainly mundane and reason-based (rationalist)
considerations. E.g. there is a line of thought related to potential qualitative merits of striving for “global ethics”
which would not accept the motivation of “hate” and of “fighting against” as forces preferable in social relations.
7 I am refering here to the aim (expressed within the Lisbon strategy to transform Europe (in 2010) into “the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. The aim of leadership is implied in the initial part of this statement,
the rest may rouse reflections on complexity of the aim and on potential conflicts of its particular aspects.
8 I am refering here to the text concerned with that goal printed in Chapter 1 (p.1) of Third European Report
on Science & Technology 2003, European Commission 2003
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the goal for the whole Union, because one should remember that the Union is composed of diverse
economies which are presently at different distances from the above mentioned ambitious target
of leadership9. The aggregate approach (and corresponding averages in terms :per capita, per
worker, per hour etc) may imply priority for total quantitative growth effects (in terms of GDP
and related productivity indicators) without adequate concern for the pattern of the components,
for structural features of the latter—as well as for the consequences of growth promotion and
of the impacts of globalization. These consequences may be unfavourable for some qualitative
aspects of in the processes of Union‘s enlargement as well as for the chances to attain the aims
of societal nature (more employment , cohesion, safety etc). The latter may become handicapped
everywhere, even in more developed European economies.
Besides, there are arguments10 that some performance indicators in several European
economies are already nearer to the top than those of the US economy.
The indicators for the whole Union will become uncomparable (over time) alongside the
processes of Union‘s enlargement , which leads to another argument against paying much
attention to the position of the whole Union in global rankings.
Much more important conseqences may be resulting from other i.e. structural features of
development processes of the whole Union, considered as a large system composed (now) of 25
states-subsystems and correspondingly greater number of smaller subsystem-regions. Considering
the utmost importance attached within the Union to the redistribution of public funds among
subsystems it seems particularly essential to continue considerations of comparative effectiveness
of variants , which would be characterised—however—not only by various GDP and productivity
growth assumptions and by intensity and patterns of redistribution flows, but also by various
patterns of relative competitiveness in subsystems (and their changes over time), looked upon in
two perspectives i.e. of global and intra-Union markets. The essays to narrow the differences
between the competitiveness of relatively poorer (weaker) and richer (stronger) subsystems may
lead to controversial problems whenever the process involves possible regres for a stronger
subsystem.
(5) According to Lisbon Conclusions it was assumed that the aim of overcoming the main
global competitors will be approached without essays to imitate the USA, which was confirmed by
a following statement: 11. “The Union must shape these changes in a manner consistent with its
own values and concepts of society”
The nature of these European values and concepts of society seem particularly relevant for
understanding and trying to disentangle a dilemma, whether more competitiveness can be attained
in Europe together with improvements in achievement of above mentioned societal aims of more
employment, cohesion, safety etc. If one assumes that European Union‘s “own values and concepts
of society” are identical with these expressed presently in practice (as well as in the recent history
of Union-15) then it would be justified to venture a conclusion that the task seems hopeless, i.e.
that relative successes in competitiveness (and the merits of their economic effects) seem doomed
to be accompanied by inevitable forces towards regress in societal domains (not necessarily in
9 One can hardly imagine, why ordinary Europeans should feel joy and satisfaction when they will be told that
European economy is the leader (as if a “world champion” but in what competition ?, should we strive for a feeling
of superiority towards all who are less afluent? what sense would be in implying that such motivations will make us
proud to be Europeans?)
10 See e.g. The Economist June 19th 2004, Special report Europe v. America pp.75–77, Similarly oriented, although
differently motivated arguments and comments were presented also in Europe in the Creative Age by Richard Florida
and Irene Tinagli, February 2004
(A booklet published by Carnegie Mellon Software Industry Center, co-published in Europe with DEMOS, London
UK)
11 Third European Report... ibid p.1
Europe—The Strategic Choices strona: 434 (434)
434 Krzysztof Porwit
aggregate terms (seen in short-term horizon) but mainly in structural and distributional aspects,
which—in a longer perspective—will have also harmful consequences for aggregate quantitative
indicators).
European Commission’s volume (Third European Report...2003, op.cit. pp. 9–10)
refers in this context to some important lines of thought, which are meant to look for chances
of finding another answer to the dilemma, i.e. finding such institutional and other systemic changes
which would be able to help European economies to harness societally detrimental secondary
effects of their strife for higher competiveness and for more market successes. Attention is
focussed primarily on measures which will sufficiently help to match structures of labor markets
supply and demand sides. This line of action includes already eneavours to increase:
(a) mobility of persons looking for employment and also (b) their ability and flexibility in
mastering new professional skills and in adapting to new places of employment. More measures
will certainly have to be done in the area of education (and continuous training). Their effectiveness
will depend—in turn—on various surrounding conditions (in terms of enhancing their friendliness
to the chances of achieving the basic aims. The section entitled“ Competitiveness with high social
cohesion?” ends with the following sentences (p.10):
“ However, thinking that the population, via education and training, can be adapted to
new market conditions and that education and training will, thus. resolve the social problem,
is a fallacy. Investment in education, training and life-long learning might be inefficient if
it is not backed up by social investment: children‘s ability to learn and success in school
depend directly and powerfully on the social situation within their families. Lingering social
inequalities unavoidably produce educational and cognitive inequalities. Active social investment
is also an answer to new needs created by changes in the family structure: new household
forms and life-style patterns.... Therefore, it appears to be important to redefine social policy in
order to nurture strong and viable families adapted to the new and rapidly changing working
conditions.”
All above mentioned measures in the areas of improving effectiveness of labour markets, as
well as of education and social investment oriented towards stronger and more viable families,
are conceived primality as catalysers. In other words they can prove sufficiently effective if they
are no serious dicrepancies between total labour demand and supply, so that the problems will be
solved through more effective adaptation within labour market. However, such assumptioms are
not justified so the whole problem of unemployment and exclusion deserves much more attention.
(6) I aggree with an ephasis on institutional and behavioural studies (expressed within
“methodological assumptions” , in note A, p.1). However, I would add that such approaches seem
useful not only in “studies analyzing the modus operandi of the grand actors”. They seem also
necessary in the sense of considering institutions as “rules of the game” related to all particularly
relevant systemic processes and interconnections12. The latter are not confined to linkages among
“global forces ” and “the grand actors” and—on the other hand—respective internal European
economic and societal issues (in particular—of KBE and KBS). They are also explicitly concerned
with certain important qualitative issues in the status of European societal and economic systems,
with the manner and qualitative features of intra-European markets as well as with the qualitive
attributes of their instituional order.
It seems that contemporary socio-economic practice is characterized by many symptoms of
institutional disorder. There are visible symptoms of continous decay, which are pehaps most
12 Refering e.g. to Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary one may remind that the word “institution” is used
in practice to express two different notions, i.e.(1) of established rules of human interactions in economic & social
relations (established formally by law or informally originated by customs or by personal moral conviction), (2) of an
organization (usually for social welfare or for other public functions). Institutionalist scholars concentrate attention on
the former interpretation (e.g. Douglas C.North)
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frequent in the sphere of individual behaviour13, whenever the people in their diverse roles (in
business, in employment, in public service, in professions, in families and other human inteactions)
forget their human obligations towards others but prefer to interpret liberty and human rights in
a way, which boils down to neglect or outwitting of all existing societal rules (not only imposed by
law but also those of an informal moral code) 14. In other words—we are witnessing in practice
frequent destruction of institutional constraints, which are supposed to matter but are in fact too
weak. As far as I know there are no precise statistical data which would allow to assess the
extent of institutional disorder, particularly in that part which refers to misbehaviour not covered
by remedial activities of courts, public police etc. Nevertheless it seems justified to express
words of warning, because :(a) there are numerous and growing cases of press reports, which
indicate respective regretable facts ,(b) wide-reaching voices of public opinion express negative
judgements for proliferation of mischief in societal matters (which in itself become relevant factors
for socio-economic perspectives), (c) professional literature and serious periodicals show concern
for many generalized types of problems emerging in that context.
13 I do not want to underestimate the importance of formally binding laws and of all arrangements set for
protection of public order. However—one should remember that without sufficiently clear and strong moral code (worthy
of human dignity) there will be an inevitable dilemma in “negative” choice of lesser evil i.e. what is preferable—is it
lack of order and safety? or dangers signalled and experienced by symptoms of autocratic regimes.
14 My reflections to these issues were presented in section 2 above. I am offering other thoughts in that
problematique elsewhere in this volume.(see: chapter on Some difficult problems facing Europe on the way towards
a top-rank knowledge-based economy. ).
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REFLECTIONS
ON PROPOSED RESEARCH AGENDA
“THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY
IN EUROPE: THE REGIONAL TRAJECTORY”
The aim of this communication is to join the discussion, which has been started by prof.
Kuklinski and his colleagues and intends to mobilise research efforts in favour of internationally
supported research project. I will be focused on two papers which have argued basic ideas and
methodological framework of intended project and been recently circulated1even if I take into
account previous publications and intellectual efforts of prof. Kuklinski.
The knowledge-based economy is the key notion of the suggested project. Here, it should be
reminded that prof. Kuklinski has played a pioneering role in introducing this concepts in the
debates about possible course of economic reforms in the accessing countries (The knowledge-based
economy, 2000). The question, how human intellectual resources can be mobilised in favour of
economic and political advancement has been always the leading issue of his interest. In the
present proposal new cognitive issues have been raised. They are concerning both the conceptual
and the methodological matters. In conceptual perspective a structured approach is proposed
taking into account both centralizing (globalising) and de-centralizing (localising) factors of current
changes. It is supposed that closer study and evaluation should be paid to the role of international
and national actors as well as to regional ones. The methodological suggestions are referring to
experience of large international agencies, which have developed the indicators and databases of
human resources, their capacities and environments of their growth. In a comparative perspective
such data offer an interesting approximation to an assessment of knowledge resources in economic
growth and social change. The paper is demonstrating how such data could be combined in order
to give a picture about differences among the proposed countries (4+4). Moreover, it is suggested
that also a qualitative approach should be applied—assessment of best practices or benchmarking
which should give a more consistent picture about the ways, how the available resources are
employed and the current results achieved in the studied countries and regions. I understand it
so, that the second paper about a dichotomic model is drawing attention to the methodological
difficulties in a study of regulatory / self-regulatory regimes. It is in fact suggesting which issues
should be taken into consideration when studying best practices of this or that country or region.
I share the idea that human resources, and the knowledge they are disposing of, have become
the key resources of economic growth and a concept of knowledge-based economy should be
1 Kuklinski, A., Burzyuñski, W., The knowledge-based economy in Europe: the regional trajectory (model
4+4+4+22); Kuklinski, A., Towards a dichotomic model of strategic choices
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taken seriously in assessing the situation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. One
can have in mind lot of political and cultural reasons for raising this issue to public attention and
debate. In political terms one can count with both the strong pull effects of EU environment and
its selective impact on political landscape of the accessing countries and the political efforts of
CEE countries for authentic action and performance in diversified and competitive environment
of EU. In cultural terms one can count with functional revival of differentiated social systems (of
education, technology, science, public administration, health care). They were heavily supported in
old regime but in their functioning (and systemic nature) shaped rather by ideological aims while
their present existence and transformations have to adapt to mutual “checks and balances” among
the social sub-systems and do so, moreover, in an open and competitive environment. I claim,
that the KBE concept is “located on the track” of these transformations and can give important
cognitive support for their orientation. Of course, such support can become more powerful provided
the KBE concept is aware of its social and cultural implications. In the commented papers such
awareness is presented in a strong statement about virtuous circle between knowledge-based
economy and knowledge-based society and more specified in the paper about dichotomic model
of strategic choices. I would like to develop my arguments in this perspective and suggest some
topics, which could accomplish a picture about societies, which make use of and attempt to promote
role of human resources and knowledge in their economic systems.
If one has in mind current concepts of KBE and looks at current conceptions of knowledge
societies he finds right away a striking difference at their evaluative framework: while the
conceptual approaches of knowledge-based economy are mostly giving positive evaluation to
the (economic) role of knowledge, the conceptions of a knowledge society are giving rather
ambivalent, if not problematic, assessment to social role of knowledge. There are two simple
reasons for such difference: (i) study of societies makes it possible to follow and assess all possible
implications of knowledge, and (ii) a closer look at process of diffusion and implementation of
knowledge brings also additional knowledge on process of knowledge generation, including its
various forms. Starting from the latter issue some starting differences and classifications can
be formulated. Speaking about knowledge we have in mind modern (discursive) knowledge. It
forms basic knowledge ground of modern societies. Yet, its application in different social spheres
(sub-systems) and impact on human life, have disclosed some serious social problems (about
emancipative role of modern knowledge and its relation to power, institutional trans-formations
of science and technology, relation to everyday-practical-knowledge). Some of these problems are
reflected in the studies of changes in science production systems: more profound utilisation of
science in social subsystems has not only influenced their performance but also has led not only
to qualitative transformations in science system (transformation from Mode I to Mode II) but
also essential transformation in nature of social relations and institutions: “.. the mergence of
more open systems of knowledge production—Mode 2 science—and the growth of complexity and
uncertainty (underlined by K.M.)—Mode-2 society—are phenomena linked in a co-evolutionary
process.”(Nowotny, Scott, Gibbons 2001: 245). Even more critical approach has been developed in
the debates about a role of information and informatisation in current societies. Closer studies of
social implications of ICT as well as post-modern interpretations of current situation in modern
societies are suggesting that information has become crucial medium of social interactions and has
been pushing out discursive knowledge of this role (in studies of Lyotard, Baudrillard, Vattimo
and others). Consequently, one should speak about information societies rather than knowledge
societies (Lash 2002).
What can we learn from these debates? How could we apply this knowledge to the discussion
about dichotomic model of strategic choices, or virtuous circle between knowledge-based economy
and knowledge-based society, as formulated by prof. Kuklinski? At the first glance it can be said
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that the virtuous circle is laden by both new challenges and new constrains and uncertainties.
Rather positive picture has been offered by studies of social impact of ICT and relevant concepts
of information society. Explosion of information has been up-grading performance of many areas
of human activity, like professional growth, education, and profit-formation in business. But such
findings are mostly interpreted in a framework of technological determinism: after identifying
social implications of a particular technology it is expected that these implications will be
transformed in social assets. The position taken by social sciences, particularly by their idiographic
discourse, is more cautious about a social power of technology—rather an approach of social
shaping of technology is preferred. In this perspective not only new challenges for social action
but also impact on existing forms of power, social control and inequalities have been identified.
The current understanding of turbulent changes in modern societies is, of course, laden not
only by different concepts but also by re-examination of basic social science notions. E.g. Lash
is expecting that informatisation of current life is so profound that it changes principal form
of wealth creation and accumulation. So in his view, we cannot count with notion of capitalism
(Lash 2002). On other hand Webster, after having reviewed all essential concepts of information
society, has been suggesting that the state of current societies is more influenced by capitalist
forms of social control. He claims, that the following “principles have spread round the globe at
an accelerated pace in recent decades:
• Ability to pay will be the major criterion determining provision of goods and services
• Provision will be made on the basis of private than public supply
• Market criteria—whether something makes a profit or loss—are the primary factor in deciding
what, if anything, is made available
• Competition—as opposed to regulation—is regarded as the most appropriate mechanism for
organising economic affairs
• Commodification of activities—i.e. relationships are regarded as being amenable to price
valuation—is the norm
• Private ownership of property is favoured over state holdings”
• Wage labour is the chief mechanism for organising work activities (Webster 2002: 268–9).
The above-mentioned assessment is, in my view, overestimating a role of capitalist markets
in co-ordination of social activities in modern activities and underestimating changes in nature
of present forms of work. The concepts of institutional cluster of modernity, which has been
suggested by A. Giddens, seems to me to be better representing scope of means and environments
of social co-ordination in modern societies (Giddens 1990). He counts with four dimensions of
institutional cluster of modern societies—besides capitalist market economy he counts with three
other dimensions without which modern societies can not be understood: the state with its
surveillance function, control of means of violence and industrial dimension (reflecting relationship
to nature and a formation of “artificial nature”). Each dimension is, however, outlined in terms of
diarchic nature of power: the above-outlined dimensions are complemented/balanced by relevant
movements (labour, political, peace and environmental ones). Such theoretical framework is much
more sensitive to account for impact of social factors. E.g. the issue of ICT need not be understood
in view of its ambivalent (positive and negative) social impacts but also in ways, how the formative
actors of this or that dimension as well as relevant movements make use of ICT -a much more
descriptive and situational picture can be gained. M. Castells has presented such picture in case of
social and cultural implications of Internet. He has come to understanding that in general social
terms Internet is representing
• Challenge to freedom—internet can be appropriated and monopolized; for this reason struggle
for access to and control of internet is a struggle for freedom;
• Challenge to exclusion is influenced by situation of access or non-access to internet;
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• Challenge to advancement of personal capacities for processing of information and knowledge
formation—growth of capabilities to make use of databases in the course of whole life.
He has also drawn attention not only to impact of internet on a context of human action but
also on forms of intersubjectivity and solidarity. He has found out that diffusion of internet is
associated with formation of four types of communities and cultures:
• Technological and meritocratic culture growing out of ethos of academic science and its
extensive facilities (“big science”) which is open to prevailing power structures;
• Hackersïculture which has produced professional excellence with orientation on freedom of
action, free access to technology, independence on power;
• Virtually communitarian culture which is associated with a growth of communities, re-
discovery of society, with orientation on freedom, horizontal communication and interactivity
in improvement of human condition of life (without adherence to technology);
• Enterprising culture—orientation on innovative ethos, wide application of new technologies
and business aims with a potential to oppose existing rules and institutions (Castells 2001).
The above-mentioned examples are well documenting that one can identify not only positive or
negative implications of modern knowledge and industrial resources but also understand that social
actors and environments are operating on their own, enhancing their capacities via appropriating
modern knowledge and shaping technology within their framework of action. Such findings are
fruitful not only for the case of better understanding contexts of knowledge production, diffusion
and application but also for governance of such processes.
It has been already mentioned above that these processes are not only governed by the
principle—“the more we know, the more we control our environment and more certain are
conditions of our life”. On contrary, the more modern knowledge is diffused and applied in
society the more open, flexible and uncertain there are context and environment of our actions.
For this reason N. Stehr is correctly claiming that social control of knowledge and governing
of knowledge societies are crucial and disturbing issues of current societies (Stehr 1994). The
issue of governance can be theoretically approached from different positions: either from action,
which is charismatic or well-networked in order to generalize its purpose or meaning, or from
self-referential social systems, which are able to reduce complexity of present societies, or from
combination of both. Anyhow, a study of institutional context of knowledge societies seems to me
to be a productive research problem where advantages of both the theoretical and the empirical
cognitive approach can be applied. I shall come to this issue in concluding part of my commentary.
The above outlined discussion has aimed to refer to 16 dichotomic strategic choices to the
future of Europe, which are mentioned by prof. Kuklinski in his paper about dichotomic model
of strategical decision making. In view of this proposal my comments have an intention to draw
attention to some additional points:
1. Since strategical decisions are taken in context of institutions it would be productive to
associate their interpretation with some basic institutional (functional or structural) framework
of current societies; the above-mentioned institutional cluster of modernity—highlighting
economic, political, industrial and military aspects—could be a good example of such
framework;
2. Important issue is concerning the cultural and evaluative issues—model of dichotomic choices
counts with several issues, which have an explicit relation to context of values and social
norms. Of course, one could treat values as preferences, order them and draw implications
for a culturally supported growth of this or that sub-system. I draw attention to different
approach which treats valuation issues as a relatively independent since their function rests in
cohesion of values being reproduced in human (everyday) practices; diarchic arrangement of
power, impact of social movements seem to be important and productive environment enabling
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that life worlds of collectivities—their capabilities to produce mutual understanding, respect
to norms of inter-subjective action and shared values—can become formative factors of social
and cultural reproduction and transformations.
3. Another level of institutional arrangement can be specified for the forms of social co-ordination
and control—having in mind in particular markets with their proprietary and competitive
environments and democracies with their role in granting equality and producing public
reputation. In analytical terms these aspects can be understood to be disjunctive and present
systems of market control have been strictly observing that informal co-operative agreements
are not corrupting competitive environments of markets. But a closer look at current forms
of governance is indicating that “borderlines” between competitive and co-operative forms of
social co-ordination (as well as between privates and public spheres) have been under pressure
of permanent changes in course of which each spheres has been adapting to another one:
the issue is, therefore, not only to observe the specific function of this or that sphere but
also to find a balance in their role with respect to specific situations. E.g. study of innovation
policies in selected accession countries has indicated that inability to balance the regimes of
competition and co-operation is one of the weaknesses of these countries in promotion of
innovation (Innovation policy 2001). For analytical reasons it seems advisable to study not
only dichotomic regulatory positions but also ways, how the dichotomies could be balanced
and complemented.
4. Next issue is concerning the first point and intends to draw attention to position of economic
system in relation to the other social sub-systems. In the preceding text some arguments have
been already mentioned to the relationship between industrial system and economic one. Now,
I would like to draw attention to a precarious issue of relationship of economic system to state
and the political public. 2 The experience of EU has been evidently documenting that economic
factors have been playing crucial role in its formation but are not sufficient for its embedding
in a reliable institutional framework. Of course, many interpretations could be suggested how
a co-evolution of both spheres might and could be promoted: one can expect that sufficient
economic growth and abundant public finances could settle the issue; one can count with
a limited role of state and political systems (in a perspective of libertarian perspective). Many
authors are, however, worried about lagging role of political institutions in present world and
its globalisng factors and actors. I shall mention recent publication of J. Habermas, which
seems to me to be persuasive enough about circumstances of emergence and consequences
of such deficit (Habermas 1998). In his view an expansive growth of market-based global
networks and the declining legitimising and regulatory role of national states have been
representing main factors of influence on the growing gap between economic and political
forms of governance. “Catching up of global networks” in formation of global agencies
which would produce regulatory and legitimising function is, however, severely constrained
by lack of common ethical and political dimension—a citizenship, a nationhood or similar
“imagined communities” which were shaped in the course of formation of national states. He is
suggesting that very sensitive balancing of globalising economic factors and factors influencing
a formation of trans-national democratic decision-making should be followed. In the latter
case he expects that local and regional issues will play crucial role even if any inter-national
agreements, alliances and coalition in favour of growth of regulatory and legitimising efforts
for global situations should be supported.
2 This formulation is referring to diarchic arrangement of public system with controlling function of state and
activities of political movements at public sphere as formulated by A. Giddens
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The aim of the above-enumerated arguments is to draw attention to the issues of institutions,
their role in governance of current global situations, changing interfaces among them and
trans-formation in their roles and internal structures.
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TIPPING POINT, CRITICAL MASS
AND SOME NEW CONCEPTS
There are a lots of concepts which describe the changes in the course of transformation of
systems. These concepts explain trends and the point from a system changes their behaviour and
qualities. To characterise the transitions and changes we use different concepts: tipping point,
point of no return, critical mass, phase transition, critical poins, self-organized criticality, threshold,
point of inflexion,
The “tipping point” phrase was first used by Morton Grodzins in his analysis and was
published in Scientific American 197 (October 1957) in “Metropolitan segregation”. It become
known in the classic paper of Thomas Schelling, “Dynamic models of segregation” in Journale of
Mathematical Sociology” 1 (1971). Both paper sought to explain the abruptness of white flight
from racially mixed neighborhoods, once a critical number (about 20%) of black people move
in. What’s so counterintuitive about this phenomenon in that a seemingly harmless individual
preference (a slight desire to have some neighbors like yourself) can snowball into drastic and
undesirable socoial outcome (total racial segregation). 1
The wider public first become aware of the concept of the tipping point after publication
Malcolm Gladwell Tipping point. 2 The author provide a lots of examples about abrupt changes
in very different phemomena: in social movements, epidemics, and fads. All phenomena was
dependent on contagion in one form or another. In his book “Six Degrees”. D.J. Watts 3 analise the
mathematics of epidemics, by teh SIR (lossof immunitiy, infection, recovery) model. By describing
the emergence of the logistic growth, displaying the slow-growth, explosive, and burnout phase—he
identify the threshold of an epidemic. These types of critical thresholds are connected to the
concept of phase transition, and also connected to the tipping point. 4
The epidemic’s like changes one can be discovered in the diffusion of new ideas, or new
products also. The Sharp introduced the first low-priced fax machine in 1984 and sold 80,000.
For the next three years the business growth slowly, but steadily. The tipping point of the fax
machines was in 1987—when enough people had faxes, that make sense for everyone to get
a fax—and suddenly was sold more than 1 million fax machine.
The critical mass—based on the dictionaries—minimum weight of fissile material required to
sustain a chain reaction. In the socal sciences the concept of critacal mass is used to describe
the phenomena that in different fields of social life there are a minimal cost, expenditure,
1 Steven Strogatz. Sync. New York 322 pages.
2 Malcolm Gladwell The tipping point. Abacus. 2001.
3 Duncan J. Watts. Six Degrees. (The science of a connected age) W.W. Norton and Company. 2000.
4 Albert-László Barabási. Linked. Perses Publishing. 2002
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attention which maintain a process, or sustain a trend or make possible the continuous work
of an organization. There are some more concepts coming from the phisical sciences—critical
point—which widely used to describe social phenomena.
The critical point describe a certain level of the phase transition. Originaly the Van der
Waals’ theory explained the existence of a critical point at which the liquid and gaseous states of
a substance become indistinguishable. In his book Phipip Ball 5 find that “it is now fashionalbe to
see critical points everywhere... and are at least a good methaphore, and sometimes rather more
than that, for strange combination of unpredictable and the rule-bound that governs much of our
life”. 6
The phenomena of self-organized criticality was discovered by Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Kurt
Wiesenfeld. They analise the behaviour of a pile of sand. Dropping grains of sand one by one
onto a table top. The pile builds up slowly into a little sand mountain. Once the slopes reach
a certain steepness, dropping new grains on top can trigger an avelanche. Before a certain point,
the grains are held in place on the slopes by friction, which prevents them from sliding. Each
avelance releases “tension” in the pile, lowering the angle of the slope and restoring the stability.
But than, as continouosly new grains are addad on the pile, the system newly reaching the point
of self-criticality, and the very next grain could trigger another landside. 7
5 Philip Ball. Critical Mass. William Heinemann: London. 2004.
6 Philip Ball 283. page.
7 Philip Ball. 298. page
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POST SCRIPTUM TO THE REUPUS VOLUME
TWO “EUROPE—THE STRATEGIC CHOICES”
The design of research programmes
in the experience of social sciences
A challenge for our imagination, intellectual capacity
and the will of implementation
I would like to analyze three challenges which are involved in the processes which lead to the
design of a research programme in the field of social sciences:
The challenge of intuition and imagination
The challenge of intellectual capacity
The challenge of implementation
The challenge of intuition and imagination
In the design of a research programme an important role is performed by the artistic spirit
of intuition and imagination. Without this spirit we will not be able to dismantle three barriers
which are blocking the way leading to an really innovative research programme:
1) the barrier of conventional wisdom
2) the barrier of political correctness
3) the barrier of intellectual self-satisfaction
The challenge of intellectual capacity
Intellectual capacity is the key factor in the design of a research programme. The main test
of this capacity is the ability to formulate the proper questions.
In this context it is advisable to quote the following observation of Gunnar Myrdal:
“‘Theory’ in this context means nothing more than a logically correlated system of questions
addressed to the material. It is in the nature of this conception of theory—which will be further
developed in the Prologue—that the author of a theory should not fear, but expect as a perfectly
normal consequence of fresh research, that further insights into various components of the complex
of social interrelationships about which he has tried to inform himself will invalidate his theory,
perhaps in fundamental respects.”
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In order to formulate the proper system of questions we need three elements:
1) “the material”—in other words—the diagnostic knowledge
2) a theoretical framework illuminating the selective process leading towards the proper questions
3) the willingness to reformulate the theory following the results of empirical analysis
I would like to suggest to apply this test of imagination and intellectual capacity—to the
system of questions emerging from the rich content of the Twin Volumes dedicated to the
European Parliament.
In this framework we can also formulate a broader methodological question—how to grasp
the interaction on the axis theoretical reflection versus empirical analysis.
The challenge of the will of implementation
There is no sense to design research programmes without the real prospect and explicit
will of implementation. I am convinced that the broad field of questions created by the
Twin Volumes will promote an intellectual and pragmatic climate leading to feasibility
studies—opening the way to a set of research programmes designed and implemented by an
innovative consortium of outstanding European and American academic institutions.
I hope that this consortium will recognize that the content of RECiFER Eurofutures
Publication Series is providing a new source of inspiration for theoretical and pragmatic
reflections related to the brainstorming topic—“Europe—the global challenges and strategic
choices”.
Warszawa–Nowy S¹cz
November 25th 2004.
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COMMENT ONE
Comments to A. Kuklinski’s paper on “The Design of research in experience of social sci-
ences. A challenge for our imagination, intellectual capacity and the will of implementation.
A note for discussion”.
Professor A. Kukliñski states that there are three challenges which are involved in process of
designing a research program. They embrace: (1) the challenge of intuition and imagination;
(2) the challenge of intellectual capacity; (3) the challenge of implementation. I fully agree
with this. Discussing point one, professor Kukliñski mentions three barriers a) of conventional
wisdom; b) of political correctness; c) of intellectual self-satisfaction. There are additional
barriers worth adding in order to create a full picture of obstacles, which can be involved in the
process. Going further one can include other barriers of: d) departing from a schedule, used by
all or overwhelming majority; e) of being rejected and criticized by forming new ideas; f) of
fame; g) of ability to evaluate the information critically; h) of being different; i) of opposing
and arguing own concept; j) of conformism.
Intellectual capacity enables to formulate proper question what according to professor
A. Kukliñski requires: (1) the material; (2) theoretical framework; (3) the willingness to
reformulate the theory. Generally I agree with this statement but reformulation or formulation
of theory not always is a result of planed activity. In most cases one formulates conclusions
from his observations or forms and proves a thesis without thinking about it as formulation
or reformulation of a theory. This can be so, if one is aimed at rejecting some old views, but
most often new findings are resulted by accidental events or thoroughful observations, which are
made automatically by the observant without any relation to theoretical background.
Next statement: it is not true that one needs always to know all theories in the field to
form a new one replacing or supplementing the former ones. In numerous cases scientists as
well as researches without academic status come to certain conclusions not building upon existing
knowledge but just as a side effect of some other activities. Theoretical background often can
be an obstacle in rejecting the theories, which prevailed in the past and often continue to
function despite the fact that they are far from the real world. In other words real world does
not reflect any more what they state, nor they can be considered as model explaining linkages or
sequences in real world.
Moreover, too often common opinion “forms the reality”, which can be called “virtual”
as it exists only in writing (literature) not in real world. Such option exists often when models
(simplifications) formed for analysis of certain dependencies are taken as reflection of real world.
Often knowledge is binding the thoughts, what creates difficulties to reject theories or
simply ideas. One has to know which model is still adequate to reality and which is not,
where is the false ingredient and where is the proper observation? In my opinion this is the
most difficult part of research as in most cases the approach here is simple: a dogma is a dogma
and one is not able to invent anything better.
Next option with misleading knowledge or information is the approach to ideas (opinions)
given by a person, who has high position in existing hierarchy or is awarded for his/her
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ideas with awards representing different value from award of the minister of science, rector,
international award, ending the list with a Nobel Prize. Often opinion of such person is always
taken for granted, what not always is true. As studies conducted by such a person where
correct, proper and innovative in the time, when they were conducted, what happen 20–30 years
ago. Now rewarded after years they reflect certain status quo from the past but no longer they
are appropriate for current times, as it took too long time to bring the results to public and
award it. In meantime the first link of the research chain, which is the “real world” on which the
research or theory is based has changed dramatically. This happens in case of causing theories
(theories that form conditions and roads of change) or reflection theories (making a photograph
model of exiting dependencies). The conducted studies helped to change the reality but the award
is granted for findings and observations which refer to first stage of research, observations and
findings. This can be considered as form of popularization of the ideas, which cause freezing
of the common knowledge in this field for a while. It is not a case always but quite often. In
this sense knowledge can be considered as condition binding formulation of the new ideas.
Interdisciplinary teams were often used as solution to overcome this specific barrier.
Those who are not able to formulate own ideas are in most cases unable to select with
possessed knowledge information which is real from a false one. In other cases most of the scholars
don’t believe in own capacities to formulate ideas contrasting with those that prevail as approved
by others. In such circumstances it is a question of self-confidence. But also self-confident people
struggle supporting ideas, which not only have passed away, but often when still used they reflect
only a small element of a model economy. Criticized for that (picking wrong citations, ideas) they
defend easily their position with simple statement: this is a quotation after well known “X”, who
is awarded in numerous competitions. The citation comes from a book and was promoted by
leading economic journals and highly ranked professors—may one be wrong in supporting his/her
idea? The answer here is that citation without critical comments is an approval of the statement
contained in the citation, as lack of rejection is approval. It is better to use own knowledge and
intuition, when one is not able to choose which theory continues to bind and which only continues
to exist only thanks to those, who still believe in its correctness and repeat someone’s thoughts.
The final point deals with challenge of the will of implementation. I fully agree but this
opinion does not cover all possible options. Here again, as in case of remaining, listed above
points I will add something. In my opinion we face more challenges here. One can have will of
implementation on the top of fulfilling of the all above mentioned ideas and still will not be able
to form a new approach, following the prevailing opinions. The main problem in this case can be
ascribe to selective knowledge of narrow specialization, what ascribes certain occurrences in the
studied field to old stimulus not seeing that they have disappeared and that other occurrences have
taken place of the old ones that have lost grounds and that the new occurrences cause similar
effects as the old ones. Generally in such case the researcher will be assured that the old theory
is still valid and reflects the reality.
I hope that my comments are clear and they give the real picture of abilities to analyze what
goes on in real world. We have to learn ourselves and teach others how to reject ideas, how to
be critical, how to form own observations, despite that they oppose overwhelming majority and
undermine existing dogmas. Evolution of science is achieved in majority of fields through rejection
and replacement old ideas by new ones. This is in case of ideas which are sensitive to changing
conditions. Other theories bind despite the fact that they are old as they are universal. We have
to choose among temporary, stage theories and those, which prove to be practical and binding
despite changes of some of the conditions. Knowledge in social sciences has to teach us how to
distinguish the first ones from the second ones and how to replace those of temporal character
by new ones also temporary or permanent and universal.
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Any research project in social sciences is a multifaceted task. In this short note I would like
to point out just to four of aspects of academic activity which seem particularly relevant in the
context of reflection on the challenges of research project design. They could be presented as
following four dimensions of social science research projects:
1. The political dimension of social science research
2. The institutional dimension (formal aspects of cooperation)
3. The theory-generation dimension of social science research
4. The description-production dimension on social science research
As I would argue, the aspects I have distinguished are related to the key problems which
should be taken into account in research program design. In the same time they can be
reformulated as dilemmas which have to be addressed during the research programme design.
The more explicitly these dilemmas will be expressed and challenged, the greater the chance that
the process of the research program design will lead to creation of an interesting and innovative
research conception.
The political functions of research programmes
As I would argue, following several well known thinkers, the discourse of social sciences is by
its nature part of the political and ideological discourse of societies they are created in. While the
academic discourse can of course aspire to a non-partisan character, it can hardly be absolutely
non-political and non-ideological. Ideological and political assumptions form the essential part of
the theoretical foundations of any research project in social sciences. Consequently the political
implications of any research, especially of its pragmatics conclusions, are also unavoidable and can
not be ignored. What I consider important in this context, is first of al awarness of this dimension
of the research. It is not always possible or even advisable to make all the ideological assumptions
clearly explicit especially for the wider public. Nevertheless the denial of their existence may have
several negative effects as well. One of the is the danger of one-sidedness of the research steaming
form inability or unwillingness of recognition of plurality of possible approaches to a given issue.
The purposeful or unconscious silencing of the political dimension of research project, especially
in the phase of its design, may also make the much more difficult to overcome the barrier of
political correctness.
On the other hand, hidden politisation of the programme may deter its potential participants
as well as public in the later stage. In the same time, as I would argue, research projects
of openly political character, while generally can be considered controversial, can have a very
important and positive role, not only from the wider social and political point of view. From the
purely academic perspective they may also appear the play the role of very important impulses to
rethinking older schemas. In the same time they may present useful, straightforward approaches
to research problems and above all they themselves make the links between political interests
and ideologies obvious giving a valuable insight into the political dimension of the studied issues,
increasing the level of our own self-reflexivity.
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The institutional functions of research programmes
The institutional dimension of any research programme is often the most important factor
influencing the design of the project. In particular the research projects financed by the European
Union are well know for their absurd domination of institutional requirements of formalized,
bureaucratized ideology of imitative research design over the pragmatic need of making them
relevant, original and cost-effective. One of the fashionable patterns of research programs
supported by many sponsors as the EU, are large research networks which are supposed to
foster international cooperation and innovativeness. As I view it, this insistence on networking
and other forms of centralized research financing is quite often a very negative factor reducing
the effectiveness, competitiveness and in fact often innovativeness of the researchers. The main
capital of any research community, especially in the context of social sciences, seems to lie in the
creative personality of individual researchers. I am deeply convinced that the key question in the
effective research design is the creation of optimal conditions for best individual researchers for
expressing as fully as possible, their creative personalities.
One could propose a large list of suggestions concerning the ways this can be achieved. In
practice, as I would argue, even if institutional functions of the project demand its centralization
and high formalization, much emphasis should be made on non-restricting the creativity of
individual researchers even at the cost of losing full control over the project and its formal
coherence.
The theoretical functions of research programmes
One of the major paradoxes of planning scientific research is that in fact designing a truly
innovative research project is simply impossible. Discoveries and new ideas simply can not be
planned. The real breakthroughs in any discipline are the most unexpected moments of the
creative process. Thus in practice the research project can be either based on the new but already
born idea or just attempt to create conditions for progress without any guarantees for success.
In the first case the project can have a very important function of empirical and theoretical
grounding of an already known but relatively new idea. This function should not be underestimated
as the grounding process is not only important end itself but it may also lead to quite unexpected
results, for example appearing the during empirical verification of the theory or its confrontation
with other theoretical models existing in the same field..
Alternatively, as it was mentioned, the project can be designed as an attempt of constructing
of optimal conditions for creative process in some vaguely defined field. As I would argue, one
of the best designs for such purpose is taking as a starting point a set of clearly contradictory
approaches to a given issue. The contradictions can concern theoretical or empirical dimension but
they can not be trivial. In any case, attempts of overcoming earlier contradictory approaches to
a given problem seems one of the best stimulus for creative solutions. The key creative moments
may consist of reformulation of the research questions. Equally important seems the issue of
the adequacy of the notions used in the theoretical framing of the questions. Their modification,
development or just criticism may appear the lead to the truly innovative approach to a given
problem.
The descriptive functions of research program
While I consider the function of theory development and verification as the key part of the
academic inquiry and see it as the basis of any ambitious research programme, I would not
disregard the descriptive and interpretative functions of social sciences. They can also be labelled
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as the function of “contextualization” of social science. Contextualization can be understood here
as showing selected phenomena in a wider context and “translating” them into a new language.
Showing a wider context of social phenomena is a function of both theoretical that is
academic and social that is political relevance. Ability to see the context in a coherent way also
demands having a good theory. Explaining the context of the other hand is a key social function
of social scientists. It includes first of all showing to their local audiences that the processes they
are witnessing are not unique and have a wider, for example international dimensions. This may
be an important element of helping the societies and in particular their leaders to adapt to the
challenges of social transformations by understanding their more general nature and trans-national
character.
This can be also seen as a part of function of academics as translators. Translation can be
defined here in an abstract way as adapting descriptions of social phenomena to new contexts
and new audiences. Contextualization in this sense can concern reframing the selected discourses
(of rather theoretical or descriptive type) in new theoretical languages. The translation can imply
adapting a given piece of discourse to the language of another academic discipline, explaining issues
to foreign audiences or expressing older visions with the use of other ideological assumptions.
Thus, in view of these needs, the re-contextualization of the social worlds for different audiences or
the descriptive dimension of research in social sciences, as I would argue, should not be dismissed.
A new contextualization of a selected social problem can be considered as a fully justified aim of
a new research problem. In other words, while I consider theory development as the key task of
science, it don’t see its exclusive function which should be included in any research programme.
Conclusions
As I have mentioned, the four above mentioned functions of research projects can be seen as
sources of four fundamental dilemmas. They can be formulated in the following way:
The first one would concern the degree of specification and formal declaration the political
functions and assumptions of the project. On one hand too far reaching openness and regulation
of these issues may restrict the creative process as well as complicate the reception of he project
results in the wider public which usually retains a belief in the idea of non-political social science.
On the other hand the non-recognition of political dimension may result in an even deeper
politicization and one-sidedness of research hidden under the slogans of its objectivity.
The second dilemma lies in the choice between the respect for formal architecture of the
research and necessity of granting maximum freedom for the most creative researchers.
The third dilemma is the dilemma between the coherence of the research plans and the need
for reliance on contradictions as the main engine of creativity. It may also concern the choice of
the research team, which on one hand should be able to cooperate and use a common theoretical
language, but on the other should also consists of researchers of diverse views in order to create
necessary tensions indispensable for a climate of creativity and innovative intellectual debate.
The fourth dilemma is the dilemma between social expectations of theory development and
on the other hand expectation of ‘translating’ and simple descriptive role of the social sciences.
Abandoning ambitious theoretical endeavours when there is a clear view of their achievement can
not be justified by any means. But on the other hand insisting on highly theoretical functions of
the research programme is not always necessary, in particular when the chances for achieving
any special results in this respects are not clear. A highly challenging character of the process
of contextualization of social phenomena should be fully appreciated and seen as a potential key
element of research programmes.
Warszawa, 12 November 2004
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COMMENT THREE
“Idols and Institutes. A few remarks on Antoni Kukliñski’s note on the design of research
programmes in the experience of social sciences. A challenge for our imagination, intellectual
capacity and the will of implementation”.
A few centuries back, in 1620, an English scientist, philosopher and a stateman, Francis
Bacon started to wonder why it was ever so difficult and dangerous to discover and promote
scientific truths. Reflecting upon various aspects and phases of scientific activities, Bacon came to
the conclusion that human progress through science was hindered by four categories of adverse
factors. Interestingly, all of them were related to social nature of human beings1. The factors were
distorting human cognitive potential and the actual process of cognition in a number of ways. He
called the factors by the Greek name of “eidola”, that is, more or less, idols. 2
In Bacon’s view the four categories of “idols”, or distorting factors, could be classified and
described in the following manner:
— 1st category comprised “idols of the tribe”, that is those factors that derived from the
characteristics of human beings as a species;
— 2nd category comprised “idols of the cave”, that is those factors that were related to education
and culture;
— 3rd category comprised “idols of the market”, that is those factors that derived from exchange,
communication and language;
— 4th category comprised “idols of the theatre”, that is those factors that were related to
(prevalent) philosophical doctrines.
Francis Bacon’s typification of “idols” constitutes one of the earliest, and most incisive,
attempts to identify and overcome social limitations and obstacles to do research, produce and
use knowledge in human societies. It is quite intriguing to note that at least three out of the
four categories of idols he described have institutional—and thus self-reproductory—character. In
other words, they are created by recurrent patterns of activities that are believed or intuited to
lower “transaction costs” involved in organizing and executing both collective and individual action
of human beings. Institutions entail a certain regularity and ...inertia. Therefore, in terms of their
impact on knowledge production and implementation, they are a source of both advantages and
disadvantages.
Their main advantages include predictability and stability of organizational and intellectual
frameworks within which the process of cognition may take place. A fair degree of continuity and
cumulation of past experience—called also institutional memory—is strongly related to the stability
1 Ni¿nik J. 1989. Socjologia wiedzy. Zarys historii i problematyki. Warszawa
2 cf. Bacon F. 1955. Novum Organum. Warszawa; Ni¿nik, op.cit.
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of the frameworks. Scientific institutional memory could in turn, as Thomas Kuhn would have it 3,
be partitioned into different paradigms that prescribe procedures by which new knowledge may
be efficiently produced. This is however also the point at which disadvantages of institutional
frameworks might enter the stage.
“Transaction-friendly”, ordered by paragons of scientific virtues, and colonized by dominant
political credo’s, scientific institutional memory (usually), in time, becomes over-routinized, rigid
and insulated from challenges posed by ever chanaging reality. The vices of “conventional(ized)
wisdom”, “political correctness” and “intellectual self-satisfaction”, named by Kukliñski, creep in4.
In such circumstances, indeed, the design of innovative research programmes capable of making
a breakthrough could seem but a long-lost skill. Dedicated scientists cannot and need not, however,
be utter pessimists.
One reason for reasoned hope have already been offered by Kuhn: sooner or later a number of
anomalies inexplicable by current scientific standards appears, which makes (some) scientists have
second thoughts on the dominat—institutionalized—scientific paradigm. It takes an individual or
a group of researchers to rebel against the dominant paradigm, make a scientific revolution (and
start ...institutionalizing a new dominant paradigm). The revolutionary pattern may not be entirely
applicable to social sciences, as Kuhn’s readers certainly know. Nevertheless, it points to one
of the modes in which an institutional stalemate might be broken and overcome as far as the
production of knowledge and its implementation are concerned.
Another, much more peaceful in nature, reason for being a bit more optimistic about the
future of research programmes could be found in the success of the formula of intellectual
exchange created by Antoni Kukliñski himself and Krzysztof Paw³owski. Offering to the Reader,
the first twin volumes of the RECiFER Eurofutures Publication Series which are “dedicated to
the European Parliament to promote brainstorming reflection illuminating the global challenges
and strategic choices emerging in the European intellectual and political landscape of the XXI
century”, the two editors are actualy co-responsible for instituting a flexible, voluntary mode of
scientific inquiry and exchange.
“The editorial process of the preparation of the two volumes was a beneficiary of the
intellectual capacity and good will of 60 eminent personalities from 14 European countries”, they
profess in the Foreword. The twin volumes were thus “built on the foundation of the pluralistic
philosophy open to Authors representing different academic and political value judgments. This
is the only way to promote an open-minded discussion related to the Future of Europe.” Indeed,
as it seems, building world-wide research communities, which consist of individuals drawn from
a variety of institutional settings and represent a variety of scientific paradigms might be taken
as a way to reinforce and widen global intellectual circles.
Moreover, it might also trigger an intellectual breakthrough that is needed if the design
of research programmes is to overcome the three generic barriers to produce and implement
new knowledge listed by Kukliñski in his note “The design of research programmes in the
experience of social sciences. A challenge for our imagination, intellectual capacity and the will of
implementation”. On the occasion of the twin volumes, for instance, several tens of intellectuals,
scientists, policy-makers and businessmen, coming from different countries, have formed a virtual
global institute where European and global issues are raised, critically discussed and commented
upon by members who, more often than not, have never met in person.
3 Kuhn T. 2001. Struktura rewolucji naukowych. Warszawa
4 K. ¯ukrowska’s and T. Zarycki’s comments to Kukliñski’s note on the design of resarch problems (this volume)
develop the issue in detail.
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The publication of the Twin Volumes should be seen not as an end but as a beginning of
a new stream of theoretical, methodological, and pragmatic reflection being an holistic inquiry
into the history and the Future of Europe. The panorama of problems and issues which can be
discussed in this context is very broad and comprehensive.
To start this brainstorming intellectual venture let us mention only three topics:
1) the identification, analysis, and evaluation of the turning points in the historical and prospective
experiences of Europe in the years 1950–2050,
2) the development of a new substantive and methodological structure of a challenging field
which can be called—“The New Futurology for Europe”. We should be not afraid to use
the term “futurology” in relation to the European experiences. Just the opposite—this field
should be promoted very strongly using both cognitive and pragmatic motivations.
3) The design and implementation of a grand European research Programme—“Europe—the
global challenges and strategic choices”.
The Twin Volumes supply a rich set of contributions which are direct inputs into the processes
of formulation and implementation of this Grand Programme. Our Mind and Will should transform
these inputs into an brilliant output—the Programme:
“Europe—the global challenges and strategic choices”.
* * *
It is a great laudatio to see in the network of cooperation of sixty Personalities—the authors
of the Twin Volumes—a sui generis virtual global institute functioning without the traditional
privilege of a face to face contact in the form of a conventional conference creating the background
for a post-conference volume. I think however that in the near future after the publication of
the Twin Volumes we should try to organize a conference: “Europe—the global challenges and
strategic choices”.
We can expect that the intellectual and pragmatic output of this Conference will be very
significant for the spirit and matter of the holistic inquiry into the Future of Europe and for the
promotion of the concept of the New Futurology. The Conference could provide a big push for the
development of ideas, approaches, and proposals presented in the Twin Volumes.
Nowy S¹cz – Warszawa, February 6th 2005.
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